JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. Pai, learned Additional Government Advocate for the petitioner. 2. By this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 02/09/2005 passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, North Goa, Panaji in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 331/2004. 3. An award dated 19/06/2004 came to be passed by the Sole Arbitrator in the matter of execution of work of construction of road from Murdi village in Village Panchayat of Narva, Bicholim Taluka. The copy of the Arbitral Award was received by the petitioner on 21/06/2004. The petitioner presented its objections under Section 34(2)(a)(v) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('the Act' for short), before the District Judge, North Goa at Panaji, for setting aside the said award dated 19/06/2004. Since there was delay of 38 days in filing the said objections, the petitioner filed an application for condonation of delay, inter alia, alleging that the delay was not deliberate or due to negligence. In reply, the respondent, inter alia, alleged that the application for condonation of delay was not maintainable by virtue of proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act. 4. By impugned order dated 02/09/2005, the learned Additional District Judge-II, relying upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of “Union of India Vs. M/s. Popular Construction Company”, [ AIR 2001 SC 4010 ], held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to an application under Section 34 of the Act and that the Court's power to condone the delay is limited to maximum of 30 days only and not thereafter. Since the objections were filed admittedly after the expiry of 38 days from the date of expiry of three months from the date of receipt of the Award, the application came to be dismissed. Therefore, the petitioner has filed the present petition against the said order. 5. Mr. Pai, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had moved an application under Section 33 of the Act for correction of the award and the said application was disposed of by the learned Sole Arbitrator by order dated 27/12/2004. Therefore, the petitioner has filed the present petition against the said order. 5. Mr. Pai, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had moved an application under Section 33 of the Act for correction of the award and the said application was disposed of by the learned Sole Arbitrator by order dated 27/12/2004. He submitted that application before the learned Additional District Court had to be considered after disposal of the said application under Section 33 of the Act, in which case the application could not be considered as suffering from any delay. He further submitted that even otherwise, Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the said application for condonation of delay and that it was only the Principal District Judge, who could have decided the same. He therefore urged that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Principal District Judge for disposal. In this regard, he relied upon the judgment of three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of “Fountain Head Developers Vs. M/s. Maria Arcangela Sequeira (since deceased through legal representatives) and others” reported in AIR 2007 Bombay 149. 6. I have considered the material on record. I have also considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the judgment cited by him. 7. Section 34 of the Act relates to applications for setting aside arbitral awards. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act reads as under: “S. 34(3).- An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” 8. In the present case, the Arbitral Award dated 19/06/2004 was admittedly received by the petitioner on 21/06/2004 and, therefore, the objections under Section 34 of the Act ought to have been filed latest by about 22/09/2004 i.e. within three months from the date of receipt of Arbitral Award, by excluding the date of receipt of the Award. However, the petitioner had not filed objections within the said prescribed limitation period. The petitioner presented the objections along with an application for condonation of delay, on 28/10/2004. In terms of proviso to Sub-section 3 of Section 34 of the Act, the petitioner could have filed the said objections within a further period of 30 days, from the date of expiry of three months period from the date of receipt of the Award, provided the petitioner satisfies the Court that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months. However, admittedly, the application for condonation of delay was not filed within the said further period of 30 days, but it was filed after 38 days. The proviso to subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act is mandatory and the objections cannot be filed after the expiry of the said period of 30 days. The learned Additional District Judge-II rightly relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of “Union of India” (supra) wherein it has been held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to an application challenging the award under Section 34 and as such, there was no scope for assessing the sufficiency of the cause for the delay beyond the period prescribed in proviso to Section 34 of the Act and that the crucial words in Section 34 “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to Sub-section (3) would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and would, therefore, bar the application under Section 5 of that Act. 9. The petitioner had not brought to the notice of the learned Additional District Judge-II that they had filed an application under Section 33 of the Act, before the Sole Arbitrator, for correction of the award, on the same day when they had filed the application for condonation of delay and that the same was disposed of on 27/12/2004. 9. The petitioner had not brought to the notice of the learned Additional District Judge-II that they had filed an application under Section 33 of the Act, before the Sole Arbitrator, for correction of the award, on the same day when they had filed the application for condonation of delay and that the same was disposed of on 27/12/2004. This fact has now been stated in the present writ petition and copies of the application dated 28/10/2004 filed by the petitioner under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 33(6) of the Act, reply filed by the respondent to the said application and the order dated 27/12/2004 passed on the said application by the Sole Arbitrator, have been produced by the petitioner on record. 10. It is seen that the said application under Section 33 (1)(a) of the Act was not filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the Arbitral Award by the petitioner, as required by Section 33(1) of the Act. But there was a delay of about 99 days in filing the said application. By order dated 27/12/2004, the learned Sole Arbitrator has held that subsection (6) of Section 33 of the Act does not empower the Arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal to extend the time for filing the application under subsection (1) of Section 33 beyond the period of 30 days. The Sole Arbitrator held that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the application under Section 33 of the Act. The application for condonation of delay was, therefore, dismissed. This order dated 27/12/2004 passed by the sole Arbitrator has not been challenged by the petitioner. Even if Section 14 of the Limitation Act was applied to the application for condonation of delay filed before the District Judge, it may be that the period from the date of filing of the application under Section 33(1)(a) till the date of disposal of the said application could have been excluded. However, the application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act was not filed within the limitation period prescribed for filing the objections under Section 34 of the Act. In that case also, there is delay of 8 days which cannot at all be explained. However, the application under Section 33(1)(a) of the Act was not filed within the limitation period prescribed for filing the objections under Section 34 of the Act. In that case also, there is delay of 8 days which cannot at all be explained. In the circumstances above, even if the application under Section 33 of the Act was taken into consideration, then also, there was delay which could not have been condoned. Hence, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. In the case of “Fountain Head Developers” (supra), it has been held that the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in a district for the purpose of a petition under Section 34 of the Act is a District Court and does not include any other Court inferior to the District Court. In view of the above, it is true that the learned Additional District Judge-II did not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the said application for condonation of delay. However, in the present petition, the petitioner has not challenged the impugned order on the ground that the Additional District Judge-II did not have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application. The circumstances are such that even if the impugned order is set aside on the ground that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the application and matter remanded to the Principal District Judge for decision, the decision will be none other than rejection of the application for condonation of delay. In the peculiar circumstances, since the petitioner has not challenged the impugned order on that count, I do not deem it appropriate to set aside the impugned order on such ground. 12. In view of the discussion supra, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged, with no order as to costs.