ORDER 1. In this writ petition, the following issues are required to be determined:- (1) Whether the respondent District Co-operative Central Bank is a State or an instrumentality of State in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India? Or, in the alternative is it imperative that the respondent ought to be a State or an instrumentality thereof to be subjected to the judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? (2) Whether the order of suspension dated 27.3.2014 is punitive in nature? (3) Whether the order of suspension complies with the regulatory regime of the respondent Bank? (4) Whether, in the absence of any specific provision in the service regulations to suspend an employee, the employer has any inherent power to be exercised in that regard? 2. The facts in brief are that the petitioner is a General Manager working in the 1st respondent Nalgonda District Co-operative Central Bank Limited (for brevity, Bank) in Nalgonda. While the petitioner was on medical leave between 21.10.2013 and 21.4.2014, the respondent Bank issued a notice to the petitioner on 25.1.2014 stating that a enquiry had been held and that in the report dated 30.9.2013 submitted by the Enquiry Officer, certain allegations of irregularities had come to light against the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner was asked to submit his explanation, which he did on 19.3.2014. The Managing Committee of the respondent Bank is said to have met on 11.3.2014, even before the petitioner could submit his explanation and tentatively decided to place the petitioner under suspension. In any event, on 27.3.2014 the respondent Bank issued proceedings in R.C. No. Estt/E3/F.282/2013-14 placing the petitioner under suspension. Assailing the order of suspension on various grounds, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. 3. Sri M. Venkat Ram Reddy, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, prefaced his submissions by stating that the respondent Bank is an instrumentality of State, inasmuch as it is under the strict supervision of the State as well as the Reserve Bank of India, which in fact has licensed it to be a banking company and that the Government of Andhra Pradesh has got deep and pervasive control over the respondent Bank. 4. 4. Adverting to the merits of the matter, the learned Counsel has stated that the issue of suspension was fait accompli, since the Managing Committee which met on 11.3.2014 took a decision to place the petitioner under suspension, though the very explanation was submitted by the petitioner on 19.3.2014 explaining why no disciplinary proceedings were to be initiated against the petitioner. Thus, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order of suspension is a product of non-application of mind, affecting the substantive rights of the petitioner to continue in service. 5. Referring to Nalgonda District Co-operative Central Bank Limited Service Regulations of the Employees (the Regulations for brevity), the learned Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to Regulations 60 to 65 with specific emphasis on Regulation 64, which speaks of suspension. The learned Counsel has contended that though there is an elaborate procedure prescribed to be followed by the respondent Bank before placing a delinquent officer under suspension, it has not complied with any of those parameters but has, in a ritualistic manner, exercised the non-existing power of suspension. The learned Counsel has also stated that since the impugned order does not speak of paying any subsistence allowance, which is sine qua non, it is punitive in nature. 6. Expatiating on his submissions as to the undesirability of placing the petitioner under suspension, the learned Counsel has further submitted that after placing the petitioner under suspension, the respondent Bank has not followed up the issue with any further action, such as issuing a charge-sheet to the petitioner spelling out the charges, etc. Accordingly, the learned Counsel has urged this Court to set aside and quash the impugned order of suspension as ultra vires of the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent Bank, i.e. the 3rd respondent and issue further consequential directions in that regard. 7. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on Union of India and Others vs. Rajpal Singh, (2009) 1 SCC 216 . 8. Sri V. Amarnath Goud, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank, in tune with the averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Bank, has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioner. 8. Sri V. Amarnath Goud, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank, in tune with the averments made in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Bank, has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioner. As a matter of preliminary objection, the learned Standing Counsel has asserted that the respondent Bank is not a State, much less an instrumentality of State, in terms of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. He has further submitted that the service regulations, on which the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed a heavy reliance, do not have any statutory force or flavour, but at best are administrative instructions meant to regulate the internal procedure of the respondent Bank. The learned Standing Counsel has further seriously contested the claim of the petitioner that the suspension is punitive in nature. According to the learned Standing Counsel, mere absence of an observation that the petitioner is entitled to subsistence allowance does not render an interim measure of suspension punitive or penal. 9. Further adverting to the merits of the matter, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that there is misappropriation and defalcation of funds, essentially public money, from the bank and that the role of the petitioner has come out very clearly in the confessions made by the other employees who were arrested in Criminal No. 143 of 2013 of Chandampet Police Station. The said crime is said to have been registered on the very same allegation of misappropriation of funds in the Bank to a tune of about Rs. 4,00,000/. 10. In support of his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank has placed reliance on A. Subbarami Reddy vs. Prohibition and Excise Superintendent and Another, 2007 (5) ALD 732 : 2007 (5) ALT 428 ; Tappers Co-operative Society, Maddur vs. Superintendent of Excise, Mahaboobnagar, 1986 (1) An. W.R. 387 and Balvantray Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 . 11. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank, apart from perusing the record. In Re : Issue No. 1 12. W.R. 387 and Balvantray Ratilal Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 . 11. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank, apart from perusing the record. In Re : Issue No. 1 12. Before appreciating this issue, it has to be borne in mind that the definition of State under Article 12 is only for the purpose of application of the provisions contained in Part III, but it has nothing to do with the rest of the Articles, such as Articles 300A, 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution of India. Hence, even though a body of persons may not constitute the State within the instant definition, a writ under Article 226 may lie against it on a non-constitutional ground or on the ground of contravention of some provisions of the Constitution outside Part III, e.g. where such body has public duty to perform or its acts are supported by the State or public officials. (See – Durga Das Basu's Shorter Constitution of India, Page 47, Volume, I and 14th Edition). 13. In Chapter III of the Constitution, exclusively dealing with Fundamental Rights, the lexical provision is Article 12, which is as follows:- "12. Definition – In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. 14. On the other hand, Part VI dealing with the federal provision States, contains Article 226, which is as follows:- "226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without –– (a) Furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order. (b) Giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the Counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this Article shal1 not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32." 15. Essentially, not in literal terms though, Part III of the Constitution begins with Article 12 and ends with Article 32, forming an arch with Article 21 being its keystone. As such, importing the lexical limitation of Article 12 for every constitutional remedy may not be necessary. In the present instance, the discussion could be with regard to the scope and ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution, rather that of Article 12. 16. As such, importing the lexical limitation of Article 12 for every constitutional remedy may not be necessary. In the present instance, the discussion could be with regard to the scope and ambit of Article 226 of the Constitution, rather that of Article 12. 16. In his celebrated cerebral work on Constitutional Law, the learned author D.D. Basu has enlisted the agencies against whom a writ under Article 226 lies:- "(i) the State/Government; (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function. However, a writ of mandamus can be issued to any person or authority performing a statutory function. However, a writ of mandamus can be issued to any person or authority performing public duty, owing positive obligation to the affected party. Where the co-operative society is not the department of the State and is also not a creature of a statue but is merely governed by a statute, i.e. it is a private party, writ petition against it would be maintainable only if it is established that a mandatory provision of a statute has been violated." Further as to what purpose, the learned Author would say:- "4. Any other purpose means a purpose for which any of the writs could, according to well established principles, issue. The result is that while under the first part, a writ may be issued under the Article only after a decision that the aggrieved party has a fundamental right and that it has been infringed under the second part, it may be issued only after a finding that the aggrieved party has a legal right which entitles him to any of the aforesaid writs and that such right has been infringed. Any other purpose, in short, means the enforcement of nay legal right and the performance of any legal-duty. A legal right, of Courts, means any legally enforceable right and includes contractual right, other than merely personal right. When there is negligence of public duty on the face of it and infringement of Article 21, there will be no bar to proceed under Article 226." 17. In the above backdrop, the rival pleas may have to be considered. A legal right, of Courts, means any legally enforceable right and includes contractual right, other than merely personal right. When there is negligence of public duty on the face of it and infringement of Article 21, there will be no bar to proceed under Article 226." 17. In the above backdrop, the rival pleas may have to be considered. The learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on Sri. Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. vs. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 AP 171 (FB) and has submitted that the respondent society is neither a State nor an instrumentality of State. As such, the ratio in Konaseema, needs to be discussed at some length. The solitary submission made in this regard was that the society was registered under the Societies Registration Act, but not under a specific statute, perforce, it cannot be termed as an instrumentality of State. If we examine Konaseema, the learned Full Bench of this Court has summarized the legal principles on this score in Para 51 (AIR) as follows:- "51. Summary –– From the above discussion the following propositions emerge:- (i) If a particular co-operative society can be characterized as a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf), it would also be an authority within the meaning and for the purpose, of Article 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation, an order passed by a Society against its employee in violation of the byelaws, can be corrected by way of a writ petition. This is not because the byelaws have the force of law, but on the ground that having framed the bye-laws prescribing the service conditions of its employees, the Society must follow them, in the interest of fairness. If it is left to the sweet will and pleasure of the Society either to follow or not to follow the bye-laws, it would be inherently arbitrary? And may very likely give rise to discriminatory treatment. A society, which is a State, has to act in conformity with Article 14 and for that reason, it will be made to follow the bye-laws. (ii) Even if a Society cannot be characterized as a State within the meaning of Article 12, even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the Society. (ii) Even if a Society cannot be characterized as a State within the meaning of Article 12, even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the Society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the Society is being treated as a person, or an authority, within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it, and the Court will enforce such statutory public duty. (iii) The bye-laws made by a co-operative society registered under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act do not have the force of law. They are in the nature of contract, terms of contract, between the Society and its employees, or between the Society and its members, as the case may be. Hence, where a Society cannot be characterized as a State, the service conditions of its employees, governed by bye-laws, cannot be enforced through a writ petition. However, in the matter of termination of service of the employees of a co-operative society, Section 47 of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act provides a certain protection, and since the said protection is based upon public policy, it will be enforced, in an appropriate case, by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, of course, an employee has to follow the remedies provided by the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act but, in an appropriate case, this Court will interfere under Article 226, if the violation of a statutory public duty is established. It is immaterial which Act or Rule casts such a statutory public duty. (iv) Mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition are public law remedies. They are not available to enforce private law rights. Every act of a society which may be a State within the meaning of Article 12, does not necessarily belong to public, law field. A society, which is a State, may have its private law rights just like a Government. A contractual obligation, which is not statutory, cannot be enforced by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. A society, which is a State, may have its private law rights just like a Government. A contractual obligation, which is not statutory, cannot be enforced by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Prior to entering into contract, however, Article 14 operates, as explained by the Supreme Court in E.E. and C. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266 and Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 ." 18. The learned Full Bench, while considering the issue whether Sree Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank's Case (supra), is a State within the meaning of Article 12, has firstly observed that co-operative society can also be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 and, therefore, a State is beyond dispute. Having thus observed, it took the test formulated in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , as affirmed in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 , listing out the criteria as follows:- "(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the Corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the Corporation, it would afford some indication of the Corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor whether the Corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of "deep and pervasive State control" may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the Corporation of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the Corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a Corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the Corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." 19. After setting out the parameters, their Lordships have observed that a Corporation to be characterized as an instrumentality or agency of State need not satisfy all the six tests. After setting out the parameters, their Lordships have observed that a Corporation to be characterized as an instrumentality or agency of State need not satisfy all the six tests. They have further held that of the six tests indicated above, tests 2, 3 and 6 are inapplicable to the case on hand. 20. Examining the facts of the case, the Full Bench has held that there is no financial assistance of the State, much less is it of such an extent as to meet almost all the expenditure of the Corporation. The Government's contribution to the share capital of the Bank is said to be 10%. It is further held that the appellant-Bank also does not enjoy any monopoly. On the question of deep and pervasive State control, it is held:- "29. The aforesaid control vested in the Government and the Registrar, particularly the power to divide, amalgamate or merge the societies, power to conduct elections to the committee (disabling the Society to conduct such an election itself), power to supersede the committee, power to recover amounts due to the societies as arrears of land-revenue, power to provide common cadres for the employees of several independent societies, as also the extensive power to give binding directions vested in both the Government and the Registrar not only in the interest of shareholders, depositors and creditors, but also in the interest of public and of co-operative movement, is liable to be characterized as deep and pervasive control, within the meaning of the fourth test aforesaid. It must be noted that in this particular writ appeal, the society concerned is a Co-operative Central Bank, which is included within the categories of Societies, included in Section 116-A." 21. The learned Full Bench went on to consider another aspect, namely whether the functions of the Society are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions. This test, it is held, is too general to be precise. On examination of the bye-laws and the functioning of the Bank, their Lordships have held that the Bank's dealings are confined to its members and its membership consists of member societies, Government, or a few nominal members. The appellant would not advance loan to a non-member-whoever he is. This test, it is held, is too general to be precise. On examination of the bye-laws and the functioning of the Bank, their Lordships have held that the Bank's dealings are confined to its members and its membership consists of member societies, Government, or a few nominal members. The appellant would not advance loan to a non-member-whoever he is. Having held that it is a function of public importance, the Full Bench has gone one to hold:- "But so does every other financial institution and Bank which provides credits to Industry, Commerce, Communications and other bodies providing various cervices to the society. More important, according to the fifth test evolved by the Supreme Court, not only the functions of a Corporation should be of public importance, but they must also be closely related to Governmental functions. Inasmuch as the operation of the appellant-Bank is not confined to State funds and also because it cannot be termed as an agency created by the State for distributing the rural credit provided by it, it cannot be said that it satisfies this test. As stated above, the appellant-Bank has its own funds and the credit provided by central agencies is only a part of it. In the circumstances, it is not possible to say that the appellant-Bank/Society satisfies the fifth test enunciated by the Supreme Court." 22. Eventually the Full Bench has held that the appellant Society cannot be characterized as a State within the meaning of Article 12. 23. In this regard, it is pertinent to submit that much water has flowed under the judicial bridges since 1990. After a series of undulating judicial pronouncements, the Courts have fixed various other parameters in that regard to determine the scope of Article 12 of the Constitution. Now, what holds the field is the ratio laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, 2003 (1) ALD 40 (SC): (2002) 5 SCC 111 , a judgment of Seven-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In any event, for our purpose what is required to be examined is the scope of Article 226, rather than Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 24. Examining the scope of Article 226, we may refer to certain definitive pronouncements on it. In any event, for our purpose what is required to be examined is the scope of Article 226, rather than Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 24. Examining the scope of Article 226, we may refer to certain definitive pronouncements on it. In U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey, 1999 (1) ALD (S.C.S.N.) 20: (1999) 1 SCC 741 , the Supreme Court has held that the language of Article 226 does not admit of any limitation on the powers of the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder, though by various decisions of the Court, with varying and divergent views, it has been held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised only when a body or authority, the decision of which is complained against, was exercising its power in the discharge of public duty, since the writ is a public law remedy. 25. In Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, (1976) 2 SCC 82 , it has been held that the expansive and extraordinary power of the High Courts under Article 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person – even a private individual - and be available for any (other) purpose - even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Article 226 in 1963 inserting Article 226(1-A) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the expressive reference to the residence of such person. But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a china shop. The Supreme Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. The Supreme Court has further observed that the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive. To cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril on human rights. The conclusion is that this power is to be kept on a judicious leash. 26. The Supreme Court has further observed that the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the qui vive. To cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril on human rights. The conclusion is that this power is to be kept on a judicious leash. 26. In Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:- "20. The term authority used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words any person or authority used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 22. Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor de Smith states – to be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition. 27. In T. Gattaiah vs. Commissioner of Labour, Hyderabad, (1981) 1 APLJ 280 , his Lordship Sri Justice P.A. Chowdhury, has, in a scintillating style, opined as follows:- "The very wide and special language of Article 226 of the Constitution occurring as it does in a primordial document like the Constitution must, in my opinion be given its full meaning. In doing so, we must take note of the fact that the Constitution itself declares that the General Clause Act would apply to its interpolation. According to the General Clauses Act, the word person refers not only to a natural person but even to a legal person. If so done, there is no doubt, in my opinion, that a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available not only against an authority or Government, but also against a private person. The restrictive meaning suggested to be given to the word person occurring in Article 226 would render that word a surpluage because according to that interpretation the word person can only mean another Governmental authority. The rule of interpretation that the meaning of a word should be ascertained from the association it keeps cannot, therefore, be applied to the word person occurring in Article 226 of the Constitution. The above considerations, in my opinion, would clearly liberate the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution from the limiting constraints of the dictum of Atkin, L.J. in the above mentioned case. I, therefore, hold that in appropriate cases a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution could issue even against private persons. 23. That apart the State power to render justice between a citizen and a citizen and between a citizen and the State belongs to the constitutional Courts of our country more by reason of their establishment and less by reason of conferment of power by the co-ordinate organs of the State acting under the Constitution. Renunciation of such jurisdiction cannot easily be accepted. Renunciation of such jurisdiction cannot easily be accepted. Some of the aforementioned cases drew a picture of dreadful consequences as flowing from giving a wider meaning to the word person. In my humble opinion, there is no scope for any such apprehension so long as we understand that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is exercised on the basis of its public law foundations and the field of public law is clearly different from the field of private law. Although there is high authority and uniform practice to the contrary we-cannot in principle issue the private remedy of an injunction in place of the public remedy of mandamus or vice versa. Regarding Hariharan case (supra), of our High Court and the Neyveli Lignite Corporation case (supra), of Madras High Court, I must make a special mention. Both these cases had proceeded on the assumption that the limited companies in those two cases although owned and controlled by the Government of India are two separate and distinct legal entities from the Government and that therefore, they are not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is a view which in my humble opinion, totally missed to take into account the significance of the great American doctrine of State action as applicable to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. I am one of these few who have first sought for the applicability of this American doctrine in our Courts. In D. Jayasri vs. Kakatiya Medical College, Warangal, 1967 (1) An. W.R. 247, this Court held that a writ would lie at the instance of the petitioner seeking admission into a medical college, against a Society which was registered under the Societies Registration Act. I further sought for the enforcement of this American doctrine of State action in cases like Kanska Durga vs. Kakatiya Medical College, AIR 1972 AP 83 ; Subhadra Devi vs. Andhra Girls College, 1973 (1) An. W.R. 94 and P.V. Naidu vs. A.P. Milling Corporation, 1974 (1) APLJ 222 and also in unreported judgments in Writ Petitions 4239 of 1969 dated 12.5.1970 and 3103 of 1975 dated 17.4.1978 This doctrine has now been firmly implanted into our Corpos Juris by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722 . The acceptance of this doctrine by our Courts would clearly constitute at least partial though not total rejection of the dictum of Atkin, L.J. in the above case. According to the traditional theory incorporated company is a distinct legal person as Hindustan Shipyard and Neyvtil Lignite Corporation (supra) are undoubtedly. The Constitution did not confer any powers on these bodies to affect the traditional rights of the citizens relating to freedom and liberty. If the dictum of Atkin, L.J. was to be followed, no writ would issue to such bodies. The fact that writs are now being issued against such bodies would clearly show the partial atrophy that the doctrine of Atkin, L.J. had suffered. For our constitutional purposes it is now clear that a private person can transform himself into a person in authority not merely by sharing in and exercising the State power affecting the rights of the citizen but even by possessing power to grant bounties and facilities. Such a private person's activities should be amenable to writ jurisdiction. 28. In Sadhu Varahala Babu and Others vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, 2005 (5) ALT 126 : 2005 (6) ALD (NOC) 261, a judgment of erudition and exertion, this Court, per Justice Dr. G. Yethirajulu, J., has summarized the entire case law on the issue and has held:- "49. A body that can be called State under Article 12 is amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 32. Though Article 226 is not in Part III, this Article empowers the High Court to issue writs to persons to enforce ordinary rights. A writ of Prohibition Certiorari will lie against a body, which is not judicial or quasi-judicial and they are available against bodies clothed with such powers. The writ of certiorari cannot be issued against private persons even under Article 226. But Article 226 empowers High Court to issue directions against private persons also. Eventually, his Lordship has held:- "77. The co-operative societies are established under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. The rules regarding the functioning of the societies were framed from time to time giving statutory recognition. The bye-laws of the societies are also given statutory flavour on account of their enforcement after getting approval from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Eventually, his Lordship has held:- "77. The co-operative societies are established under the A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. The rules regarding the functioning of the societies were framed from time to time giving statutory recognition. The bye-laws of the societies are also given statutory flavour on account of their enforcement after getting approval from the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Though the authorities of the State are not directly involving in the ordinary functioning of the societies, the authorities under the statute are regulating the functioning of the societies by fixing the staffing pattern, regulating the expenditure towards establishment charges, supervising the elections to the respective societies, conducting audit of the accounts of the societies, instructing the concerned authorities to take disciplinary actions against the erring officials and to reduce the members of the establishment in tune with the ceiling provided under the Act. In the first set of decisions mentioned in the aforementioned paragraphs, though the Courts held that a co-operative society is not a State or other authority under Article 12 of the Constitution, they did not put any embargo for treating it as an authority mentioned under Article 226 of the Constitution and for issuing necessary directions by invoking powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The second set of decisions are to the effect that a co-operative society would also come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. Keeping in view the above trend of decisions rendered by various Courts, I wish to summarize as under:- (1) Article 226 empowers the High Court to issue writs to persons or authorities to enforce ordinary rights. (2) An order can be issued against private persons by granting appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. (3) Even if a society cannot be characterized as a State within the meaning of Article 12, a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty. (4) In the matter of termination of service of the employees of a co-operative society, Section 47 of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act provides a certain protection and since the said protection is based upon public policy, it will be enforced, in an appropriate case, by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. (4) In the matter of termination of service of the employees of a co-operative society, Section 47 of the A.P. Shops and Establishments Act provides a certain protection and since the said protection is based upon public policy, it will be enforced, in an appropriate case, by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. (5) A writ can be maintained under Article 226 if there is flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, which are required to be followed under a statute. (6) The power of the High Court is not confined only to issue of writs to a public authority. It can also issue directions to enforce any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. (7) The scope of Article 226 has been widened by maintaining the writ petition against other authorities and persons also. (8) Mandamus under Article 226 may issue even to a private person or a body regarded as a Government instrumentality even when it is incorporated or registered under a statute viz. a cooperative society or a limited company. 78. In the light of the above findings, I hold that even if a co-operative society is not treated as a State within the scope of Article 12 of the Constitution, it can be treated as an authority for the purpose of Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, a writ against a co-operative society under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained. 29. Continuing in the same vein, we may examine the ratio laid down in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudani (supra), wherein their Lordships, as a matter of comparative jurisprudence, have observed:- "16. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy by prerogative writs in England started with very limited scope and suffered from many procedural disadvantages. To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission to review the existing remedies for the judicial control of administrative acts and omissions with a view to evolving a simpler and more effective procedure. The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Commission Report No. 73). The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Commission Report No. 73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by Section 31 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981. It combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial Review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this judicial review:- "At one stroke the Courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate. Not only certiorari and mandamus, but also declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure was much more simple and expeditious. Just a summons instead of a writ. No formal pleadings. The evidence was given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination, no discovery, and so forth. But there were important safeguards. In particular, in order to qualify, the applicant had to get the leave of a Judge. The statute is phrased in flexible terms. It gives scope for development. It uses the words having regard to. Those words are very indefinite. The result is that the Courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law. They are to have regard to it. So the previous law as to who are - and who are not - public authorities, is not absolutely binding. Nor is the previous law as to the matters in respect of which relief may be granted. This means that the Judges can develop the public law as they think best. That they have done and are doing. 17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The public authority for them means every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and Corporations, are all public authorities. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ in the nature of mandamus. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English Law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to any person or authority. It can be issued for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose." 30. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English Law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to any person or authority. It can be issued for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose." 30. In the light of the above definitive judicial pronouncements of unquestionable efficacy, we hold that the appellant Society is to be treated as an entity amendable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, if not Article 12, of the Constitution of India. In Re : Issue Nos. 2 and 4 31. Indeed, law recognises three types of suspensions, namely – (1) Suspension as a punishment; (2) Suspension during or in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings or an enquiry; (3) Suspension in the sense that the employee may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against him. In V.P. Gidroniya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 SCC 362 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has held:- "6. Three kinds of suspension are known to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspensions. Lastly he may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against him which act is also called suspension. The right to suspend as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both regulated by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the conditions of service. But the last category of suspension referred to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant from doing the work which he had to do under the terms of the contract of service or the provisions governing his conditions of service at the same time keeping in force the master's obligations under the contract. In other words the master may ask his servant to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfill his part of the contract." 32. In other words the master may ask his servant to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfill his part of the contract." 32. On the issue of inherent power of the employer to place a person under suspension, in Hotel Imperial vs. Hotel Workers' Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 , a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that in cases where no standing orders provide for suspension without payment of wages, it is not open to the employer to withhold wages as the orders of suspension made in those cases merely amounted to this that the employers are not prepared to take work from the workmen. Even so, the right of the workmen to receive wages has remained and the employer is bound to pay the wages during the period of so-called suspension. Later a Constitutional Bench in T. Cajee vs. U. Jormanik Siem, AIR 1961 SC 276 , has clarified Hotel Imperial's case (supra), by holding that in the absence of such power the master can pass an order of interim suspension but he will have to pay the servant according to the terms of contract between them. In L.K. Verma vs. HMT Limited, (2006) 2 SCC 269 , having acknowledged the classification of suspension, the Supreme Court has further said that an order of suspension can also be passed by the employer in exercise of its inherent power in the sense that it may not take any work from the delinquent officer but in that event, the entire salary is required to be paid. 33. It is thus can be stated that an employee can be placed under suspension de hors the statutory sanction, but the employee cannot be deprived of his wages or salary for the said period. In other words, an employer has always got the power to keep away the employee from work so long as he is willing to pay him. 34. It is one of the pleas of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the suspension amounts to being punitive on account of lack of reference to subsistence allowance in the impugned order of suspension. On the issue of placing an employee under suspension, guided by the principles of equity, the Courts have developed the concept of subsistence allowance to the employees who are under the cloud of indiscipline, as a measure of sustenance and survival. On the issue of placing an employee under suspension, guided by the principles of equity, the Courts have developed the concept of subsistence allowance to the employees who are under the cloud of indiscipline, as a measure of sustenance and survival. With the passage of time it has assumed statutory form and now it has passed itself into the realm of an inviolable facet of service jurisprudence. Put on the pedestal of principles of natural justice, the subsistence allowance now has the potential of vitiating the very disciplinary proceedings. Courts, indeed, have gone to the extent of declaring that the enquiry would be vitiated if the delinquent is deprived subsistence allowance and of course, thereby he has been incapacitated, owing to his indigence or lack of resources, to contest the charges effectively in the departmental enquiry. 35. Veering back to the facts, it is to be observed that Regulation 65 provides for subsistence allowance at a rate of 50% of the basic pay along with allowance, which the employee would have got but for the suspension, for the first six months and thereafter full pay and allowances. It is further mandated that the suspended employee shall also be entitled to the medical allowance and hospitalization. In the light of specific provisions in the Regulations, mere failure on the part of the management to mention its availability in the impugned notice does not render the suspension punitive. Suspension as a measure of punishment stands entirely on a different footing and any elaboration on that count may not be called for at this juncture. 36. Although Section 16(1) of the General Clauses Act provides that the power of appointment includes the power to suspend or dismiss, that by itself does not resolve the question as to what amount should be paid to a public servant during such suspension. That will depend, as held by the Supreme Court, upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision, the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, then the public servant will be entitled to his usual or normal emoluments during the period of suspension. The amount when fixed by the rules is referred to as subsistence allowance, which is usually less than his salary. 37. But if there is no such provision, then the public servant will be entitled to his usual or normal emoluments during the period of suspension. The amount when fixed by the rules is referred to as subsistence allowance, which is usually less than his salary. 37. Accordingly, it is to be held that the suspension is not punitive, but, once the authorities do not have the power to suspend, while keeping the officer away from duty, he shall be paid full salary, rather than subsistence allowance. In Re : Issue No. 3 38. Chapter 10 of the Regulations deals with conduct, discipline, procedure, suspension, punishment and appeal. Regulation 60 enumerates the minor punishment; Regulation 61, major punishment. Regulation 62 prescribes the procedure for imposing any of the major punishments under Regulation 61. Regulation 63, on the other hand, describes the manner and method of receiving the explanation and its consideration. Regulation 64, which speaks of suspension, being essential for our consideration, is extracted herein below:- "The employee on whom disciplinary procedures are pending and the charges are of grave nature or when the charges amount to a criminal offence and when the employee is avoiding arrest on such charges or when the employee absenting himself from duty for an unduly long period without valid reasons and indulging in such acts detriment to the image of the Bank, he may be placed under suspension, pending further disciplinary procedures. An employee who may be arrested on a criminal charge in connection with the Bank's affair or otherwise shall be considered as being kept under suspension from the date of his arrest. In the event, the employee is acquitted of all charges on the basis of the enquiry findings or on the basis of the decisions by the Court, the employee's absence shall be treated as on duty during the period of his absence, provided further, the employee is not proceeded against the departmentally, depending upon the nature and gravity of the charges." 39. In fact, from the facts narrated above, it can be stated that the authorities have not complied with the statutory or regulatory safeguards before placing the petitioner under suspension. 40. In fact, from the facts narrated above, it can be stated that the authorities have not complied with the statutory or regulatory safeguards before placing the petitioner under suspension. 40. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is held that the respondent Society has every power to keep away the petitioner, short of suspension, from duty, in the face of the allegations he faces and in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings to be initiated. Yet, it is incumbent to pay to the petitioner full salary, till the petitioner can be placed under suspension in terms of Regulation 64 referred to above. 41. With the above observations, the writ petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs. As a sequel to it, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.