ORDER Heard Sri Durgesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Madan Prasad Singh, learned counsel who has appeared on behalf of respondent no. 1/claimant and Sri Ranjan Kumar Jha, learned counsel who has appeared on behalf of respondent no. 2/owner of the offending vehicle. 2. The present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “M.V.Act”) has been preferred against an order dated 08-02-2012 passed by Addl. District Judge (FTC-I)-cum-Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Jamui (hereinafter referred to as “Tribunal”) in Claim Case No. 7 of 2007, whereby petition filed on behalf of claimant under Section 140 of the M.V.Act has been allowed and direction has been given to the appellant to pay Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand), as no fault claim. 3. Short fact of the case is that on 11-05-2007, son of respondent no. 1/claimant, while moving on a bicycle, was dashed by a tractor. In the said accident, the son of respondent no. 1 died and thereafter, in the year 2007, a claim petition under Section 166 of the M.V.Act was filed. In the said case, one another petition under Section 140 of the M.V.Act was filed seeking direction for payment of interim compensation. Before the Tribunal, the insurer filed written statement and raised objection on the point that forged insurance policy has been brought by the claimant. However, the learned Tribunal, by order dated 08-02-2012, allowed the petition filed by the claimant and directed the appellant to pay Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand), as interim compensation, which has been assailed in the present appeal. 4. Sri Duresh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, assailing the order of the Tribunal, submits that it is true that while considering a petition under Section 140 of the M.V.Act, there is no requirement of detailed inquiry, but at the same time, it was necessary for the Tribunal to notice the objection raised by the appellant, regarding forged insurance policy of offending vehicle. He further submits that in support of the stand of the insurance company that vehicle in question was not at all under insurance cover of the appellant, number of documents were brought on record by the insurer, even then, the Tribunal, ignoring the same, has passed the order and directed the appellant to pay the aforesaid amount, as interim compensation. He further submits that in support of the stand of the insurance company that vehicle in question was not at all under insurance cover of the appellant, number of documents were brought on record by the insurer, even then, the Tribunal, ignoring the same, has passed the order and directed the appellant to pay the aforesaid amount, as interim compensation. He submits that since vehicle in question was not at all under insurance cover of the appellant, the appellant may not be liable to pay any compensation amount. 5. Sri Madan Prasad Singh, learned counsel for respondent no. 1/claimant has opposed the prayer of the appellant. He submits that at the time of hearing of a petition under Section 140 of the M.V.Act, it was not at all necessary for the Tribunal to examine in detail regarding the veracity of the insurance policy, which was brought on record on behalf of the claimant. He submits that such fact can be examined in the main petition, which has been filed under Section 166 of the M.V.Act on behalf of the claimant. Alternatively, he has argued that even in the event the insurance company is exonerated, the claimant is required to be compensated by owner of the offending vehicle, who had not appeared before the Tribunal, but before this Court, the owner has already appeared. 6. Sri Ranjan Kumar Jha, learned counsel for respondent no. 2/owner of the offending vehicle, supporting the stand of the claimant, submits that offending vehicle was under insurance cover of the appellant. 7. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have also perused the materials available on record, particularly; lower court record, which was summoned in the present case. On perusal of the same, it is evident that in the written statement, which was filed by the insurer/appellant, a specific plea was taken that vehicle in question was not under insurance cover, rather statement has been made that fake insurance policy has been brought on record by the claimant. Fact remains that the owner though has appeared in the present appeal, had not appeared before the Tribunal. In view of the stand taken by the insurance company before the Tribunal, owner would be the best person to support the stand as to whether his vehicle was under insurance cover or not. 8. Fact remains that the owner though has appeared in the present appeal, had not appeared before the Tribunal. In view of the stand taken by the insurance company before the Tribunal, owner would be the best person to support the stand as to whether his vehicle was under insurance cover or not. 8. In view of the fact that once specific plea was taken that vehicle was not under insurance cover of the appellant, even though, deft inquiry was not required to be done at the moment, the Tribunal at the same time was not required to ignore the written statement filed by the appellant. The Tribunal was also required to examine the documents, which were brought on record by the insurance company. On perusal of the order impugned, the Court is satisfied that no such effort was taken by the Tribunal and in perfunctory manner, the appellant has been directed to pay the interim compensation. 9. Accordingly, order impugned i.e. order dated 08-02-2012 passed in Claim Case No. 7 of 2007 is, hereby, set aside and matter is remitted back to the court below with a direction to proceed with the Claim Case No. 7 of 2007 for its expeditious disposal. While proceeding with the main case, the Tribunal is required to take up the matter at least twice in a week. Since, owner of the offending vehicle has already appeared before this Court, the owner is directed to appear before the Tribunal forthwith. 10. With above observation and direction, the appeal stands allowed. 11. Accordingly, the statutory amount, which was deposited at the time of filing of the present appeal, is directed for its return to the appellant.