JUDGMENT : - Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The appellants are the proforma defendants and have come up in appeal against the judgment and decree dated 6.12.2007 passed by learned District Judge (F), Shimla in Civil Appeal No. 68-S/13 of 2005/04. 2. The facts as necessary for the adjudication of the case are that one Udi Ram son of late Sh. Handu at the time of his death was succeeded by his four sons namely Het Ram, Jagat Ram, Mast Ram and Thapi. Het Ram had son proforma defendant No.7 Anokhi Ram and Mohi Ram, plaintiff, Jagat Ram had widow Mathi, Mast Ram had sons Mehar Singh, defendant No.1 and Dharam Singh Defendant No.2, Vidya Devi, daughter, defendant No.3, Thapi had sons Med Ram, defendant No.4 and daughter defendant No.5 Smt. Kalawati maintained that Udi Ram was owner in possession of landed property situated at Mauja Suin, Kogi, Pateog and Mauja Majhiar, Tehsil and Distt. Shimla, H.P. The details of the property was given in para No.4(1) of the plaint. The details of property had also been given which was situated in Suin Kogi. The property situated at Pateog (hereinafter referred to as the suit property), maintained that during his life time, late Sh.Udi Ram himself effected family partition amongst his sons, according to which he gave finally all his moveable and immoveable properties including land at Mauja Pateog to his sons Het Ram and Jagat Ram. The remaining land situated at Mauja Kogi, Majhiar and Suin was kept joint by Udi Ram through a family settlement of his properties effected on 17.6.1930 and the possession of the same was also kept joint. The plaintiffs and proforma defendants are as such co-owners in possession with defendants No. 1 to 5 in respect of the land situated at Mauja Kogi, Majhiar and Suin and are exclusive owners of the property at Village Pateog. The defendants No. 1 to 5 have no right, title or interest in the suit property averred in the plaint that a family settlement which was carried out by late Sh. Udi Ram, whereas Het Ram and Jagat Ram jointly settled at Mauja Pateog and started to own and possess exclusively the total land which was in the ownership and possession of late Sh. Udi Ram. By virtue of the aforesaid family settlement which was done by late Sh. Udi Ram, late Sh. Udi Ram, whereas Het Ram and Jagat Ram jointly settled at Mauja Pateog and started to own and possess exclusively the total land which was in the ownership and possession of late Sh. Udi Ram. By virtue of the aforesaid family settlement which was done by late Sh. Udi Ram, late Sh. Het Ram and Jagat Ram became absolute owner in possession of the property situated at village Pateog, Tehsil and District Shimla. To this effect in the column of possession in the revenue record the entries finds mention and the defendants No. 1 to 5 have no right, title or interest over the suit property. It was further averred that during the year 1984 in order to bring the correct position in revenue record, a report was lodged with the Halqua Patwari Kasumpti by Med Ram son of late Sh. Thapi Ram etc. vide rapat rojnamcha No. 407, dated 11th June, 1985. It was averred that plaintiffs and proforma defendants are the absolute owners in possession of the total land at mauja Pateog i.e. suit land. It was averred that some of the land is being acquired by the Government of H.P. for use by the Shimla Development Authority. However, it has revealed now, that the defendants No. 1 to 5 on the basis of wrong revenue entries are trying to claim and withdraw the amount of compensation. It was alleged that necessary award for acquisition of land at Mauja Pateog i.e. suit land is likely to be passed and payments are going to be made within 2-3 days. It was averred that defendants No. 1 to 5 have no existing right, title and interest and as such, it was submitted that if the partition has not been established in that event, in the alternative, the plaintiffs and proforma defendant Anokhi Ram have been coming in physical, peaceful, open, uninterrupted and hostile ownership and possession of the suit land for the last more than 60 years and as such they have acquired title in respect of the suit property by way of adverse possession. The suit property is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The Land Acquisition Collector, Rural Shimla was going to award and make payment of amount of compensation in respect of the suit land in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs, to the defendants No. 1 to 3. The suit property is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The Land Acquisition Collector, Rural Shimla was going to award and make payment of amount of compensation in respect of the suit land in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs, to the defendants No. 1 to 3. They deserved to be restrained from making any payment of amount of compensation to the defendants in respect of the suit property. The cause of action had arisen a week before filing of the suit within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court and prayed that a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants No. 1 to 5 from referring any claim over absolute ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants over the land i.e. Khata Khatauni No. 22/42, kita 22 measuring 48.7 bighas land as entered against khata khatauni No. 33/56, Kh. No. 328 measuring 6 bighas and land as entered against Khata Khatauni No. 28/49, Kita 3 measuring 36.19 bighas situated at Mauja Pateog, Tehsil and District Shimla directly or indirectly in any manner personally through their persons, agents, servants, labourers etc. and the plaintiffs and proforma defendants be also declared as owner in possession of the suit land. The defendants be also restrained from interfering in the ownership and possession of the suit land and they also be restrained from using the entries in the revenue record contrary to this position against the plaintiffs in any way. The defendant No.6 be also restrained from making any payment of amount of compensation to the defendants No. 1 to 5 with respect to acquisition of any portion of land at Mauja Pateog. 3. The defendants No. 1 to 6 contested the suit and filed written statement and raised preliminary objections that the suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, the suit as framed is neither competent nor maintainable, the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file and maintain the present suit, the suit has not been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction, plaintiffs are estopped to file the present suit due to their own acts, deeds etc., the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties, there is no cause of action in favour of the plaintiffs, the suit is barred by the principles of constructive res judicata and the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. On merits, denied the averments as maintained in the plaint. The averments of family settlement had been denied. It was submitted that the parties are in joint possession of entire suit property alongwith other. The document dated 17.6.1930 made by late Sh. Udi Ram appears to be forged and fabricated document prepared by the plaintiffs to gain undue advantage over the defendants. It was further denied that the plaintiffs and proforma defendants are the exclusive owner of the suit property. It was submitted that the property is undivided and was never partitioned. It was further submitted that the Sub Judge Court No.3, Shimla in case No. 144/1 of 1990 decided on 15.12.1992, titled Smt. Mathi vs. Anokhi Ram and others decided that the said suit property was joint interse the parties and it was further declared that Smt. Mathi, one of the co-sharers is owner of 1/4th undivided share in whole of the land of Udi Ram. The said document has become final and conclusive as has not been challenged in any court of law. Therefore, the suit is barred by principle of constructive res-judicata. It was further submitted that the possession of the one co-sharer is admitted to be the possession of all the other co-sharers. Therefore, the entry in the column of possession in favour of the plaintiffs and proforma defendants cannot acquire the title to the property by way of partition or by way of adverse possession. 4. The remaining defendants also contested the suit and filed separate written statement claiming that the compensation was awarded as per revenue entries. It was further submitted that the rights of the parties are finally decided by learned Sub Judge, Court No.3, Shimla which judgment has become conclusive and final and the suit is barred by principle of res-judicata. The plaintiffs filed replication and reiterated their claim as maintained in the plaint. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 5.10.1993, 13.5.1997 and 5.6.1997 framed the following issues: 1. Whether Udi Ram has executed any family settlement on 17.6.1930 and plaintiff and proforma defendants are exclusive owner in possession of the suit land at Mauja Pateog and co-owner in possession with defendants No. 1 to 5 in respect of mauja Kogi on the basis of aforesaid family settlement as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of permanent prohibitory injunction as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD 5. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit? OPD 7. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action? OPD 8. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit? OPD 8.A. Whether the plaintiffs and proforma defendants in the alternative have become owner of the lands at mauja Pateog by way of adverse possession as alleged? OPP 8.B. Whether the present suit is barred by limitation as alleged? OPD 1 to 5. 8.C. Whether the present suit is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata as alleged? OPD 1 to 5. 9. Relief. 6. The learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.8.2004 dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 24.8.2004 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Shimla, the proforma defendants/appellants preferred an appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court, who vide impugned judgment and decree dated 6.12.2007 dismissed the appeal and this is how the appellants/proforma defendants are before this Court by way of the present regular second appeal. 7. On 23.10.2009 this Court was pleased to admit the appeal on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the principle of res judicata was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case even after the discovery of new facts and the documents after the passing of the decree in the earlier suit? 2. Whether the documents exhibit PW-1/A being 30 years old was proved to have come from a proper custody and the courts below have erred in law in rejecting the said document as well as the document exhibit PW-4/A, which was duly proved? 3. Whether the Courts below have erred in law in not passing a decree against one of the contesting respondents in view of the application under Order 12, Rule 6 CPC filed by him? 4. Whether the Courts below have ignored material oral and documentary evidence and have misread and misinterpreted the evidence adduced on the record? 8. 3. Whether the Courts below have erred in law in not passing a decree against one of the contesting respondents in view of the application under Order 12, Rule 6 CPC filed by him? 4. Whether the Courts below have ignored material oral and documentary evidence and have misread and misinterpreted the evidence adduced on the record? 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records carefully. 9. Mr. G.C.Gupta, learned Senior counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that the principles of res judicata would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case since there was discovery of new facts and documents after the passing of the decree in the earlier suit. He further contended that the Courts below have failed to take into consideration the fact that they were required to apply the principles of res judicata as applicable between the codefendants while they have applied the rule of res judicata simpliciter as if it was dealing with a case of the plaintiff and defendants in the earlier suit. In support of his contention, he cited number of judgments and in rebuttal thereto, Mr. Bhupender Gupta, learned senior counsel for the defendants has also cited number of authorities. 10. There is inherent fallacy in the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants because in the suit filed by Mathi, she was held entitled to 1/4th share in the suit property taking into consideration the natural succession of Udi Ram, who admittedly had four sons namely Het Ram, Jagat Ram, Mast Ram and Thapi and Mathi was the widow of one of the son Sh. Jagat Ram. The remaining 3/4th shares in terms of this judgment was held to be of those who were the successors of three other brothers Het Ram, Mast Ram and Thapi. 11. Further what is not forthcoming is that in case there had been severance of status amongst the co-sharers by way of family arrangement or by any other mode, then what prevented the appellants from raising such pleas in the suit filed by Mathi because admittedly if such a plea would have been raised then the appellants would not have been entitled to 1/4th but double of the share i.e. one half share. Therefore, to my mind, the claim now sought to be raised by the appellants who are proforma defendants and whose interest is that with the plaintiffs, this suit can conveniently be held to be barred by principles of constructive res judicata. 12. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with res judicata as under: “11. Res judicata. – No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I to III: xxx xxx xxx Explanation-IV.-Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.” Therefore, in terms of the aforesaid provision, as a general rule, every ground of attack with reference to the title sued on must be pleaded and the plaintiffs will not be allowed to make out a fresh case afterwards. Conversely, if the decree passed in the previous suit is inconsistent with a defence which ought to have been raised, that defence must be deemed to have been raised and finally decided, and is barred by principle of res judicata. 13. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. No doubt, where a matter has been constructive in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. and others vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri and others (1986) 1 SCC 100 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “20. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. and others vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri and others (1986) 1 SCC 100 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to S. 11, C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force.” 14. The law on the subject has been dealt with in detail in three Judges Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramchandra Dagdu Sonavane (dead) by LRs and others vs. Vithu Hira Mahar (dead) by LRs and others (2009) 10 SCC 273 wherein it has been held as under: “Res judicata and the Code of Civil Procedure 42. It is well known that the doctrine of res- judicata is codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 generally comes into play in relation to civil suits. It is well known that the doctrine of res- judicata is codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11 generally comes into play in relation to civil suits. But apart from the codified law, the doctrine of res-judicata or the principle of the res-judicata has been applied since long in various other kinds of proceedings and situations by courts in England, India and other countries. The rule of constructive res-judicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other situations also Principles not only of direct res-judicata but of constructive res-judicata are also applied, if by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explicitly decided, the decision operates as res-judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceedings between the same parties. 43. The principle of res- judicata comes into play when by judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implications even then the Principle of res-judicata on that issue is directly applicable. When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it, is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, is taken as decided. [See Workmen v. Cochin Port Trust (1978) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1978 SC 1283 ]. 44. In Swamy Atmandanda vs. Sri Ramakrishna, Tapovanam [ (2005) 10 SCC 51 ], it was held by this court : (SCC p.61 paras 26-27) "26. The object and purport of the principle of res judicata as contended in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every subsequent suit between the same parties. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of lis stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Once the matter which was the subject-matter of lis stood determined by a competent court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent litigation. Such a rule was brought into the statute-book with a view to bring the litigation to an end so that the other side may not be put to harassment. 27. The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create a bar as regards a plea, between the same parties in some other matter in another court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh the very point that was determined in the earlier judgment." 45. When the material issue has been tried and determined between the same parties in a proper suit by a competent court as to the status of one of them in relation to the other, it cannot be again tried in another suit between them as laid down in Krishna Behari Roy vs. Bunwari Lal Roy reported in [1875 ILR (IC-144)], which is followed by this Court in the 28 case of Ishwar Dutt Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr. [ (2005) 7 SCC 190 ], wherein the doctrine of `cause of action estoppel' and `issue estoppel' has been discussed. It is laid down by this Court, that if there is an issue between the parties that is decided, the same would operate as a res-judicata between the same parties in the subsequent proceedings. This court in the case of Isher Singh vs. Sarwan Singh, [ AIR 1965 SC 948 ] has observed : (AIR p.951, para 11) "11. We thus reach the position that in the former suit the heirship of the respondents to Jati deceased (a) was in terms raised by the pleadings, (b) that an issue was framed in regard to it by the trial Judge, (c) that evidence was led by the parties on that point directed towards this issue, (d) a finding was recorded on it by the appellate court, and (e) that on the proper construction of the pleadings it would have been necessary to decide the issue in order to properly and completely decide all the points arising in the case to grant relief to the plaintiff. We thus find that every one of the conditions necessary to satisfy the test as to the applicability of Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is satisfied." 46. So far as the finding drawn in the suit for injunction in O.S. No.104 of 1953, regarding adoption would also operate as a res-judicata in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sulochana Amma Vs. Narayanan Nair [ (1994) 2 SCC 14 ]. It is observed: "The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, it operates as a res-judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res-judicata. “9….It is a settled law that in a Suit for injunction when title is in issue, for the purpose of granting injunction, the issue directly and substantially arises in that suit between the parties when the same is put in issue in a later suit based on title between the same parties or their privies in a subsequent suit, the decree in injunction suit equally operates as a res-judicata." (SCC p.20, para 9) 47. The same view is reiterated in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 3272 ]. This Court has stated, that, even in an earlier suit for injunction, there is an incidental finding on title, the same will not be binding in the later suit or proceedings, where title is directly in question, unless it is established, that it was "necessary" in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and that the relief for injunction was found or based on the bindings of title. Even the mere framing of an issue may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case.” 15. Even the mere framing of an issue may not be sufficient as pointed out in that case.” 15. The principle of res judicata comes into play when by judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implications not only this, when any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eyes of the law, to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in it, is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, it is taken as decided. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment of Workmen v. Cochin Port Trust (1978) 3 SCC 119 . 16. The decision in earlier case on the issue between the same parties or persons under whom they claim title or litigating under the same title, operates as a res judicata. A plea decided even in a suit for injunction touching title between the same parties, would operate as res judicata. (See: Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan Nair (1994) 2 SCC 14 and Gram Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh (2000) 7 SCC 543 : AIR 2000 SC 3272 . 17. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not contest the suit of Mathi. Not only this, they were even satisfied with the awards made by the Land Acquisition Collector/ Courts. Undisputedly, the basis of such awards in so far as it relates to the apportionment of shares was determined entirely on the basis of the judgment and decree in Mathi’s case. Thus, the learned Courts below have rightly concluded that the appellants having accepted the judgment and decree in Mathi’s case to attain finality and thereafter having withdrawn the amount of compensation are clearly estopped from filing the present suit. 18. Mr. G.C.Gupta, learned senior counsel for the appellants would contend that the determination of the question of title under Land Acquisition Act would not operate res judicata in the subsequent suit between the parties and has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar and another (2003) 3 SCC 128 more particularly the following observations: “34. The award made by the Collector is final and conclusive as between the Collector and the 'persons interested', whether they have appeared before the Collector or not, on two issues : (i) as to true area, i.e. measurement of land acquired, (ii) as to value of the land, i.e. the amount of compensation, and (iii) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the 'persons interested'-again, between the Collector and the 'persons interested' and not as amongst the 'persons interested' inter se. In the event of a reference having been sought for u/S. 18, the Collector's award on these issues; if varied by Civil Court, shall stand superseded to that extent. The scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom compensation is payable; in spite of the award by Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum.” 19. Mr. G.C.Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants would also contend that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly stated that the scheme of the Act does not attach a similar finality to the award of the Collector on the issue as to the person to whom the compensation is payable; inspite of the award by the Collector and even on failure to seek reference, such issue has been left available to be adjudicated upon by any competent forum. 20. I am afraid that I cannot agree with these submissions. Firstly, it is not on the basis of the award of the Collector that plea of res judicata is being raised by the other side. This plea is being raised on the basis of the award passed by the learned District Judge, Shimla in references under Sections 18 and 30 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was not only the adequacy of the compensation but even the apportionment which had been questioned and thereafter determined by the competent court of jurisdiction which determination has attained finality. 21. The plea of res judicata being applicable on question of title determined by the Land Acquisition Collector and thereafter by the competent court in reference is no longer res-integra. Reference can conveniently be made to the decision of the Hon’ble in T.B.Ramchandra Rao and another vs. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao and others AIR 1922 Privy Council, 80. 21. The plea of res judicata being applicable on question of title determined by the Land Acquisition Collector and thereafter by the competent court in reference is no longer res-integra. Reference can conveniently be made to the decision of the Hon’ble in T.B.Ramchandra Rao and another vs. A.N.S. Ramchandra Rao and others AIR 1922 Privy Council, 80. The position of law reiterated and followed in Mt. Bhagwati vs. Mt. Ram Kali AIR 1939 Privy Council 133 in the following terms: “In order successfully to establish a plea of res judicata or estoppel by record it is necessary to show that in a previous case a Court having jurisdiction to try the question came to a decision necessarily and substantially involving the determination of the matter in issue in the later case. It was at one time a matter of doubt in India whether the determination of a Court to which a matter has been referred by the Collector Under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was such a decision. That doubt was resolved, by the judgment of this Board in Raniachmdra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (1922) L.R. 49 I.A. 129 : S.C. 24 Bom. L.R. 963, which decided that, where a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation has been referred to the Court, a decree thereon not appealed from renders the question of title res judicata in a suit between the parties to the dispute. In that case some question arose as to whether any appeal lay to His Majesty in Council in a case where the determination of the Judge ended in an award and not in a decree. The Board took the view that where the matter referred was not the adequacy of the amount of compensation awarded, but a dispute between the persons claiming compensation, involving, it might be, difficult questions of title, the resultant decision was not an award but a decree. The Board took the view that where the matter referred was not the adequacy of the amount of compensation awarded, but a dispute between the persons claiming compensation, involving, it might be, difficult questions of title, the resultant decision was not an award but a decree. This particular part of the judgment has, however, become academic, since an appeal to His Majesty in Council is now given by Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act which was added by amendment in 1921 and enacts : Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2), and Section 2, Clause (9), respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. If, then, in a matter referred to him by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, a Judge to whom it is referred has in a dispute as to their title to the land between two of the parties claiming compensation, determined that dispute, the matter is res judicata and binds the parties in any later suit involving that issue……...” 22. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the question of title determined under the Land Acquisition Act would operate as res judicata in subsequent proceedings relating to title. The decision of the Hon’ble Privy Council aforesaid was followed and statement of law made therein was approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shrimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others vs. Banamali Sen and others AIR 1953 SC 33 in the following manner: “20. It was then argued by Mr. Ghose that the Judge who decided the apportionment issue in the land acquisition proceedings of 1928 was a special Judge appointed under the land Acquisition Act and not being a District Judge, the two decisions of the Privy Council, i.e., Ramachandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao, 49 I. A. 129 and Bhagwati v. Ram Kali, 66 I.A. 145 had no application, as the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the present suit, while the District Judge in those cases would have jurisdiction to hear the regular suits. It was urged that to substantiate the plea of res-judicata even on general principles of law it was necessary that the Court that heard and decided the former case should be a Court competent to hear the subsequent case. It was urged that to substantiate the plea of res-judicata even on general principles of law it was necessary that the Court that heard and decided the former case should be a Court competent to hear the subsequent case. This contention was based on the language of S. 11. “The condition regarding the competency of the former Court to try the subsequent suit is one of the limitations engrafted on the general rule of res judicata by s.11of the Code and has application to suits alone. When a plea of res judicata is founded on general principles of law, all that is necessary to establish is that the Court that heard and decided the former case was a Court of competent jurisdiction. It does not seem necessary in such cases to further prove that it has jurisdiction to hear the later suit. A plea of res judicata on general principles can be successfully taken in respect of judgments of Courts of exclusive jurisdiction like revenue Courts, land acquisition Courts, administration Courts, etc. It is obvious that these Courts are not entitled to try a regular suit and they only exercise special jurisdiction conferred on them by the statute.” We have not been able to appreciate the distinction sought to be made out by Mr. Ghose that had this matter been decided by a District Judge, then the decision of the Privy Council would have been res judicata but as it was by a special Judge the effect was different. The District Judge when exercising powers of a Court under the Land Acquisition Act, in that capacity is not entitled to try a regular suit and his jurisdiction under the Land Acquisition Act is quite different from the jurisdiction he exercises on the regular civil side.” 23. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by courts that are competent to deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of the judgments is an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country and the law on this subject has been summed up by the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.Unnikrishnan and another vs. V.K.Mahanudevan and others (2014) 4 SCC 434 wherein it has been held as under: 19. It is trite that law favours finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by Courts that are competent to deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of judgments pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction has always been treated as an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in the Daryao v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457 where the Court succinctly summed up the law in the following words: (AIR p. 1462, paras 9 & 11) “9. ….It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. * * * 11.…The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.” 20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res-judicata is also fairly well settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 65 , this Court observed: (AIR p.72, para-23) “23.There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as ‘res judicata’ between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as ‘res judicata’.” 21. Similarly in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee AIR 1966 SC 1061 , this Court reiterated the above principles in the following words : (AIR p.1066, para 14) 14.…..A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides.” 22. The recent decision of this Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (2013) 5 SCC 252 is a timely reminder of the very same principle. The recent decision of this Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India (2013) 5 SCC 252 is a timely reminder of the very same principle. The following passage in this regard is apposite: (SCC pp.267-68, para-44) “44.…..In our opinion, if the parties are allowed to reagitate issues which have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the law then all earlier litigation relevant thereto would always remain in a state of flux. In such circumstances, every time either a statute or a provision thereof is declared ultra vires, it would have the result of reopening of the decided matters within the period of limitation following the date of such decision.” 24. The law on the subject has been reiterated in another recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2014) 5 SCC 75 in the following terms: “39.The scope of application of doctrine of res judicata is in question. The literal meaning of “ res ” is “everything that may form an object of rights and includes an object, subject-matter or status” and “ res judicata ” literally means “a matter adjudged a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgments”. “Res judicata pro veritate accipitur” is the full maxim which has, over the years, shrunk to mere “ res judicata ”, which means that res judicata is accepted for truth. The doctrine contains the rule of conclusiveness of the judgment which is based partly on the maxim of Roman jurisprudence “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it concerns the State that there be an end to law suits) and partly on the maxim “nemo debet bis vexari pro uno et eadem causa (no man should be vexed twice over for the same cause). 40. Even an erroneous decision on a question of law attracts the doctrine of res judicata between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. (Vide: Shah Shivraj Gopalji v. ED-, Appakadh Ayiassa Bi & Ors. , AIR 1949 PC 302; and Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors. , AIR 1953 SC 65 ). 41. In Raj Lakshmi Dasi & Ors. v. Banamali Sen & Ors. (Vide: Shah Shivraj Gopalji v. ED-, Appakadh Ayiassa Bi & Ors. , AIR 1949 PC 302; and Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors. , AIR 1953 SC 65 ). 41. In Raj Lakshmi Dasi & Ors. v. Banamali Sen & Ors. , AIR 1953 SC 33 , this Court while dealing with the doctrine of res judicata referred to and relied upon the judgment in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Singh , AIR 1916 PC 78 wherein it had been observed as under: (Raj Lakshmi Dasi AIR p.38 para 15) “15......... the rule of res judicata, while founded on ancient precedents, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time..... Though the rule of the Code may be traced to an English source, it embodies a doctrine in no way opposed to the spirit of the law as expounded by the Hindu commentators. Vijnanesvara and Nilakantha include the plea of a former judgment among those allowed by law, each citing for this purpose the text of Katyayana, who describes the plea thus: 'If a person though defeated at law, sue again, he should be answered, ‘‘you were defeated formerly". This is called the plea of former judgment.’... And so the application of the rule by the courts in India should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law’ (Sheoparsan Singh case, IA pp.98-99).” 42. This Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & Anr. , AIR 1960 SC 941 explained the scope of principle of res-judicata observing as under: (AIR p.943 para 7) “7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation, When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law -has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.” A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Daryao & Ors. v. The State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457 ; Greater Cochin Development Authority v. Leelamma Valson & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 952 ; and Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr. (2005) 1 SCC 787 . 43. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. & Anr. v. Janapada Sabha Chhindwara & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1013 , considered the issue of res judicata applicable in writ jurisdiction and held as under: (AIR p. 1018, para 17) “17....Therefore, there can be no doubt that the general principle of res judicata applies to writ petitions filed under Article 32 or Article 226. It is necessary to emphasise that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to the petitions filed under Art. 32 does not in any way impair or affect the content of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. It only seeks to regulate the manner in which the said rights could be successfully asserted and vindicated in courts of law.” 44. In Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade & Anr., (1999) 5 SCC 590 , this Court has explained the scope of finality of the judgment of this Court observing as under: (SCC pp.604 & 607, paras 17 & 26) “17…..One important consideration of public policy is that the decision pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by the appellate authority and other principle that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice ever because such a procedure should be contrary to consideration of fair play and justice. * * * 26.……Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. * * * 26.……Rule of res judicata prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination may even be demonstratedly wrong. When the proceedings have attained finality, parties are bound by the judgment and are estopped from questioning it.” (See also: Burn & Co., Calcutta v. Their Employees , AIR 1957 SC 38 ; G.K. Dudani & Ors. v. S.D. Sharma & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1455 ; and Ashok Kumar Srivastav v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. , (1998) 4 SCC 361 .) 45. A three-Judge Bench of this court in The State of Punjab v. Bua Das Kaushal, AIR 1971 SC 1676 considered the issue and came to the conclusion that if necessary facts were present in the mind of the parties and had gone into by the court, in such a fact-situation, absence of specific plea in written statement and framing of specific issue of res judicata by the court is immaterial. 46. A similar view has been re-iterated by this court in Union of India v. Nanak Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1370 observing as under: (AIR p.1372, para 5) “5.This Court in Gulabchand Chhotalal v. State of Gujarat , AIR 1965 SC 1153 observed that the provisions of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not exhaustive with respect to all earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular suit, and on the general principle of res judicata , any previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not necessary that the Court deciding the matter formerly be competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject-matter. There is no good reason to preclude, such decisions on matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the principle of the finality of decisions after full contest.” 47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. “The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact-situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.” 25. Now in so far as the other plea raised by the appellants that there was discovery of new facts and documents after passing of the previous decree which permitted filing of fresh suit at the instance of the plaintiffs therein (as appellants were proforma defendants therein) is concerned, the same is without any merit. The plea of severance of status was always available to the appellants irrespective of whether the same was based on family settlement or deed of partition or the like. The severance of status was not dependant upon the execution of any document as a condition precedent for setting up of such plea and could have conveniently been raised as a defence in a suit filed by Mathi. The mere fact that Ex.PW-1/B is stated to have been discovered or found lateron is of no avail because this plea of severance of status was otherwise available to the appellants right from the year 1930 even without the document Ex.PW-1/B when the plaintiffs claims severance of status effected by Udi Ram by way of family settlement on 17.6.1930. As already observed earlier the appellants did not contest the suit filed by Mathi and therefore, no such plea despite being available was raised in that suit. Consequently, under the garb of discovery of new facts or documents the present suit was not maintainable and is barred by res judicata as also constructive res judicata. 26. The learned counsel for the appellants would then contend that the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the fact that this was a case where the principle of res judicata simpliciter was not applicable but was required to be seen in the context of its applicability amongst co-defendants. I am afraid that I cannot agree with such submissions. 26. The learned counsel for the appellants would then contend that the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the fact that this was a case where the principle of res judicata simpliciter was not applicable but was required to be seen in the context of its applicability amongst co-defendants. I am afraid that I cannot agree with such submissions. Undisputably, the previous suit filed by Mathi and the present suit filed by the parties are none other than the successors of the parties in the previous suit filed by Mathi which include the successors of not only the defendants but also the plaintiffs in the present suit. All submissions made by the appellants hold no water when the appellants failed to answer the pointed question as to why the defence as sought in the present appeal was not raised in the earlier suit filed by Mathi. Substantial Question of law No.2: 27. The plaintiff Salig Ram in his statement has stated that the settlement deed Ex.PW-1/A was traced when the construction work of his house was going on. However, when he was examined again on 3.12.2003 wherein he tendered the settlement deed Ex.PW-1/A and its translation Ex.PW-1/B. He in his cross-examination stated that with respect to this deed he was told by Anokhi Ram in the year 2000 and this deed was given to him at his house by said Anokhi Ram. In continuity after some time, he goes on to state that Anokhi Ram died in the year 1998. He feigned ignorance regarding the production of this document in the Court till the death of Anokhi Ram. There are major contradictions in the statement of plaintiff Salig Ram as has been rightly noted by the learned Courts below which clearly suggest that the plaintiff did not know as to from where and when this document was traced. Further no details have been given regarding this fact in the amended plaint which was filed in the year 1996. There are so many discrepancies in the statement of the plaintiffs as has otherwise been noticed by the learned Courts below that it makes difficult for this Court to apply the provisions of Section 90 of the Evidence Act and had the document to have been proved to have come from proper custody despite the fact that the alleged document no doubt is purported to be more than 30 years old. Though the number of judgments has been cited by either side with respect to the applicability of Section 90 of the Evidence Act, but it is settled law that the judgments as precedence would only apply when the fact situation so warrants. This question has been rendered academic in view of the answer to question No.1. Substantial question of law No.3: 28. No arguments were addressed by learned counsel for the appellants on this substantial question of law, moreover, merely because one of the defendant Dharam Singh has filed an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC that would not be sufficient for decreeing the suit against one of the respondents without adjudicating the entire dispute. Substantial question of law No.4: 29. The learned counsel for the appellants could not convince me as to what material and which oral and documentary evidence either misread or misinterpreted by the learned Courts below. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below are neither perverse nor erroneous or rendered in utter disregard to the important materials on record. Accordingly all the aforesaid substantial questions of law are answered. 30. In view of aforesaid discussion, the appeal being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Taking into consideration the inter se relationship between the parties, the parties are left to bear their own costs. All pending applications have become infructuous in view of dismissal of the main appeal.