ORDER : Petitioners are sons of late Legori Veigus. They have assailed order dated 01.07.2011 passed in TNC NO.7135/7475 passed by the 2nd respondent – Land Tribunal, Bantwal (Annexure-A), with regard to the land bearing Sy.No.154/2B2 at Navoor Village, Bantwal Taluk, D.K.District, measuring 2.70 acres. Petitioners have also assailed order dated 12.08.1980 passed in TNC No.3984/7475, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-B. A direction is sought against the 2nd respondent Land Tribunal, to consider the claim of the petitioners’ father in Form No.7, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-C. 2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners. At the outset, it is noticed that the order dated 12.08.1980 (Annexure-B) is one made as against the petitioners in respect of an application Form No.7 (Annexure-C) filed by father of the petitioners. So far as that order is concerned, it is noticed that the petitioners’ father, who had participated in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, did not choose to assail that order during his lifetime. It is only after 33 years that the petitioners as the children of the original declarant, have sought to assail that order. There is no explanation, whatsoever, for approaching this Court after this length of time. Therefore, the writ petitions insofar as it assails the orders dated 12.08.1980 (Annexure-B), is rejected on the ground of delay and laches. 3. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: a)In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (State of Orissa & Anr. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: a)In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (State of Orissa & Anr. Mamata Mohanty) the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. b)In the case of Shankar Coop Housing Society Ltd. – Vs M.Prabhakar & Ors (2011 AIR SCW 3033), the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; “53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” c) Similarly, the Apex Court in 2010(4) SCC 532 in the case of SAWARAN LATHA AND OTHERS VSSTATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged. d)Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of (1996) 6 SCC 445 STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS VSD.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS), wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. [(2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus:“The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” f)In fact in S.S.Balu and others v. State of Karnataka [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 3. Insofar as, order dated 01.07.2011 (Annexure-A) is concerned, that is an order made by the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights to respondent No.3. By that order occupancy rights have been granted to respondent No.3 on the basis of Form No.7 filed by the father of respondent No.3, a copy of which is produced as at Annexure-D. The petitioners could not have assailed the order dated 01.07.2011 as well as order dated 12.08.1980 by filing this single memorandum of writ petition. 4. These two orders arise out of two independent proceedings, there is thus misjoinder of parties and causes of action. 5. In the circumstances, writ petitions assailing the order dated 01.07.2011 is also rejected, reserving liberty to the petitioners to assail that order in an independently constituted petition, if the petitioners are so advised, in case they have the locus standi to do so. Office to return certified copy of Annexure-A to the petitioners’ counsel forthwith, subject to the filing a of copy of the same for the purpose of record. In the result, subject to aforesaid liberty, the writ petitions stand rejected.