JUDGMENT : I. Mahanty, J. In the present writ application, the petitioner (M/s.Jay Balaji Jyoti Steels Ltd.) has sought to challenge the order dated 24.10.2013 passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) in Appeal No.ST/70690/2013-SM dismissing the said appeal on the ground that the Commissioner (Appeals) is vested with the power to condone the delay of 30 days in addition to the statutory limit of 60 days as prescribed under Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the appeal having been filed beyond the 90 days permissible, the same was dismissed on the ground of delay and affirmed by the CESTAT. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, it is suffice to note that the petitioner-company in the present case while being registered under the Service Tax law as envisaged under Finance Act, 1994 under the category of “transport of goods by road service” by virtue of Rule (2)(1) (d)(b) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994, having not deposited the service tax including education cess and other cess was liable for demand of Rs.7,54,752.00, on the allegation that, there has been willful suppression by the petitioner-company and consequently, contravention of the Act. The show cause demand notice was issued by Opposite Party No.3 dated 10.6.2010 calling upon the petitioner-company to show cause. The petitioner-company filed a show cause and by order dated 12.7.2011 a demand of service tax, interest and penalty was raised. Thereafter, an appeal was moved by the petitioner-company before the Commissioner (Appeals)-Opposite Party No.2 and by order dated 12.7.2011, the Commissioner (Appeals) dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay and the CESTAT in the second appeal confirmed the same. 3. The main contention raised by Mr. Sahoo, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner was that the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 12.7.2011 was sent to the petitioner-company, which was handed over to “a Peon” of the company in July 2011 and since the same could not be brought to the knowledge of the “management”, there was no effective communication of order as a consequence, there was no real delay in filing of the appeal. It is further alleged that the petitioner-company brought the misplacement of the impugned order to the notice of the Officer-in-charge, Police Outpost, Kalunga, Rourkela. It is further alleged that the petitioner-company brought the misplacement of the impugned order to the notice of the Officer-in-charge, Police Outpost, Kalunga, Rourkela. It is, therefore, submitted that the Commissioner (Appeals)-Opposite Party No.2 vide his order dated 19.03.2013 dismissed the appeal on the ground that he had no power to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period. It is further submitted that Opposite Party No.2 came to a finding that the appeal having been filed after 244 days beyond the prescribed time limit fails in view of the settled position of law under Section 85(3) of the Finance Act, 1994. The petitioner-company being aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 19.3.2013 filed Second Appeal before the CESTAT and the Tribunal by order dated 24.10.2013 relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Singh Enterprises Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, 2008 (221) ELT 163 (Supreme Court) and came to hold that “it has no authority nor power to condone the delay beyond 90 days and the Tribunal accordingly dismissed the appeal. Challenging the orders passed by the Tribunal (CESTAT), the present writ application has came to be filed. 4. Mr. Sahoo, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner attempted to distinguish the facts of the case in the case of Singh Enterprises (supra) and stated that Hon’ble Supreme Court recorded a finding that “the causes shown for condonation have no acceptable value” which persuaded the Hon’ble Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal. He asserted that the facts situation that has arisen for consideration in the present case, is distinct from the factual background of the aforesaid case. Learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that, in fact, there was no delay caused in filing the appeal since the petitioner actually received the order-in-original issued by Opposite Party No.3 on 29.5.2012 i.e. the date of acknowledge of receipt of the order-in-original and the appeal was filed on 14.6.2012 within the statutory period prescribed under Section 30-F of the Central Excise Act, 1944. It is further submitted that the clerk (employee of the petitioner-company) on whom the order passed by the adjudicated authority was served, had no authority to acknowledge receipt of the statutory order on behalf of the petitioner-company, for which, service of the impugned order also not lawful and proper and there has been no valid service of adjudication order on the petitioner-company. He, therefore, vehemently urged that when law prescribes a particular manner for doing a particular act and act must be done in that manner alone, other methods and modes of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. Relying on the above and various case laws cited he submited that Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribes the mode of service of notice. The same is quoted hereunder: “37C. Service of decisions, orders, summons, etc.- (1) Any decision or order passed or any summons or notices issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be served,- (a) by tendering the decision, order, summons or notice, or sending it by registered post with acknowledgment due, to the person for whom it is intended or his authorized agent, if any; xxx xxx xxx xxx.” Learned Senior Counsel asserted that the statute has provided for service of orders by “registered post” on the petitioner and sending the order by “speed post” was not in strict compliance of the law and hence, such notice served was in a manner not prescribed by law. Therefore, the same cannot be held to be adequate service on the petitioner. In this respect, reliance is placed on the following three judgments: (i) Amidev Agro Care Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India, 2012 (279) ELT 353 (Bombay) (ii) Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana Vs. Best Dyeing 2012 (27) STR 97 (P & H) (iii) Metal Powder Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), Tiruchirapalli, 1997 (89) ELT 475 (Madras) 5. On perusing the judgments referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, it appears that whereas the impugned order has been communicated by “speed post”, in the case of Amidev Agro Care Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana (supra) and in the case of Metal Powder Co. Ltd (supra), the order was communicated by “Telegram”. On perusing the judgments referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, it appears that whereas the impugned order has been communicated by “speed post”, in the case of Amidev Agro Care Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Commissioner of Central Excise, Ludhiana (supra) and in the case of Metal Powder Co. Ltd (supra), the order was communicated by “Telegram”. In all these three cases, the Hon’ble High Court came to hold that sending of an order in a manner not provided under Section 37(C) amounts to no evidence of tendering of the decision to the assessee. 6. At this juncture, it would became most relevant to take note of the fact that in none of the judgments cited hereinabove the Hon’ble High Courts have taken into consideration the definition of “registered post” which has been provided under Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 which is quoted hereunder: “Section 28. 6. At this juncture, it would became most relevant to take note of the fact that in none of the judgments cited hereinabove the Hon’ble High Courts have taken into consideration the definition of “registered post” which has been provided under Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 which is quoted hereunder: “Section 28. Registration of Postal articles.-The sender of a postal article may, subject to the other provisions of this Act, have the article registered at the post office at which it is posted, and require a receipt therefore; and the [Central government] may, by notification in the [Official Gazette], direct that, in addition to any postage chargeable under this Act, such further fee as may be fixed by the notification shall be paid on account of the registration of postal articles.” It would be relevant also to take note of the fact that an amendment was brought into the Indian Post Office Rules, 1933, by a Gazette Notification issued by the Ministry of Communications (Department of Posts), Government of India dated 24th July, 1986 introducing “Inland, Speed Post Service” by inserting Rules 66-B thereto which is quoted hereunder: “Rule 66-B. INLAND SPEED POST SERVICE.- Inland Postal articles may be booked after obtaining receipts therefor, at the places specified in column(1) of the Schedule below and the post offices specified in the corresponding entries in column (2) of the said Schedule for delivery under the Inland Speed Post Service subject to the following conditions namely: (1) Inland Speed Post Service shall be available in respect of all classes of mails, which can be sent by the registered service: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx” In view of Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 read with Rule 66-B of Indian Post Office Rules, 1933 (as inserted vide Gazette Notification dated 24th July, 1986), any postal article i.e. registered at the post office from which it is posted, and a receipt issued in respect of such article is to be treated as “registered post”. Both in the case of “registered post” as well as “speed post”, the articles when delivered to the post offices, receipts thereof are required to be issued and consequently, both “speed post” and “registered post” satisfy the requirement of Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. Both in the case of “registered post” as well as “speed post”, the articles when delivered to the post offices, receipts thereof are required to be issued and consequently, both “speed post” and “registered post” satisfy the requirement of Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898. The only difference between registered post and speed post if at all is the charges payable are normally higher for “speed post” as the name suggests the delivery of such articles at an early date. 7. We are of the considered view that none of the judgments cited by the petitioner as noted hereinabove, the Hon’ble High Courts have taken into consideration Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898 nor Rule-66B of the 1933 Rules and consequently, are not of any assistance for deciding the present lis. 8. Mr. Sahoo, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was amended w.e.f. 10.5.2013 and by such an amendment, “speed post” was added thereto to Section 37C and he asserted that such a legislative act, adding an additional mode of service, can only operate prospectively and not retrospectively. 9. We record the aforesaid contention merely to reject the same outright. It is well settled in law that where an amendment which is brought about is “clarificatory in nature”, the same would date back to the date on which the original provision was introduced. No doubt, prior to the amendment on 10.5.2013, the word “registered post” found mentioned in Section 35(C) of the Central Excise Act. In view of Section 28 of the Indian Posts Office Act, 1898, we are of the considered view that both “registered post” as well as “speed post” would come within the fold of Section 28 of the Indian Post Office Act, since on delivery of the postal article, receipt thereof are issued by the Postal Department and consequently, the addition of the term “speed post” with amendment on 10.5.2013 is in our considered view, merely clarificatory and hence, retrospective in its operation. 10. 10. It would be relevant also to point out herein that an additional affidavit was filed by the petitioner-company on 21.11.2014 claiming therein that the employee who received speed post packet on behalf of the company, is a Class-IV employee Miss Bengi Oram, who was not authorized by the company to do so and consequently, the company had initiated a disciplinary against her. When such affidavit was filed, this Court directed vide its order dated 5.12.2014 calling upon the General Manager (Accounts) to file a further affidavit before this Court indicating as to whether the said Class-IV employee-Miss Bengi Oram had in the past ever received postal packages on behalf of the company or not. We also called upon Miss Bengi Oram to file an affidavit whether she had received earlier any postal packages on behalf of the company. After such order was passed, a further affidavit came to be filed on behalf of the petitioner-company through its General Manager, tendering an unconditional apology for filing additional affidavit dated 21.11.2014 without verifying the detail factual position and seeking indulgence of the Court to withdraw the said additional affidavit dated 21.11.2014. The aforesaid facts are merely being recorded to indicate the manner in which the petitioner-company has sought to try and pass the blame on an employee in order to try and justify their admitted delay in filing of the appeal. 11. It appears that post amendment vide Finance Act, 2013 (17 of 2013) w.e.f. 10.5.2013, the following amendment came to be incorporated in Section 37C(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which is as follows: “SECTION 37C. Service of decisions, orders, summons, etc. – (1) Any decision or order passed or any summons or notices issued under this Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be served, - (a) by tendering the decision, order, summons or notice, or sending it by registered post with acknowledgment due [or by speed post with proof of delivery or by courier approved by the Central Board of Excise and Customs constituted under the Central Boards of Revenue Act, 1963 (54 of 1963)] to the person for whom it is intended or his authorized agent, if any.” On perusal of the aforesaid amended provision, it is clear that after the words “sending it by registered post with acknowledgment due” the words i.e. “or by speed post with proof of delivery” has been inserted. The aforesaid amendment itself would clearly shows that the amendment sought to be made is not only clarificatory in nature but also purely procedural for the purpose of communication of decisions/orders/summons to the parties. 12. In the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shyam Sunder and others vs. Ram Kumar and another, 2001(8) SCC 24 , affirmed the judgment of apex Court earlier in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan (dead) by Lrs., 1995 (2) SCC 630 to the following effect: “Declaratory enactment declares and clarifies the real intention of the legislature in connection with an earlier existing transaction or enactment, it does not create new rights or obligations. If a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended....A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the Constitution came into force the amending Act also will be part of the existing law. If a new Act is to explain an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act." Following the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as noted hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the insertion of the words “Speed Post” under Section 37C)(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is clearly curative since various High Courts as quoted hereinabove had came to hold that “communication of notices through speed post was in consonance with law”. Further this amendment is purely explanatory since Section 28 of Indian Post Office Act, 1988 read with Rule 66-B of the Indian Post Office Rules, 1993 (as amended on 24th July 1986). In our considered view, the insertion of “speed post” within the scope and ambit with the “registered post” as mandatory thereunder. Consequently, the amending statute is held by us as “clarificatory amendment” and would have retrospective effect and, therefore, the argument to the contrary by the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner hereby stands rejected. 13. In our considered view, the insertion of “speed post” within the scope and ambit with the “registered post” as mandatory thereunder. Consequently, the amending statute is held by us as “clarificatory amendment” and would have retrospective effect and, therefore, the argument to the contrary by the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner hereby stands rejected. 13. In this respect, before concluding the matter, it would also to be most relevant to note herein that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Singh Enterprises (supra), came to hold that “sufficient cause for explaining the delay is an expression which is found in various statute and it is essentially means as adequate or enough”. 14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that in the facts and circumstances, the explanation offered by the petitioner for the delay of 244 days and the attempt made to cover up the delay by raising another matter, i.e. “a disciplinary action initiated against a Class-IV employee”, we are afraid that the same does not show sufficient cause and the causes shown for condonation are of no acceptable value. 15. Accordingly, the writ application merits no further consideration and the same stands dismissed but in the circumstances no costs.