JUDGMENT : Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This appeal under section 173 of the Motors Vehicle Act is at the instance of the claimants and is directed against the award dated 29th November, 2001 passed by the M.A.C.Tribunal (Main), Bharuch in M.A.C.P.No.347 of 1993 thereby awarding a sum of Rs.2,03,000/- in favour of the claimants with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the application till realization. 2. Being dissatisfied, the claimants have come up with present appeal. 3. It appears from the record that the victim was travelling in a luxury bus, which due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver capsized, as a result, the victim who was travelling in the said bus died on the spot. According to the claimants, the victim used to work in a silk mill and used to get Rs.72/- per diem as wages. According to the claimants, deceased also used to help his father in agricultural activities and from that source also, he used to earn some amount. According to the claimants, the victim was aged 32 years at the time of death. 4. The Tribunal below, on consideration of materials on record was of the view that as the claimants could not prove any documentary evidence in support of their claim that the victim used to earn Rs.72 a day, the Tribunal treated monthly income of the victim to be Rs.1500/- a month and thereafter, after deducting ?rd from the said amount for personal expenses and applying multiplier of 15 arrived at a figure of Rs.1,80,000/-. In addition to the said amount, the Tribunal added Rs.10,000/- towards conventional amount, Rs.10,000/- towards loss of expectation of life and Rs.3000/- towards the transportation and funeral expenses. Therefore, total amount awarded was Rs.2,03,000/-. 5. Mr. Hakim, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants contended before this Court that for assessing the said amount, the Tribunal below has not taken into consideration the future prospect of the victim and according to him, the Tribunal below should have applied the principle as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 . Mr.Hakim, further contends that the findings of the Tribunal below that the monthly wages of the victim was Rs.1500/- is based on no evidence and it is on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Mr. Hakim, therefore, prayed for treating the income of the victim to be Rs.1872/- a month as is reflected from the certificate given by the employer of the victim and marked as 35/1. 6. Mr. Thakkar, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company has opposed the contention of Mr. Hakim and contented that in absence of any documentary evidence, the Tribunal below has rightly assessed the monthly wages to be Rs.1500/- and I should not interfere with the findings of fact based on the appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal. 7. After hearing learned advocates for the parties and after going through the deposition of the widow of the victim, I find that in the examination -in- chief, it has been stated that the victim used to serve in Jay Amber Silk Mill and used to get Rs.72 per diem. She has further asserted that certificate showing that her husband was working has been produced in the Court. In cross examination by the learned advocate for the insurance company, no suggestion was given that the victim was not working in the said silk mill or that victim did not earn Rs.72/- per diem. 8. In such circumstances, in my opinion, having regard to the certificate produced from the said employer, there was no just reason to disbelieve the said amount as monthly wages. Said certificate further states that at the rate of Rs.72/- per diem for 26 days, monthly wages of the victim was Rs.1872/-. On the face of such material on record, I am of the view that in the facts of the present case, monthly wages of the victim at the relevant point should be taken to be Rs.1872/-. 9. I, now propose to apply the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma (supra). If we add 50% of Rs.1872/-, the total amount will be Rs.2808/- (Rs.1872 + Rs.936). Since the victim had six dependents, ¼th namely Rs.702/- should be deducted from the said amount and thus the amount comes to Rs.2106/- per month and multiplying the said amount by 12, the annual amount comes to Rs.25,272/-. If we add 50% of Rs.1872/-, the total amount will be Rs.2808/- (Rs.1872 + Rs.936). Since the victim had six dependents, ¼th namely Rs.702/- should be deducted from the said amount and thus the amount comes to Rs.2106/- per month and multiplying the said amount by 12, the annual amount comes to Rs.25,272/-. If we apply the multiplier of 16 as prescribed in the case of Sarla Verma (Supra) after taking into consideration the age of the victim being between 30 and 35 years, the total amount should be Rs.4,04,352/-. The accident having been occurred in the year 1992, Rs.25,000/- should be added to it as conventional charges and the total amount will be Rs.4,29,352/-. 10. At this stage, Mr. Thakkar, appearing on behalf of the insurance company vehemently contends before me that the claimants having restricted their claim before the Tribunal to Rs.3,50,000/- and even before this Appellate Court having restricted the claim only to further sum of Rs.1,40,000/-, there is no scope of granting any amount of compensation in excess of Rs.3,43,000/- and enhancement should be to that extent only. 11. In my view the aforesaid contention is not tenable in view of the following observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent decision of Ibrahim v. Raju reported in 2011 (10) SCC 634 :- "21. We are conscious of the fact that in the petition filed by him, the appellant had claimed compensation of Rs.3 lakhs only with interest and costs. It will be reasonable to presume that due to financial incapacity the appellant and his family could not avail the services of a competent lawyer and make a claim for adequate compensation. However, as the Tribunal and the High Court and for that reason this Court are duty-bound to award just compensation, we deem it proper to enhance the compensation from Rs.1,89,440 to Rs.6 lakhs. This approach is in tune with the judgment in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh. In that case, the Court considered a similar issue, referred to the judgments of the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corpn. Of Greater Bombay v. Kisan Gangaram Hire, Orissa High Court in Mulla Md. Abdul Wahid v. Abdul Rahim and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Devki Nandan Bangur v. State of Haryana and observed: (Nagappa case, (2003) 2 SCC 274 , p.282, para 21) "21. Of Greater Bombay v. Kisan Gangaram Hire, Orissa High Court in Mulla Md. Abdul Wahid v. Abdul Rahim and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Devki Nandan Bangur v. State of Haryana and observed: (Nagappa case, (2003) 2 SCC 274 , p.282, para 21) "21. For the reasons discussed above, in our view, under the MV Act, there is no restriction that the Tribunal/court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/court is to award just compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in such cases there is no question of claim becoming time-barred or it cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that as provided under sub-section (4) to Section 166, even the report submitted to the Claims Tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for compensation under the MV Act. If required, in appropriate cases, the court may permit the amendment to the claim petition." 12. Similar view is also taken in the case of "Sanjay Batham v. Munnalal Parihar" and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 665 where at paragraph 18, the Supreme Court has made the following observations:- "18. It is true that in the petition filed by him under Section 166 of the Act, the appellant had claimed compensation of Rs.4,20,000/- only, but as held in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, in the absence of any bar in the Act, the Tribunal and for that reason any competent court is entitled to award higher compensation to the victim of an accident." 13. It is, therefore, apparent that in course of a proceeding for compensation under Motor Vehicles Act even if at the appellate stage, the Appellate Court finds that the claimant is entitled to have more amount of compensation than the one claimed either in the claim application or in the Memorandum of Appeal against the award of compensation and if the Tribunal or Court comes to the conclusion that the just amount of compensation would be more than the amount restricted by the claimant, such fact will not stand in the way of the Court in awarding just amount of compensation. However, in my opinion, in such case, the Court should pass direction for payment of additional amount of court fees. 14. However, in my opinion, in such case, the Court should pass direction for payment of additional amount of court fees. 14. I, thus, set aside the award impugned in this appeal and enhance the amount to Rs.4,29,352/- which according to me should be just amount of compensation based on the materials on record. The appellant should pay excess amount of Court fees for additional amount of Rs.86,352/- within two weeks from today. On payment of additional amount of Court fees as indicated above, the appellant would be entitled to enhanced amount. The insurance company is directed to deposit the balance amount within two months from today. 15. The appellants are also entitled to the amount of interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the application till 31st December, 1999 and at the rate of 9% per annum from 01st January, 2000 till realization. Mr.Thakkar, contends before this Court that the rate of interest should not be enhanced. Having regard to the fact that the insurance company has utilised the money which is otherwise payable to the appellants and having earned interest out of that amount, it cannot resist such prayer. In this connection, I profitably refer to the decision of Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India reported in AIR 2007 SC 1198 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court made following observations about the object and grant of interest : - "9. It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say 10 years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B 10 years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned interest on it for this period. Hence equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B." (emphasis supplied by me) The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. Appeal allowed.