Judgment L. Narasimha Reddy, J. This Letters Patent Appeal is being decided after remand by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It arises out of O.S.No.1110 of 1981 on the file of the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The facts, in brief, are as under: For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as arrayed in the suit. One Ganesh Lal and his wife Sharbati Bai had four sons, viz., Brij Mohan, Shambudayal Gupta, Jagadish Pershad and Omprakash Gupta. Sharbati Bai purchased a house near Charkaman, Hyderabad through sale deed dated 02-09-1960 (Ex.A-28) from her close relation, by name, Gilli Bai. The plaintiff, Smt. Sharada Bai, wife of the youngest son, Sri Omprakash Gupta is said to have purchased the suit schedule property through two sale deeds dated 05-12-1980 (Ex.A-3) and 04-06-1981 (Ex.A-4) from her mother-in-law, Sharbati Bai. According to her, there are three tenants in the premises but the wife and son of her brother-in-law, Mohan Gupta have trespassed into the property covered by Ex.A-3. She filed the suit for declaration of title in respect of plaint ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties; recovery of plaint ‘A’ schedule, perpetual injunction in respect of plaint ‘B’ schedule, and for recovery of damages @ Rs.6,000/- per month from the date of filing of the suit, and @ Rs.2,000/- per month prior to the filing of the suit. The plaintiff pleaded that the suit schedule was the self-acquisition of her mother-in-law Sharbati Bai, and that she has purchased the same for valuable consideration under Exs.A-3 and A-4. She pleaded that neither defendants 1 and 2, nor any other members of the family have any right over the property. The suit was contested by the defendants 1 and 2. They pleaded that the property was actually purchased by Sri Ganesh Lal with the joint family funds. According to them, the joint family had extensive properties, including business in agriculture, rice mill and jewellery, and part of the income therefrom was utilized in purchasing the property. The suit was contested by the defendants 1 and 2. They pleaded that the property was actually purchased by Sri Ganesh Lal with the joint family funds. According to them, the joint family had extensive properties, including business in agriculture, rice mill and jewellery, and part of the income therefrom was utilized in purchasing the property. It was pleaded that one of the sons by name, Jagadish Pershad filed O.S.No.1380 of 1978 in the Court of III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for perpetual injunction in respect of the present suit schedule property against his mother, Sharbati Bai and husband of the plaintiff, Omprakash Gupta and in the said suit, a compromise was entered into wherein Sharbati Bai kept for herself life-estate vis-à-vis the suit schedule property and vested remainder in favour of her four sons, and in that view of the matter, the so-called sale in favour of the plaintiff is untenable. The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment dated 25-09-1987. It was declared that the plaintiff has title to the suit property. The eviction of defendants 1 and 2 from plaint ‘A’ schedule property was ordered and perpetual injunction in relation to ‘B’ schedule was granted. However, the relief of recovery of damages and future rents was denied. The defendants 1 and 2 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendants’) filed C.C.C.A.No.1 of 1992 before this Court against the judgment and decree in the suit. A learned single Judge of this Court took the view that the sale deed, Exs. A-3 and A-4 are valid and genuine and that the compromise entered into in O.S.No.1380 of 1978 is not binding upon Sharbati Bai. However, it was held that the suit schedule property is the joint family property of Ganesh Lal and his sons, and that Sharbati Bai did not have valid title to execute Exs.A-3 and A-4. The plaintiff filed the present L.P.A., against the findings of the learned single Judge in relation to the nature of the suit schedule property, and right of Sharbati Bai, to sell the property to the plaintiff. Defendants, on the other hand, filed L.P.A.266 of 1999, feeling aggrieved by the findings in relation to the genuinity of the sale transactions and the binding nature of the compromise, in O.S.No.1380 of 1978. Defendants, on the other hand, filed L.P.A.266 of 1999, feeling aggrieved by the findings in relation to the genuinity of the sale transactions and the binding nature of the compromise, in O.S.No.1380 of 1978. A Division Bench of this Court upheld the findings of the learned single Judge about the sale deeds, but reversed the findings in relation to the nature of the suit schedule property and the right of Sharbati Bai to execute the sale deeds. Since all the findings went against the defendants, they filed Civil Appeal Nos.7153 and 7154 of 2003 against the decrees in both the L.P.As. Through its order dated 11-08-2010, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set aside the judgment rendered in the L.P.As and remanded the matter to this Court. It was observed that the discussion undertaken on the question as to whether Sharbati Bai was possessed of independent resources and whether the acquisition of the suit schedule property was out of those resources was not adequate. Accordingly the matter was remanded for fresh consideration and disposal. Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff submits that the plaintiff has her own independent sources of income and purchased the suit schedule property with the same. He contends that the occasion to invoke or apply the presumption about the nature of the properties in relation to a joint family, would arise only vis-à-vis the coparceners. He submits that though it is well-settled that, if it is proved that there existed a joint family nucleus, sufficient to acquire an item of property, the burden, to prove that an item of property was acquired with the funds of a coparcener, who claims the property exclusively to himself and on such proof, it cannot be treated as joint family property and this cannot be applied to a person who is not a coparcener. He submits that Sharbati Bai was not a coparcener of the joint family and the suit property was not part of the coparcenery. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of the High Courts of Patna, Madras and Orissa in Yugal Kishore Sinha v. Nagendra Prasad Yadav AIR 1964 Patna 543, Nagayasami Naidu and others v. Kochadai Naidu AIR 1969 Madras 329and Smt Manohari Devi and others v. Choudhury Sibanava Das and others AIR 1983 Orissa 135in support of his contention. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of the High Courts of Patna, Madras and Orissa in Yugal Kishore Sinha v. Nagendra Prasad Yadav AIR 1964 Patna 543, Nagayasami Naidu and others v. Kochadai Naidu AIR 1969 Madras 329and Smt Manohari Devi and others v. Choudhury Sibanava Das and others AIR 1983 Orissa 135in support of his contention. He submits that once it is not disputed that the suit property was purchased in the name of Sharbati Bai, the burden rested squarely upon defendants to establish that it was a benami transaction, and not upon the plaintiff to prove that Sharbati Bai had her own funds to purchase the property. Arguments on behalf of the plaintiff on other aspects were supplemented by the learned counsel Sri J. Prabhakar. He submits that the record discloses that Sharbati Bai owned properties such as a rice mill, and other sources of income, and it cannot be said that there was anything unnatural about her acquiring the suit property. He submits that the trial Court as well as the learned single Judge of this Court have correctly taken the view that the compromise decree in O.S.No.1380 of 1978 is inadmissible in evidence, since it was not registered, as required under law. Learned counsel further submits that the fact that the permission to construct new building after the suit property was purchased in 1960, was obtained in the name of Sharbati Bai, and absence of any evidence to show that the construction was made with the aid of the funds of the family would establish that the suit schedule property was owned, exclusively by Sharbati Bai. Other contentions are also urged. Sri M.R.K. Chowdary, learned Senior Counsel for the defendants submits that though Sharbati Bai cannot be strictly treated as a member of the joint family, any property acquired in her name, with the funds of the joint family, would certainly make it available for partition among the coparceners. He submits that Sharbati Bai was not possessed of independent resources of income, sufficient to purchase the suit schedule property, and it was only with the funds of the joint family, that it was purchased. He submits that Sharbati Bai was not possessed of independent resources of income, sufficient to purchase the suit schedule property, and it was only with the funds of the joint family, that it was purchased. He contends that it was admitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the rice mill, which was said to have been owned by Sharbati Bai, has fallen to the share of Shambu Dayal Gupta, one of her sons, and that itself would show that the rice mill itself was owned by the joint family, notwithstanding the fact that it was in the name of Sharbati Bai. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that the husband of the plaintiff brought into existence Exs.A-3 and A-4 by misleading or coercing Sharbati Bai and the very fact that she was not examined though she was alive, not only through out the pendency of the suit, but also long thereafter, would disclose that the plaintiff was afraid that truth would come out if Sharbati Bai is examined as a witness. He contends that the compromise decree passed in a suit is certainly admissible in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of registration, and even otherwise, the contents thereof can be taken note of, by applying the principle underlying proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. He too placed reliance upon quite large number of precedents. As observed earlier, this matter is heard at length, after remand. Though the observation of the Supreme Court was only in relation to the finding about the possession of funds by Sharbati Bai, arguments are advanced on all facts and relevant law. The trial Court framed four issues for consideration, viz., 1. Whether the sale deeds dt.5-12-1980 and 4-6-1981 are true, valid and binding? 2. Whether the defendants trespassed into the suit building on 1-7-81 and whether the plaintiff’s entitled to receive the costs? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of title, permanent injunction and damages as claimed? 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable without relief to avoid the compromise in O.S.No.1380/78 on the file of the III Asst. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad? On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-47 were filed. On behalf of the defendants DWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-4 were filed. Exs. C-1 to C-7 and Ex.X-1 were also taken on record. The suit was decreed. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad? On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-47 were filed. On behalf of the defendants DWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-4 were filed. Exs. C-1 to C-7 and Ex.X-1 were also taken on record. The suit was decreed. In C.C.C.A.1 of 1992, a learned single Judge framed the following points for consideration: 1. Whether the agreement of sale Ex.A2 and sale deeds Exs.A3 and A4 are valid or sham or nominal? 2. Whether the suit property is the joint family property of Ganeshlal and his sons or the self-acquired property of Smt.Sharbati Bai? 3. Whether Sharbati Bai could convey valid title under Exs.A3 and A4 in favour of the plaintiff? 4. Whether the compromise entered into in O.S.1380/78 is hit by Sec.17 of the Registration Act and the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act and is not binding upon Sharbati Bai? While points 1 and 4 were answered against the plaintiff, points 2 and 3 were answered in her favour. In view of the elaborate submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties, and the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while remanding the matter, we find that the following points arise for consideration: a) Whether Sharbati Bai was possessed of sufficient funds to purchase the suit schedule property through Ex.A-28, dated 02-09-1960; b) Whether Sharbati Bai treated the suit schedule property as her exclusive one or as part of the joint family property of her sons and husband; c) Whether the sale of the suit schedule property through Exs.A-3 and A-4 is valid and legal; and d) Whether the decree passed by the trial Court and upheld by the learned single Judge of this Court can be sustained in law. Before the commencement of arguments in this L.P.A., the defendants have withdrawn L.P.A.226 of 1999. On behalf of plaintiffs, it is urged that such withdrawal would disable the defendants from contesting the other L.P.A. That contention is taken up at the outset. The judgment rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court in C.C.C.A.No.1 of 1992 gave rise to two L.P.As, i.e. 166 of 1998 and 226 of 1999. On behalf of plaintiffs, it is urged that such withdrawal would disable the defendants from contesting the other L.P.A. That contention is taken up at the outset. The judgment rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court in C.C.C.A.No.1 of 1992 gave rise to two L.P.As, i.e. 166 of 1998 and 226 of 1999. While the plaintiff filed C.C.C.A.No.166 of 1998, feeling aggrieved by the findings on points 2 and 3, the defendants filed L.P.A.No.266 of 1999 assailing the findings on points 1 and 4. This is not a case where two appeals arose out of two separate proceedings, decided through a common judgment. If the appeals have arisen out of separate decrees passed in different appeals, albeit, through a common judgment, the dismissal of one such appeal or failure to file an appeal even where it was necessary, would attract the principle underlying Section 11 of C.P.C., and would adversely affect the other appeals. That is not the case here. Further if some of the findings in a judgment rendered by a Court are against a particular party, it can canvass the correctness thereof before an appellate forum, if an appeal is fled by the other party. Rule 33 of Order 41 C.P.C., confers power on the Appellate Court, in this behalf. It is not necessary that the party who felt aggrieved only by certain observations, and not the final result, must file an appeal. For all practical purposes, filing of L.P.A.No.266 of 1999 was superfluous. Without even filing cross-objections, defendants could have challenged the findings on points 1 and 2 in C.C.C.A.No.1 of 1992. Therefore, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff cannot be sustained. Points (a) & (b): The entire controversy revolves around the question as to whether the Sharbati Bai in whose name the suit schedule property was purchased, was possessed of adequate funds. As submitted by Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel, there is phenomenal difference in the context of placing of burden in relation to an issue, as to whether a particular item of property, is held by the joint family or exclusively by a member thereof. As submitted by Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned Senior Counsel, there is phenomenal difference in the context of placing of burden in relation to an issue, as to whether a particular item of property, is held by the joint family or exclusively by a member thereof. The judgment of the Privy Council in Appalaswami v. Suryanarayanamurti and others AIR (34) 1947 Privy Council 189, and that of the Supreme Court in Mudigowda Gowdappa Sankh and others v. Ramchandra Revgowda Sankh AIR 1969 SC 1076 arose out of the suits for partition, and there was no dispute that the parties thereto were coparceners. The same principle cannot be applied, in a case where the plea as to exclusive ownership is taken by a person, who is not a coparcener. Reference in this context may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Rao AIR 1985 SC 716 . The following observation in Mayne’s Hindu Law was quoted with approval: “264. It is evident that there can be no limit to the number of persons of whom a Hindu joint family consists, or to the remoteness of their descent from the common ancestor, and consequently to the distance of their relationship from each other. But the Hindu coparcenary is a much narrower body…….For, coparcenary in the Mitakshara law is not identical with coparcenary as understood in English law : when a member of a joint family dies, “his right accrusces to the other members by survivorship, but if a coparcener dies, his or her right does not accrue to the other coparceners, but goes to his or her own heirs”. When we speak of a Hindu joint family as constituting a coparcenary, we refer not to the entire number of persons who can trace descent from a common ancestor, and amongst whom no partition has ever taken place; we include only those persons who, by virtue of relationship, have the right to enjoy and hold the joint property, to restrain the acts of each other in respect of it, to burden it with their debts, and at their pleasure to enforce its partition. Outside this body, there is a fringe of persons possessing only inferior rights such as that of maintenance, which however tend to diminish as the result of reforms in Hindu law by legislation.” More often than not, a joint family, which comprises of several male and female members with close relationship is treated as synonymous with coparcenary. The use of the expression i.e. “joint family” to all such entities some times blurs the subtle distinction. Though the practice of referring to a joint family in its strict sense and a coparcenary with that expression cannot be found fault with; at least, in the context of partition, a restricted approach is warranted. It is only such persons, who are conferred with the right to a share in the joint family properties and who can seek partition, that can be treated as members of the joint family, whenever an issue pertaining division of the properties arises. Under Hindu Law, such persons are treated as coparceners. In the other instances, joint family can take in its fold, not only the coparceners, but also others, outside the frame, depending upon the proximity of relationship. For instance, though the mother of an individual cannot be treated as a coparcener, she is certainly be treated as a member of the joint family, in the ordinary parlance. It is quite possible to argue that not being a coparcener of the joint family in its strict sense, Sharbati Bai did not owe explanation to anyone, as to how she acquired the suit schedule property. However, we refrain from undertaking any discussion in this behalf, in view of the specific observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while remanding the matter. The relevant portion reads: “…The learned Single Judge had proceeded on the basis that the presumption regarding the joint family character of the property had remained unrebutted for no evidence to displace the presumption had been led. But the Division Bench has not satisfactorily dealt with that aspect, while taking a contrary view. We are not inclined in these appeals to reappraise the evidence to determine whether or not Sharbati Bai possessed any independent resources and whether the acquisition in question was made out of those resources. But the Division Bench has not satisfactorily dealt with that aspect, while taking a contrary view. We are not inclined in these appeals to reappraise the evidence to determine whether or not Sharbati Bai possessed any independent resources and whether the acquisition in question was made out of those resources. In our opinion remand of the matter back to the High Court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law is a better course…” From this, it is evident that Their Lordships wanted this Court to decide, whether Sharbati Bai was possessed of independent resources, that enabled her to purchase the suit schedule property. The best person to speak about this was, Sharbati Bai herself. Not only in this context, but also from the point of view of proving Exs.A-3 and A-4, her evidence was material. The plaintiff did not enter the witness box. Sharbati Bai was alive till the year 1991, i.e. for full length of the pendency of the suit, and part of the pendency of CCCA No.1 of 1992. Failure on the part of the plaintiff to examine Sharbati Bai gives a scope for drawing inference, provided for under law. Throughout the length and breadth of the oral evidence, adduced by the plaintiff, extensive reference was made to the various steps taken by Sharbati Bai. It was mentioned that, she had a rice mill and the income derived therefrom was utilized in purchasing the suit schedule property. The defendants, on the other hand, pleaded that the said rice mill, though was standing in the name of Sharbati Bai, was owned by the joint family. One of the undisputed facts is that, out of the four brothers, Shambu Dayal Guptha started living separately from 1964 onwards. At more places than one, it was mentioned that he was given his share of property in 1964 itself. In the cross-examination of DW-2, the 1st defendant, the following suggestion was made on behalf of the plaintiff: “…The Rice Mill of Shamshirgunj was also in the name of my mother in law. I do not know if my mother in law gave Rice mill to Shambu dayal in 1964 when he insisted……I do not know if Sharbathi Bai was having income from her lands in village. It is not true to suggest that Sharbathi Bai was having gold, jewellery and income and that she had capacity to purchase the land. I do not know if my mother in law gave Rice mill to Shambu dayal in 1964 when he insisted……I do not know if Sharbathi Bai was having income from her lands in village. It is not true to suggest that Sharbathi Bai was having gold, jewellery and income and that she had capacity to purchase the land. It is not true to suggest that Sharbathi Bai constructed the suit house with her own funds…” It needs to be noted that the so-called giving of the Rice Mill was neither through gift, nor through other modes of transfer. If it was given towards the share of Shambu Dayal Gupta, it obviously means that though the mill stood in the name of Sharbati Bai, it was treated as the one, owned by the joint family. Though it was mentioned that Sharbati Bai had lands also, no evidence in that behalf was adduced. The effort of an individual to speak about the income or assets of a third party has its own limitations. If such third party is not available to speak, one has only to wander in the realm of speculation, for want of exact information. However, if such third party is very much available, but the person adducing evidence to discharge the burden in this behalf fails to examine the third party, a presumption provided for under Section 114 of the Evidence Act deserves to be drawn. One strong circumstance, which has some relevance to point (d) is that in O.S.No.1380 of 1978 filed by one of the sons of Sharbati Bai, a compromise was entered into. PW-1 herein i.e. the husband of the plaintiff, and Sharbati Bai were parties to that suit. The compromise decree that was passed in, in that suit (Ex.B-2) contained the following clause, in relation to the suit schedule property: “Clause (e) ...House No.21-2-131/7 to 9 Charkaman shall belong to and in possession of Sharbathi bai and Jamunabai and they shall have life interest in this house. They shall be entitled to receive benefits with enjoyment for their lifes time in this house. They shall be entitled for the possession of the said house and to utilize the rents of this house till their respective life time. After their death the would be wife of Jagmohan Alias Anil Kumar shall become absolute owner of the said property. They shall be entitled to receive benefits with enjoyment for their lifes time in this house. They shall be entitled for the possession of the said house and to utilize the rents of this house till their respective life time. After their death the would be wife of Jagmohan Alias Anil Kumar shall become absolute owner of the said property. However in the event of the no marriage took place of Sri Jagmohan alias Anil Kumar or the marriage if dissolved or death of his wife, the said Jagmohan alias Anil Kumar shall become absolute owner of the said property exclusively. Shambudayal Gupta, Jagdishprashad and Omprakash Gupta shall have no interest or rights or any kind whatsoever in the said house…” The admissibility of the compromise decree would be dealt with while discussing point (d) in detail. In case Sharbati Bai was the absolute owner of the property, there was no question of her relinquishing the rights in favour of third parties, in the manner indicated in the above paragraphs. The plaintiff did not examine any witness, closely associated with the income or administration of properties of her mother-in-law, Sharbati Bai. PW-1 is the husband of the plaintiff, and he did not speak of any independent resources of his mother. PW-2 is one of the tenants. His evidence is only to the effect that his tenancy was attorned to the plaintiff. PW-3 is none other than the brother of the plaintiff. When neither plaintiff nor Sharbati Bai were examined to speak about the income of Sharbati Bai, it is difficult to conclude that she possessed of resources to purchase the property. Added to that, the joint family comprising of the husband and sons of Sharbati Bai possessed adequate resources from agriculture and business. The manner in which Sharbati Bai acted, vis-à-vis the properties, that were standing in her name i.e., a rice mill in Shamshirgunj and suit schedule property would clearly disclose that she did not exercise rights of exclusive ownership over them and on the other hand, treated them as the properties held by the joint family. Points (a) and (b) are accordingly answered against the plaintiff. Point (c): At least after the matter was remanded, no effort was made by the plaintiff to place any material before this Court, to establish that her vendor was possessed of adequate properties. Points (a) and (b) are accordingly answered against the plaintiff. Point (c): At least after the matter was remanded, no effort was made by the plaintiff to place any material before this Court, to establish that her vendor was possessed of adequate properties. It has already been mentioned that the various acts and omissions on the part of the Sharbati Bai indicated that she never exercised absolute rights of ownership over the suit schedule property. Once it is held that Sharbati Bai did not possess adequate resources to purchase the property, the inescapable conclusion is that it was purchased in her name by her husband Ganesh Lal with the funds of the joint family. Added to that, she sacrificed whatever rights she had in it, through the compromise, evidenced through Ex.B-2, which was long prior to the execution of Exs.A-3 and A-4 in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, no valid title can be said to have been transferred by Sharbati Bai, in favour of the plaintiff, vis-à-vis the suit schedule property. Point (d): The defendants intended to rely upon Ex.B-2, a memorandum of compromise, in O.S.No.1380 of 1978. That was filed for the relief of injunction. However, as between the members of the same family, several other proceedings ensued. With the intervention of some of the well-wishers, a compromise was brought, to put an end to all the proceedings, including a criminal complaint filed by one of the sons of Ganesh Lal and Sharbati Bai against his brothers. PW-1 herein, who figured as a party to that suit, did not dispute the truth of Ex.B-2. On the other hand, he made extensive reference to it in his deposition. The objection raised by the plaintiff is that Ex.B-2 cannot be received in evidence, for want of registration. The objection may hold good, if any rights are claimed by the parties to Ex.B-2, on that basis. The limited purpose for which it was filed was, to demonstrate that Sharbati Bai ceased to be the owner of the suit property by the time, she executed Exs.A-3 and A-4. Even if there exists any prohibition in law, as to the admissibility of Ex.B-2 for want of registration, it can certainly be looked into, for collateral purposes, under proviso to Section 49. The defendants are not claiming any rights under Ex.B-2. Added to that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mst. Even if there exists any prohibition in law, as to the admissibility of Ex.B-2 for want of registration, it can certainly be looked into, for collateral purposes, under proviso to Section 49. The defendants are not claiming any rights under Ex.B-2. Added to that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mst. Subhadra v. Narsaji Chenaji Marwadi AIR 1966 SC 806 would apply to the facts of the case, if only any rights under the deed of compromise are sought to be enforced. Once the document is filed by a person who is not a party to such decree, that too for a collateral purpose, it cannot be said to be inadmissible. For the foregoing reasons, the L.P.A. is dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.