JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant-defendants are aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15.3.2005 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No. 1, Alwar, and by the judgment and decree dated 30.3.2010 passed by Additional District Judge No. 2, Alwar. By the former judgment and decree the learned Magistrate had decreed the suit for eviction filed by the respondent-plaintiff. By the latter judgment and decree the learned Judge had upheld the judgment and decree dated 15.3.2005 passed by the learned Magistrate. Hence this second appeal before this Court. 2. Ms. Sangeeta Sharma, the learned counsel for respondent, has raised the preliminary objection that the case is entirely based on questions of fact. Therefore, no substantial question of law arises in the second appeal. Hence this second appeal is not maintainable under the Code of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Mathur, the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has contended that substantial questions of law do arise. Therefore, the present appeal is maintainable. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused both the impugned judgments. 4. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment dated 15.3.2005 clearly reveals that Jagdish Prasad had instituted a suit for eviction and for mandatory injunction. According to Jagdish Prasad, he had bought a plot situated in khasra No. 427 ad measuring 1 bigha 8 biswa, which he had bought from his own personal income. Subsequently, the said plot was converted into a residential plot. He had constructed a room on the said plot. Thereafter, dispute arose within his full family. However, considering the difficulty faced by his own son, Hukam Chand, the appellant before this Court, his father permitted him to stay in his house as a licensee. However, when dispute arose between him and his son, the appellant, he sought the eviction of his son. However, the appellant refused to do so. Hence the civil suit. 5. Upon the evidence produced by he parties, the learned Trial Court framed six issues including the issue of relief. Issue No.1 was whether the plot and the house was bought by the plaintiff with his own personal money or not? Issue No.2 was whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the defendant evicted from the property or not? Obviously both these issues are questions of fact. Both these issues were decided by the learned Trial Court in favour of respondent-plaintiff. Issue No.2 was whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the defendant evicted from the property or not? Obviously both these issues are questions of fact. Both these issues were decided by the learned Trial Court in favour of respondent-plaintiff. Therefore, by judgment dated 15.3.2005 the suit was decreed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Both these issues were again adjudicated upon by the regular first appellate court. As mentioned above the learned Judge confirmed the finding of the learned Trial Court. Thus, there are concurrent findings of both the learned courts below on questions of facts, in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Hence the entire case is based on merely questions of fact. 6. A three-Judges-Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bholaram v. Ameerchand [ (1981) 2 SCC 414 ] , considered the effect of amendment made in Section 100 of the CPC in 1976, and held as under: "......The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law." 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ramaswamy Kalingaryar v. Mathayan Padayachi, AIR 1992 SC 115 , while considering the scope of Section 100 CPC, held as under: "......Suggested shortcomings in the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below would not alter the situation that those were findings of facts, unquestionable, under the provisions of Section 100, C.P.C., which defines the contours of the power of the High Court in second appeal. ....." 8. ....." 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others, [ (2007) 1 SCC 546 ] , considered the true import, scope and ambit of Section 100 CPC by referring the Section 100 CPC, before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under: "81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs." 9. The Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali, reported in [ (2010) 12 SCC 740 ] , held that a second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. The High Court should not entertain a second appeal unless it raises a substantial question of law. It is obligation on the court of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. 10. The Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitri Bai Sopan Gujar, [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] , has held that the second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. It is obligation on the court of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. 10. The Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitri Bai Sopan Gujar, [ (1999) 3 SCC 722 ] , has held that the second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. 11. Thus, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. This appeal being devoid of any merit is, hereby, dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******