ORDER 1. W.P. No. 1916/2013 is filed by one K. Balaji, President of Gandhiji Consumer Forum, having office at No.22, Lawyers Chambers, High Court Buildings, Chennai-104 and it is filed for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondents 1 to 4 to pass necessary orders to remove shops, eateries and fun game gadgets and merry-go-round etc., immediately and further directing them not to allow any such thing to come in the future and to maintain the entire length of Marina Beach and all parts inclusive thereof. 2. W.P. No. 16716 of 2013 is filed by Thiru K.R. Ramaswamy alias Traffic Ramaswamy, praying for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents 1 to 5 to consider the representation dated 18.06.2013 and pass appropriate orders within the stipulated time, framed for an enquiry about allowing the hawkers to do hawking in the Marina Beach and Elliots Beach in Chennai. 3. This Court, vide orders dated 26.02.2013 and 19.03.2013 respectively made in M.P.Nos. 2 and 3 of 2013, has impleaded respondents 5 and 6 as parties in W.P. No. 1916/2013. 4. The petitioner in W.P. No. 1916/2013, in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, averred among other things that Gandhiji Consumer Forum has taken up the issue with regard to unauthorized constructions and haphazard buildings coming up in Kodaikanal Hills and the Patron of the Forum Mr. Gandhi, Senior Advocate, has also filed various Public Interest Litigations before this Court, including the naming of the beach opposite to Presidency College as “Thilagar Kattam” and it was also ordered. The petitioner would aver that the City of Chennai is blessed with second longest and most beautiful beach in the world, namely, “The Marina Beach” and various public meetings used to take place in the beach. 5. On an earlier occasion, one Mr. The petitioner would aver that the City of Chennai is blessed with second longest and most beautiful beach in the world, namely, “The Marina Beach” and various public meetings used to take place in the beach. 5. On an earlier occasion, one Mr. P.S. Srinivasan, freedom fighter and Trustee of Gandhi Dharshan Kendra, has filed a writ petition in W.P. No. 4609/2008 on the file of this Court, praying for issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the order dated 21.09.2006 of the Director of Information and Public Relations and Ex Officio Joint Secretary to Government, Tamil Development, Religious Endowments and Information (memorials) Department, Chennai and further communication sent by him vide letter No.44728/Memorials/2007-1 dated 24.12.2007 and direct the respondents 2 to 4 therein to declare the name, the place opposite to Presidency College as “Thillagar Kattam” and also a erect a plaque informing the leaders who had addressed in that place. In the said writ petition, the second respondent herein has filed a counter affidavit and in para 5 took the following stand: “It is submitted that Chennai Metropolitan Beach Committee (CMBC) in their meeting held on 22.2.2005 observed that Marina Beach is an internationally renowned beach and the Government is striving to bring back its glory and beauty. The Government has taken a policy decision to maintain the Beach without any structure/construction henceforth. Consequently, recommended that the request of the petitioner to earmark an area of 30 mts. * 30 mtrs. Of the sandy beach as “Thilagar Ghat” and allow erection of the structure need not be considered.” Ultimately, the second respondent, vide letter dated 09.11.2009, has conveyed the decision of the Government to declare the stretch of sands in front of the Presidency College as “Thilagar Ghat” or “Thilagar Kattam” and to commemorate 26.01.2010 as the 60th Anniversary of the day on which we became a Republic by putting two plaque (English and Tamil) at the “Thilagar Ghat” or “Thilagar Kattam”. Based on the said letter, a Division Bench of this Court has disposed of the above said writ petition. 6. Based on the said letter, a Division Bench of this Court has disposed of the above said writ petition. 6. It is further contended by the petitioner that in view of the pathetic and shabby condition of the Marina Beach, it is frowned and avoided not only by foreign tourists but also visitors from other states and adding salt to the wound, hundreds of small shops and vendors were carrying on their business in the Marina Beach generating filth and make the environment unhygienic. The petitioner would further state that there are number of eateries located both mobile and semi permanent in the Marina Beach and none of them prepare food in accordance with the provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act and inspite of such a blatant violation of the provisions of an important Act, the respondents are doing nothing. The petitioner, in this regard submitted a detailed representation dated 05.01.2013 to the respondents 1 to 4 and though it was acknowledged, they have failed to take any action and hence, he filed the above writ petition. 7. In W.P. No. 16716/2013, the petitioner claims that he is the founder Chairman of Tamil Nadu Social Workers Organization and he filed number of Public Interest Litigations including compulsory use of helmets by two wheeler drivers and also banning of Motorised Fish Cary Bandies in Tamil Nadu. The petitioner would state that the Corporation of Chennai is incapable of controlling street hawkers and in this regard, he filed W.P.No.1049/2006; which is still pending and a contempt petition in Cont. P.No.1916/2011, which is also pending and though number of years had passed, no fruitful or effective steps have been taken to regulate the said hawkers. The petitioner would further aver that almost in all pavements in the City of Chennai, street hawkers had put their shops and thereby, preventing the pedestrian from using it and though it has been brought to the knowledge of the concerned authorities including the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, no worthwhile action has been taken so far. 8. Insofar as the location of number of shops in Marina Beach, the petitioner would state that location and running of shops remain uncontrolled which generate huge amount of garbage and it is not at all removed at regular intervals. 8. Insofar as the location of number of shops in Marina Beach, the petitioner would state that location and running of shops remain uncontrolled which generate huge amount of garbage and it is not at all removed at regular intervals. It is further stated by the petitioner that though a Hawking Committee has been constituted under the chairmanship of a retired Judge of this Court, the matter connected thereof have not been referred to him at all and with the connivance of political highups and other anti social elements, unauthorized shops/eateries continue to exist in Marina Beach and none of the provisions of the relevant Statutes are complied with and in this regard, he submitted a detailed representation dated 18.06.2013 and since it failed to invoke any kind of response, he came forward to file this writ petition. 9. The third respondent in W.P. No. 1916/2013, who is fifth respondent in W.P.No. 16716/2013, has filed a counter affidavit in both the writ petitions stating among other things that the matter in issue involves eviction of over thousands of shops temporarily put up over the years in the beach without any permission or licence from the Corporation of Chennai and it has not allowed anybody to run the business in the beach and that it never collected any rent or fee from them and all of them are running the business without any permission or licence from the Corporation of Chennai. It is further stated that the Corporation is in need of appropriate orders/directions from this Court, as it is facing problems to implement the order. The said respondent would further state that the Corporation of Chennai has already initiated action to implement the order by starting enumeration work to identify the hawkers and in the larger interest of public and to maintain glory of the Marina Beach, it has to maintain the entire stretch of beach in a good and clean condition for the use of general public without any hindrance and health hazard. The said respondent further stated that it has also started enumeration work to identify the hawkers and hence prays for three months time to identify the hawkers and to frame a scheme for them without affecting their livelihood and at the same time providing certain facilities to the beach users without affecting the environment and maintain hygiene. The said respondent further stated that it has also started enumeration work to identify the hawkers and hence prays for three months time to identify the hawkers and to frame a scheme for them without affecting their livelihood and at the same time providing certain facilities to the beach users without affecting the environment and maintain hygiene. The above said respondent also stated that keeping in mind the health hazard being caused to the public on account of the above said uncontrolled activities, it has been regularly cleaning up the areas in and around the beach by engaging workers and also using sand cleaning machines and effective steps are being taken to beautify the beach. 10. The Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, has also filed a report dated 07.06.2013 giving out the details as to the enumerations and identification of hawkers and steps taken to frame the scheme and it is relevant to refer para 4 of the said report which reads as follows: “4. I respectfully submit that as per the latest enumeration conducted by the Corporation of Chennai, there are about 1489 hawkers in the Marina Beach area, who cater to the requirement of beach goers, such as water, refreshments etc. However, they need to be regulated, so that the beach does not get adversely affected by uncontrolled commercial activities. Hence, in order to balance environmental, recreational and livelihood concerns of various stakeholders, a beach management plan has been evolved after careful study and detailed deliberations. The salience features of this plan are as follows:- i. No permanent shops will be allowed in the beach area. ii. Only mobile shops/push carts of the enumerated hawkers will be permitted in selected locations on the beach. iii. The hawkers will be permitted to do their business in the particular area allotted to them by Corporation of Chennai. iv. Commercial activity will be permitted only within the timings laid down by the Corporation of Chennai. v. The hawkers and commercial eateries should maintain cleanliness in and around their business area, by using separately provided bins and washbasins and by adhering to other conditions laid down by Corporation of Chennai.” A sketch as well as the Scheme for Regulation of Hawkers at Marina Beach has also been given by the above said respondent and it is also relevant to extract the same. “SCHEME FOR REGULATION OF HAWERS AT MARINA 1. “SCHEME FOR REGULATION OF HAWERS AT MARINA 1. Marina Beach spreads over a length of 3.48 km spanning from Anna Square to Light House. 2. It is estimated that around one lakh people per day gather at Marina Beach to enjoy the nature. 3. It has been assessed that 1489 hawkers are carrying out business activities of different kinds at the sandy area such as eatables, fancy and other entertainment items. 4. These categories of business are scattered over the sand area of Marina and thereby garbage is being spread all over the Marina causing unhygienic conditions. 5. Regulation and relocation of hawkers in necessary to maintain the Marina in neat and hygienic condition. 6. As per this proposal the entire hawkers shall be relocated in perpendicular to the Kamarajar Salai by restricting the hawkers only behind the Labour statue and behind Gandhi statue in the sandy area. 7. No permanent shops/structures will be permitted in the sandy area only mobile/push carts permitted in the beach. 8. The mobile carts to be located at rear side of Labour Statue and behind Gandhi statue are given below. The schematic illustration is enclosed separately. Details of mobile carts to be provided in the Marina Beach I. Behind Gandhi statue Length – 200 m Size of one mobile cart (Shop) – 2 m x 1.20 m No. of carts can be allowed in each block – 5 cars (shops) The space required for 5 mobile shops – 10 m The space in between two blocks – 1 m No. of shops that can be provided in each row – 90 No. of shops that can be provided in 6 rows – 540 II. Behind Labour Statue Length – 362 m Size of one mobile cart (shop) – 2m x 1.20m No. of carts that can be allowed in each block – 5 carts (shops) The space required for 5 mobile shops – 10m The space in between two blocks – 1m No. of shops that can be provided in each row – 160 No. of shops that can be provided in 6 rows – 960 Total No. of shops that can be provided – 540+960=1500 I. It is proposed that the hawkers be allowed to do their business by keeping the articles in mobile cart only. II. The hawking should be regulated by issuing identity cards to the hawkers. II. The hawking should be regulated by issuing identity cards to the hawkers. The hawkers bearing identity cards only should be allowed inside the Marina Beach. III. Drop gates shall be provided at all entry points and the movement of hawkers inside the beach should be regulated at the entry point itself by verifying the identity card to be issued by the Chennai Corporation. IV. Required no. of security personnel shall be appointed to operate the drop gate and regulate the hawker inside the beach. V. The hawkers will be allowed in the beach only during prescribed timings. 9. The hawkers should use dust bins and prevent littering of their business area. 10. The Corporation may levy on the hawkers a suitable charge for the use of the space mobile cart for their business. 11. The Corporation will periodically review the above arrangement and may modify any of the conditions or take appropriate action against violators with the view to maintaining the cleanliness of the beach. A sketch has also been enclosed as to the manner of location of mobile cart shops. 11. The writ petitioner in W.P.No.1916/2013, in response to the counter affidavit, report and Scheme for Regulation of Hawkers at Marina filed by the Corporation of Chennai, has filed a reply stating among other things that inspite of repeated orders passed by this Court for the removal of encroachers, the hawkers continue to occupy the pavements and no effective steps whatsoever has been taken by the Corporation of Chennai and in the event of approval of the scheme, being granted by this Court, the entire sand area of Marina Beach will get converted into trading centre and may pave way for so many illegal activities. It is further contended that the sand area of Marina beach is the universal property of the world and the Government is not at all having power to regularize the shops and hawkers and therefore, all of them are to be vacated. 12. It is further contended that the sand area of Marina beach is the universal property of the world and the Government is not at all having power to regularize the shops and hawkers and therefore, all of them are to be vacated. 12. The fifth respondent in W.P.No.1916/2013 contended that there are more than 250 persons in their association and they are running smell bunk stalls in Marina Beach from Kamarajar statue to Kannagi statue for more than 30 years and there are eking their livelihood from and out of the meager income derived from the sale of eatables, sweet meat, toys, play articles etc., and they are running their bunk stalls between 3.00 p.m and 10.00 p.m and they have also not put up any permanent structures and capable of being removed and there is no inconvenience or hindrance caused to the public. It is further contended by the fifth respondent that each and every member who is running a stall are maintaining cleanliness and no environmental pollution whatsoever has been caused. 13. The said Association also filed W.P.No.12606/2012 praying for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus forbearing the Corporation of Chennai and other officials from interfering with the running of the business in the temporary shops and bunk shops in Marina Beach between Kamarajar statue and Kannagi statue without resorting to due process of law and a Single Bench of this Court, vide orders dated 04.05.2012, has directed them to dispose of the representation on merits and in accordance without law within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and therefore, their request is for framing and implementation of the scheme to regularize their business. 14. Mr. R. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.1916/2013 has vehemently contended that the officials of the Corporation of Chennai have not taken any action deliberately and in fact turned a blind eye to the running of eateries and other shops by the hawkers and traders, though they do not have permission or licence whatsoever and thereby abetted the illegality. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that when a freedom fighter sought to declare a particular area in which the great leaders had addressed the gathering opposing the British, it was opposed tooth and nail by the second respondent and only at the intervention of this Court, they passed an order to put up plaque opposite to Presidency College to commemorate 26.01.2010 as the 60th Anniversary of the day on which we became a republic and having taken such a stand in the said writ petition that no construction or permanent structure will be permitted in the Marina beach, had permitted hawkers and encroachers to run their business in brazen violation of law and regulations. It is further submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that framing a Scheme and regularizing the said illegal activities, would be a seal of approval and if such a kind of things are allowed, it may encourage others to venture into such kind of illegal activities. 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also drawn the attention of this Court to the hawkers who are doing business just opposite to High Court and would contend that though a Scheme has been framed, it is not at all been implemented and hawkers continue to run their business on the platform and thereby causing utmost inconvenience to the pedestrians, who have no other option except to use the road instead of platform and though the said illegality is brought to the notice of the Corporation of Chennai, no action taken to control the said nuisance. Insofar as identification and enumeration of hawkers/petty traders who are doing their illegal business in the Marina Beach is concerned, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that it is not made clear as to how the Corporation of Chennai has arrived at the figure that 1489 persons are doing business in Marina Beach and no scientific enumeration or data has been collected. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner invited the attention of this Court to the mushrooming growth of unauthorized constructions in the city of Chennai and vehemently contended that the officials of the Corporation of Chennai has done nothing to monitor as to whether constructions have been put up in accordance with the sanctioned plan and though number of orders have been passed by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, except locking and sealing of premises, no worthwhile action has been taken to demolish the unauthorized constructions and in the light of the above said facts, the Scheme for Regulation of Hawkers cannot be implemented successfully and the beach is not meant for trading activities, but it is meant for general public to enjoy the Breeze and getting relaxed. 16. In sum and substance, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that all hawkers should be removed from Marina Beach and no commercial activities should be permitted in that place and it is always open to the Corporation of Chennai to relocate them in some other place without causing hindrance to the Corporation to the general public and damage to environment and hence, prays for allowing the writ petition. 17. The petitioner/party-in-person in W.P.No.16716/2013, apart from adopting the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No. 1916/2013, would contend that the officials of the Corporation of Chennai are deliberately doing nothing to control the illegal activities that are taking place right in front of their eyes and in fact conniving with them and inspite of so many orders passed from this Court for demolition of unauthorized constructions, removal of digital banners put on the pathways, the said orders have not been implemented at all and the Scheme proposed by them for regulation of hawkers in the Marina Beach is nothing but an eye wash and it cannot be implemented successfully and there is no effective monitoring system is available with regard to the successful implementation and hence prays for allowing the writ petition. 18. Mr. 18. Mr. S. Arivazhagan, learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent in W.P.No.1916/2013 has drawn the attention of this Court to the National Policy of Urban Street Vendors, 2009 formulated by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India and would submit that comprehensive policy has been framed by the said Ministry and the official respondents may take it as a guidance and accordingly formulate a scheme so that the livelihood of hawkers, who are poor and down trodden, may not be affected. 19. This Court considered the rival submissions and also perused the materials available on record. 20. In Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others { (1985) 3 SCC 545 }, forcible eviction and removal of pavement and slum dwellers under the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 and the Government obligation to act upon its assurances regarding providing alternative accommodations to evicted persons came up for consideration before the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and it is relevant to extract the following paragraphs of the said decision: “32. As we have stated while summing up the petitioners’ case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The Sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live: only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas, J. in Baksey {347 US 442, 472:98 L ED 829 (1954)} that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois {(1877) 94 US 113} means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. “Life”, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois {(1877) 94 US 113} means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. This observation was quoted with approval by this Court in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. { AIR 1963 SC 1295 } 34. Learned counsel for the respondents placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in In Re Sant Ram { AIR 1960 SC 932 } in support of their contention that the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 does not include the right to livelihood. Rule 24 of the Supreme Court Rules empowers the Registrar to publish lists of persons who are proved to be habitually acting as touts. The Registrar issued a notice to the appellant and one other person to show cause why their names should not be included in the list of touts. That notice was challenged by the appellant on the ground, inter alia, that it contravenes Article 21 of the Constitution since, by the inclusion of his name in the list of touts, he was deprived of his right to livelihood, which is included in the right to life. It was held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that the language of Article 21 cannot be pressed in aid of the argument that the word “life” in Article 21 includes “livelihood” also. This decision is distinguishable because, under the Constitution, no person can claim the right to livelihood by the pursuit of an opprobrious occupation or a nefarious trade or business, like toutism, gambling or living on the gains of prostitution. The petitioners before us do not claim the right to dwell on pavements or in slums for the purpose of pursuing any activity which is illegal, immoral or contrary to public interest. Many of them pursue occupations which are humble but honourable. 37. Two conclusions emerge from this discussion: one, that the right to life which is conferred by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and two, that it is established that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. But the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty. But the Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal liberty. By Article 21, such deprivation has to be according to procedure established by law. In the instant case, the law which allows the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21 is the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, the relevant provisions of which are contained in Sections 312(1), 313(1) (a) and 314. These sections which occur in Chapter XI entitled ‘Regulation of Streets’ read thus: “312. Prohibition of structures or fixtures which cause obstruction in streets.-(1) No person shall, except with the permission of the Commissioner under Section 310 or 317, erect or set up any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or other structure or fixture in or upon any street or upon or over any open channel, drain, well or tank in any street so as to form upon obstruction to, or an encroachment upon, or a projection over, or to occupy, any portion or such street, channel, drain, well or tank. 313. Prohibition of deposit, etc., of things in streets.-(1) No person shall, except with the written permission of the Commissioner.- (a) place or deposit upon any street or upon any open channel, drain or well in any streets (or in any public place) any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale or other thing so as to form an obstruction thereto or encroachment thereon. 314. 314. Power to remove without notice anything erected, deposited or hawked in contravention of Section 312, 313 or 313-A.-The Commissioner may, without notice, cause to be removed – (a) any wall, fence, rail, post, step, booth or other structure or fixture which shall be erected or set up in or upon any street, or upon or over any open channel, drain, well or tank contrary to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 312, after the same comes into force in the city or in the suburbs, after the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Municipal (Extension of Limits) Act, 1950 or in the extended suburbs after the date of the coming into force of the Bombay Municipal Further Extension of Limits and Schedule BBA (Amendment) Act, 1956; (b) any stall, chair, bench, box, ladder, bale, board or shelf, or any other thing whatever placed, deposited, projected, attached, or suspended in, upon, from or to any place in contravention of sub-section (1) of Section 313; (c) any article whatsoever hawked or exposed for sale in any public place or in any public street in contravention of the provisions of Section 313-A and any vehicle, package, box, board, shelf or any other thing in or on which such article is place or kept for the purpose of sale.” By Section 3(W), “street” includes a causeway, footway, passage etc., over which the public have a right of passage or access. 38. These provisions, which are clear and specific, empower the Municipal Commissioner to cause to be removed encroachments on footpaths or pavements over which the public have a right of passage or access. It is undeniable that, in these cases, wherever constructions have been put up on the pavements, the public have a right of passage or access over those pavements. The argument of the petitioners is that the procedure prescribed by Section 314 for the removal of encroachments from pavements is arbitrary and unreasonable since, not only does it not provide for the giving of a notice before the removal of an encroachment but, it provides expressly that the Municipal Commissioner may cause the encroachment to be removed “without notice”. 43. In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. 43. In the first place, footpaths or pavements are public properties which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates the very object for which they are carved out from portions of public streets. The man reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the padestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. There is no substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put up constructions on pavements and that of the pedestrians to make use of the pavements for passing and repassing, are competing claims and that, the former should be preferred to the latter. No one has the right to make use of a public property for a private purpose without the requisite authorization and, therefore, it is erroneous to contend that the pavement dwellers have the right to encroach upon pavements by constructing dwellings thereon. Public streets, of which pavements form a part, are primarily dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even pedestrians have but the limited right of using pavements for the purpose of passing and repassing. So long as a person does not transgress the limited purpose for which pavements are made, his use thereof is legitimate and lawful. But, if a person puts any public property to a use for which it is not intended and is not authorized so to use it, he becomes a trespasser. The common example which is cited in some of the English case (See, for example, Hickman v. Maisey, (1990) 1 QB 752) is that if a person, while using a highway for passage, sits down for a time to rest himself by the side of the road, he does not commit a trespass. But, if a person puts up a dwelling on the pavement, whatever may be the economic compulsions behind such an act, his user of the pavement would become unauthorized. But, if a person puts up a dwelling on the pavement, whatever may be the economic compulsions behind such an act, his user of the pavement would become unauthorized. As stated in Hickman it is not easy to draw an exact line between the legitimate user of a highway as a highway and the used which goes beyond the right conferred upon the public by its dedication. But, as in many other cases, it is not difficult to put cases well on one side of the line. Putting up a dwelling on the pavement is a case which is clearly on one side of the one showing that it is an act of trespass. Section 61 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act lays down the obligatory duties of the Corporation, under clause (d) of which, it is its duty to take measures for abatement, of all nuisances. The existence of dwellings on the pavements is unquestionably a source of nuisance to the public, at least for the reason that they are denied the use of pavements for passing and repassing. They are compelled, by reason of the occupation of pavements by dwellers, to use highways and public streets as passages. The affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation shows that the fall-out of pedestrians in large numbers on highways and streets constitutes a grave traffic hazard. Surely, pedestrians deserve consideration in the matter of their physical safety, which cannot be sacrificed in order to accommodate persons who use public properties for a private purpose, unauthorizedly. Under clause (o) of Section 61 of the B.M.C. Act, the corporation is under an obligation to remove obstructions upon public streets and other public Places. The counter-affidavit of the Corporation shows that the existence of hutments on pavements is a serious impediment in repairing the roads, pavements, drains and streets. Section 63(k), which is discretionary empowers the corporation to take measures to promote public safety, health or convenience not specifically provided otherwise. Since it is not possible to provide any public conveniences to the pavement dweller on or near the pavements, they answer the nature’s call on the pavements or on the streets adjoining them. These facts provide the background to the provision for removal of encroachments on pavements and footpaths. 57. Since it is not possible to provide any public conveniences to the pavement dweller on or near the pavements, they answer the nature’s call on the pavements or on the streets adjoining them. These facts provide the background to the provision for removal of encroachments on pavements and footpaths. 57. To Summarise, we hold that no person has the right to encroach, by erecting a structure or otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose like, for example, a garden or a playground; that the provision contained in Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of the case; and that, the Kamraj Nagar Basti is situated on an accessory road leading to the Western Express Highway, we have referred to the assurances given by the State Government in its pleadings here which, we repeat, must be made good. Stated briefly, pavement dwellers who were censused or who happened to be censused in 1976 should be given, though not as a condition precendent to their removal, alternate petches at Malavani or, at such other convenient place as the Government considers reasonable but not farther away in terms of distances; slum dwellers who were given identity cards and whose dwellings were numbered in the 1976 census must be given alternate sites for their resettlement; slums which have been in existence for a long time, say for twenty years or more, and which have been improved and developed will not be removed unless the land on which they stand or the appurtenant land, is required for a public purpose, in which case, alternate sites or accommodation will be provided to them, the “Low Income Scheme shelter Programme” which is proposed to be undertaken with the aid of the World Bank will be pursued earnestly; and the “Slum upgradation Programme (SUP)” under which basic amenities are to be given to slum dwellers will be implemented without delay. In order to minimize the hardship involved in any eviction, we direct that the slums, wherever situated will not be removed until one month after the end of the current monsoon season, that is until October 31, 1985 and, thereafter, only in accordance with this judgment. It any slum is required to be removed before that date, parties may apply to this Court. It any slum is required to be removed before that date, parties may apply to this Court. Pavement dwellers, whether censused or uncensused, will not be removed until same date viz. October 31, 1985. The above cited decision was a path breaking decision having set the way for protection of payment and slum dweller and providing of alternative accommodation to the evicted persons and it has also been made clear in the above cited decision that no person has the right to encroach by erecting a structure or otherwise, on footpaths, pavements or any other place reserved or earmarked for a public purpose like example, a garden or a playground. 21. In Chameli Singh and others v. State of U.P and Another [ (1996) 2 SCC 549 ], the subject matter of challenge was the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the main challenge was made to the invocation of emergency clause under Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has gone into the question of Right to shelter and also referred to alga Tellis case (Cited supra) and observed as follows: “8. In any organized society, right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to achieve this object. Right to live guaranteed in any civilized society implies the right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and shelter, These are basic human rights known to any civilized society. All Civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention or under the Constitution of India cannot be exercised without these basic human rights. Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right. As is enjoined in the Directive Principles, the State should be deemed to be under an obligation to secure it for its citizens, of course subject to its economic budgeting. In a democratic society as a member of the organized civic community one should have permanent shelter so as to physically, mentally and intellectually equip oneself to improve his excellence as a useful citizen as enjoined in the Fundamental Duties and to be a useful citizen and equal participant in democracy The ultimate object of making a man equipped with a right to dignity of person and equality of status is to enable him to develop himself into a cultured being. Want of decent residence, therefore, frustrates the very object of the constitutional animation of right to equality, economic justice, fundamental right to residence, dignity of person and right to live itself. To bring the Dalits and Tribes into the mainstream of national life, providing these facilities and opportunites to them is the duty of the State as fundamental to their basic human and constitutional rights.” It has been held in the said decision that the Right to Shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. 22. 22. In Anamallai Club v. Government of T.N. and others [ (1997) 3 SCC 169 ], the facts of the case would disclose that the appellant, namely, Anamallai Club was granted licence in respect of an extent of 28.70 acres for sports and recreation purposes and its was terminated and resumption of possession was done unilaterally and it was put to challenge by the appellant and it was unsuccessful and hence, it reached the portals of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by way of appeal. In para 8 of the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as follows: “8. Law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespassers. Law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. Law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a court. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. Undoubtedly, the true owner is entitled to retain possession ever though he had obtained it by force or by other unlawful means but that would not be a ground to permit the owner to take the law into his own hand and eject the person in juridical possession or settled possession without recourse to law.” 23. In Ahmadabad Municipal Corporation v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan and Others [ (1997) 11 SCC 121 ), 29 pavement dwellers had filed writ petition on the file of the High Court of Gujarat, forbearing the Allahabad Municipal Corporation from evicting them and the High Court directed the said Municipal Corporation not to remove their huts until suitable accommodation was provided to them and it also directed that before removing the unauthorized encroachments, the concerned pavement dweller have to be heard. The Allahabad Municipal Corporation, challenging the vires of the said act, preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Allahabad Municipal Corporation, challenging the vires of the said act, preferred an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has considered Olga Tellis case (cited supra) and Chameli Singh case (cited supra) and also the judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sodan Singh V. New Delhi Municipal Committee [ (1989) 4 SCC 155 )] and it is useful and relevant to extract the following paragraphs: “8. It is for the court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure which is reasonable fair and just or it is otherwise. Footpath, street or pavement are public property which are intended to serve the convenience of the general public. They are not laid for private use and indeed, their use for a private purpose frustrates they very object for which they are carved out from portions of public roads. The main reason for laying out pavements is to ensure that the pedestrians are able to go about their daily affairs with a reasonable measure of safety and security. That facility, which has matured into a right of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by allowing encroachments to be made on the pavements. The claim of the pavement-dwellers to construct huts on the pavement or road is a permanent obstruction to free passage of traffic and pedestrians safety and security. Therefore, it would be impermissible to permit or to make use of the pavement for private purpose. They should allow passing and repassing by the pedestrians. No one has a right to make use of a public property for their private purpose without the requisite authorization for the competent authority. It would, therefore, be but the duty of the competent authority to remove encroachments on the pavement or footpath of the public street obstructing free flow of traffic or passing or repassing by the pedestrians. 10. The Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of live or personal liberty but such a deprivation must be according to the procedure, in the given circumstances, fair and reasonable. To become fair, just and reasonable, it would not be enough that the procedure prescribed in law is a formality. It must be pragmatic and realistic to meet the given fact-situation. To become fair, just and reasonable, it would not be enough that the procedure prescribed in law is a formality. It must be pragmatic and realistic to meet the given fact-situation. No inflexible rule of hearing and due application of mind can be insisted upon in every or all cases. Each case depends upon its own backdrop. The removal of encroachment needs urgent action. But in this behalf what requires to be done by the competent authority is to ensure constant vigil on encroachment of the public places. Sooner the encroachments is removed when sighted, better would be the facilities or convenience for passing or repassing of the pedestrians on the pavements or footpaths facilitation free flow of regulated traffic on the road or use of public places. On the contrary, the longer the delay, the greater will be the danger of permitting the encroachers claiming semblance of right to obstruct removal of the encroachment. It the encroachment is of a recent origin the need to follow the procedure of principle of natural justice could be obviated in that no one has a right to encroach upon the public property and claim the procedure of opportunity of hearing which would be a tedious and time consuming process leading to putting a premium for high handed and unauthorized acts of encroachment and unlawful squatting. On the other hand, if the Corporation allows settlement of encroachers for a long time for reasons best known to them, and reasons are not far to see, then necessarily a modicum of reasonable notice for removal, say two weeks or 10 days, and personal service on the encroachers or substituted service by fixing notice on the property is necessary. It the encroachment is not removed within the specified time, the competent authority would be at liberty to have it removed. That would meet the fairness of procedure and principle of giving opportunity to remove the encroachment voluntarily by the encroachers. On their resistance, necessarily appropriate and reasonable force can be used to have the encroachment removed. Thus considered, We hold that the action taken by the appellant-Corporation is not violative of the principal of natural justice. 18. This Court in Maha Gujarat Hawkers Vyapar Mahanans v. Ahmedabed Municipal Corpn. [SLPs Nos. 47-51 of 1996] had given directions to regulate hawking. On their resistance, necessarily appropriate and reasonable force can be used to have the encroachment removed. Thus considered, We hold that the action taken by the appellant-Corporation is not violative of the principal of natural justice. 18. This Court in Maha Gujarat Hawkers Vyapar Mahanans v. Ahmedabed Municipal Corpn. [SLPs Nos. 47-51 of 1996] had given directions to regulate hawking. The Corporation has regulated, in terms of the said order, the hawking business on the pavements by dwellers in the city of Ahmedabad within the specified areas and identified some as non-hawking zones in the Scheme which is operated in the city of Ahmedabad. No direction in derogation thereof would be given permitting the pavements-dwellers to convert the hutments for commercial purpose. It is also suggested that with the cooperation of the Non-Governmental Organisations and financial participation of the slum-dewellers and industrialists the Corporation has introduced Slum Networking Project. Under the Scheme, they have provided 35,000 built-up individual toilets in the slum areas. Subsidy component to the hutment-dwellers has been raised to 90 per cent w.e.f. 1-4-1996. 22. Empirical sturdy of urban and rural population in India discloses that due to lack of civic facilities and means of livelihood people from rural areas constantly keep migrating to the urban areas resulting in mushroom growth of slums and encroachment of the pavements/footpaths etc. Every municipal corporation has statutory obligation to provide free flow of traffic and pedestrians’ right to pass and repass freely and safely; as its concomitance, the corporation/municipality have statutory duty to have the encroachments removed. It would, therefore, be inexpedient to give any direction not to remove, or to allow the encroachments on the payments or footpaths which is a constant source of unhygienic ecology, traffic hazards and is risk-prone to the lives of the pedestrians. It would, therefore, be necessary to permit the Corporation to exercise the statutory powers to prevent encroachment of the pavements/footpaths and to prevent construction thereon. As held earlier, the Corporation should always be vigilant and should not allow encroachments of the pavements and footpaths. As soon as they notice any encroachment they should forthwith take steps to have them removed and not allow them to settle down for a long time. It is stated in their affidavit that they are giving 21 days’ notice before taking action for the ejectment of encroachers. As soon as they notice any encroachment they should forthwith take steps to have them removed and not allow them to settle down for a long time. It is stated in their affidavit that they are giving 21 days’ notice before taking action for the ejectment of encroachers. That procedure, in our view, is a fair procedure and, therefore, the right to hearing before taking action for ejectment is not necessary in the fact-situation. But the Commissioner should ensure that everyone is served with a notice and as far as possible by personal service and if is not possible for reasons to be recorded in the file, through affixture of the notice on the hutment, duly attested by two independent panchas. This procedure would avoid the dispute that they were not given opportunity; further prolongation of the encroachment and hazard to the traffic and safety of the pedestrians. 25. Article 19(e) of the Constitution provides to all citizens fundamental rights to travel, settle down and reside in any part of Bharat and none have right to prevent their settlement. Any attempt in that behalf would be unconstitutional. The preamble of the Constitution assures integrity of the nation, fraternity among the people and dignity of the person to make India an integrated and united Bharat in a socialist secular democratic republic. The policy or principle should be such that everyone should have the opportunity to migrate and settle down in any part of Bharat where opportunity for employment or better living conditions are available and, therefore, it would be unconstitutional and impermissible to prevent the persons from migrating and settling at places where they find their livelihood and means of avocation. It is to be remembered that the preamble is the arch of the Constitution which accords to every citizen of India socio-economic and political justice, liability, equality of opportunity and of status, fraternity, dignity of person in an integrated Bharat. The fundamental rights and the directive principles and the preamble being trinity of the Constitution, the right to residence and to settle in any part of the country is assured to every citizen. In a secular socialist democratic republic of Bharat hierarchical caste structure, antagonism towards diverse religious beliefs and faith and dialectical difference would be smoothened and the people would be integrated with dignity of person only when social and economic democracy is established under the rule of law. In a secular socialist democratic republic of Bharat hierarchical caste structure, antagonism towards diverse religious beliefs and faith and dialectical difference would be smoothened and the people would be integrated with dignity of person only when social and economic democracy is established under the rule of law. The difference due to caste, Sect or religion pose grave threat to affinity, equality and fraternity. Social democracy means a way of life with dignity of person as a normal social intercourse with liberty, equality and fraternity. The economic democracy implicits in itself that the inequalities in income and inequalities in opportunities and status should be minimized and as far as possible marginalised. The right to life enshrined under Article 21 has been interpreted by this Court to include meaningful right to life and not merely animal existence as elaborated in several judgments of this Court including Hawkers case, Olga Tellis case [ (1985) 3 SCC 545 ] and the latest Chameli Singh case [ (1996) 2 SCC 549 ] and a host of other decisions which need no reiteration. Suffice it to state that right to life would include right to live with human dignity. As held earlier, right to residence is one of the minimal human rights as fundamental right. Due to went of facilities and opportunities, the right to residence and settlement is an illusion to the rural and urban poor. Articles 38, 39 and 45 mandate the state, as its economic policy, to provide socio-economic justice to minimize inequalities in income and in opportunities and status. It positively charges the State to distribute its largess to the weaker sections of the society envisaged in Article 46 to make socio-economic justice a living with dignity of person and equality of status and to constantly improve excellence. 30. Encroachment of public property undoubtedly obstructs and upsets planned development, ecology and sanitation. Public property needs to be preserved and protected. It is but the duty of the State and local bodies to ensure the same. This would answer the second question. As regards the fourth question, it is to reiterate that judicial review is the basic structure of the Constitution. Every citizen has a fundamental right to redress the perceived legal injury through judicial process. The encroachers are no exceptions to that constitutional right to judicial redressal. This would answer the second question. As regards the fourth question, it is to reiterate that judicial review is the basic structure of the Constitution. Every citizen has a fundamental right to redress the perceived legal injury through judicial process. The encroachers are no exceptions to that constitutional right to judicial redressal. The constitutional court, therefore, has a constitutional duty as Sentinel on the qui vive to enforce the right of a citizen when he approaches the court for perceived legal injury, provided he establishes that he has a right to remedy. When an encroacher approaches the court, the court is required to examine whether the encroacher had any right and to what extent he would be given protection and relief. In that behalf, it is the salutary duty of the State or the local bodies or any instrumentality to assist the court by placing necessary factual position and legal setting for adjudication and for granting/refusing relief appropriate to the situation. Therefore, the mere fact that the encroachers have approached the court would be no ground to dismiss their cases. The contention of the appellant-Corporation that the intervention of the court would give impetus to the encroachers to abuse the judicial process is untenable. As held earlier, if the appellant-Corporation or any local body or the State acts with vigilance and prevents encroachment immediately, the need to follow the procedure enshrined as an inbuilt fair procedure would be obviated. But if they allow the encroachers to remain in settled possession sufficiently for a long time, which would be a fact to be established in an appropriate case, necessarily suitable procedure would be required to be adopted to meet the fat-respondent concerned and also for the petitioner to establish the respective claims and it is for the court to consider as to what would be the appropriate procedure required to be adopted in the given facts and circumstance. 31. It is true that in all cases it may not be necessary, as a condition for ejectment of the encroacher, that he should be provided with an alternative accommodation at the expense of the State which given due credence, is likely to result in abuse of the judicial process. But no absolute principle of universal application would be laid in this behalf. But no absolute principle of universal application would be laid in this behalf. Each case is required to be examined on the given set of facts and appropriate direction or remedy be evolved by the court suitable to the facts of the case. Normally, the court may not, as a rule, direct that the encroachers should be provided with an alternative accommodation before ejectment when they encroached public properties, but, as stated earlier, each case requires examination and suitable direction appropriate to the facts requires modulation. Considered from this perspective, the apprehensions of the appellant are without force. 32. As regards the direction given by the High court to provide accommodation as a condition to remove the encroachment, as held earlier, since the Municipal Corporation has a constitutional and statutory duty to provide means for settlement and residence by alotting the surplus land under the Urban Land Ceiling Act and if necessary by acquiring the land and providing house sites or tenements, as the case may be, according to the Scheme formulated by the Corporation, the financial condition of the corporation may also be kept in view but that would not be a constraint on the Corporation to avoid its duty of providing residence/plot to the urban weaker sections. It would, therefore, be the duty of the Corporation to evolve the Schemes. In the light of the Schemes now in operation, we are of the view that opportunity should be given to the ten-named petitioner-encroachers to opt for any one of the three Schemes and the named two persons who are carrying on commercial activities should immediately stop the same. If they intend to have any commercial activity or hawking, it should be availed of as per the directions already issued by this Court in the aforesaid judgment and no further modification or any directions contra thereto need to be issued. Out of these 10 persons, if they are eligible within the terms of the Schemes and would satisfy the income criterion, they would be given allotment of the sites or the tenements, as the case may be, according to their option. In case they do not opt for any of the Schemes, 21 days’ notice would be served on them and other encroachers and they may be ejected from the present encroachment. In case they do not opt for any of the Schemes, 21 days’ notice would be served on them and other encroachers and they may be ejected from the present encroachment. As regards other persons who have become encroachers by way of purchase either from the original encroachers or encroached pending writ petition/appeal in this Court, they are not entitled to the benefits given to the 10 encroachers. As regards those who are eligible according to the guidelines in the Schemes and also fulfil the income critertion, it may be open to the Corporation to extend the same benefits in either of the three Schemes, if they so desire. It is, however, made clear that we are not giving any specific direction in this behalf lest it would amount to encouraging the people to abuse the judicial process to avail of such remedy by encroaching public property.” 24. In Almitra H. Patel and Another v. Union of India and Others [ (2000) 2 SCC 679 ], the issues relating to sanitation and public health prohibiting accumulation of any rubbish and solid wastes and thereby making the city of Delhi clean, came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and it is relevant to extract the following paragraphs of the said decision: “7. We are not oblivious of the fact in a large city like Delhi where the floating population which comes in everyday is not very small, keeping the city clean is indeed a daunting task. Just because the work involved is difficult cannot be a reason for lack of initiative or inaction on the part of the authorities concerned. 9. Keeping Delhi clean is not an easy task but then it is not an impossible one either. What is required is initiative, selfless zeal and dedication and professional pride – elements which are sadly lacking here. 11. In Delhi which is the capital of the country and which should be its showpiece no effective intiative of any kind has been taken by the numerous governmental agencies operating here in cleaning up the city. As a result thereof the Court had to in Dr. B.L. Wadehra case [ (1996) 2 SCC 594 ] perforce step in because of the non-performance or non-implementation of the law by the municipal authorities. As a result thereof the Court had to in Dr. B.L. Wadehra case [ (1996) 2 SCC 594 ] perforce step in because of the non-performance or non-implementation of the law by the municipal authorities. The law, inter alia, makes it obligatory on them to discharge their municipal functions and at least prevent filth and garbage from lying strewn at different public places causing hezard to public health. 12. The local authorities are constituted for providing services to the citizens – not merely to provide employment to a few of its inhabitants. Tolerating filth, while not taking action against the lethargic and inefficient workforce for fear of annoying them, is un-understandable and impermissible. Non-accountability has possibly lad to lack of effort on the part of the employees concerned. They are perhaps sanguine in their belief that non-performance is not frowned upon by the Government or by the heads of the organizations and no harm will befall them. 13. Domestic garbage and sewage is a large contributor of solid waste. The drainage system in a city is intended to cope and deal with household effluent. This is so in a planned city. But when a large number of inhabitants live in unauthorized colonies, with no proper means of dealing with the domestic effluents, or in slums with no care for hygiene the problem becomes more complex. 14. Establishment or creating of slums, it seems, appears to be good business and is well organized. The number of slums has multiplied in the last few years by geometrical proportion. Large areas of public land, in this way, are usurped for private use free of cost. It is difficult to believe that this can happen in the capital of the country without passive or active connivance of the land-owning agencies and/or the municipal authorities. The promise of free land, at the taxpayers’ cost, in place of a jhuggi, is a proposal which attracts more landgrabbers. Rewarding an encroacher on public land with a free alternative site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket. The Department of Slum Clearance does not seem to have cleared any slum despite its being in existence for decades. In fact more and more slums are coming into existence. Instead of “slum clearance” there is “slum creation” in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land in and around the slums. The Department of Slum Clearance does not seem to have cleared any slum despite its being in existence for decades. In fact more and more slums are coming into existence. Instead of “slum clearance” there is “slum creation” in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being strewn on open land in and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, in the first instance, by preventing the growth of slums. The authorities must realize that there is a limit to which the population of a city can be increased, without enlarging its size. In other words the density of population per square kilometer cannot be allowed to increase beyond the sustainable limit. Creation of slums resulting in increase in density has to be prevented. What the Slum Clearance Department has to show, however, does not seem to be visible. It is the garbage and solid waste generated by these slums which require to be dealt with most expeditiously and on the basis of priority.” Ultimately, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India issued following directions to the New Delhi Municipal Corporation at para 21: “21. In addition to and not in derogation of the orders passed by this Court in Dr. B.L. Wadehra case we order as follows: 1. We direct the Municipal Corporation of Delhi through the Commissioner, NDMC through its Chairman and the Cantonment Board through its Executive Officer and all other officials concerned including Sanitation Superintendents/Chief Sanitary Inspectors/Sanitary Inspectors/Assistant Sanitary Inspectors/Sanitary Guides/Medical Officers to ensure that the relevant provisions of the DMC Act, 1957, the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 and the Cantonments Act, 1924 relating to sanitation and public health prohibiting accumulation of any rubbish, filth, garbage or other polluted obnoxious matters in any premises and/or prohibiting any person from depositing the same in any street or public place shall be scrupulously complied with. 2. We direct that the streets, public premises such as parks etc. shall be surface-cleaned on a daily basis, including on Sundays and public holidays. 3. 2. We direct that the streets, public premises such as parks etc. shall be surface-cleaned on a daily basis, including on Sundays and public holidays. 3. We direct and authorize MCD, NDMC and other statutory authorities through competent officers, as may be designated by them (but not lower than in the rank of Sanitary Superintendent or equivalent post), to levy and recover charges and costs from any person littering or violating the provisions of the diverse Acts, bye-laws and regulations relating to sanitation and health for violating the directions being issued herein. For this purpose the Commissioner, MCD, the Chairman, NDMC and other heads of sanitary authorities concerned will prepare and publish for the information of the public at large the scale of such charges/costs as may be levied and recovered in respect of the diverse acts of commission/omission. The charges/costs will be recoverable on the spot by such designated officers from any person found littering or throwing rubbish and causing nuisance so as to affect sanitation and public health. The Commissioner, MCD and the Chairman, NDMC and other authorities may frame and publish such schemes as may be necessary to ensure compliance with these directions forthwith. Till the scheme is framed and published, the authorities named above would recover Rs.50 as charges and costs from any person littering or violating provisions of the Municipal Corporation Act, Bye-laws and Regulations relating to sanitation and health. This part be published and implemented at the earliest through the Sanitary Inspectors concerned. 4. We direct MCD through the Commissioner, NDMC through its Chairman and other statutory authorities through their respective heads to ensure proper and scientific disposal of waste in a manner so as to subserve the common good. In this connection they shall endeavour to comply with the suggestions and directions contained in the report prepared by the Asim Burmon Committee. 5. We direct that sites for landfills will be identified bearing in mind the requirement of Delhi for the next twenty years within a period of four weeks from today by the exercise jointly conducted by the Union of India through the Ministry of Urban Development, the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, the Commissioner, MCD and the Chairman, NDMC and other heads of statutory authorities like DDA etc. These sites will be identified keeping in mind the environmental considerations and in identifying the same the Central Pollution Control Board’s advice will be taken into consideration. The sites so identified shall be handed over to MCD and/or NDMC within two weeks of the identification, free from all encumbrances and without MCD or NDMC having to make any payment in respect thereof. 6. We direct the Union of India through the Ministry of Urban Development, the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, the Commissioner of MCD, the Chairman, NDMC and other statutory authorities like DDA and the Railways to take appropriate steps for preventing any fresh encroachment or unauthorized occupation of public land for the purpose of dwelling resulting in creation of a slum. Further appropriate steps be taken to improve the sanitation in the existing slums till they are removed and the land reclaimed. 7. We further direct the Union of India through the Ministry of Urban Development, the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, the Commissioner, MCD, the Chairman, NDMC and other statutory authorities like DDA etc. to identify and make available to MCD and NDMC within four weeks from today sites for setting up compost plants. Initially considering the extent of solid waste, which is required to be treated by compost plants, the number of sites which should be made available will be eight. Such sites shall be handed over to MCD/NDMC free of cost and free from all encumbrances within two weeks of identification. MCD and NDMC shall thereupon take appropriate steps to have the compost plants/processing plants established or caused to be established and to be in operation by 30-9-2000. 8. We direct MCD, NDMC and other statutory authorities concerned with sanitation and public health to regularly publish the names of the Superintendents of Sanitation concerned and such equivalent officers who are responsible for cleaning Delhi who can be approached for any complaint/grievance by the citizens of Delhi together with their latest office and residential telephone numbers and addresses. 9. We direct the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to appoint Magistrate under Section 20 and/or Section 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for each board/circle/ward for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the MCD and the NDMC Acts and to try the offences specified therefore in relation to littering and causing nuisance, sanitation and public health. 9. We direct the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to appoint Magistrate under Section 20 and/or Section 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for each board/circle/ward for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the MCD and the NDMC Acts and to try the offences specified therefore in relation to littering and causing nuisance, sanitation and public health. These appointments shall be made within a period of six weeks from today in conformity with the reasons contained in this order. 10. All the authorities concerned will file compliance reports of these directions within eight-weeks from today. The Central Pollution Control Board will also file within the same time an affidavit indicating as to what extent the directions issued have been complied with.” 25. In a Division Bench decision of this Court in A. Thayal Nayagi v. Union of India and Others ( (2005) 1 MLJ 453 ), the appellant therein is a licensee of a railway land and though the licence period has expired, the appellant failed to evict from the plot and she filed a writ petition challenging the action under the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Authorised Occupants) Act and the writ petition was dismissed and aggrieved by the same, she preferred an appeal. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markendey Katju, C.J., (as the Hon’ble Judge then was) has spoken for the Bench and observed as follows: “6. Learned counsel for the appellant however argued that the procedure mentioned in the Public premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 should have been followed by the authorities, but it was not followed. In our opinion, this argument is based on a total misconception. The object of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 is to forcibly evict unauthorized occupants who are deliberately remaining in occupation of public premises unauthorisedly. Hence the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge is fulfilling exactly the same object which the aforesaid Act aims at, namely, to forcibly throw out unauthorized occupants from public property. Decent people vacate the premises when the period of lease of license expires. When a person does not behave in a decent manner, the only way left is to forcibly throw him out. It is for this purpose that the aforesaid Act was enacted, and the same object has been achieved by the learned Single Judge namely, to throw out an unauthorized occupant. When a person does not behave in a decent manner, the only way left is to forcibly throw him out. It is for this purpose that the aforesaid Act was enacted, and the same object has been achieved by the learned Single Judge namely, to throw out an unauthorized occupant. Hence, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge, which is eminently, just and fair. The writ appeal is dismissed. Consequently, W.A.M.P.No. 179 of 2005 is also dismissed.” 26. In Gainda Ram and Others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others ( (2010) 10 SCC 715 ), hawking on the streets of Delhi came up for consideration and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has considered its earlier decisions including Olga Tellis case (cited supra) and Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, ( (1989) 4 SCC 155 ), where it has been held that hawkers and squatters have fundamental right to carry on business on the public streets, but the same should be regulated and that such right of hawkers to carry on business on the streets cannot be denied, if they are properly regulated and found that New Delhi Municipal Corporation has not made any bye-law under Section 388 of the Municipal Corporation Act, so as to regulate the fundamental right of the hawkers who hawk or squat on the streets of Delhi and the Schemes which have been framed as per the directions of the Supreme Court or the 2004 policy which has been framed by the Government, cannot be said to be framed under the power to frame bye-laws and they do not have the status of law or even subordinate legislation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has also taken into consideration the Bill floated by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation namely, Model Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and regulation of Street Vending), Bill, 2009 and observed that most of the hawkers are very poor, a few of them may have a marginally better financial position, but by and large they constitute an unorganized poor sector in our society and therefore, structured regulation and legislation is urgency necessary to control and regulate the fundamental right of hawing of these vendors and hawkers. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has also taken into consideration the adjudicating mechanism formulated by the New Delhi Municipal Corporation in the form of vending Sub-Committees and the appellate authority over and above the above said committees and held as follows: “79. The hawkers’ and squatters’ or vendors’ right to carry on hawking has been recognized as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). At the same time the right of the commuters to move freely and use the roads without any impediment is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(d). These two apparently conflicting rights must be harmonized and regulated by subjecting them to reasonable restrictions only under a law. The question is, therefore, vitally important to a very large section of people, mostly ordinary men and women. Such an issue cannot be left to be decided by schemes and which are monitored by this Court from time to time. 81. The fundamental right of the hawkers, just because they are poor and unorganized, cannot be left in a state of limbo nor can it be left to be decided by the varying standards of a scheme which changes from time to time under the orders of this Court. With the aforesaid observations and directions the writ petition and all the IAs are disposed. No order as to costs.” 27. The above cited decisions, makes it clear that encroachment of public property undoubtedly obstructs and upsets planned development, ecology and sanitation and the public property needs to be preserved and protected and when an encroacher approaches, the Court is required to examine whether the encroacher had any right and to what extent he would be given protection and relief. It has been further held that with regard to the providing of alternative accommodation, each case requires examination and suitable direction appropriate to facts and circumstances can be issued. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India uniformly held that hawkers and squatters have a fundamental right to carry on business on public streets/places, but the same should be regulated and it is subject to reasonable restrictions under Clause 6 of the Article 19 of the Constitution of India. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India uniformly held that hawkers and squatters have a fundamental right to carry on business on public streets/places, but the same should be regulated and it is subject to reasonable restrictions under Clause 6 of the Article 19 of the Constitution of India. 28. In Gainda ram and Others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others ( (2010) 10 SCC 715 ), it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that though hawking has been recognized as a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, at the same time the right of the commuters to move freely and use the roads without any impediment is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(d) of the Constitution of India and these two apparently conflicting rights must be harmonized and regulated by subjecting them to reasonable restrictions only under a law and such an issue cannot be left to be decided by schemes and which are monitored by Courts from time to time and it has also taken into consideration, the Model Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and regulation of Street Vending) Bill, 2009 introduced by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Properly Alleviation, Government of India. 29. It has been brought to the knowledge of the learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent in W.P.No. 1916/2013 that the above said Ministry of the Government of India has formulated a policy namely, National Policy on Urban Street Vendors, 2009; however it is yet to become a law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited decision has taken into consideration and enactment of the above said Bill and granted time till 30.06.2011 so as to enable the Bill be converted into a law by following the constitutional process. 30. In Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers Union and another v. Municipal Corporation, Greater Mumbai and Others (2013-4-L.W.777), the right of street vendors/hawkers came up for consideration and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has taken up for consideration its earlier decisions in Gainda Ram Case (cited supra) and the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Bill, 2012 and issued the following directions: “16. For facilitating implementation of the 2009 Policy, we issue the following directions: i) Without one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order, the Chief Secretaries of the State Government and Administrators of the Union Territories shall issue necessary instructions/directions to the concerned department(s) to ensure that the Town Vending Committee is constituted at city/town level in accordance with the provisions contained in the 2009 policy. For the cities and towns having large municipal areas, more than one Town vending Committee may be constituted. ii) Each Town Vending Committee shall consist of representatives of various organizations and street vendors/hawkers. 30% of the representatives from the category of street vendors/hawkers shall be women. iii) The representatives of various organization and street vendors/hawkers shall be chosen by the Town Vending Committee by adopting a fair and transparent mechanism. iv) The task of constituting the Town Vending Committee shall be completed within two months of the issue of instructions by the Chief Secretaries of the State and the Administrators of the Union Territories. v) The Town Vending Committee shall function strictly in accordance with the 2009 policy and the decisions taken by it shall be notified in the print and electronic media within next one week. vi) The Town Vending Committees shall be free to divide the municipal areas in vending/hawing zones and sub-zones and for this purpose they may taken assistance of experts in the field. While undertaking this exercise, the Town Vending Committees constituted for the cities of Delhi and Mumbai shall take into consideration the work already undertaken by the municipal authorities in furtherance of the directions given by this Court. The municipal authorities shall also take action in terms of Paragraph 4.2(b) and (c). vii) All street vendors/hawkers shall be registered in accordance with paragraph 4.5.4 of the 2009 policy. Once registered, the street vendor/hawker, shall be entitled to operate in the area specified by the Town Vending Committee. viii) The process of registration must be completed by the municipal authorities across the country within four months of the receipt of the directions by the Chief Secretaries of the States and Administrators of the Union Territories. (ix) The State Governments/Administration of the Union the Union Territories and municipal and local authorities shall take all the steps necessary for achieving the objectives set out in the 2009 policy. (ix) The State Governments/Administration of the Union the Union Territories and municipal and local authorities shall take all the steps necessary for achieving the objectives set out in the 2009 policy. x) The Town vending Committee shall meet every month and ensure implementation of the relevant provisions of the 2009 policy and, in particular, paragraph 4.5.1 (b) and (c). xi) Physically challenged who were allowed to operate PCO’s in term of the judgment reported in (2009) 17 SCC shall be allowed to continue to run their stalls and sell other goods because running of PCOs. Is no longer viable. Those who were allowed to run Aarey/Sarits shall be allowed to continue to operate their stalls. xii). The State Governments, the Administrations of the Union Territories and municipal authorities shall or free to amend the legislative provisions and/or delegated legislations to bring them in turn with the 2009 Policy. If there remains any conflict between the 2009 Policy and the municipal laws, insofar as they relate to street vendors/hawkers, then the 2009 policy shall prevail. xiii). Henceforth, the parties shall be fees to approach the jurisdictional High Courts for redressal of their grievance and the direction, if any, given by this Court in the earlier judgments/orders shall not impede disposal of the cases which may be filed by the aggrieved parties. xiv) The Chief Justices of the High Courts are requested to nominate a Bench to deal with the cases filed for implementation of the 2000 Policy and disputes arising out of its implementation. The concerned Bench shall regularly monitor implementation of the 2009 policy and the law which may be enacted by the parliament. xv). All the existing street vendors/hawkers operation across the country shall be allowed to operate till the exercise of registration and creation of vending/hawking zones is completed in terms of the 2009 policy. Once that exercise is completed, they shall be entitled to operated only in according with the orders/directions of the concerned Town Vending Committees. xvi). The provisions of the 2009 policy and the directions contained hereinabove shall apply to all the municipal areas in the country. 17. The aforesaid directions shall remain operative till an appropriate legislation is enacted by parliament or any other competent legislature and is brought into force. 18. The parties, whose applications have remained pending before this Court, shall be free to institute appropriate in the jurisdictional High Court. 17. The aforesaid directions shall remain operative till an appropriate legislation is enacted by parliament or any other competent legislature and is brought into force. 18. The parties, whose applications have remained pending before this Court, shall be free to institute appropriate in the jurisdictional High Court. If so advised, the aggrieved person shall be free to file petition under Articles 226 of the Constitution. 19. All the appeals and I.As are disposed of in the manner indicated above. 20. The Registry is directed to send copies of this order to the Chief Secretaries of all the States, Administrations of the Union Territories and Registrar Generals/Registrars (Judicial) of all the High Courts, who shall place the order before the Chief Justice for consideration and necessary directions.” In Clause No.XVI of the above paid directions, it is stated that the provisions of the 2009 policy and the directions contained therein above shall apply to all the municipal areas in the country and in para 17 of the order, it is stated that the aforesaid directions shall remain operative till an appropriate legislation is enacted by parliament or any other competent legislature and is brought into force. 31. In the light of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited decision (Maharashtra Ekka Hawkers Union case), this Court cannot issue any fresh direction to the respondents to formulates a scheme with regard to the hawkers/vendors, who are doing business in Marina and Elliots Beach in Chennai. 32. In the result, these writ petitioners are disposed of directing the respondents to comply with the directions applicable to them, issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the above cited decision (Maharashtra Ekka Hawkers Union case), by giving utmost preference, as expeditiously as possible. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.