JUDGMENT 1. - This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the petitioner with a prayer for quashing the F.I.R. No. 6/2014 dated 16.1.2014 of Police Station, Sadar, District Churu, for offences punishable under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B I.P.C. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondent No. 2 has filed false complaint against the petitioner for committing the offence of forgery and criminal breach of trust though no such offences has been committed by the petitioner. It is contended that petitioner has facilitated the departure of the respondent No. 2 for Saudi Arabia wherein the petitioner was offered a job and was also paid wages, however, the respondent No. 2 has left Saudi Arabia on his own will and after reaching India has filed false F.I.R. against the petitioner. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Jeevan Khan v. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in 2008(1) R.Cr.D 286 (Raj.) , and has prayed that the F.I.R. in question may kindly be quashed and set aside. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that a bare reading of the F.I.R. in question constitutes prima facie case against the petitioner and, therefore, no interference is called for while exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 5. Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Public Prosecutor and perused the F.I.R. in question. 6. Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 has examined the powers of the High Court of quashing an First Information Report lodged in any Police Station while exercising the power under Article 226 of Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has held as under:- "102.
v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 has examined the powers of the High Court of quashing an First Information Report lodged in any Police Station while exercising the power under Article 226 of Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and has held as under:- "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(5) Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice." 7. In a later decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rupan Deol Bajaj (Mrs.)& Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr., reported in 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059 has reiterated the above principle. 8. From a perusal of the F.I.R. in question allegations levelled in the F.I.R. it is clear that the respondent No. 2 has alleged that though the petitioner has promised him regarding job opportunity at Saudi Arabia but after his arrival at Saudi Arabia no job was offered to him and he was kept in custody and has returned to India after great difficulties. It is also alleged in the complaint that after his arrival in India when the respondent No. 2 has ask for returning the money the petitioner and other accused person have refused to return the same. 9.
It is also alleged in the complaint that after his arrival in India when the respondent No. 2 has ask for returning the money the petitioner and other accused person have refused to return the same. 9. In the instant case, after reading the contents of the F.I.R. in question, it cannot be said that the allegations levelled by the respondent No. 2 against the petitioner do not prima facie constitutes any offence or make out a case against the accused. At this stage it cannot be said that the respondent No. 2 has lodged false F.I.R. against the petitioner.So far as the judgment passed by this Court in Jeevan Khan's case (supra) is concerned, it is distinguishable from the facts of the present case because in that case there was a job agreement executed between the parties, whereas no such job agreement exists in the present case.In such circumstances, in the light of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in above referred cases this Court does not find any merit in this Criminal Misc. Petition as the petitioner have failed to make out a case for quashing the F.I.R. in question.Hence there is no force in this Criminal Misc. Petition the same is hereby dismissed.Stay petition is also dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******