JUDGMENT ARIJIT BANERJEE, J. 1. This is an appeal arising out of a judgment and order dated 3rd, March, 2014 passed by the learned Single Judge in A.P. No. 87 of 2012 whereby the learned Judge dismissed the appellant’s application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award dated 8th November, 2011. 2. By two separate Memoranda of Understanding (in short MOU) both dated 19th April, 1996, the respondent agreed to sale several lots of properties situate in the industrial area of Kanpur including a Mini Coal Storage, Ice Factory, Petrol Pump, Service Station, Tannery etc. and the appellant agreed to purchase the same in his own name or in the name of his nominees. The consideration money mentioned in the two MOUs were Rs. 2,65,00,000/- and Rs. 2,02,23,200/- respectively and the time prescribed for completion of the sale was two years calculated from the date of the MOUs. 3. On 22nd June, 1996 the respondent executed two powers of attorney in favour of the appellant in aid of implementation of the two MOUs. 4. On 1st September, 1998, the respondent revoked the powers of attorney and on 9th September, 1998 terminated the MOUs on the alleged ground that the appellant had failed and neglected to effect sale of the entirety of the properties and had started acting in breach of the MOUs with a view to wrongfully enriching himself at the cost of the respondent and had also misappropriated large sums of money out of some of the sales effected by him. 5. In September, 1998, the respondent filed a suit in the Calcutta High Court being CS No. 414 of 1998 for a declaration that the two MOUs and the powers of attorney stood terminated and for injunction. 6. Subsequently, the parties entered into negotiation which resulted in a settlement between them leading to execution of another MOU dated 10th December, 1998 with a fresh power of attorney in favour of the appellant. Under this MOU the appellant was appointed as an agent of the respondent for the purpose of selling the entirety of the balance of the properties which stood unsold for a total consideration of Rs. 1,62,75,000/. It further provided that if the appellant was unable to sell the entirety of such property within one year then the appellant would himself purchase the same. 7. 1,62,75,000/. It further provided that if the appellant was unable to sell the entirety of such property within one year then the appellant would himself purchase the same. 7. On 20th April, 1999 the parties rescinded the above MOU and also cancelled the supporting power of attorney and on the same date a fresh MOU was executed between the parties. Under this MOU, the appellant was appointed as the respondent’s agent to sell the balance properties for a total consideration of Rs. 1,17,12,000/-. The agency was to come to an end with the expiry on December 31, 1999. Before that date the agent shall have to pay the sum of Rs. 1,17,12,000/- and if before December 31, 1999 the agent was unable to procure purchases, he would purchase the properties in his own name. Time was made the essence of the contract. 8. Between 20th April, 1999 and 16th October, 1999 the appellant arranged sale of some of the properties covered by the aforesaid MOU but a substantial portion remained unsold. 9. According to the respondent, the appellant failed to effect any further sale and the agreement expired by efflux of time on 31st December, 1999. The value of the portion of the properties sold was Rs. 57,68,000/- and the value of the balance unsold property was Rs. 59,44,000/-. The respondent revoked the power of attorney and claimed that the unsold part of the property continued to be in its ownership. 10. The respondent referred the disputes and differences to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the said MOU. 11. In its statement of claim, the claimant (the respondent herein) claimed an award for Rs. 1,39,99,531/- including Rs. 59,44,000/-. The claimant also claimed an award for delivery up and cancellation of powers of attorney dated April 20, 1999 and June 5, 1999, award for delivery up and cancellation of the memorandum of understanding dated 20th April, 1999, award directing the respondent to cancel the 38 registered agreements for sale as contained in Annexure J.J to the statement of claim and declaration that the 38 registered agreements for sale are not binding on the claimant. 12. 12. In its counter statement, the respondent counter-claimed an award for specific performance of the agreement dated April 20, 1999 and an award of perpetual injunction restraining the claimant from dealing with, disposing of, and alienating or encumbering the balance portion of the subject property. 13. After discussing in details the cases advanced on behalf of the parties, the Learned Arbitrator rejected the respondent’s counter claim for specific performance and allowed the claimant’s claim for declaration that the MOU dated 20th April, 1999 stood expired on December 31, 1999 and the unsold part of the property covered thereby remains the property of the claimant. The other claims of the claimant were rejected. Since the main counter claim for specific performance was rejected, the consequential counter claims of the respondent were also rejected. The operative portion of the arbitral award is set out hereunder: "Be it declared that the agreement dated 20th April, 1999 between the parties is an agreement of agency and the same as also the two Powers of Attorney executed in terms of the said agreement and in relation thereto – those dated 20th April 1999 and 5th June, 1999 – stood terminated with effect from the expiry of the 31st day of December 1999 and as such those are cancelled. Be it further declared that the unsold part of the property covered by the said agreement dated 20th April 1999 i.e. the properties constituting the subject matter of the said agreement excluding therefrom the portion actually sold at the instance of Prime Products Ltd. between 20th April 1999 and 16th October 1999 as depicted in yellow colour in the Map attached hereto which forms part of this award remained the property of Prime Products Ltd. and in their ownership." 14. Being aggrieved, the appellant assailed the said arbitral award before the Learned Single Judge by way of an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 15. One of the points urged before the Learned Single Judge was that although the petitioner (appellant before us) had laid oral evidence before the Arbitrator and relied on several documents, the award did not refer to any document or the oral evidence. 15. One of the points urged before the Learned Single Judge was that although the petitioner (appellant before us) had laid oral evidence before the Arbitrator and relied on several documents, the award did not refer to any document or the oral evidence. The learned Judge held that if the Arbitrator heard the matter over a period of 8 years, in course whereof, the petitioner led oral evidence and relied on several documents, and the Arbitrator formed an impression that the petitioner had unfairly hung on to the property with the intent of causing prejudice to the respondent, there appears to have been substantial material before the Arbitrator to form such impression. The Arbitrator has summarized the substance or essence of the primary clauses of the Contract, discovered the real meaning of the contract upon noticing the minor conflicts between some of the clauses and found that the petitioner was not qualified to seek specific performance of the agreement of sale of the property. The operative portion of the order of the Learned Single Judge is set out hereunder:- "There does not appear to be any irregularity or illegality committed by the arbitrator in arriving at the conclusion on the basis of the material as indicated in the award. The award is neither in derogation of the agreement between the parties nor otherwise opposed to public policy. The arbitrator does not appear to have transgressed the bounds of his authority under the arbitration agreement. Merely because the petitioner wanted to stretch the proceedings, as the petitioner did even at this stage before the Court, would not imply that the arbitrator or the Court has to refer to and deal with every irrelevant submission made or red herring planted to divert the attention from the primary focus of the matter. The award does not call for any interference. A.P. No. 87 of 2012 is dismissed. For the petitioner having undeservingly delayed the implementation of the award and having assailed the award without any basis whatsoever, the petitioner will pay costs assessed at Rs. 5 lakh." 16. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us. Mr. Saha, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that 90 sittings were held before the learned Arbitrator between 2002 and 2010. The hearing was concluded on 21st December, 2010 and the award was published on 8th November, 2011. 5 lakh." 16. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before us. Mr. Saha, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that 90 sittings were held before the learned Arbitrator between 2002 and 2010. The hearing was concluded on 21st December, 2010 and the award was published on 8th November, 2011. The oral evidence led on behalf of the appellant and the several documents relied upon by the appellant find no mention in the award. The learned Arbitrator ignored the law and the Apex Court’s decisions. The contract, even with the time limit, does not terminate ipso facto. For termination, an overt act is necessary. No reason has been given by the learned Arbitrator as to why he did not believe the appellant’s case. The award is vitiated by legal perversity. The award is also not supported with reasons and is bad on that ground also. 17. Mr. Saha relied on the case of Arosan Enterprises Ltd. vs. Union of India, 1999 (9) SCC 449 , paragraphs 13, 14, 19, 26 and 27 in support of his submission that when the contract itself provides for extension of time the same cannot be termed to be the essence of the contract and default in such a case does not make the contract voidable. It becomes voidable provided the matter in issue can be brought within the ambit of the first para of Section 55 of the Contract Act. Mr. Saha also relied on the decision in the case of Tandra Venkata Subrahmanayam vs. Vegesana Viswanadharaju, AIR 1968 AP 190 , paras 8 and 9 in support of his contention that at the expiry of the time for specific performance of the contract, the promisee may avoid the contract but the contract automatically does not become void. He submitted that the finding in the award that the contract stood determined automatically is contrary to law. 18. Mr. Saha also relied on Sections 51 to 54 of the Contract Act and submitted that in the instance case there were reciprocal obligations of the respondent which the respondent did not perform. The respondent did not co-operate in registration of conveyance in favour of the purchasers procured by the appellant. He finally submitted that the award suffers from legal bias and perversity. 19. Per contra, Mr. The respondent did not co-operate in registration of conveyance in favour of the purchasers procured by the appellant. He finally submitted that the award suffers from legal bias and perversity. 19. Per contra, Mr. S.P. Sarkar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that this is not an appeal from the award. While hearing an application for setting aside an award, the Court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction. The grounds for interfering with an arbitral award are limited. Mr. Sarkar relied on the following decisions:- (i) Union of India vs. Vinod Kumar Agarwal, AIR 2013 Cal 52 (ii) Handelsgesellschaft M.B.H. vs. Westzucker G.M.B.H. (No. 2) (iii) Westzucker G.M.B.H. vs. Bunge G.M.B.H. (1981) 2 Ll. L. Reports, 130 (iv) Som Datt Builders Limited vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 10 SCC 259 (v) K.V. Mohammad Zakir vs. Regional Sports Centre, (2009) 9 SCC 357 (vi) Eagil Trust Co. Ltd. vs. Pigott-Brown, (1985) 3 All ER 119. 20. In the decision reported in AIR 2013 Calcutta 52 a Division Bench of this Court after discussing the precedents on the exercise of jurisdiction by a court while hearing a setting aside application, culled out the principles from the decisions in paragraph 19 of the judgment. Broadly speaking, the principles are that a court hearing a setting aside application does not exercise appellate jurisdiction, will not reappraise the evidence adduced before the Arbitral Tribunal, will not interfere with the Tribunal’s interpretation of contractual clauses unless such interpretations are perverse and will not interfere with the award unless it is contrary to the law of the land or terms of the contract or is contrary to public policy or is so unjust as to shock judicial conscience. In the case reported in 1981 2 Ll. L. reports, 130 the Court of appeal held that all that is necessary is that the Arbitrators should set out what, on their view of the evidence, did or did not happen and should explain succinctly why, in the light of what happened, they have reached their decision and what that decision is. This is all that is meant by reasoned award. In the case reported in 2009 10 SCC 259 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that reasons are essential in support of an award, however, the same need not be elaborate and the arbitral Tribunal is not expected to right a judgment like a Court. This is all that is meant by reasoned award. In the case reported in 2009 10 SCC 259 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that reasons are essential in support of an award, however, the same need not be elaborate and the arbitral Tribunal is not expected to right a judgment like a Court. In the decision reported in 2009 9 SCC 357 the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Court should not substitute its own view for the view taken by the Arbitrator while dealing with the proceedings for setting aside an award. Where the Arbitrator acts within jurisdiction, the reasonableness of the reasons given by the Arbitrator is not open to scrutiny by Courts. However, if the reasons are such as no person of ordinary prudence can ever approve of them or if the reasons are so outrageous in their defiance of logic that they shock the conscience of the Court, then it is a different situation. In the case reported in 1985 3 ALL ER 119, the Court of appeal held that although it is a Judge’s duty to give his reasons for his decision, there are well-established exceptions. The most obvious and frequently used is the exercise of the Judge’s discretion on costs. 21. In reply, Mr. Saha, ld. Senior Counsel submitted that although an arbitral Tribunal may go wrong in publishing an award, so long as he is acting within his jurisdiction, the Courts will not interfere. However, the Tribunal cannot go wrong in law as that would be contrary to public policy and make the award bad. 22. We have considered the rival contentions of the parties. While hearing a setting aside application, the Court does not sit as an appellate court. We have perused the award carefully. It is a well-reasoned and compact award in our opinion. It is unfortunate that the proceedings continued for about 8 long years but for that the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be necessarily made responsible. The parties had equal contribution in making the proceedings as protracted as they were. The learned Arbitrator interpreted the various clauses of the contract and we do not find any perversity in such interpretation. Even if we do not agree with the construction of the clauses as made by the ld. Arbitrator, that would not entitle us to substitute our opinion in the place and stead of the ld. The learned Arbitrator interpreted the various clauses of the contract and we do not find any perversity in such interpretation. Even if we do not agree with the construction of the clauses as made by the ld. Arbitrator, that would not entitle us to substitute our opinion in the place and stead of the ld. Arbitrator’s opinion and if we do so we would be transgressing our jurisdiction. The Arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality as well as quantity of evidence. It may be possible that on the same evidence, the Court might have arrived at a different conclusion but that by itself is no ground for setting aside the award. An award is not open to challenge on the ground that the Arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or failed to appreciate facts, as under the law the Arbitrator is made the final arbiter of the disputes between the parties. The court will not sit in appeal over the award nor re-appreciate the evidence for the purpose of finding whether on the facts and circumstances the award in question could have been made. Intervention of the Court is envisaged in few circumstances only to ensure fairness like in case of fraud or bias by the Arbitrators, violation of natural justice etc. The court cannot correct errors of the Arbitrators. The scheme of the 1996 Act aims at keeping the supervisory role of the court at minimum level and this is quite justified as parties to the agreement make a conscience decision to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction by opting for arbitration as they prefer the expediency and finality offered by it. 23. We are unable to agree with Mr. Saha’s submissions that the award impugned is an unreasoned award. As noted earlier, the reasons need not be elaborate. In the case of Union of India vs. Royal Construction, 2002 (1) CHN 13 in para 20, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:- "(1) To make a reasoned award the Arbitrator has to make his mind known on the basis which he has acted. (2) Statement of reasons is not the same thing as the giving of a detailed judgment. (3) Reasons are short and intelligible indications of the arbitrator’s mind, no more. (2) Statement of reasons is not the same thing as the giving of a detailed judgment. (3) Reasons are short and intelligible indications of the arbitrator’s mind, no more. (4) The reasons must have such connection with the conclusions reached by the arbitrator as to show that the arbitrator has not acted irrelevantly, unreasonably or capriciously. (5) The reasons should deal with the substantial points raised in the reference." 24. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any scope for interfering with the arbitral award. We are in complete agreement with the judgment and order of the Ld. Judge. However, for the ends of justice we reduce the costs from Rs. 5 lakh to Rs. 2 lakh. Subject to the reduction of costs as aforesaid, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I agree.