JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J.:- All the four writ petitions, noted above, were taken up together for hearing and disposal at the admission stage itself on the prayer of learned counsel of both side considering that the matters were urgent, since it involves disqualification of elected members of a particular Gram Panchayat. The facts and the question of law involved in all the cases are same and identical and hence, this common judgment is passed which shall govern all the four cases. 2. Fatikroy Gram Panchayat (for short, FGP), constituted as a 'Gram Panchayat' under the Tripura Panchayats Act, 1993, (for short, Act of 1993) consisted of 12 Members. In the year 2009, election of Gram Panchayat was held and in the said election, 12 Members were declared elected, who were set up by different political parties and out of them, four Members were elected sponsored by Communist Party of India (Marxist) (for short, CPI(M)), party and 8 Members were elected sponsored by Indian Nation Congress (for short, INC) party. The name of the elected Members and the political party, which sponsored them indisputably are as follows:-- i) Sri Subhash Dutta - INC ii) Smt. Suprabha Nag - Do - iii) Sri Janardhan Banik - Do - iv) Smt. Priyabala Malakar - Do - v) Smt. Usha Barua - Do - vi) Sri Ratan Roy - Do - vii) Smt. Sikha Das - Do - viii) Sri Jyotirmoy Chakraborty - Do - ix) Sri Shaktipada Deb - CPIM x) Md. Habibur Rahaman - Do - xi) Rasendra Dey - Do - xii) Sri Jantu Malakar - Do - 3. Smt. Suprabha Nag, Member, was elected as Pradhan and Sri Subhash Datta, Member was elected as Upa Pradhan of the Panchayat by the majority Members belonging to INC party and they were performing their job as such, Pradhan and Upa Pradhan. 4. Smt. Suprabha Nag, Member, was elected as Pradhan and Sri Subhash Datta, Member was elected as Upa Pradhan of the Panchayat by the majority Members belonging to INC party and they were performing their job as such, Pradhan and Upa Pradhan. 4. On 19.03.2012, four members of the Panchayat issued a notice in Form No. 2 of Tripura Panchayats (Election of Office Bearers) Rules, 1994 (for short, Rules of 1994) addressed to the District Panchayat Officer, Kumarghat, expressing no confidence against the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan of the Panchayat on different charges and pursuant to that notice, the District Panchayat Officer conveyed two meetings of the Panchayat on 07.04.2012 at 11.00 a.m. for moving no confidence motion against the Pradhan and at 1.00 p.m. for moving no confidence motion against the Upa Pradhan. The District Panchayat Officer ordered the Panchayat Extension Officer, Kumarghat (Sri Ranatosh Kr. Deb)) to preside over the meeting to be held in the Panchayat office of FGP. On 05.04.2012, the District Panchayat Officer received a Whip issued by one Md. Badaujjaman, President of Kailashahar District Congress Committee, issued on 04.04.2012 directing that every Member of the said Panchayat elected as a candidate of INC to cast their vote against the said no confidence motion. On receipt of that Whip, the District Panchayat Officer issued a letter on 05.04.2012 directing the Panchayat Extension Officer, Sri Ranatosh Kr. Deb to serve the Whip to each and every Member of the Panchayat and the Panchayat Extension Officer received the Whip on the date of moving the no confidence motion i.e. on 07.04.2012 and read over the Whip in the meeting of the Panchayat. The Panchayat Extension Officer read over the Whip in the presence of all the 12 Members of the Panchayat and obtained signature of the Members on the reverse page of the Whip, but 3 Members namely, Smt. Usha Barua, Sri Ratan Roy and Smt. Sikha Das, i.e. the petitioners, who belonged to INC party refused to put their signature in the Whip. The Panchayat Extension Officer thereafter, put the no confidence motion to vote and it was found that 4 Members belonging to CPI(M) party and 3 Members belonging to INC party namely, Smt. Usha Barua, Sri Ratan Roy and Smt. Sikha Das i.e. the petitioners cast their vote in favour of no confidence motion and the rest 5 Members belonging to INC party cast their vote against the no confidence motion of both the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan and accordingly, the motion was through and the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan were removed from their respective office. The Panchayat Extension Officer recorded the Minutes of the meeting in a report and also obtained the signature of all the 12 Members in the motion moved and thereafter, forwarded a report to the District Panchayat Officer as well as to the Block Development Officer for taking action in respect of the Members, Smt. Usha Barua, Sri Ratan Roy and Smt. Sikha Das, i.e. the petitioners who voted supporting the no confidence motion, defying the party Whip. Considering the report submitted by the Panchayat Extension Officer and after inquiry, as stated, BDO, Kumarghat by order dated 14.05.2012 declared that the Members namely, Smt. Usha Barua, Smt. Sikha Das and Sri Ratan Roy i.e. the petitioners earned disqualification from the Membership of the Panchayat (FGP) since they faulted Sub-rule (2) of Section 16 of Tripura Panchayats Act, 1993 by casting their vote in favour of the no confidence motion violating the party Whip issued by the authorized person of the INC party. Those three disqualified Members challenged the declaration of their disqualification made by the BDO by filing separate writ petitions. Smt. Usha Barua filed W.P. (C) No. 287 of 2012, Smt. Sikha Das filed W.P. (C) 408 of 2012 and Sri Ratan Roy filed W.P. (C) No. 409 of 2012. The rest five Members of the Gram Panchayat, who belonged to INC party namely, Sri Subhash Datta, Smt. Suprabha Nag, Sri Jyotirmoy Chakraborty, Sri Janardhan Banik and Smt. Priyabala Malakar filed W.P. (C) No. 446 of 2012 challenging a Notice dated 05.09.2012 (Annexure-4 to that writ petition) where under the Block Development Officer convened a Meeting of all the Members of the Panchayat including the Members, who earned disqualification to temporarily appointed the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan of the Panchayat. 5. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Deb assisted by learned counsel, Mr. 5. Heard learned senior counsel, Mr. S. Deb assisted by learned counsel, Mr. S. Datta for the petitioners of W.P. (C) No. 287 of 2012, 408 of 2012 and 409 of 2012 and also heard learned State counsel, Mr. G.S. Bhattacharjee for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, learned senior counsel, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik assisted by learned counsel, Mr. R. Datta for respondent Nos. 6 to 10 and learned counsel, Mr. J. Majumder for respondent Nos. 11 to 14. In W.P. (C) No. 446 of 2012, heard learned senior counsel, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik assisted by learned counsel, Mr. R. Datta for the petitioners, learned Additional GA, Ms. A.S. Lodh for the State respondents and learned counsel, Mr. J. Majumder for the private respondents. 6. The petitioners of W.P. (C) No. 287 of 2012, 408 of 2012 and 409 of 2012 inter alia contended that they were elected as Member of the Panchayat as a candidate sponsored by INC party. A no confidence motion was brought against the elected Pradhan and Upa Pradhan i.e. the respondent Nos. 6 and 7. No Whip was issued on them by the party which sponsored them as candidate in the election and they knew nothing about any such Whip issued by the party. The Panchayat Extension Officer i.e. respondent Nos. 4/5 never read over any such Whip in the meeting held on 07.04.2012, while the no confidence motions were moved. They were elected democratically and were answerable to the people, who elected them to protect their right and interest in respect of the act of the Panchayat and therefore, they participated in the no confidence motion and voted against the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan in the public interest i.e. in the interest of the people of the Panchayat. They knew nothing about any Whip issued by their party (INC) which sponsored them and no such Whip was also taken to their notice at the time of the meeting held over the no confidence motion. The Block Development Officer to their utter surprise issued the declaration in Form 6B (Annexure P-5 to the writ petitions) and thereby, declared that the petitioners earned disqualification because of voting in favour of the no confidence motion and thereby, violated the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Section 16 of the Act of 1993. The Block Development Officer to their utter surprise issued the declaration in Form 6B (Annexure P-5 to the writ petitions) and thereby, declared that the petitioners earned disqualification because of voting in favour of the no confidence motion and thereby, violated the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Section 16 of the Act of 1993. The Block Development Officer never issued any notice to them to show cause and also never heard them while issuing the declaration dated 14.05.2012. Such declaration disqualifying them as a Member of the Panchayat, has a serious civil consequence and since the petitioners were not heard before issuance of those declarations, were liable to be declared as invalid and should be quashed. 7. Order dated 16.06.2012 passed in the writ petition Nos. 287 of 2012, 408 of 2012 and 409 of 2012 shows that learned GA appeared and received notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. A common counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. Respondent No. 4 was the Panchayat Extension Officer and respondent No. 5, Sri Ranatosh Kr. Deb was the person, at the relevant time working as a Panchayat Extension Officer and has been made a party by name also. So, the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 may be taken as a counter affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 5 also. Though learned GA recorded appearance on behalf of respondent No. 3, District Panchayat Officer, but no counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 3. In all those writ petitions, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4/5 inter alia contended that the District Panchayat Officer of Kumarghat R.D. Block received a notice of no confidence for removal of Pradhan and Upa Pradhan of FGP given by 4 Members of the said Panchayat dated 19.03.2012 and on receipt of that notice, he convened a meeting of the Gram Panchayat on 07.04.2012 for moving the no confidence motion in respect of Pradhan at 11.00 a.m. and in respect of Upa Pradhan at 1.00 p.m. and he also ordered Panchayat Extension Officer (Sri Ranatosh Deb) (R.4/5) to preside over the meeting. On 05.04.2012, the District Panchayat Officer received a Whip issued by Md. On 05.04.2012, the District Panchayat Officer received a Whip issued by Md. Badrujjaman, the President of Kailashahar District Congress Committee dated 04.04.2012 and he communicated that Whip to the Panchayat Extension Officer for issuing the Whip to all Members of the Panchayat and to deal with it according to law. On the date of meeting i.e. on 07.04.2012, the Panchayat Extension Officer read over the Whip before the Members of the Panchayat in the meeting and it is stated that the signature of the Members were obtained, but the three writ petitioners declined to put their signature. The no confidence motions were moved and seven Members i.e. the four Members belonging to the CPI(M) party and the three writ petitioners, who belonged to the Congress party voted in favour of the no confidence motion and the rest five Members belonging to INC party i.e. respondent Nos. 6 to 10 voted against the no confidence. Since seven Members voted in favour of the no confidence motion, the motion was accepted and the Panchayat Extension Officer prepared a Minutes of the meeting obtained signature of all the participating Members, who were present in the meeting and thereafter, sent the report to the District Panchayat Officer as well as to the Block Development Officer informing that the three writ petitioners voted in favour of the no confidence motion defying their party Whip. The Block Development Officer duly enquired about the report in respect of violation of Whip issued by the INC party and taking into consideration, the relevant records and after waiting for 30 days, as per provisions of the Act and Rules framed there under, issued impugned declaration dated 14.05.2012 declaring thereby that the three writ petitioners earned disqualification from the Membership of the Panchayat. There was nothing wrong in the decision taken by the BDO and he acted bona fide on the basis of the materials placed before him. Since the Panchayat Extension Officer already sought clarification from the petitioners after the no confidence motions were moved, there was no necessity for the Block Development Officer to again ask for clarification from the writ petitioners and since nothing was received by the Block Development Officer condoning the writ petitioners from the mischief of violating the Whip, Block Development Officer was justified in declaring the petitioners as disqualified from the Membership because of defection. 8. Respondent Nos. 8. Respondent Nos. 6 to 10 also submitted a counter affidavit inter alia stating that the Whip was read over in the open meeting before the no confidence motions were moved and put to vote. The respondent Nos. 6 to 10 put their signature on the back of the Whip, which was read over in presence of all the Members and they further stated that the writ petitioners refused to sign the Whip and that the Panchayat Extension Officer thereafter, prepared the Minutes of the meeting stating the fact of disobedience of Whip by the writ petitioners. 9. Respondent Nos. 11 to 14 inter alia stated that the no confidence motion was brought against the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan and the meeting was held on 07.04.2012, but in the meeting, the Panchayat Extension Officer never read over any Whip issued by the INC party or any authorized person of that party. 10. There is no dispute that the three writ petitioners were elected as Member of the FGP as a candidates sponsored by INC party. It is also undisputed fact that four Members of the Panchayat brought a no confidence motion against the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan (respondent Nos. 7 and 6) and the no confidence motions were put to vote after discussion on 07.04.2012. It is further undisputed fact that the three writ petitioners voted in favour of no confidence motion and as a result, Pradhan and Upa Pradhan were removed from their office as Pradhan and Upa Pradhan of FGP. 11. The question fell for considerations in these writ petitions are:-- a) Whether any Whip issued by INC party or any person authorized by that party was read over and brought to the notice of the petitioners in the meeting held on the issue of no confidence motion, before the motion was put to vote? b) Whether the three writ petitioners were heard and/or any notice was issued to them by the Block Development Officer (respondent No. 2) before issuing declaration dated 14.05.2012 (Annexure P-5 to the writ petitions) declaring the three writ petitioners disqualified for being a Member of the Panchayat? If not, whether declaration dated 14.05.2012 is liable to be quashed on that ground? 12. Learned senior counsel Mr. If not, whether declaration dated 14.05.2012 is liable to be quashed on that ground? 12. Learned senior counsel Mr. Deb, appearing on behalf of the aforesaid three writ petitioners inter alia contended that the petitioners were set up/sponsored as candidate by INC party and they owned the elections. As per the democratic norms and ethics, they were supposed to protect the interest of people, who elected them. The Pradhan and Upa Pradhan since were indulged in illegal activities, no confidence motions were brought against them and as a public representative, they voted in favour of no confidence. No Whip was served on them by their party (INC) to oppose the no confidence. There is no proof that the alleged Whip issued by Md. Badrujjaman was read over in the meeting and brought it to the notice of the petitioners. In absence of any such cogent evidence of bringing about any such Whip to the notice of the petitioners, they cannot be held guilty of the mischief prescribed in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1993. Learned senior counsel has strenuously argued that no record of the proceeding of the no confidence meeting was prepared in the presence of the petitioners and petitioners knew nothing about any report submitted by the Panchayat Extension Officer regarding violation of any Whip issued by INC party. The Block Development Officer quite surprisingly issued impugned declaration dated 14.05.2012 and even no show cause notice was issued to the petitioners and since the petitioners knew nothing about the Whip, by not issuing a show cause notice and by not giving any opportunity to say their case, the Block Development Officer, respondent No. 2, has virtually given good bye to the principles of natural justice and on that ground alone the declaration of disqualification dated 14.05.2012 is liable to be set aside and quashed. It is emphatically submitted by the learned senior counsel that according to law, the matter of disqualification on the ground of defection should be treated as a proceeding before the Block Development Officer and he was supposed to follow the principles of natural justice before issuing an order of disqualification, but unfortunately, in the cases at hand, the Block Development Officer based on certain papers allegedly sent by the Panchayat Extension Officer took decision behind the back of the petitioners and that has violated the principles of audi alteram partem and therefore, the decision of the Block Development Officer is violative of the settled law of the land and cannot therefore, stand in the eye of law. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel referred the following case laws:-- i) Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India And Others reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641. ii) Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu And Others reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651. iii) Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana And Others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 1 . iv) Rajendra Singh Rana And Others v. Swami Prasad Maurya And Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 270 . v) Balchandra L. Jarkiholi And Others v. B.S. Yeddyurappa and Others reported in (2011) 7 SCC 1 . 13. Appearing on behalf of the State respondents, learned counsel, Mr. G.S. Bhattacharjee has strenuously argued that Whip issued by the authorized person of INC party was duly received by the District Panchayat Officer and that was communicated to the Panchayat Extension Officer to bring it to the notice of the Members of the FGP in the no confidence motion meeting. It is the clear case that the Whip was read over by the Panchayat Extension Officer and the Panchayat Extension Officer took signature of the Members, but the writ petitioners quite fully knowing the consequence of the Whip denied to put their signature on the back of the letter of Whip whereas the respondent Nos. 6 to 10 put their signature, which abundantly proved that the Whip was read over in the meeting before the no confidence motion was put to vote. He has also contended that the official act is to be presumed to have done according to law and as stated by the officials concerned unless, the contrary is proved. 6 to 10 put their signature, which abundantly proved that the Whip was read over in the meeting before the no confidence motion was put to vote. He has also contended that the official act is to be presumed to have done according to law and as stated by the officials concerned unless, the contrary is proved. Since the action taken by respondent No. 4/5 in respect of the Whip has been supported by the respondent Nos. 6 to 10 and since the document itself proves that the writ petitioners did not put their signature in the reverse page of the Whip and since it is mentioned in the Minutes of the meeting, it is well established that the Whip was read over in the meeting and writ petitioner knowing fully well defied the Whip and therefore, they were bound to be disqualified for defection. It is also contended by learned counsel, Mr. Bhattacharjee that the Panchayat Extension Officer has also sought clarification from the writ petitioners after the meeting, but they kept silent. That statement has been clearly made in the counter affidavit of the official respondents at Page 8 and that has not been disputed by the writ petitioners. So, Block Development Officer taking into consideration the materials placed before it was satisfied after having inquiry and such satisfaction is a subjective satisfaction of the Block Development Officer and there was no need of further issuing a notice to the petitioners, which would bring no different consequence and hence, the action taken was justified. 14. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik, appearing for the respondent Nos. 6 to 10 has contended that it is quite evident that the Whip was read over in the meeting. There is no material or evidence on record and even there is no averment in the writ petition that the petitioners took prior permission from INC party to vote in favour of no confidence. There is no record of subsequent condonation by the party. So, service of notice would in no way change of the fate of the case of the writ petitioners. Block Development Officer was waiting for 30 days from the date, the petitioners earned disqualification by way of defection. There was no need for the Block Development Officer to issue a further notice since it would never produce a different result. It is further contended by Mr. Block Development Officer was waiting for 30 days from the date, the petitioners earned disqualification by way of defection. There was no need for the Block Development Officer to issue a further notice since it would never produce a different result. It is further contended by Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel that Section 16 nowhere stipulated that a notice should be issued by the Block Development Officer before passing of the order of disqualification. The subjective satisfaction of the Block Development Officer based on the relevant records was enough to take a decision regarding disqualification. Learned senior counsel has also referred the provision of Section23 of the Act of 1993 and submitted that in respect of removal of Pradhan and Upa Pradhan on any other ground, show cause notice was required whereas, in respect of disqualification under Section 16, the legislature conspicuously did not mention that for the purpose of disqualification on the ground of defection, further service of notice or hearing on the issue was necessary. Under such circumstances, the declaration made by BDO dated 14.05.2012 in respect of disqualification of the writ petitioners from being the Members of FGP was justified and there is no question of interference in the decision. Learned senior counsel has also contended that in a democracy, it is mandatory for the elected representatives to be loyal to people, who elected them. An elected Member has no right to vote against the decision of the party, which has voted them as candidate and if, such activities is not restricted with strict hand, it will destroy the fabric of democracy. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel referred the following case laws:-- i) Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Others reported in (2003) 2 SCC 111 . ii) Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union Of India and Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 54 . iii) Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia And Others reported in (2005) 7 SCC 764 . iv) Lechu Miah v. State of Tripura And Ors. reported in (2012) 3 GLR 592. 15. Learned counsel, Mr. J. Majumder, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 11 to 14 has submitted that no Whip was read over in the meeting in presence of the respondents and no record of the proceeding was prepared in the presence of the respondents. iv) Lechu Miah v. State of Tripura And Ors. reported in (2012) 3 GLR 592. 15. Learned counsel, Mr. J. Majumder, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 11 to 14 has submitted that no Whip was read over in the meeting in presence of the respondents and no record of the proceeding was prepared in the presence of the respondents. No clarification was sought from the writ petitioners regarding the alleged violation of the Whip. It is therefore, clear that there was no Whip issued by INC party and at least, no such Whip was brought to the notice of the writ petitioners and the respondent Nos. 11 to 14. The action taken by Block Development Officer, therefore, was wrong and should be set aside. 16. For ready reference and for fair appreciation of the rival contentions, let us reproduce here the relevant provisions of the Act of 1993 and Rule of 1994. Section 16 of the Act of 1993 prescribes disqualification on ground of defection. Sub-section 1 of Section16 reads thus: 16(1) A member of a Gram Panchayat belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the Gram Panchayat-- (a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in the Gram Panchayat contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in this behalf, without obtaining in either case, the prior written permission of such political party, persons or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within thirty days from the date of such voting or abstention. EXPLANATION: For the purpose of this sub-section, a member of a Gram Panchayat shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. Rule 27 of the Rules of 1994 reads thus: 27. EXPLANATION: For the purpose of this sub-section, a member of a Gram Panchayat shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such member. Rule 27 of the Rules of 1994 reads thus: 27. (1) In any meeting of a Gram Panchayat, or a Panchayat Samiti or a Zilla Parishad, where vote is taken for election or for any other purpose, the Presiding Officer shall, if his attention is drawn that any member has voted or abstained from voting contrary to the direction of the political party to which he belongs and thereby has earned disqualification under Section 16, or Section 76, or Section-128, record the facts in the Remarks Column of the record of proceedings of the meeting, obtain clarification from such member and then refer the question to the Block Development Officer or, as the case may be, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction for decision in Form 6A, or 12A or 17A as the case may be. (2) If the Gram Panchayat or a Panchayat Samiti or a Zilla Parishad received a written information from a political party or from a member that the member has voluntarily given up the membership of the party or the member having been elected otherwise than as a member of a political party has joined the political party, the Pradhan or Upa Pradhan in case of Gram Panchayat, the Chairman or Vice Chairman in case of Panchayat Samiti or Sabhadhipati or Sahakari Sabhadhipati in case of Zilla Parishad shall refer the question to the Block Development Officer or, as the case may be, the District Magistrate to decide whether such member has earned disqualification under Section 16, or Section 76, or Section 128 in Form 6A, 12A or 17A as the case may be. 3. 3. Every such member who is alleged to have earned disqualification by reason of voting or abstained from voting contrary to the direction of his political party, may submit letter or prior permission or condonation to the Block Development Officer or, as the case may be, the District Magistrate having jurisdiction within thirty days from the date of voting and such authority shall take up the question of disqualification only after expiry of the said period of thirty days and decide the same within fifteen days from the expiry of the said period of thirty days. 4. If the authority, as aforesaid, is satisfied on the basis of the report of the Presiding Officer and after making such enquiry as he may consider necessary that any such member has become disqualified under Section 16 or, as the case may be, Section 76 or Section 128, record his decision, communicate it to the Gram Panchayat concerned, or, as the case may be, the Panchayat Samiti or the Zilla Parishad and make declaration in Form 6B, or 12B, or 17B as the case may be, that the member has ceased to be the member of that Gram Panchayat or, as the case may be, the Panchayat Samiti or the Zilla Parishad. 17. Section 16 of the Act of 1993 is pari materia of Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. Sub Para (1) of paragraph 2 of 10th Schedule is reproduced here for ready reference, which reads thus: 2. Disqualification on ground of defection.--(1) Subject to the provisions of [paragraphs 4 & 5, a member of a House belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a member of the House- (a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention. 18. Tenth Schedule was appended to the Constitution by introducing 52nd Amendment Act of 1985. 18. Tenth Schedule was appended to the Constitution by introducing 52nd Amendment Act of 1985. The statements of object and reasons of the said Amendment Bill read thus: The evil of political defection has been a matter of national concern. If it is not combated, it is likely to undermine the very foundation of which democracy and the principles which sustain it. With this object, an assurance was given in the Address by the President to Parliament that the Government intended to introduce the current session of Parliament an anti-defection Bill. This Bill is meant for outlawing defection and fulfilling the above assurance. 19. While considering the provisions of Section 16 of the Act of 1993 and Rule 27 of the Rules of 1994, for a broader retrospection, we may gainfully look into the provisions as a whole prescribed in Schedule 10 of the Constitution of India and may further read the provisions contained in Article 102, 103 as well as Articles 191 and 192 of the Constitution of India. 20. Having taken note of the provisions prescribed above, let us first decide point No. (a) formulated hereinbefore. The petitioners contended that they knew nothing about any Whip issued by the INC party or any person authorized by the party and that no Whip was read out by the Panchayat Extension Officer (respondent No. 4/5) in the meeting held on 07.04.2012 before the motions were put to vote. Official respondents i.e. respondent Nos. 1 to 5 contended that the District Panchayat Officer received the Whip dated 04.04.2012 issued by one Md. Badrujjaman, President of Kailashahar District Congress Committee, on 05.04.2012 and he sent the Whip to the Panchayat Extension Officer for the service to the Members of the Panchayat. The copy of the Whip annexed as Annexure R-2 and the letter to the Panchayat Extension Officer about the Whip by the District Panchayat Officer annexed as Annexure R-3. The signature of respondent Nos. 6 to 10 on the back side of the Whip is marked as Annexure R-5. It is clearly contended by the State respondents that respondent Nos. 4/5 read over the Whip in the meeting and it was before the motion was put to vote. Respondent Nos. 6 to 10 clearly contended that the Whip was read over by respondent Nos. 4/5 in the meeting noticing all the Members present in the meeting about the Whip. It is clearly contended by the State respondents that respondent Nos. 4/5 read over the Whip in the meeting and it was before the motion was put to vote. Respondent Nos. 6 to 10 clearly contended that the Whip was read over by respondent Nos. 4/5 in the meeting noticing all the Members present in the meeting about the Whip. The presence of the petitioners in the meeting is an undisputed fact. Annexure R-4 series shows that the petitioners signed the resolution of the no confidence motion adopted in the meeting held at 11.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. on 07.04.2012. All the Members signed those two documents of moving the no confidence motion. Only respondent Nos. 6 to 10 put their signature on the back side of the no confidence motion (Annexure R-5), but the writ petitioners and respondent Nos. 11 to 14 did not put their signature. It is evident that they conspicuously were determined not to put their signature since it will be an evidence against them that the Whip was read over in their presence. The official act is to be presumed to have done according to the Rules. If a Whip is issued by a party in respect of a meeting, it is the solemn duty of the officer concerned to read it over in the meeting. By filing affidavit, the officer stated that the Whip was read over. In support thereof, the official respondents produced the document i.e. the Whip itself and the signature of respondent Nos. 6 to 10 on the back of the Whip. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the Whip was issued by an authorized person of INC party namely, the President of the District Congress Committee, Md. Badrujjaman and that Whip was read over in the meeting called by the District Panchayat Officer to move the no confidence motion against the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan. The contention of the petitioners that they were never informed about any such Whip before the meeting is of no consequence and cannot be attached with any importance since Md. Badrujjaman has not been made a party in the writ petition. There is nothing placed before this Court that the petitioners were informed about the Whip by their party before 07.04.2012. Badrujjaman has not been made a party in the writ petition. There is nothing placed before this Court that the petitioners were informed about the Whip by their party before 07.04.2012. It is abundantly clear with the documents placed on record that District Congress President issued a Whip dated 04.04.2012 and that was received by the District Panchayat Officer on 05.04.2012 and by writing Annexure-3, letter dated 05.04.2012, he sent the Whip to respondent No. 4/5, the Panchayat Extension Officer with a copy to the Block Development Officer, Kumarghat and the Panchayat Extension Officer read over the Whip in the meeting held on 07.04.2012 and thereafter, asked the Members present to sign in the reverse page of the Whip, but the writ petitioners declined to sign the Whip whereas, the respondent Nos. 6 to 10, who were other Members of the same party signed the Whip and that signatures also brought on record as Annexure R-5. This point, therefore, is decided that a Whip was issued by the authorized person of INC party in respect of the no confidence motion moved in FGP directing all the elected Members of INC party to cast their vote against the Motion and it is abundantly, proved that the three writ petitioners being Members of INC party cast their vote in favour of the no confidence motion and therefore, they are liable to come under the mischief of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act of 1993. 21. We are in a democracy. Anti-defection laws are safety bulbs of democracy. Anti-defection laws, in the Constitution of India, as well as in the other relevant laws, have been introduced to prevent horse trading of the democratically elected public representatives and to protect the essence and ethics of democracy. Therefore, they should be strictly implemented to keep up the democratic values and norms. If this safety bulb is not there or is withdrawn, it will indulge in horse trading of the democratically elected public representatives resulting in total jeopardy of the democratic values and principles. 22. In the case of Lechu Miah v. State of Tripura and Ors. reported in (2012) 3 GLR 592, the Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court (judgment scribed by me, Das, J.) in Para 19 of the judgment observed:-- 19. India has established the largest multiparty democracy in the world. 22. In the case of Lechu Miah v. State of Tripura and Ors. reported in (2012) 3 GLR 592, the Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court (judgment scribed by me, Das, J.) in Para 19 of the judgment observed:-- 19. India has established the largest multiparty democracy in the world. It has been perfected in the meantime. The nation feels proud of its democratic norms, ethics and values. At a point of time 'horse trading' blemished and/or stigmatized our democratic values. To protect democracy from the hand of unscrupulous political gamblers, Tenth Schedule was incorporated in the Constitution of India. Keeping parity with the constitutional provisions, to protect democratic institutions, in other enactments also similar provisions were introduced through out the country by the legislature and with the same spirit Section 16 to the Tripura Panchayats Act, 1993 was introduced and Rules also framed thereunder. The solemn object of the law should be applied with all sincerity and vigour. No leniency should be shown to a detractor if it is found established that a person, after getting elected by the people, changed his affiliation or allegiance or loyalty to the party which sponsored him for election to the democratic institution. Once a person is nominated or set up by a political party as candidate and he returned successful in the election he becomes a trustee of the electorate. His conducts and activities must conform to public trust and morals. In the event he violates it, and is not condoned by the party which nominated him, he should be deemed to have disqualified himself from being a member of such democratic institution. The erring member may try to justify his unbecoming conduct raising various pleas, but those should be closely scrutinized. Burden would be strictly on the violator or the detractor to prove innocence. Such burden cannot be shifted on the reverse side. Once the allegation is brought home, no leniency should be shown to a political mocker. Keeping in mind the democratic ethos and values and the relevant law interpreted by the apex Court and this Court time to time, let us now decide the points formulated for decision in this case. 23. In the case of Bengia Menia (ASM Chulyu) and Ors. v. Deputy Commissioner And Ors. Keeping in mind the democratic ethos and values and the relevant law interpreted by the apex Court and this Court time to time, let us now decide the points formulated for decision in this case. 23. In the case of Bengia Menia (ASM Chulyu) and Ors. v. Deputy Commissioner And Ors. reported in (2011) 5 GLR 113, a Single Bench of the Gauhati High Court while deciding almost a similar case of disqualification on political defection in Para 13 and 14 of the judgment has observed:-- 13. Under the Tenth Schedule as well as Prohibition Act disqualification of members can be ordered on ground of voluntarily giving up membership of the political parties to which they belong or abstaining from voting in the house contrary to any direction issued by the respective political parties. By the impugned order, the petitioners have been disqualified on the ground of voluntarily resigning from INC by which they were nominated and returned to the panchayat bodies. The petitioners have denied the accusation of voluntarily giving up membership from INC party because they have not so far resigned or given up the membership by way of communicating to the party or by expressing anything from their end to that effect. There is no express or implied action by which the petitioners can be treated as giving up the membership of INC. As per the decision of the Apex Court, if the words "voluntarily given up his membership" are not synonymous with "resignation" and it should be given wider connotation, the impugned order disqualifying the petitioners could be saved inasmuch as the petitioners have admittedly acted in the assembly election for making rival candidate nominated by TMC returned violating the direction of the party high command to work for returning the INC candidate. If the said admitted anti-party activities of the petitioners are taken into consideration it would amount to resignation or voluntarily giving up their membership by their conduct and by implication in "wider connotation" to save the most important democratic institutions like Panchayat. It cannot be denied by anybody that the Tenth Schedule has been incorporated in the Constitution of India so much so the Prohibition Act has been enacted to save the democracy and its institutions like Parliament, State Legislatures and the Panchayats. It cannot be denied by anybody that the Tenth Schedule has been incorporated in the Constitution of India so much so the Prohibition Act has been enacted to save the democracy and its institutions like Parliament, State Legislatures and the Panchayats. The erring members may try to justify their unbecoming conduct like proposing a member of a rival political party as candidate to contest the assembly election but it has already worked against the democratic norms and the democratic institutions sought to be protected by effecting amendment to the constitution of India in response to popular will. Such important democratic institutions may turn to a sterile woman or prostitute at the hands of the immoral and unethical members, who shift their party loyalty in the cheapest manner to serve the individualistic interest and their conduct has not only cost the party they belong to but also the entire nation. 14. It may apparently be correct that the anti-party activities of an elected member of the Panchayat would not attract disqualification under section 3(1)(a)of the Prohibition Act unless he violates the conditions set forth under section3(1)(b). The object of the Prohibition Act vis-à-vis the Tenth Schedule does not allow such interpretation in narrow connotation. Once the person is nominated as a party candidate and returned to the Panchayat body he becomes a trust of the electorate and his conduct and activities must conform to public trust and moral within or outside the House; be it Parliament, Legislature or Panchayat body, because he is a member of the democratic institution elected by the people who have faith in democracy and its institutions. Equally he must be committed to the party by which he was nominated and the electorate as well till the terms of election or the terms of the body is completed. In this context, one may appropriately refer to Kihoto Hollohon (supra), wherein it is observed that the provisions in Tenth Schedule give recognition to the root of political parties in the political process. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme and a person who gets elected as a candidate set up by political party, is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. A political party goes before the electorate with a particular programme and it sets up candidates at the election on the basis of such programme and a person who gets elected as a candidate set up by political party, is so elected on the basis of the programme of that political party. The provisions of para 2(1)(a) proceed on the premise of the political propriety and morality demands that if a person, after the election "changes his affiliation" and leaves, the political party which had set him up as a candidate at the election, then he should give up his membership of the Legislature and go back before the electorate. 24. Keeping in mind, the democratic ethics and principles and further keeping in view the settled law of the land, let us now see and decide point No. (b), whether the principles of natural justice has been violated or not by the Block Development Officer while issuing the impugned declaration dated 14.05.2012 (Annexure P-5). 25. Annexure P-4 series is the Minutes of the meeting held on 07.04.2012 in the FGP in respect of the no confidence motion brought against the Pradhan and Upa Pradhan. The said Minutes of the meeting clearly reveals that the Presiding Officer i.e. the Panchayat Extension Officer read over the Whip issued by President of the Kailashahar District Congress Committee addressed to all the 8 elected Members of the Panchayat belonged to the INC party and that was put to those 8 Members for putting their signature, but the petitioners i.e. Smt. Usha Barua, Smt. Sikha Das and Sri Ratan Roy did not put their signature and other 5 Members belonging to INC party put their signature and it is clearly recorded in the Minutes of the meeting that the three writ petitioners did not obey the Whip. At the bottom of the Minutes of the meeting (Annexure P-4), it is also written that signature of all the Members taken after the meeting and those signatures taken after the meeting has been annexed by the official respondents as Annexure R-4 series, which shows that all the Members including the present writ petitioners has signed it, which makes it evident that the Minutes of the meeting was signed by all the Members including the three writ petitioners. It was therefore, evident that the matter of Whip was well within the knowledge of those three writ petitioners and they signed the Minutes of the meeting whereas refused to sign on the back of the Whip. By signing the Minutes of the meeting wherein it is clearly written that the three writ petitioners voted in favour of the motion defying the Whip has been clearly admitted. 26. The crucial question to be decided, now, is whether Block Development Officer was supposed to hear the writ petitioners again before declaring them as disqualified and whether there was any obligation for the Block Development Officer again to issue notice to them and to offer them a scope of hearing. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb contended that Rule 27 of the Rules of 1994 has not been followed since no clarifications obtained from the writ petitioners, in the record of the proceedings in respect of alleged violation of Whip. The official respondents including the respondent Nos. 4/5 categorically stated that the Whip was read over and that after the writ petitioners voted in favour of the motion violating the Whip, respondent No. 4/5 tried to obtain clarification from the petitioners, but they kept silent. This statement of the official respondents made in Paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit (Page 8) has not been controverted by the writ petitioners by way of filing any rejoinder affidavit or otherwise. It is therefore, clear that the clarification in respect of the petitioners disobedience to the Whip, was sought but the writ petitioners did not respond and they kept silent. Therefore, the submission of learned senior counsel that Sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 was not complied with cannot stand in the eye of law and fact. While the clarification was sought but the petitioners kept silent, there was no other alternative for the Panchayat Extension Officer, but to refer the matter for disqualification of the petitioners Membership because of defection. It has also been contended by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb that Block Development Officer was supposed to hear the petitioners before issuing the impugned declaration dated 14.05.2012. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the official respondents and Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the respondent Nos. It has also been contended by learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb that Block Development Officer was supposed to hear the petitioners before issuing the impugned declaration dated 14.05.2012. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the official respondents and Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel for the respondent Nos. 6 to 10 contended that subjective satisfaction of the Block Development Officer was enough to arrive at a conclusion that the petitioners violated the Whip and thereby, earned disqualification and even if, a notice issued and the petitioners were heard, there would be no different result than that of disqualification since there is nothing to show that the writ petitioners were condoned by the INC party for their alleged act of voting against the party Pradhan and Upa Pradhan. 27. Section 16 of the Act of 1993 prescribes that the question regarding disqualification should be referred to the Block Development Officer and the decision of the Block Development Officer shall be final. It is also stipulated that the proceeding shall be completed and decision thereon shall be communicated within 15 days from the date when such question has been referred. Annexure P-5 i.e. the declaration of disqualification in all the three cases are similar having same wordings, which reads as follows:-- FORM-6B [See sub-rule(4) of Rule 27] DECLARATION In exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Tripura Panchayats Act, 1993 read with Sub-rule (2) and Sub-rule (3) of Rule 27 of the Tripura Panchayat (Election of Office bearers) Rules, 1994. I, the Block Development Officer, Kumarghat R.D. Block, after making an enquiry, have come to the decision that Smt. Usha Barua member of the Fatikroy Gram Panchayat has earned disqualification under sub-section (6) of Section 16 and, therefore, I hereby declare that the said member has ceased to be a member of that Gram Panchayat with effect from the date of this order. Date: 14/05/2012 Block Development Officer Place: Kumarghat R.D. Block Unakoti Tripura. 28. There is nothing in Section 16 that before taking decision, Block Development Officer was bound to issue a show cause notice or to hear the petitioners afresh on the issue of disqualification. Contention of the petitioners is that the principles of natural justice had been violated since the petitioners were not heard and since no notice was issued before the decision of disqualification was taken. Contention of the petitioners is that the principles of natural justice had been violated since the petitioners were not heard and since no notice was issued before the decision of disqualification was taken. The decision of Block Development Officer, whether was vitiated for not hearing the writ petitioners after issuing a notice or whether issuing of a notice and of hearing them again would be of no use since the result ought to have been the same even if a notice was issued and they were heard are tricky questions. In my considered opinion, since the petitioners could not place on record anything to show that they were condoned by the party which fitted them as candidate and since it is already on record that the Whip was read over and brought to their notice and defying the Whip, they have voted in favour of the no confidence motion, the question of giving them notice and affording them a scope of hearing by BDO, become redundant. The Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India And Another reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 , which corresponds to AIR 1978 SC 597 on the question of principals of natural justice has held that even if not specifically mentioned, it may be applicable by implication. Admittedly, Section 16 is silent about issuance of any such notice by Block Development Officer before taking decision on disqualification. However, it was proper for the Block Development Officer to issue such a notice and to give a scope of hearing to the petitioners. The question, now, for not issuing such a notice, whether the decision vitiated and whether such a notice if issued and a hearing was made, whether result would have been otherwise, in absence of any material to show that the writ petitioners were condoned by the INC party. 29. In the case of Kihoto Hollohan (supra), the Apex Court considered the constitutional validity of 52nd Amendment Act and the Court has held that the provisions brought by way of 52nd Amendment were salutary and were entitled to strengthen the fabric of Indian Parliamentary democracy by carving un-principled political defections. The Court has further held that the decision of the Speaker in respect of disqualification was not immune in view of the provisions of Article 122 and 212 of the Constitution and it is amenable to judicial review. The Court has further held that the decision of the Speaker in respect of disqualification was not immune in view of the provisions of Article 122 and 212 of the Constitution and it is amenable to judicial review. Para 95, 96 and 97 may be carefully quoted here, which reads thus:-- 95. In the present case, the power to decide disputed disqualification under Paragraph 6(1) is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion. 96. The fiction in Paragraph 6(2), indeed, places it in the first clause of Article 122or 212, as the case may be. The words "proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings in the legislature of a State" in Paragraph 6(2) have their corresponding expression in Articles 122(1) and 212(1) respectively. This attracts an immunity from mere irregularities of procedures. 97. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention to invoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct of resolution of disputes as to the disqualification of members under Articles 191(1) and 102(1). The very deeming provision implies that the proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the House; but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject to the approval by the House. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. 30. In the case of Ravi S. Naik (supra), the Supreme Court has categorically held that whether natural justice principles violated or not would depend on facts and circumstances of the particular case. In a given case, even if no scope of further hearing is given, there cannot be an inevitable conclusion that the principles of natural justice was violated. In Para 20 of the judgment, the Court held thus:-- 20. Principles of natural justice have an important place in modern Administrative Law. They have been defined to mean "fair play in action". In a given case, even if no scope of further hearing is given, there cannot be an inevitable conclusion that the principles of natural justice was violated. In Para 20 of the judgment, the Court held thus:-- 20. Principles of natural justice have an important place in modern Administrative Law. They have been defined to mean "fair play in action". (See: Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , Bhagwati, J.) As laid down by this Court: "They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men" (Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel 5 (1985) 3 SCC 398 ). An order of an authority exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is procedurally ultra vires and, therefore, suffers from a jurisdictional error. That is the reason why in spite of the finality imparted to the decision of the Speakers/Chairmen by paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule such a decision is subject to judicial review on the ground of non-compliance with rules of natural justice. But while applying the principles of natural justice, it must be borne in mind that "they are not immutable but flexible" and they are not cast in a rigid mould and they cannot be put in a legal strait-jacket. Whether the requirements of natural justice have been complied with or not has to be considered in the context of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the case at hand, there is no allegation of mala fide or unfair play on the part of the official respondents. The writ petitioners questioned the action taken by the official respondents only on the ground that the principles of natural justice was not followed since no notice was issued and they were not heard on the issue of disqualification. The Block Development Officer in the impugned order clearly spelt that after making inquiry, he has issued the declaration. The inquiry need not be necessarily after issuing notice to the petitioners and hearing them on the issue. The Block Development Officer in the impugned order clearly spelt that after making inquiry, he has issued the declaration. The inquiry need not be necessarily after issuing notice to the petitioners and hearing them on the issue. While all the papers were placed before the Block Development Officer that the writ petitioners disobeyed the Whip, voted against their party, refused to sign on the reverse page of the Whip whereas signed the Minutes of the meeting wherein the matters of disobey in the Whip has been recorded and where no letter of condonation was placed, Block Development Officer was bound to pass an order of disqualification declaring that the petitioners were within the mischief of defection. This decision rather supporting the case of the official respondents and against the writ petitioners. 31. In the case of Jagjit Singh (supra), the Supreme Court has observed:-- The Speaker, while exercising power to disqualify Members under Schedule X, acts as a Tribunal and though validity of the orders, thus, passed can be questioned in the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or High Courts, the scope of judicial review is limited. If the view taken by the Tribunal is a reasonable one, the Court would decline to strike down an order on the ground that another view is more reasonable. The Tribunal can draw an inference from the conduct of a Member, of course, depending upon the facts of the case and totality of the circumstances. The orders can be challenged on the ground of ultra vires or mala fides or having been made in colourable exercise of power based on extraneous and irrelevant considerations. The order would be a nullity if rules of natural justice are violated. While considering the plea of violation of principles of natural justice, it is necessary to bear in mind that the proceedings under Schedule X to the Constitution are not comparable to either a trial in a court of law or departmental proceedings for disciplinary action against an employee. The proceedings are against an elected representative of the people and the judge holds the independent high office of Speaker. Howsoever limited may be the field of judicial review, the principles of natural justice have to be complied with and in their absence, the orders would stand vitiated. The yardstick to judge the grievance that reasonable opportunity has not been afforded would, however, be different. Howsoever limited may be the field of judicial review, the principles of natural justice have to be complied with and in their absence, the orders would stand vitiated. The yardstick to judge the grievance that reasonable opportunity has not been afforded would, however, be different. The requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice is also recognized in the Haryana Legislative Assembly (Disqualification of Members on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1986 made by the Speaker in exercise of powers conferred by Para 8 of Schedule X. Undoubtedly, the proceedings before the Speaker which is also a tribunal albeit of a different nature, have to be conducted in a fair manner and by complying with the principles of natural justice. However, the principles of natural justice cannot be placed in a rigid mould or straitjacket. The court, on facts of a case despite denial of opportunity to lead evidence or to cross-examine a witness, may come to the conclusion that reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the person aggrieved. These are flexible rules. Their applicability is determined on the facts of each case. The question to be asked in the ultimate analysis would be whether the person aggrieved was given a fair deal by the authority or not? Could a reasonable person, under the circumstances in which Tribunal was placed, pass such an order? 32. The fact of Jagjit Singh (supra) is on a different context. Here the petitioners could not show violation of any Rules for which, a conclusion could be arrived that principles of natural justice were not followed. The ratio of decision of Jagjit Singh (supra) therefore, cannot be applied in the facts of the present case. 33. In the case of Rajendra Singh Rana (supra), the Supreme Court considered Para 6 of the 10th Schedule vis-à-vis the provisions of Article 122 and 212 of the Constitution. The Court also considered the ratio laid down in Kihoto Hollohan (supra). In that reported case, the copies of the relevant papers were not supplied. The fact of that case is also distinguishable to that of the fact of the present cases. It was a case of violating the provisions of 10th Schedule and the Rules framed thereunder. In this case, there is no question of any complaint, but the question is of disobedience of Whip issued by the party and thereby, earning disqualification. Learned senior counsel, Mr. It was a case of violating the provisions of 10th Schedule and the Rules framed thereunder. In this case, there is no question of any complaint, but the question is of disobedience of Whip issued by the party and thereby, earning disqualification. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Deb referred Para 22, 25, 33 and 39 of the judgment and we may refer here those paragraphs of the judgment for appreciation:-- 22. The Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985 amended Articles 102and 191 of the Constitution by introducing sub-articles to them and by appending the Tenth Schedule introducing the provisions as to disqualification on the ground of defection. They were introduced to meet the threat posed to democracy by defection. A ground of disqualification from the membership of the Parliament or of the Assembly on the ground of defection was introduced. The constitutional validity of the amendment and the inclusion of the Tenth Schedule was upheld by this Court in Kihoto Hollohan (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651) except as regards para 7 thereof, which was held to require ratification in terms of Article 368(2) of the Constitution. It is not in dispute that para 7 of the Tenth Schedule is not operative in the light of that decision. The constitution Bench held that the right to decide has been conferred on a high dignitary, namely, the Speaker of the Parliament or the Assembly and the conferment of such a power was not anathema to the constitutional scheme. Similarly, the limited protection given to the proceedings before the Speaker in terms of paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution was also justified even though the said protection did not preclude a judicial review of the decision of the Speaker. But that judicial review was not a broad one in the light of the finality attached to the decision of the Speaker under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule and the judicial review was available on grounds like gross violation of natural justice, perversity, bias and such like defects. It was following this that Ravi S. Naik (Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641) decision was rendered by two of the judges who themselves constituted the majority in Kihoto Hollohan and the observations above referred to but which were explained subsequently, were made. It was following this that Ravi S. Naik (Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641) decision was rendered by two of the judges who themselves constituted the majority in Kihoto Hollohan and the observations above referred to but which were explained subsequently, were made. Suffice it to say that the decision of the Speaker rendered on 6.9.2003 was not immune from challenge before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 25. In the context of the introduction of sub-article (2) of Article 102 and Article191 of the Constitution, a proceeding under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution is one to decide whether a Member has become disqualified to hold his position as a Member of Parliament or of the Assembly on the ground of defection. The Tenth Schedule cannot be read or construed independent of Articles 102 and 191 of the Constitution and the object of those Articles. A defection is added as a disqualification and the Tenth Schedule contains the provisions as to disqualification on the ground of defection. A proceeding under the Tenth Schedule gets started before the Speaker only on a complaint being made that certain persons belonging to a political party had incurred disqualification on the ground of defection. To meet the claim so raised, the Members of the Parliament or Assembly against whom the proceedings are initiated have the right to show that there has been a split in the original political party and they form one-third of the Members of the legislature of that party, or that the party has merged with another political party and hence para 2 is not attracted. On the scheme of Articles 102 and 191 and the Tenth Schedule, the determination of the question of split or merger cannot be divorced from the motion before the Speaker seeking a disqualification of a member or members concerned. It is therefore not possible to accede to the argument that under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the Speaker has an independent power to decide that there has been a split or merger of a political party as contemplated by paras 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The power to recognise a separate group in Parliament or Assembly may rest with the Speaker on the basis of the Rules of Business of the House. The power to recognise a separate group in Parliament or Assembly may rest with the Speaker on the basis of the Rules of Business of the House. But that is different from saying that the power is available to him under the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution independent of a claim being determined by him that a member or a number of members had incurred disqualification by defection. To that extent, the decision of the Speaker in the case on hand cannot be considered to be an order in terms of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. The Speaker has failed to decide the question, he was called upon to decide, by postponing a decision thereon. There is therefore some merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the BSP that the order of the Speaker may not enjoy the full immunity in terms of para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution and that even if it did, the power of judicial review recognised by the court in Kihoto Hollohan is sufficient to warrant interference with the order in question. 33. It may be true that collective dissent is not intended to be stifled by the enactment of sub-article (2) of Articles 102 and 191 of the Tenth Schedule. But at the same time, it is clear that the object is to discourage defection which has assumed menacing proportions undermining the very basis of democracy. Therefore, a purposive interpretation of para 2 in juxtaposition with paras 3 and 4 of the Tenth Schedule is called for. One thing is clear that defection is a ground for disqualifying a member from the House. He incurs that disqualification if he has voluntarily given up his membership of his original political party, meaning the party on whose ticket he had got elected himself to the House. In the case of defiance of a whip, the party concerned is given an option either of condoning the defiance or seeking disqualification of the member concerned. But, the decision to condone must be taken within 15 days of the defiance of the whip. This aspect is also relied on for the contention that the relevant point of time to determine the question is when the Speaker actually takes a decision on the plea for disqualification. 39. But, the decision to condone must be taken within 15 days of the defiance of the whip. This aspect is also relied on for the contention that the relevant point of time to determine the question is when the Speaker actually takes a decision on the plea for disqualification. 39. On the side of the 37 M.L.As., the scope of judicial review being limited was repeatedly stressed to contend that the majority of the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. Dealing with the ambit of judicial review of an order of the Speaker under the Tenth Schedule, it was held in Kihoto Hollohan (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651): 95. In the present case, the power to decide disputed disqualification under Para 6(1) is preeminently of a judicial complexion. 96. The fiction in para 6(2), indeed, places it in the first clause of Article 122 or 212, as the case may be. The words "proceedings in Parliament" or 'proceedings in the legislature of a State' in para 6(2) have their corresponding expression in Articles 122(1) and212(1) respectively. This attracts an immunity from mere irregularities of procedures. 97. That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention to invoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct of resolution of disputes as to the disqualification of Members under Articles 191(1) and 102(1). The very deeming provision implies that the proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the House; but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision under para 6(1) is not the decision of the House, nor is it subject to the approval by the House. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the Speaker or Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. After referring to the relevant aspects, it was held: 100. By these well-known and accepted tests of what constitute a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal. It was concluded: 109. After referring to the relevant aspects, it was held: 100. By these well-known and accepted tests of what constitute a Tribunal, the Speaker or the Chairman, acting under para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule is a Tribunal. It was concluded: 109. In the light of the decisions referred to above and the nature of function that is exercised by the Speaker/Chairman under para 6, the scope of judicial review under Articles 136, and 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of an order passed by the Speaker/Chairman under para 6 would be confined to jurisdictional errors only viz. infirmities based on violation of constitutional mandate, mala fides, non-compliance with rules of natural justice and perversity. The position was reiterated by the Constitution Bench in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184 ). We are of the view that contours of interference have been well drawn by Kihoto Hollohan and what is involved here is only its application. 34. The factual matrix since is different, I respectfully differ with the learned senior counsel to apply the ratio of the decision in the fact of the present case and I am of the opinion that the decision is in no way in aid of the petitioners. 35. In the case of Balchandra L. Jarkiholi (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that judicial review is clearly available in respect of a proceeding involving question of disqualification before the speaker. In Para 89 of the judgment, the Court has held thus:-- 89. It was submitted that the scope of judicial review of the order of the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly was extremely limited in view of the finality attached to the Speaker's order under Para 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule. Mr. Sorabjee submitted that in Kihoto Hollohan's case (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651) this Court had held that the immunity granted under sub-para (2) of Para 6 was in respect of the procedural aspect of the disqualification proceedings, but that the decision itself was not totally immune from judicial scrutiny. However, having regard to the finality attached to the decision of the Speaker, as indicated in sub-para (1), judicial review of the said order would be confined to infirmities based on: (a) violation of constitutional mandate; (b) mala fides; (c) non-compliance with the rules of natural justice; and (d) perversity. However, having regard to the finality attached to the decision of the Speaker, as indicated in sub-para (1), judicial review of the said order would be confined to infirmities based on: (a) violation of constitutional mandate; (b) mala fides; (c) non-compliance with the rules of natural justice; and (d) perversity. In Para 143 of the judgment, the Court has held thus:-- 143. Even it as held by this Court in Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh case (Mahachandra Prasad Singh (Dr.) v. Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8 SCC 747 ), Rules 6 and 7 of the Disqualification Rules are taken as directory and not mandatory, the appellants were still required to be given a proper opportunity of meeting the allegations mentioned in the show-cause notices. The fact that the appellants had not been served with notices directly, but that the same were pasted on the outer doors of their quarters in the MLA complex and that too without copies of the various documents relied upon by Shri Yeddyurappa, giving them three days' time to reply to the said notices justifies the appellants' contention that they had not been given sufficient time to give an effective reply to the show-cause notices. 36. In the present case, there is nothing to show that there was any violation of Constitutional mandate or mala fides on the part of the official respondents. The rules of natural justice what is vehemently argued, as not observed, is also of no consequence in the peculiar facts of this case since even if a notice was issued and the writ petitioners were heard the result should not have been different and there was no scope for taking a different view else the view already taken by the respondent No. 2. 37. In the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar (supra), the Supreme Court has held that there is no doubt, whatsoever that the audi alteram partem is one of the basic pillars of natural justice which means no one should be condemned unheard and no one should be a judge of his own cause and the Court held that wherever possible the principles of natural justice should be followed, but such principle cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. The principle may not be applied in a given case unless prejudice is shown. The principle may not be applied in a given case unless prejudice is shown. In the present case, the petitioners even did not utter a single word as to how they have been prejudiced or as to in what manner their right have been curtailed for not issuing a notice to them by the respondent No. 2 and for not hearing them afresh on the issue of disqualification. The petitioners since disobeyed the Whip and admittedly voted supporting the no confidence motion against their party Pradhan and Upa Pradhan, they were supposed to be within the trap of disqualification and there is no way out for them with the plea of non-observance of principles of natural justice. We may refer here Paragraph 26, 27 and 28 of Ashok Kumar Sonkar (supra), which reads as follows:-- 26. This brings us to the question as to whether the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the audi alteram partem is one of the basic pillar of natural justice which means no one should be condemned unheard. However, whenever possible the principle of natural justice should be followed. Ordinarily in a case of this nature the same should be complied with. Visitor may in a given situation issue notice to the employee who would be effected by the ultimate order that may be passed. He may not be given an oral hearing, but may be allowed to make a representation in writing. 27. It is also, however, well-settled that it cannot put any straightjacket formula. It may not be applied in a given case applied unless a prejudice is shown. It is not necessary where it would be a futile exercise. 28. A court of law does not insist on compliance of useless formality. It will not issue any such direction where the result would remain the same, in view of the fact situation prevailing or in terms of the legal consequences. Furthermore in this case, the selection of the appellant was illegal. He was not qualified on the cut off date. Being ineligible to be considered for appointment, it would have been a futile exercise to give him an opportunity of being heard. 38. Furthermore in this case, the selection of the appellant was illegal. He was not qualified on the cut off date. Being ineligible to be considered for appointment, it would have been a futile exercise to give him an opportunity of being heard. 38. The Supreme Court while deciding the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar (supra), also taken into consideration several other earlier decision of the Court and noted it in Paras 29, 30, 31 and 32, which reads as follows:-- 29. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [ (2000) 7 SCC 529 ], the law is stated in the following terms: 25. The 'useless formality' theory, it must be noted, is an exception. Apart from the class of cases of 'admitted or indisputable facts leading only to one conclusion' referred to above, there has been considerable debate on the application of that theory in other cases. The divergent views expressed in regard to this theory have been elaborately considered by this Court in M.C. Mehta [M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 ] referred to above. This Court surveyed the views expressed in various judgments in England by Lord Reid, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Woolf, Lord Bingham, Megarry, J. and Straughton, L.J. etc. in various cases and also views expressed by leading writers like Profs. Garner, Craig, de Smith, Wade, D.H. Clark etc. Some of them have said that orders passed in violation must always be quashed for otherwise the court will be prejudging the issue. Some others have said that there is no such absolute rule and prejudice must be shown. Yet, some others have applied via media rules. We do not think it necessary in this case to go deeper into these issues. In the ultimate analysis, it may depend on the facts of a particular case. 30. In Karnataka SRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa and Another [ (2005) 3 SCC 409 ], this Court held: The question as to what extent, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. The principles of natural justice cannot be applied in vacuum. They cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The principles of natural justice are furthermore not required to be complied with when it will lead to an empty formality. The principles of natural justice cannot be applied in vacuum. They cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The principles of natural justice are furthermore not required to be complied with when it will lead to an empty formality. What is needed for the employer in a case of this nature is to apply the objective criteria for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. If the criteria required for arriving at an objective satisfaction stands fulfilled, the principles of natural justice may not have to be complied with, in view of the fact that the same stood complied with before imposing punishments upon the respondents on each occasion and, thus, the respondents, therefore, could not have improved their stand even if a further opportunity was given. 31. In Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh and Another [ (2006) 8 SCC 647 ], this Court opined: The principles of natural justice were also not required to be complied with as the same would have been an empty formality. The court will not insist on compliance with the principles of natural justice in view of the binding nature of the award. Their application would be limited to a situation where the factual position or legal implication arising thereunder is disputed and not where it is not in dispute or cannot be disputed. If only one conclusion is possible, a writ would not issue only because there was a violation of the principle of natural justice. 32. In P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India and Others [ (2006) 8 SCC 776 ], this Court observed: 30. The Principles of natural justice cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. It must be seen in circumstantial flexibility. It has separate facets. It has in recent time also undergone a sea change. It was further observed: 39. Decision of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors. [ (1980) 4 SCC 379 ], whereupon Mr. Rao placed strong reliance to contend that non-observance of the principles of natural justice itself causes prejudice or the same should not be read 'as it causes difficulty of prejudice', cannot be said to be applicable in the instant case. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, have undergone a sea change. In view of the decision of this Court in State Bank of Patiala & Ors. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, have undergone a sea change. In view of the decision of this Court in State Bank of Patiala & Ors. v. S.K. Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 ] and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [ (1996) 5 SCC 460 ], the principle of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in the order being rendered a nullity. To the principal/doctrine of audi alteram partem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principal. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straightjacket formula. [See Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J. & K. Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 337 and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi & Ors. JT 2006 (1) SC 19. See also Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P. (2006) 1 SCALE 265 .] The principles of equity in a case of this nature, in our opinion, will have no role to play. Sympathy, as is well-known, should not be misplaced. 39. The Supreme Court while considering the issue of the principles of natural justice has observed that unless it is shown that there were mala fides or colourable exercise of power, the burden is very heavy on the complainant to prove that non-observance of the principles of natural justice vitiated the decision. The fact of Ajit Kumar Nag (supra) though is different, but the principle laid down may be followed and I would like to gainfully quote here the observation of the Court:-- The principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. The approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than "precedential". In certain circumstances, application of the principles of natural justice can be modified and even excluded. Both in England and in India, it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct in the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. It can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion. The maxim audi alteram partem cannot be invoked if import of such maxim would have the effect of paralyzing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency so demands. The principles of natural justice have no application when the authority is of the opinion that it would be inexpedient to hold an enquiry and it would be against the interest of security of the Corporation to continue in employment the offender workman when serious acts were likely to affect the foundation of the institution. 40. There is nothing to show that by not issuing a notice to the writ petitioners and not affording them a scope of hearing, any valuable right of the petitioners were taken away or that anything new which had happened beyond the knowledge of the petitioners taken to consideration by the respondent No. 2 while declaring disqualification. 40. There is nothing to show that by not issuing a notice to the writ petitioners and not affording them a scope of hearing, any valuable right of the petitioners were taken away or that anything new which had happened beyond the knowledge of the petitioners taken to consideration by the respondent No. 2 while declaring disqualification. What has happened in the meeting of no confidence that has been recorded in the Minutes of the meeting signed by the petitioners and other members of the Panchayat and that Minutes of the meeting with the report of the Panchayat Extension Officer has been taken to consideration and the Block Development Officer made inquiry in his own way and to his subjective satisfaction taken the decision declaring disqualification of the petitioners from the Membership of the FGP, which stands good and does not appear to have vitiated in any manner for not giving notice afresh and for not hearing the petitioners on the issue again. 41. I, therefore, find no merit in the writ petitions filed by the three writ petitioners and all three writ petitions are dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand) in each of the writ petitions. It has been submitted by learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik that since Writ Petition Nos. 287 of 2012, 408 of 2012 and 409 of 2012 have been taken up for hearing and disposal and so, the writ petitioners of W.P. (C) 446 of 2012 does not like to insist upon that writ petition and the writ petition therefore, stands disposed of and is governed by the decision of other three writ petitions.