ORDER Seeking quashing of the award dated 22.09.2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 in Reference No. 84 of 1992, the writ petition has been filed by the wife of the deceased employee namely, late Suraj Lal. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that though the deceased employee was employed in the respondent B.C.C.L on 14.08.1961 and his actual date of birth is 01.03.1935, he was retired from service with effect from 19.07.1990 illegally. In support of his contention the learned counsel refers to AnnexureA, copy of Form B in which the date of birth of the husband of the petitioner is recorded as 01.03.1935. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that since from the record of the employer itself it appears that the date of birth of the husband of the petitioner is 01.03.1935, he could not have been retired from service prior to 30.06.1995. It is further submitted that in the service excerpt the date of birth of the husband of the petitioner has been corrected unilaterally by the employer from 01.03.1935 to 01.03.1930 and since no notice or opportunity of hearing was given to the employee, such correction made by the employer cannot be validated. 3. Per-contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Verma, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent B.C.C.L has submitted that the employee namely, late Suraj Lal himself has filled in his date of birth as 01.03.1930 and the interpolation as alleged by the husband of the petitioner was done at the instance of the husband of the petitioner himself. Moreover, after superannuation from service, any dispute with respect to date of birth cannot be agitated by the employee. 4. It is well settled that correction in date of birth of an employee entails serious consequences in so far as the benefit to the employee and adverse impact on the other juniors in the organisation, are concerned. At the fag end no correction in date of birth is permissible. Different organisations have provided guidelines with respect to the time limit seeking correction in date of birth. It is also well settled that after superannuation from service the Court would not interfere in a dispute regarding date of birth and in fact, it cannot be ordered 5. In “Union of India Vs. Different organisations have provided guidelines with respect to the time limit seeking correction in date of birth. It is also well settled that after superannuation from service the Court would not interfere in a dispute regarding date of birth and in fact, it cannot be ordered 5. In “Union of India Vs. C. Rama Swamy & Ors.”, reported in (1997) 4 SCC 647 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: 26. “In such a case, even in the absence of a statutory rule like Rule 16A, the principle of estoppel would apply and the authorities concerned would be justified in declining to alter the date of birth. If such a decision is challenged the court also ought not to grant any relief even if it is shown that the date of birth, as originally recorded, was incorrect because the candidate concerned had represented a different date of birth to be taken into consideration obviously with a view that that would be to his advantage. Once having secured entry into the service, possibly in preference to other candidates, then the principle of estoppel would clearly be applicable and relief of change of date of birth can be legitimately denied. To that extent the decision in Manak Chand case does not lay down the correct law.” 6. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Hindustan Lever Ltd. Vs. S.M. Jadhav and Another”, reported in (2001) 4 SCC 52 . 7. In the present case, the petitioner raised a dispute with respect to his superannuation from service on 19.07.1990 and after considering the materials on record the learned Labour Court dismissed the Reference No. 84 of 1992. It is not the case of the petitioner that while making the award dated 22.09.2011, the learned Labour Court has ignored the materials on record and recorded a finding contrary to the materials on record. It is also not the case of the petitioner that proper opportunity to defend herself was not given by the learned Labour Court. The writ Court while examining the legality of an award would have a very limited jurisdiction. 8. I do not find any error in award dated 22.09.2011. This writ petition lacks merit and accordingly, it is dismissed.