Judgment U.C. Maheshwari, J. The appellant -defendant has filed this appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16.2.2013, passed by 15th Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 4-A/11, whereby allowing the appeal of the respondents - plaintiffs by setting aside judgment dated 25.7.2011, passed by 4th Civil Judge, Class -I, Jabalpur in Civil Original Suit No. 101-A/09, dismissing the suit of the respondents filed for eviction on the grounds of Sections 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1) (f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961, in short "The Act", such suit of the respondents has been decreed on aforesaid both the grounds against the appellant. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal in short are that the predecessor in title of respondents - plaintiffs namely Smt. Sharifunnisha had filed the impugned suit against the appellant for eviction, arrears of rent, mesne profit with some other reliefs in respect of the tenanted premises bearing house no. 32- P.P. Colony, Gwarighat Road, Jabalpur contending that on dated 25.1.1988, the husband of the principal plaintiff, namely Mohd. Yakub had taken such house under the hire purchase agreement from the M.P. Housing Board, during subsisting such hire purchase agreement, he passed away, on which after depositing the entire consideration in accordance with such higher purchase agreement, a registered sale deed of the premises was executed by the Housing Board in favour of principle plaintiff and the respondents, on dated 27.5.2006. Such house is comprising with one hall, open courtyard, kitchen, lat bath alongwith some open land. In the life time of Mohd. Yakub, Smt. Jainab bi, mother of the appellant was his monthly tenant @ Rs.300/- per month for residential purpose. She passed away on dated 8.12.2008 and since then the appellant being tenant of the respondents on the same terms is in occupation of such house. Subsequent to death of Jainab bi, the appellant became defaulter in payment of the monthly rent and inspite making the demand by the respondents, the same was not paid. Apart from this, the principal plaintiff, (since deceased) was also in bonafide genuine need of such premises for the residence of her sons (respondents) and their family for which she did not possess any other accommodation of her own in such town. Apart from this, the principal plaintiff, (since deceased) was also in bonafide genuine need of such premises for the residence of her sons (respondents) and their family for which she did not possess any other accommodation of her own in such town. Besides this, the premises was not being used for the purpose for which it was taken by the appellant's family and the same has been kept in locked condition for more than seven months, on which the principle plaintiff through her counsel sent the quit notice dated 7.3.2009, the principle defendant by making the demand of outstanding rent, intimated to vacate the premises, but the same was not served because the house was found to be locked. With these pleadings, the impugned suit was filed. 3. After service of the summons of the suit, the appellant himself appeared before the trial court on 19.5.2010 and took adjournment to engage the counsel and to file WS but on subsequent dated 6.7.2010, no one appeared on behalf of the appellant and WS was also not filed, on which the case was proceeded exparte against him and posted for recording exparte evidence. Before recording such evidence, an application under Order 9, Rule 7 of CPC for setting aside exparte order was filed on behalf of appellant on 7.12.2010, the same was replied and opposed by the respondents. On consideration, vide order dated 25.1.2011, such application was allowed and after setting aside the exparte order, the appellant was extended further opportunity to file the WS. Subsequent to it, even on extending the various dates, the WS was not filed. Then on 12.5.2011 again the suit was proceeded exparte against the appellant and after recording the exparte evidence of the respondents on appreciation, the trial court by holding that the respondents could not prove the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties dismissed the suit. Then on 12.5.2011 again the suit was proceeded exparte against the appellant and after recording the exparte evidence of the respondents on appreciation, the trial court by holding that the respondents could not prove the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties dismissed the suit. Such dismissal was challenged by the respondents before the appellate court, after extending opportunity of hearing to the parties, on consideration the appellate court in the lack of any pleadings and evidence in rebuttal on behalf of appellant, taking into consideration the unrebutted pleadings and evidence of the respondents allowed the appeal and by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court by holding the relationship as landlord and tenant, decreed the suit on the grounds of arrears of rent and the bonafide genuine requirements of the premises to the respondents for their residence under Section 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1) (e) of the Act. Being dissatisfied with this judgment of the Appellate Court, the appellant has come to this court with this appeal. 4. The appellant's counsel after taking me through the record of the courts below alongwith the impugned judgments argued that although on behalf of the appellant neither the WS was filed nor any evidence was adduced in the matter but even then on the basis of available pleadings and the evidence of respondents, the approach of the trial court for dismissal of the suit was correct and the same could not be interfered in the appeal but contrary to the record and settled propositions by relying on untrustworthy pleadings of the suit and exparte evidence of respondents, the appellate court has committed error in holding the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant and setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court dismissing the suit and decreeing the suit of the respondents on the aforesaid grounds of arrears of rent and bonafide genuine requirement enumerated under Sections 12 (1) (a) and 12 (1) (e) of the Act. In continuation, he said that in any case in the lack of cogent and reliable evidence proving the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents and appellant, the impugned suit could not have been decreed by the appellate court. In continuation, he said that in any case in the lack of cogent and reliable evidence proving the relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents and appellant, the impugned suit could not have been decreed by the appellate court. In any case, the decree passed by the appellate court on the grounds of arrears of rent under Section 12 (1) (a) is not sustainable because undisputedly demand notice of such arrears was never served on the appellant - defendant and in the lack of such service of the notice, the decree of eviction on this ground could not be passed. With these submissions, he prayed to admit this appeal by framing the substantial questions of law, proposed in the appeal memo. 5. Having heard, keeping in view the arguments advanced, I have carefully gone through the records of both the courts below alongwith the impugned judgment. 6. True it is that on appreciation, the trial court had dismissed the suit of the respondents but the appellate court taking into consideration the available unrebutted pleadings and evidence of the respondents, by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial court, decreed the suit on the ground of arrears of rent and benafide genuine requirement of the premises to the respondents for the residence of the members of their family. 7. It is apparent from the pleadings of the plaint and available record of the trial court that the demand notice of arrears of rent sent by the predecessor in title of respondents- the principle plaintiff through counsel to the appellant was not served on him before filing the impugned suit on the ground of arrears of rent also. As per settled proposition in the lack of service of such demand notice of arrears of rent on the tenant like appellant, the decree on such ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act could not have been passed by the appellate court. As per settled proposition in the lack of service of such demand notice of arrears of rent on the tenant like appellant, the decree on such ground under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act could not have been passed by the appellate court. So on this count, the impugned judgment of the appellate court being contrary to the existing law requires interference, but even on framing the substantial questions of law on such count in this appeal, no fruitful purpose would be served because unless the circumstances for framing the substantial questions of law regarding existence of relationship of the tenant and landlord between the parties and on the ground of Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act are found in the matter. In view of the following discussion, I have not found any material circumstance in the matter to frame any substantial question of law on such grounds. 8. As per available record of the trial court on behalf of appellant neither the Written Statement was filed nor any evidence in rebuttal of the evidence of the respondents has been adduced. It is settled proposition of law that in the lack of the pleadings the evidence, if adduced, then the same could not be read to adjudicate the matter. So in such premises, the trial court could not have held contrary to the available unrebutted evidence of the respondents that relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondents and the appellant has not been proved. On the contrary, in view of unrebutted pleadings and the evidence of respondents, the trial court ought to have held that there was relationship as landlord and tenant between the parties. Pursuant to it, the trial court, on the basis of such unrebutted pleadings and the evidence was also bound to pass the decree of eviction against the appellant on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement of the disputed accommodation to the respondents- plaintiffs for the residence of their family members for which they are not in possession any other accommodation of their own in the township of Jabalpur. As such, by holding the relationship as landlord and tenant, the decree of eviction ought to have been passed under Section 12 (1) (e) in favour of the respondents. As such, by holding the relationship as landlord and tenant, the decree of eviction ought to have been passed under Section 12 (1) (e) in favour of the respondents. It is also apparent that in pendency of the suit neither the arrears of rent nor the recurring monthly rent of the disputed accommodation was deposited by the appellant. So in such circumstance, no defence was available to the appellant to defend the case on the ground of eviction enumerated under Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act. But such aspect was also not considered by the trial court with proper approach. In such premises, on going through the judgment of the appellant court, I have found that considering the unrebutted pleadings and the evidence of the respondents alongwith the aforesaid legal position of the Act, the appellate court has decided the appeal on right dimension and has not committed any error in holding the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and decreed the suit against the appellant for eviction on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement alongwith the sum of outstanding rent. 9. As such the findings of the appellate court till the extent of decreeing the suit for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent under Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act is neither correct nor sustainable. 10. In view of aforesaid, the findings of the appellate court based on unrebutted pleadings and evidence of the respondents holding the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant being finding of fact is not giving rise to any substantial question of law as per requirement of Section 100 of the CPC and in such premises, the approach of appellate court decreeing the suit on the ground of bonafide genuine requirement of the disputed accommodation to the respondent and regarding sum of the arrears of rent are also not faulted and the same are not giving rise to any question of law rather than substantial questions of law requiring any interference under Section 100 of CPC. Hence, this appeal could not be admitted for final hearing even on establishing the case that decree of the appellate court on ground of Section 12 (1) (a) of the Act is not sustainable because of even on admission of the appeal on such ground, the impugned decree could not be set aside because the decree has been passed on the ground of Section 12 (1) (e) of the Act also. 11. Apart the aforesaid, the appellant has proposed the substantial question of law on the ground that the impugned decree being passed by the appellate court in a matter in which the regular trial was not held by the trial court is not sustainable, is concerned, the argument advanced by the counsel in this regard has not appealed me because it is apparent from the proceeding of the trial court as stated in earlier part of this order while dictating the facts that inspite extending various opportunities to the appellant to file WS, neither the W.S. was filed nor any evidence was adduced by the appellant. In such premises, I have not found any circumstance to frame the substantial question of law on this ground. 12. Although it is a case in which the trial court has dismissed the suit of the respondents and the appellate court has decreed the same but mere on the ground of reversal of the judgment, appeal could not be admitted unless substantial grounds as per requirement of Section 100 of CPC to frame the substantial questions of law is found in the matter. In view of aforesaid discussion, I have not found any such circumstance. So merely on account of reversal of the judgment by the appellate court this appeal could not be admitted. 13. In view of aforesaid discussion, in the lack of substantial circumstance giving rise to any substantial questions of law this appeal being devoid of any merits deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing. 14. So merely on account of reversal of the judgment by the appellate court this appeal could not be admitted. 13. In view of aforesaid discussion, in the lack of substantial circumstance giving rise to any substantial questions of law this appeal being devoid of any merits deserves to be and is hereby dismissed at the stage of motion hearing. 14. Before parting with the matter, I would like to mention here that on winding up the arguments, by the appellant's counsel, I asked him that on dismissing this appeal at motion hearing stage, the appellant wants some breathing period to vacate the disputed premises, on which he had submitted that at the instance of the appellant a suit for specific performance with respect of the disputed premises is pending against the respondents and in such premises, he does not want to make any such prayer in this appeal. In view of such submission, no time is being extended to the appellant to vacate the premises. 15.There shall be no order as to cost.