ORDER : 1. Aggrieved by the order dated 05.07.2014 in E.P. No.39/2013 in O.S. No.110 of 2001 before the Munsiff’s Court, Chengannur, the decree holder-plaintiff has come up in Revision. 2. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the premises in question was subject matter of agreement under Ext. A1 document dated 05.02.1999. On the basis of that document, eviction was sought for in O.S. No.31/2000. Though initially the respondent admitted the arrangement as per Ext.A1, later he sought to amend the written statement by characterising A1 as a lease deed as per I.A. No.233/2005. The trial court dismissed the application and that brought the respondent before this court in W.P.(C) No.6639/2005 and this court confirmed the order of the trial court. But, however, this court reserved the liberty of the respondent to urge all his contentions at the time of trial. Subsequently, on 08.04.2005 the suit was decreed. 3. The disappointed defendant took up the matter in A.S. No.100/05 before the Additional District Court, Mavelikkara which was transferred to Sub Court, Chengannur and renumbered as A.S. 245/2008. While the appeal was pending, the parties in their wisdom, thought of entering into a compromise and Ext.A3 compromise was entered into between the parties. They approached the appellate court for accepting the compromise and based on the compromise the appeal be disposed of. That was accepted by the appellate court and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed. 4. The case put forward by the petitioner is that as per the compromise entered into between the parties which was incorporated in the decree the respondent was bound to vacate the premises on expiry of the stipulated period. Since that was not done, the petitioner had no option but to seek eviction as per the appellate decree. The petitioner accordingly filed E.P. No.39/2013 to have the respondent evicted and recover possession of the premises. 5. The said claim of the petitioner was resisted by the respondent contending that there is a change of status after the compromise entered into by the parties and that he was a tenant holding under lease arrangement after the compromise. Ext. A3 compromise resulted in a new arrangement and he qualified to be a tenant under the Rent Control Act. 6. Ext. A3 compromise resulted in a new arrangement and he qualified to be a tenant under the Rent Control Act. 6. The execution court being impressed with the contention raised by the respondent of a new arrangement and also after going through the terms of the compromise entered into between the parties, came to the conclusion that the matter is covered by the Rent Control Act and therefore the decree obtained by the petitioner in A.S. No.207/2008 is unexecutable. The court below dismissed the Execution Petition. 7. The bone of contention is therefore the interpretation of A3 document. That is a compromise entered into between the parties while the appeal was pending before the lower appellate court. It has to be borne in mind that the petitioner herein had approached the civil court for mandatory injunction. Both in the trial court and in appeal also, the contention was to the effect that it was only a licence arrangement, which was accepted by the trial court and a mandatory injunction followed. 8. It will be useful to extract the terms of the compromise as incorporated in the decree. They read as follows: “(1) XXXX (2) XXXX (3) XXXX (4) XXXX (5) XXXX (6) XXXX (7) XXXX (8) XXXX (9) XXXX (10) XXXX (11) XXXX (12) XXXX 9. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the court below had erred in appreciating the terms of above deed both on facts and in law. It is clear that there was no new arrangement as per the compromise but only an extension of the then existing arrangement and if that be so, the Rent Control Act cannot cannot have any application. Merely because the words ‘rent’, ‘possession’ etc. are used are not conclusive of the issue and the relationship has to be determined on the facts of the case. Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi (Dead) by His Legal Representatives v. Gopinath Naik and others’ ( AIR 1968 SC 919 ), it is contended that merely because of a new agreement was executed it does not mean there is change of status and the occupation and possession to be treated as a continuation of the then existing arrangement. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in ‘Som Dutt (Dead) by LRS. v. Govind Ram’ ( (2000) 9 SCC 345 ). 10. Reliance was also placed on the decision reported in ‘Som Dutt (Dead) by LRS. v. Govind Ram’ ( (2000) 9 SCC 345 ). 10. Apart from the above aspects, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also drew attention to the terms of Ext.A3 and pointed out that a reading of the same, no doubt, would indicate that it was a document in continuation of the earlier arrangement and it cannot be treated as a lease arrangement at all. The learned counsel contended that these crucial aspects have been lost sight of by the execution court. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that a look at the document in question will reveal the relationship. If the document on a plain reading shows that it is a lease agreement nothing more survives for consideration and the order of the lower court is only to be upheld. The learned counsel drew attention of this court to the various words used in the document and contended that it was in tune with the lease agreement. The fact that no default clause was incorporated in the document itself indicative of the fact that it is a lease arrangement. 12. The learned counsel sought to distinguish the decision reported in ‘Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi’s (1968 SC 919) case (cited supra) on two grounds. According to the learned counsel, the agreement in that case was a lease covered by the Rent Control Act and the second contention raised is that there were no challenge to the decree passed in that case and so that the principle laid down in that case cannot be applied to the facts of this case. The learned counsel then pointed out that the court while accepting the compromise ought to ascertain whether it is legal and relied on the decision reported in ‘Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and others’ ( (1974) 1 SCC 242 ). 13. The learned counsel drew attention of the court to para 16 of the O.P. No.375/2011 and pointed out that there is a tacit admission by the petitioner himself that the arrangement is in the nature of the lease agreement which cannot be omitted to be taken note of. 14. 13. The learned counsel drew attention of the court to para 16 of the O.P. No.375/2011 and pointed out that there is a tacit admission by the petitioner himself that the arrangement is in the nature of the lease agreement which cannot be omitted to be taken note of. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that on a plain reading of Ext.A3 there are no indications of licence agreement and when the words of the document are clear and explicit, it is unnecessary to go for searching for the intention of the parties to the compromise. There cannot be any doubt that Ext.A3 is a lease arrangement. The court below could not find fault with for holding that since the Rent Control Act is applicable, the decree cannot be executed. 15. The question is whether A3 is a lease or licence arrangement. It is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that the deed should be viewed in isolation. The sequence of events will be appreciated to reach a conclusion. Recollecting the facts, the suit O.S. No.110/2001 which resulted in a compromise was based on A1 agreement which was held to be a licence arrangement. Though initially, the defendants did not dispute that claim made by the plaintiff, at a later stage, he sought to amend the written statement by setting up a case of lease or in other words, he contended that A3 was a lease agreement and he cannot be evicted other than under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. As already observed, that amendment was not allowed and an attempt to have the order of the trial court reversed did not succeed. 16. Subsequently, accepting the allegation that A1 is a licence arrangement, a decree of mandatory injunction followed. 17. One may have a look at Ext.A3. It speaks about a compromise between the parties stating that the parties have agreed as a result of mediation and conciliation that the respondent therein can continue his possession for a period of 50 months from the date of agreement. The further stipulation is that on the expiry of 50 months thereof, he has to unconditionally surrender the premises to the petitioner. Of course, there are conditions for payment of rent etc. which are not relevant under the present purposes. 18. The further stipulation is that on the expiry of 50 months thereof, he has to unconditionally surrender the premises to the petitioner. Of course, there are conditions for payment of rent etc. which are not relevant under the present purposes. 18. In the decision reported in ‘Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi (Dead) by His Legal Representatives v. Gopinath Naik and others’ ( AIR 1968 SC 919 ), the question was considered as to whether in the circumstance disclosed, it was considered whether the compromise was a fresh agreement. It was held as follows: “(9) Lord Denning, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Isack v. Hotel De Paris’, 1960-1 All ER 348-352 observed: “There are many cases in the books where exclusive possession has been given of premises outside the Rent Restriction Acts and yet there has been held to be no tenancy. Instances are Errington v. Errington and Woods. 1952-1 All ER 149 and Cobb v. Lane, 1952-1 All ER 1199 which were referred to during the argument. It is true that in those two cases there was no payment or acceptance of rent, but even payment and acceptance of rent-though of great weight - is not decisive of a tenancy where it can be otherwise explained. See Clark v. Grant. 1949-1 All ER 768. A Lord Greene M.R. Said, in Booker v. Palmer, 1942-2 All ER 674-677: “There is one golden rule which is of very general application namely, that the law does not impute intention to enter into legal relationship where the circumstances and the conduct of the parties negative any intention of the kind.” (10) Keeping in mind the above observations, what was the intention of the parties? It seems to us that the fact that the decree holder had brought a suit for ejectment of the judgment debtor and that a compromise was entered into in that suit is important. It is difficult to impute to him an intention to create a fresh tenancy while the fact that he brought the suit shows that his intention was to eject the judgment debtor after having purported to terminate the tenancy. It is difficult to impute to him an intention to create a fresh tenancy while the fact that he brought the suit shows that his intention was to eject the judgment debtor after having purported to terminate the tenancy. (11) Coming to the terms of the compromise, it is true, as stressed by the learned counsel for the respondent that the word “rent” is not conclusive for as observed by this Court in State of Punjab v. British India Corporation Ltd., 1964-2 SCR 114 at p. 123 = ( AIR 1963 SC 1459 at p. 1463), in its wider sense rent means any payment made for the use of land or buildings and thus includes the payment by a licensee in respect of the use and occupation of any land or building. In its narrower sense it means payment made by tenant to landlord for property demised to him.” 19. In the decision reported in (1982) 1 SCC 633 , it was held as follows: “When a compromise petition is filed in an execution proceeding, and a contention is raised by the judgment-debtor on a subsequent execution being started by the decree-holder that the compromise has given rise to a fresh contract between the parties and that the decree sought to be executed is not executable, what is to be seen is whether the decree has been extinguished as a result of the compromise and a fresh contract has emerged. When a compromise takes place in the course of execution of a decree -- for eviction, the compromise may extinguish the decree and create a fresh lease, or the compromise may provide a mere mode for the discharge of the decree. What actually takes place depends on the intention of the parties to the compromise. And the intention has to be gathered from the terms of the compromise and the surrounding circumstances including the order recorded by the court on the basis of the compromise.” 20. Going by the above decisions, when compromise is entered into between the parties during the lis, it is normally treated as a continuation of the then existing arrangement unless there are compelling reasons to hold otherwise. It is also clear that use of the words ‘possession’ and ‘rent’ are by themselves not determinative of the character of the deed. Going by the above decisions, when compromise is entered into between the parties during the lis, it is normally treated as a continuation of the then existing arrangement unless there are compelling reasons to hold otherwise. It is also clear that use of the words ‘possession’ and ‘rent’ are by themselves not determinative of the character of the deed. It is the intention of the parties that is the paramount consideration even though intention is to be generally gathered by going through the relevant deed. 21. The learned counsel for the respondent may be justified in the submission that if the wording of the agreement is clear and admits of no doubt, nothing more needs to be looked into. But, that is not to say the circumstances entered into can be overlooked or need not be looked into. 22. In the grounds canvassed by the petitioner, it is stated that inadvertently A1 has been referred to a rental agreement but by the compromise it cannot be said that the document is a lease deed shifting from a licence agreement. 23. One cannot omit to note the words in A3 and that is “ ….. (XXXX), which means in continuation of the grounds of earlier transaction evidenced by A1, which has already noticed held to be a licence arrangement. 24. The court is legally bound to see if compromise is legal and proper. It was contended that if the compromise agreement was intended to circumvent the provisions of Act 2 of 1965 the compromise ought not to have been accepted. Every arrangement by which a person is inducted into possession or occupation need not be a lease. Law permits entering into licence arrangement and if that be done, the arrangement cannot be ignored stating that it is intended to circumvent the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The parties are entering into a relationship with open eyes and they must be presumed to know the arrangement the person is put in occupation of a premises. When a person is put in occupation on the basis of licence arrangement and that is renewed it comes with little grace to say that relationship is transferred from licence to lease. 25. Except for the words ‘rent’ or ‘possession’, there is nothing in A3 to indicate that the parties intended it to be a lease agreement. When a person is put in occupation on the basis of licence arrangement and that is renewed it comes with little grace to say that relationship is transferred from licence to lease. 25. Except for the words ‘rent’ or ‘possession’, there is nothing in A3 to indicate that the parties intended it to be a lease agreement. One must remember that the petitioner was armed with a decree for mandatory injunction and so was in an advantageous position. It is imprudent to assume that petitioner would give up the benefit obtained and consequently bring about a change in status thereby putting the chance of eviction of respondent in jeopardy. Further, going by the terms of A3, it is extremely difficult to come to the conclusion that altogether a fresh transaction was being entered into totally unconnected with the earlier arrangement. 26. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent placed strong reliance on the decision reported in ‘Bibekananda Bhowal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Satindra Mohan Deb (dead) by L.Rs.’ ( AIR 1996 SC 1985 ) and contended that an execution petition is not maintainable. It was contended that fresh action for eviction will have to be brought in to get vacant possession. The facts in the above case have comparison to the facts of this case. The absence of default clause as in the above case but that by itself is not decisive. 27. The distinction between licence and lease is well established and needs no elucidation. The test is to see if there is exclusive possession. That may be determined either on the terms of agreement or the nature of business or purpose for which the premises is put to use etc. Going by the tests available, it is difficult to say that A3 is a complete determination of the earlier arrangement of licence especially when A3 specifically mentioned that it is the continuation of the earlier arrangement. 28. The court below did not advert to the above aspects and jumped into the conclusion that the arrangement is a lease without appreciating the materials on record in this proper perspective and without considering the circumstances under which A3 came into existence. For the above reasons, this court is unable to sustain the order impugned and accordingly, it is set aside and the execution court is directed to proceed with the execution. No order as to costs.