ORDER : Petitioner has assailed order dated 15.1.1997 in LRT No.1401/7980, passed by the Land Tribunal, Mangalore Taluk. The relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner’s brother Lawrence Mascaranhas had filed form No.7 seeking grant of occupancy right in respect of the following lands to their respective extents: Sy.No. Extent 1-1C1 0-50 1-3A1 0-80 1-3B 0-15 1-3C1 0-50 Total 1-95 The said application was filed against one Smt. Nagammathird respondent who is since deceased, represented by her legal representatives. The Land Tribunal by order dated 17.10.1981 granted occupancy rights in respect of the aforesaid lands. The grant was in the following manner. Sy. No. Extent 1-1C1 0-50 3A1 0-80 1-3B 0-15 1-3C1 0-50 Total 1-95 Thereafter, the impugned order dated 15.1.1997 was passed by the Land Tribunal, by which, in respect of lands in survey No.13A1 and 13C1, the extent of grant of land has been reduced, that is to say, in respect of 13A1, instead of 80 cents, it was reduced to 34 cents and in respect of 13C1, instead of 50 cents, it was reduced to 38 cents. That order has been assailed in these writ petitions. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for respondents and perused the material on record. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed without issuing any notice to her and she had not participated in the proceedings leading up to the impugned order. Therefore, the said order reducing the extent of land granted to her brother earlier is a nullity being in violation of principles of natural justice. He therefore contended that the impugned order may be quashed and fresh consideration be made in the matter. 4. I have considered this submission in light of material on record, particularly, the impugned order dated 15.1.1997. From the material on record, it is evident that insofar as survey Nos.13A1 and 13C1, what was granted by the Land Tribunal by the order dated 17.10.1981 was 80 cents and 50 cents respectively. Thereafter, at the time of issuance of form No.10, it is the petitioner herein who approached the Land Tribunal for issuance of form No.10 in respect of the extent of land in her actual possession. The said fact is very much evident from the impugned order. Thereafter, at the time of issuance of form No.10, it is the petitioner herein who approached the Land Tribunal for issuance of form No.10 in respect of the extent of land in her actual possession. The said fact is very much evident from the impugned order. As such, the Land Tribunal took up the proceedings for the passing of the impugned order on the application filed by the petitioner, accordingly, in respect of survey No.13A1, the extent of land was reduced to 34 cents and in respect of survey No.13C1, it was reduced to 60 cents. 5. On a perusal of the impugned order, it becomes apparent that the Land Tribunal passed the said order on the basis of the application made by the petitioner herein. In fact, the impugned order also states that she had engaged the services of an advocate who had appeared in the matter on her behalf and on the other hand, respondents had not appeared. In that view of the matter, the contention that she was not heard in the matter and the order was passed behind her back is incorrect. The impugned order would therefore not call for any interference. That apart, the order impugned is dated 15.1.1997. The writ petition is filed on 06.1.2011. There are no reasons assigned as to why the writ petition was filed after nearly 14 years. The writ petition is also hit by delay and latches. 6. In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (State of Orissa & Anr. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows: a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1332 (State of Orissa & Anr. Mamata Mohanty) the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. b) In the case of Shankar Coop Housing Society Ltd. – Vs M.Prabhakar & Ors (2011 AIR SCW 3033), the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows; “53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” c) Similarly, the Apex Court in 2010(4) SCC 532 in the case of SAWARAN LATHA AND OTHERS VS STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged. d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of (1996) 6 SCC 445 STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS VSD.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS), wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. [( 2002) 2 SCC 48], it has been opined thus: “The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” f) In fact in S.S. Balu and others v. State of Karnataka [ (2009) 2 SCC 479 ], it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time. The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, the writ petitions being speculative in nature and an instance of abuse of process of this Court, is rejected. However, I refrain from imposing costs.