CAV ORDER I. A. ANSARI This appeal has put to challenge the order, dated 07.05.2014, passed, in CWJC No. 8822 of 2014, by a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereby the learned single Judge of this Court, while dismissing the writ petition, has given liberty by observing that since the second show cause notice has already been issued, it is left open to the petitioner (i.e., appellant herein) to assail any order of punishment, which may visit him, including the validity of the decision of the respondents to hold a second enquiry inasmuch as the previous enquiry, according to the writ petitioner, had been purportedly completed and the law, according to the writ petition, does not envisage a second enquiry and/or the manner in which the second enquiry had been conducted. 2. The material facts, which gave rise to the present appeal, may, in brief, be set out as under: (i) A departmental proceeding was initiated, on 21.02.2007, under Bihar Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “2005 Rules”), against the writ petitioner on the charges levelled against him in a vigilance case instituted on the basis of a complaint, received against the writ petitioner, whereby demand of bribe of Rs. 10,000/- was alleged to have been made by the writ petitioner in a case pending with the writ petitioner as Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bettiah. (ii) According to the writ petitioner’s case, the writ petitioner took charge of the post of Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bettiah, on 24.12.2004 and there was no occasion for him to ask for bribe inasmuch as the final order in the case, pending under the Minimum Wages Act, had already been concluded on 20.09.2004 itself and communication, in this regard, had been issued, vide Memo No. 30, dated 28.09.2006, to the complainant. Why the order was communicated so belatedly was, however, not explained by the writ petitioner. (iii) In fact, the writ petitioner was arrested on the basis of the said allegation and, following his arrest, Disciplinary Authority decided to keep the writ petitioner under suspension and proceeded against him departmentally. Why the order was communicated so belatedly was, however, not explained by the writ petitioner. (iii) In fact, the writ petitioner was arrested on the basis of the said allegation and, following his arrest, Disciplinary Authority decided to keep the writ petitioner under suspension and proceeded against him departmentally. (iv) The writ petitioner challenged the order of his suspension and initiation of the departmental proceeding by filing a writ petition, made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which gave rise to CWJC No. 7679 of 2007, contending therein, inter alia, that the departmental proceeding, which had been initiated on the charge framed therein, was based on a subject matter of a case, registered by the Vigilance Department, and when the Vigilance Department was proceeding to prosecute the case against him, the departmental proceeding, if allowed to proceed, on the same set of charges, which a criminal court was required to look into, would cause serious prejudice to the writ petitioner and, hence, the departmental proceeding needed to be stayed. (v) By order, dated 31.07.2007, passed, in CWJC No. 7679 of 2007, a learned single Judge of this Court stayed the departmental proceedings for one year and directed that all attempts shall be made to dispose of the vigilance case within the said period of one year and further directed that if vigilance case was not concluded within a period of one year, the respondents go ahead with the departmental proceedings in accordance with law. The order, dated 31.07.2007, passed in CWJC No. 7679 of 2007, was never challenged by the present appellant and the said order, therefore, attained finality except the fact that the order, dated 31.07.2007, was, later on, modified by extending the said period of one year. The learned single Judge further period of six months. (vi) As the vigilance case was not concluded within the period aforementioned, the respondents resumed the departmental proceeding. The resumption of the disciplinary proceeding was never challenged by the appellant herein. (vii) In course of time, an enquiry report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority by the Enquiry Officer’s letter No. 3476, dated 30.11.2012. (vi) As the vigilance case was not concluded within the period aforementioned, the respondents resumed the departmental proceeding. The resumption of the disciplinary proceeding was never challenged by the appellant herein. (vii) In course of time, an enquiry report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority by the Enquiry Officer’s letter No. 3476, dated 30.11.2012. The enquiry report, so submitted, did not record any finding of the Enquiry Officer as regards the question as to whether the charge, framed against the writ petitioner, in the departmental proceeding, stood proved or not; rather, the Enquiry Officer, vide his letter No. 3476, dated 30.11.2012, aforementioned, merely pointed out that since the departmental proceeding and the criminal case were based on the same set of facts and a charge, which involves commission of an offence, can be proved only in the Vigilance Court and, hence, such charges, in a departmental proceeding, cannot be pursued and proved. (viii) On receiving this enquiry report, dated 30.11.2012, aforementioned, Disciplinary Authority ordered a fresh enquiry on the same set of charges against the writ petitioner by its resolution, contained in Memo No. 3192, dated 30.10.2012, which was amended to some extent by a subsequent letter, contained in Memo No. 377, dated 13.02.2013. (ix) Aggrieved by the fresh enquiry, which was ordered, vide Memo No. 3192, dated 30.10.2012 aforementioned, and amended vide Memo No. 377, dated 13.02.2013, the present appellant put the direction to hold fresh enquiry by way of a writ petition, which gave rise to CWJC No. 8822 of 2013, wherein he sought for setting aside and quashing the order, dated 30.10.2012 aforementioned, whereby fresh enquiry had been ordered, the ground of challenge being that 2005 Rules do not vest in Disciplinary Authority any power to take resort to fresh enquiry. (x) In CWJC No. 8822 of 2013, the respondents herein contended thus: Though the Enquiry Officer had submitted his enquiry report, dated 30.11.2012, stating therein that the departmental proceeding had been initiated on the basis of the vigilance case and since trial, in a criminal court, at Muzaffarpur, was in progress, on the same set of charges, such a charge could be decided only in a court of criminal jurisdiction and not in a departmental proceeding, Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the view so adopted by the Enquiry Officer in the enquiry report, the disagreement being on the ground that in a case of present nature, the departmental proceeding and a criminal case can proceed simultaneously, though separately and, therefore, a fresh enquiry was ordered against the writ petitioner by Disciplinary Authority under resolution No. 3192, dated 31.10.2012, whereby a different Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were appointed. (x) As the time rolled on, the appellant herein superannuated on 31.07.2013. Upon his superannuation, the departmental proceeding was continued by taking recourse to resolution No. 3040, dated 18.10.2013, under Rule 43 (b) of Bihar Pension Rules. (xi) In the fresh enquiry, so ordered, an enquiry report was submitted, on 07.02.2014, with the finding that all the charges, which had been brought against the delinquent, stood proved. This was followed by a second show cause notice issued to the appellant asking him to file his reply thereto. 3. In the backdrop of the facts indicated above, the second writ petition, namely, CWJC No. 8822 of 2013, was dismissed, on 07.05.2014, with the liberty to the writ petitioner to assail (as indicated in the preceding paragraph of this order), any order of punishment, which may visit him, including the validity of the decision of the respondents to hold a second or fresh enquiry. 4. 4. Aggrieved by the order, dated 07.05.2014, passed, in CWJC No. 8822 of 2013, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed, the writ petitioner is, in appeal, before us, on the ground that no fresh enquiry can be initiated against him on the same set of facts on which the earlier enquiry had been initiated and if Disciplinary Authority found the first enquiry report not agreeable, it could have assigned its reasons and, then, having given necessary opportunity to the writ petitioner to have his say in the matter, appropriate order(s), resuming the fresh enquiry could have been passed, but by no means, a fresh enquiry, could have been ordered inasmuch as fresh enquiry is de hors the relevant rule, i.e., Rule 18 of the 2005 Rules. 5. We have heard Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, learned Counsel for the writ petitioner-appellant, and Mr. Manikant Mishra, learned Government Pleader No. 25, appearing for the State. 6. A careful perusal of Rule 17 of the 2005 Rules clearly indicates that when an Enquiry Authority is not the Disciplinary Authority, the Enquiry Authority shall forward to Disciplinary Authority the record on conclusion of the enquiry with a report prepared under sub-clause (ii) of clause (23) of Rule 17 of the 2005 Rules, which shall be accompanied by the written statement of the defence by the Government servant; oral and documentary evidence produced in the course of the inquiry; written briefs, if any, filed, during the course of the inquiry, by the Presenting Officer or the Government servant or both; and the orders, if any, made by Disciplinary Authority and the Enquiry Authority, in this regard, in the course of the inquiry and it is only after the submission of the aforesaid enquiry report that the question, as regards the action to be taken on the enquiry report, will arise. 7. What action can be taken on an enquiry report stands embodied in Rule 18 of 2005 Rules, which reads as follows: “18. Action on the inquiry report. – (1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, may remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 17 as far as may be. – (1) The disciplinary authority, if it is not itself the inquiring authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, may remit the case to the inquiring authority for further inquiry and report and the inquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 17 as far as may be. (2) The disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report as per Rule 17 (23) (ii) or as per sub-rule (1), shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidences on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) The disciplinary authority shall forward or cause to be forwarded a copy of the inquiry report, together with its own findings, if any, as provided in sub-rule (2), to the government servant who may submit, if he or she so desires, his or her written representation or submission to the disciplinary authority within fifteen days. (4) The disciplinary authority shall consider the representation or submission, if any, submitted by the Government Servant before proceeding further in the manner specified in sub rules (5) and (6). (5) if the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (v) of Rule 14 should be imposed on the Government Servant, it shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 19, make an order imposing such penalty. (6) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses [(vi) to (xi)] of Rules 14 should be imposed on the Government Servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government Servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (5) and (6), in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the Commission shall be consulted and its advice shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing any penalty on the Government Servant.” (Emphasis is added) 8. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (5) and (6), in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the Commission shall be consulted and its advice shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing any penalty on the Government Servant.” (Emphasis is added) 8. From a cautious reading of Rule 18 of the 2005 Rules, what becomes evident is that Disciplinary Authority cannot, under Rule 18 of the 2005 Rules, order a fresh enquiry; rather, Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Enquiry Authority, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case to the Enquiry Authority for further enquiry and report and the Enquiry Authority shall, thereupon, proceed with further enquiry, according to the provisions of Rule 17 of 2005 Rules as far as may be. 9. Thus, when Disciplinary Authority, on receipt of the enquiry report, disagrees with the findings of the Enquiry Authority on any charge, Disciplinary Authority is required to record its own finding on such a charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. Disciplinary Authority shall, then, forward a copy of the enquiry report, together with its own findings, if any, to the Government servant, who may submit, if so desires, written representation or submission to the Disciplinary Authority within fifteen days. Disciplinary Authority shall, then, consider the representation or submission, if any, made by the Government servant before proceeding any further in the manner specified in Section 18 of 2005 Rules. 10. Situated thus, it becomes clear that Rule 18 of 2005 Rules does not permit initiation of a fresh enquiry by Disciplinary Authority on the same set of charges and, in the case of the disagreement with the findings of an Enquiry Authority, what can be ordered is a further enquiry. 11. Having indicated the position of law, what, now, needs to be noted, most carefully, is that in the case at hand, the Enquiry Officer did not record any finding at all with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the writ petitioner-appellant against whom the disciplinary proceeding had been initiated. The writ petitioner-appellant cannot, therefore, be treated to have been exonerated of the charges brought against him by Disciplinary Authority. This apart, there are no inherent limitations in holding a departmental proceeding on the same set of charges, which a criminal court may be in seisin of. 12. The writ petitioner-appellant cannot, therefore, be treated to have been exonerated of the charges brought against him by Disciplinary Authority. This apart, there are no inherent limitations in holding a departmental proceeding on the same set of charges, which a criminal court may be in seisin of. 12. In the case at hand, since there was no finding rendered by the Enquiry Officer, by its letter No. 3476, dated 30.112012, with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the writ petitioner-appellant, it logically follows that there was no question of any fresh enquiry being ordered; rather, the enquiry, which had already been ordered, could have been resumed by appointing, if necessary, a new Enquiry Officer and a new Presenting Officer, the resumption of enquiry being on the ground that there is no inherent bar on the part of Disciplinary Authority to proceed departmentally against a Government servant on a charge, particularly, when the charge is of making demand for bribe or taking of bribe. Merely because a criminal court is in seisin of such a charge, the Enquiry Officer could not have closed the enquiry as has been done in the present case. To that extent, the Enquiry Officer’s enquiry report was not accepted by Disciplinary Authority for good reasons. 13. The contention of the writ petitioner-appellant is, therefore, partly correct that there cannot be, or could not have been, a fresh enquiry; but it is wholly incorrect to suggest that Disciplinary Authority was divested of its power to resume the earlier enquiry by appointing afresh, if necessary, as already indicated hereinabove, an Enquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer, when there was no specific finding rendered by the earlier Enquiry Officer on the guilt or otherwise of the person charged with. 14. It may be pertinent to note that the resumption of the enquiry would obviously fall within the ambit of further enquiry. 15. Because of what has been discussed above, the order, dated 07.05.2014, passed in CWJC No. 8822 of 2013, which stands impugned in this appeal, needs to be interfered with, albeit partly, and this appeal needs to be partly allowed and disposed of with appropriate directions. 16. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal partly succeeds. 15. Because of what has been discussed above, the order, dated 07.05.2014, passed in CWJC No. 8822 of 2013, which stands impugned in this appeal, needs to be interfered with, albeit partly, and this appeal needs to be partly allowed and disposed of with appropriate directions. 16. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal partly succeeds. While the order, dated 13.02.2013, passed by Disciplinary Authority directing a fresh enquiry and the consequent enquiry report, submitted by the second Enquiry officer, are hereby set aside and quashed, the matter is remitted back to Disciplinary Authority with liberty to resume the first enquiry, which had been initiated by the order, dated 21.02.2007, aforementioned by appointing afresh, if necessary, Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer and if the enquiry is resumed, the writ petitioner-appellant shall be informed accordingly. 17. We further direct and clarify that if Disciplinary Authority decides to resume the enquiry, appoint Enquiry Authority and/or Presenting Officer, as the case may be, and inform the writ petitioner-appellant accordingly and, thus, having given notice, as regards resumption of the first enquiry, to the writ petitioner-appellant, ensure that unless the writ petitioner-appellant does not co-operate in getting the further enquiry so resumed, expeditiously, the further enquiry is concluded, in accordance with law, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the notice of the resumption of such further enquiry by the writ petitioner-appellant.