JUDGMENT : Jitendra Chauhan, J. The present appeal has been filed by the Owner of the offending vehicle, challenging the impugned award dated 6.5.2009, passed by the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jind (for short 'the Tribunal'). Claimants/respondent Nos. 7 and 8- cross objectors have also filed the cross objections for enhancement of the compensation. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Tribunal erred in fastening the liability upon the Owner and driver on the ground the offending vehicle did not have a valid route permit. However, in view of the provisions contained in Section 148 of the Motor Vehicle, there is no requirement of route permit. The vehicle was insured at the time accident. Therefore, the liability should be fastened upon the Insurance Company. 2. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that the vehicle was being used against the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, therefore, the learned Tribunal has rightly fastened the liability upon the appellant and has given recovery rights to the Insurance Company. He prays for the dismissal of the appeal. 3. Learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 7 and 8-cross objectors submits that the learned Tribunal erred in applying the multiplier of 15 instead of 17, as the deceased was 30 years of age at the time of his death. He further submits that no amount has been awarded towards future prospects, loss of love, care and guidance to the children, and loss of love and affection to the mother. The amount awarded towards loss of consortium i.e. Rs. 15,000/- is also on the lower side. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file. 5. A Division Bench of this Court while deciding FAO No. 3726 of 2006 titled as "United India Insurance Company Limited v. Subhash Chander and others" on 18.8.2006, considered the case of "Challa Bharathamma (supra)" has dealt with a question of route permit and held as under:-- "We have carefully perused the judgment and we find that, in the said case, there was no permit at all in terms of definition of permit, as contained in Section 2(31) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short 'the Act'). The said definition, on reproduction, reads as under:-- "2(31) "Permit" means a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorizing the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle." We have also perused Section 149 of the Act which relates to insurer's liability and it is reproduced as under:-- "149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.- (1) If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of Section 147 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment or award in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) (or under the provisions of Section 163A) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment debtor, in respect of the liability, together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any enactment relating to interest on judgments. (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under Sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had noticed through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and ah insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely.- (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely:-- (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle- (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. (3) Where any such judgment as is referred to in Sub-section (i) is obtained from a Court in a reciprocating country and in the case of a foreign judgment is, by virtue of the provisions of Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) conclusive as to any matter adjudicated upon by it, the insurer (being an insurer registered under the Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938) and whether or not he is registered under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country) shall be liable to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree in the manner and to the extent specified in Sub-section (1), as if the judgment were given by a Court in India: Provided that no sum shall be payable by' the insurer in respect of any such judgment unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment is given, the insurer had notice through the Court concerned of the bringing of the proceedings and the insurer to whom notice is so given is entitled under the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, to be made a party to the proceedings and to defend the action on grounds similar to those specified in sub-section (2). (4) Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under sub-section (3) of section 147 to the person by whom a policy has been effected, so much of the policy as purports to restrict the insurance of the persons insured thereby by reference to any condition other than those in clause (b) of Sub-section (2) shall, as respects such liabilities as are required to be covered by a policy under clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of section 147, be of no effect: Provided that any sum paid by the insurer in or towards the discharge of any liability of any person which is covered by the policy by virtue only of this sub-section shall be recoverable by the insurer from that person. (5) If the amount which an insurer becomes liable under this section to pay in respect of a liability incurred by a person insured by a policy exceeds the amount for which the insurer would apart from the provisions of this section be liable under the policy in respect of that liability, the insurer shall be entitled to recover the excess from that person. (6) In this section the expression "material fact" and "material particular" means, respectively a fact or particular of such a nature as to influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether he will take the risk and, if so, at what premium and on what conditions, and the expression "liability covered by the terms of the policy" means a liability which is covered by the policy or which would be so covered but for the fact that the insurer is entitled to avoid or has avoided or cancelled the policy. (7) No insurer to whom the notice referred to in Sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) has been given shall be entitled to avoid his liability to any person entitled to the benefit of any such judgment or award as is referred to in sub-section (1) or in such judgment as is referred to in sub-section (3) otherwise than in the manner provided for in Sub-section (2) or in the corresponding law of the reciprocating country, as the case may be. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "Claims Tribunal" means a Claims Tribunal constituted under section 165 and "award" means an award made by that Tribunal under section 168." None of the provisions contained in both the above Sections refers to route permit. Under the circumstances, we are not inclined to accede to the submissions of learned counsel for the appellant, and further, no such plea was ever taken in the written statement before the Tribunal." 6. In the instant case, route permit had not been brought on record. The above-cited case law shows that there, is no requirement of law, to possess a route permit. Section 2(31) of the Motor Vehicles Act talks about "Permit" only. Section 149 of the Act is also silent about route permit. 7. In the light of the above cited law, the present appeal is allowed and the findings with regard to the recovery rights given to the Insurance Company are set aside. Cross objections for enhancement of the compensation 8. The factum of accidental death of Pawan Kumar is not disputed. There is no proof of age of the deceased except as mentioned in the claim petition i.e. 30 years. He left behind widow, three minor children and old parents. He was the sole bread earner of the family. Cross objections for enhancement of the compensation 8. The factum of accidental death of Pawan Kumar is not disputed. There is no proof of age of the deceased except as mentioned in the claim petition i.e. 30 years. He left behind widow, three minor children and old parents. He was the sole bread earner of the family. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Smt. Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the multiplier of 17 and deduction of 1/4th ought to have been taken. From the perusal of the award, it emerges that no amount has been awarded towards future prospects, loss of love, care and guidance to the child, and loss of love and affection to the mother. The amount awarded towards loss of consortium is inadequate. In view of Rajesh and Others Vs. Rajbir Singh and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 54 (S.C.), Rajesh and Others Vs. Rajbir Singh and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 54 , 50% increase is allowed to the appellants towards future prospects. Keeping in view the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vimal Kanwar and Others Vs. Kishore Dan and Others, (2013) 7 SCC 476 , the compensation under the following head is allowed:-- 9. Accordingly the total compensation comes to Rs. 10,67,350/- (3300 (monthly income) +50% (future prospects)x 3/4th (dependency) x 12x 17 (multiplier)+ 1,00,000 (loss of consortium to the widow only) + 10,000 (funeral expenses already granted) + 1,00,000 (Loss of love, care and guidance to the child) + 1,00,000 (loss of love and affection to the mother). The balance enhanced amount i.e. Rs. 5,56,350/- (10,67,350 - 5,11,000/- already awarded) shall be paid to the claimants, in the manner indicated in this judgment as well as in the impugned Award, within a period of 45 days from the date of the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment, failing which, they shall be entitled to get interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of the filing of the cross-objections till its realisation. In view of the above, the cross objections are allowed and the impugned award is modified to the above extent.