JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. This regular second appeal stands filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Concurrent findings of fact are challenged by the defendants. 2. Plaintiffs (respondents herein) Ram Sukh and Daya Ram filed a suit for declaration and injunction pleading themselves to be recorded owners of the suit land measuring 7 bighas. Their predecessor-in-interest namely Sh. Surtia and Sh. Shibia transferred possession thereof to the Department of District Board, Shimla vide mutation No. 124 dated 4.4.1936. Such transfer of possession was conditional till such time Middle School Chhausha was to remain there. Even though complete possession of the suit land is recorded to be with the department but however only part thereof, in the shape of play ground, is actually with the defendants. Being absolute owners, plaintiffs are entitled to the timber and grass grown thereupon. With these pleadings, plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of their rights. 3. Defendants (appellants herein) resisted the suit inter alia pleading gift in their favour also asserting their title on a plea of adverse possession. 4. Based on respective pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are recorded joint owners of the suit land, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs have transferred the possession of the suit land, in favour of the Distt. Board, Shimla, on the condition that the Middle School Chhausha remain in existence on the land, as alleged? OPP 3. Whether the valuable trees of Khair, etc. are also sanding on the suit land, which are the property of the plaintiffs, as alleged? OPP 4. Whether the entries, in favour of the District Board, Shimla with regard to the suit land in the shape of Ghasni and Banjar Kadeem are illegal and wrong? OPP 5. Whether the possession of the defendants over the suit land, is that of licensee, as alleged? OPP 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the sale proceeds of the timber ordered to be auctioned in case F.I.R. 90/94 dated 27.10.1994? OPP 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 8. Whether the suit is hit by principle of res judicata? OPD 9. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 10. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their conduct, acts, and acquiescence to file and maintain the present suit? OPD 11. OPP 7. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 8. Whether the suit is hit by principle of res judicata? OPD 9. Whether the suit is time barred? OPD 10. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their conduct, acts, and acquiescence to file and maintain the present suit? OPD 11. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit? OPD 12. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction? OPD 13. Whether the suit land was gifted by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs long back in 1936 to the District Education Board, Shimla, as alleged? OPD 14. Whether in the alternative, the defendants have become the owners of the suit property by way of adverse possession? OPD 15. Relief. 5. Issues stood adjudicated in favour of the plaintiffs in terms of judgment and decree dated 10.12.2001, so passed by the trial Court in Civil Suit No. 74-K/1 of 98, titled as Ram Sukh & another v. State of H.P. & others. 6. Findings of fact, judgment and decree stands affirmed by the lower appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 12.7.2002, passed in Civil Appeal No. 9-S/13 of 2002, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh & others v. Ram Sukh & another. 7. The Courts below concurrently have held the plaintiffs to be owners of the suit land though possession, conditional in nature, is with the defendants. Hence the present appeal which was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- 1. Whether both the Courts below have mis-read and mis-interpreted the oral and documentary evidence on record more specifically the revenue entries and mis-applied the relevant provisions of Registration Act to hold the appellants as licencees on the property in dispute and the respondents-plaintiffs as owners in possession? 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties as also perused the record, I am of the considered view that no ground for interference is made out in the present appeal. 9. Through documentary evidence so placed on record by the parties, it cannot be inferred that predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs transferred possession of the suit land in favour of the defendants, by way of gift. Also through the testimony of Sh. Ichhpal Singh (DW-1) and Sh. Dhyan Singh (DW-2) such fact cannot be inferred. 9. Through documentary evidence so placed on record by the parties, it cannot be inferred that predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs transferred possession of the suit land in favour of the defendants, by way of gift. Also through the testimony of Sh. Ichhpal Singh (DW-1) and Sh. Dhyan Singh (DW-2) such fact cannot be inferred. Revenue record and more particularly mutation No. 124 dated 4.4.1936 clearly establishes that possession would remain with the Board for such period, till such time Middle School Chhausha remains in existence. The person in whose presence alleged gift was made has not been examined. Also there is no documentary evidence to establish such fact. Mere possession over the suit land, continuous in nature, would not establish factum of relinquishment of title by the predecessor in interest of the plaintiffs in favour of the department, by way of gift. Undisputedly, no deed of gift was either prepared, executed, registered or placed on record by the State. On the other hand, through the testimony of plaintiffs' witnesses namely Sh. Ram Sukh (PW-1) and Sh. Ashok Kumar (PW- 2) it stands established that not only transfer of possession over the suit land was conditional, for a specific period, but plaintiffs remained owners thereof. 10. It has also come on record that when plaintiffs/successors-in-interest setup their claim with regard to their standing trees existing over the suit land, Head Master of the school took action and pursuant thereto criminal proceedings were initiated. Sh. Jai Pal Singh and Sh. Satya Pal, both sons of plaintiff Sh. Ram Sukh stand acquitted by the court of learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Kangaghat, Distt. Solan, H.P., vide judgment dated 30.4.1997 (Ext. PW-1/B), passed in Criminal Case No. 31/2 of 1995, titled as State v. Jai Pal Singh & another, with the following observations:- "In view of my discussion and findings on point No. 1, above, both accused deserve acquittal and are therefore, acquitted for offence punishable u/s 379 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. Bail bonds discharged. Accused have claimed the properties stating that tree in question was cut by them under bonafide belief. I have already held in the discussion aforesaid that dispute appears to be of Civil Nature. The timber in question is in possession of school authorities. Bail bonds discharged. Accused have claimed the properties stating that tree in question was cut by them under bonafide belief. I have already held in the discussion aforesaid that dispute appears to be of Civil Nature. The timber in question is in possession of school authorities. Once the parties are hostile to the title of each other, the timber in question cannot be released either to accused or to the school authorities. Accordingly parties are directed to file a Civil Suit and establish their right qua the timber. Accordingly the same is ordered to be sold by Public auction by Forest Corporation. The sale proceeds be deposited in the Govt. treasury and whosoever established his claim in the civil court he would be entitled for the sale proceeds. The case property however be dealt with as per order of Ld. Appellate Court in the event of appeal. Let copy of this order be sent to Forest Corporation." (Emphasis supplied) 11. Only thereafter plaintiffs initiated the proceedings in question and their suit stands decreed as under:- "In view of my findings, on the above issues, the suit of the plaintiffs, is hereby decreed with costs against the defendants, to this effect that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit land and have right over the trees, standing on the same and have right to cut the same and have further right to cut the grass from the same and use the same for the purposes of agriculture, which is comprised in khasra No. 416, 459 and 460, situated in village Podhna, Tehsil Kandaghat, District Solan, H.P. The plaintiffs are also entitled to the sale proceeds of the timber ordered to be auctioned by the S.D.J.M. Kandaghat in case No. 31/2 of 95, decided on 30.4.1997, titled as State v. Jai Pal. The defendants are also restrained from interfering into portion the suit land, by cutting, felling any tree or cutting grass, till the portion of the suit land, is not used for the purpose of running of Govt. High School Chhausha. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. File after completion be consigned to the record room." 12. Defendants plea of ownership is mutually destructive. Having taken the plea of ownership by way of gift, it was not open for them to have pleaded title on the basis of adverse possession. High School Chhausha. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. File after completion be consigned to the record room." 12. Defendants plea of ownership is mutually destructive. Having taken the plea of ownership by way of gift, it was not open for them to have pleaded title on the basis of adverse possession. That apart, defendants could neither plead nor prove such plea of having perfected their title by virtue of adverse possession. Neither is it pleaded nor has anyone proved that defendants' possession over the suit land is hostile to that of true owners. Consequently, I do not find any reason or ground sufficient enough to interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. In my considered view, judgments passed by the Courts below cannot be said to be perverse or that evidence led by the parties was not correctly and completely appreciated. As such, substantial question of law is answered accordingly and the present appeal is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of accordingly. Appeal disposed of.