JUDGMENT : - Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The appellants, who were defendants No.4 and 5, before the trial Court, have filed the present appeal against the judgment and decree dated 26.08.1994 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Kullu, in Civil Appeal No. 70/1990 whereby he affirmed the judgment and decree dated 30.06.1990 passed by learned Senior Sub Judge, Lahaul & Spiti District at Kullu, in Civil Suit No. 120 of 1988. 2. Plaintiff Smt. Chepri Devi, filed a suit for possession, declaration and permanent prohibitory injunction that her husband Shobhu was the owner in possession of land comprised in Khasra No.764, Khata-Khatauni No.187/264, measuring 8-15-0 bighas, situate in Mauza Fatehpur, Phati Mohni, District Kullu to the extent of half share denoted by (A) in the head note of the plaint and also owner in possession of a two-storeyed house along with 1½ storeyed shed meant for storing grass etc. to the extent of half share as shown by (B) in the head note of plaint, situate in Khasra No. 764. It was averred that after the death of Shobhu in the year 1980, the plaintiff Chepri succeeded her husband as his sole heir, however, about two years prior to the filing of the suit, the appellants started forcibly cultivating the land denoted by letter (A) in the head note of the plaint and also threatened to dispossess her forcibly from the house denoted by letter (B). It was also alleged that on inquiry from the Patwari, it was revealed that defendants-respondents No.2 and 3 namely Sairu and Manglu, respectively, got the mutation of inheritance of Shobhu attested in their favour along with their sister Tulli at the back of the plaintiff-respondent No.1. After mutation was attested, Smt. Tulli bequeathed her share in the land to respondent-defendant Manglu and said Manglu sold his share to one Shamsher Singh in the suit land vide sale deed Ext.DW5/A. Further, Shamsher Singh sold such purchased share to the appellants vide sale deed Ex.D3. Sairu originally arrayed as defendant No.1 in the suit executed gift deed Ex.D2 of his share in favour of defendant-appellant Thakur Dass. Sairu originally arrayed as defendant No.1 in the suit executed gift deed Ex.D2 of his share in favour of defendant-appellant Thakur Dass. It was averred that since the defendants Sairu and Manglu as well as Tulli could not inherit the suit property, all the transactions made by them in favour of the defendant Shamsher Singh and appellants are illegal, void and without any right or title and are not binding on the plaintiff-respondent. As per plaintiff, she asked defendants-appellants time and again to admit her claim regarding her being the sole owner of the aforesaid property, but they refused to do so. Hence, suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent that she is entitled to possession of the land comprised in Khasra No. 764 to the extent of her share and that she being in possession of the house property, the appellants be restrained from interfering in her ownership and possession over the same by way of permanent prohibitory injunction. 3. The defendants Sairu and Manglu filed written statements and admitted the claim of the plaintiff-respondent. However, the suit was contested by defendants Shamsher Singh, Maru Ram and the present appellants. As per the averments of their written statements, the plaintiff-respondent Smt. Chepri was married to defendant Manglu and she continued to be his wife and she was never married to Shobhu and thus her status as widow of Shobhu was disputed. It was averred that she had three daughters and two sons from the loins of Manglu and that the suit was filed by her in connivance with Sairu, Manglu and Shamsher Singh to harass the appellants and it was disputed that Smt. Chepri was owner in possession of the house property in question or that she had any right, interest or title to the suit property consisting of land comprised in khasra number 764 and the house property situate thereon. It was further averred that the transactions made in favour of defendant Shamsher Singh and defendants-appellants Khub Ram and Thakur Dass in respect of the suit land by Sairu and Manglu were legal and valid as they had inherited the estate of Shobhu, their deceased brother. Thus, defendants-appellants claim themselves to be the bonafide purchasers of the share in the suit land purchased by them. Thus, defendants-appellants claim themselves to be the bonafide purchasers of the share in the suit land purchased by them. The suit of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 was alleged to be barred by time and not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction. 4. Replications to the written statements were filed by the plaintiff-respondent and allegations contained in the written statements were controverted and those contained in the plaint were reasserted. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 05.12.1988 framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiff filed this suit in collusion with defendant Nos. 1 to 3? If so, to what effect? OPD 2. Whether the plaintiff is widow of Sobhu deceased? OPP 3. Whether the suit with respect to prayer ‘B’ is not maintainable as plaintiff is not in possession of the suit house? OPD 4. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP 5. Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? If so what is its correct valuation for this purpose? OP Parties 6. Whether the defendants No.4 and 5 are bonafide purchasers for consideration and without notice? OPD. 7. Relief. 6. After recording evidence, the learned trial Court vide his judgment and decree dated 30.06.1990 decreed the suit. The defendants-appellants preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 30.06.1990 before the learned lower appellate Court who vide his judgment and decree dated 26.08.1994 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court, the defendants/ appellants have come up in appeal before this Court. On 22.03.1995, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether rejoinder constitutes pleadings under Order 6 Rule 1? 2. Whether custom which is a fact is required to be pleaded and proved specifically? 3. Whether the learned courts below erred in appreciating documents Ex.P1 and PW2/A thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees? 8. I have heard Shri Ajay Sharma, Advocate, for the appellants and Shri K.D. Sood, Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Sanjeev Sood, Advocate, for the respondents and gone through the records of the case. Question No.1. 9. 3. Whether the learned courts below erred in appreciating documents Ex.P1 and PW2/A thereby vitiating the impugned judgments and decrees? 8. I have heard Shri Ajay Sharma, Advocate, for the appellants and Shri K.D. Sood, Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Sanjeev Sood, Advocate, for the respondents and gone through the records of the case. Question No.1. 9. This question has been framed in the backdrop of the fact that the appellants for the first time in their written statement had challenged the status of the plaintiff being widow of Shobhu. These averments obviously could have been rebutted only by way of replication/rejoinder and, therefore, in this background the rejoinder essentially constitutes “part of the pleadings” under Order 6 Rule 1. There was no requirement of law that the plaintiff in the suit should have pleaded divorce from Manglu and thereafter her marriage with Shobhu. It is only when this fact was denied by the defendants-appellants in their written statement, that all these pleas were controverted and elaborated in the replication. Therefore, in this factual context, an inescapable conclusion that can be drawn is that the replication/rejoinder was essentially a part of the pleadings under Order 6 Rule 1. 10. Not only this, even the law considers rejoinder to be an essential part of the pleadings as is clear from the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sri-la Sri Subramania Desika Gnanasambanda Pandarasannidi versus State of Madras and another AIR 1965 SC 1578 wherein it has been held as under:- “17.That takes us to the consideration of the question as to whether the two reasons given by the High Court in support of this decision are valid. The first reason, as we have already indicated, is that the High Court thought that the plea in question had not been raised by the appellant in his writ petition. This reason is no doubt, technically right in the sense that this plea was not mentioned in the first affidavit filed by the appellant in support of his petition; but in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the appellant this plea has been expressly taken. This reason is no doubt, technically right in the sense that this plea was not mentioned in the first affidavit filed by the appellant in support of his petition; but in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the appellant this plea has been expressly taken. This is not disputed by Mr.Chetty, and so, when the matter was argued before the High Court, the respondents had full notice of the fact that one of he grounds on which the appellant challenged the validity of the impugned Order was that he had not been given a chance to show cause why the said notification should not be issued. We are, therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming that the ground in question had not been taken at any stage by the appellant before the matter was argued before the High Court.” 11. Similarly, in Jag Dutta versus Smt. Savitri Devi AIR 1977 Punjab & Haryana 68, the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has clearly held that the replication is a part of pleadings in the following terms:- “18.The learned counsel for the petitioner raised two arguments; firstly, that the landlady did not specifically incorporate two of the ingredients mentioned in Section 13(3)(a)(1) of the 1949 Act, namely, that she was not occupying another residential building in the area of Ambala Cantonment and that she had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Act in Ambala Cantonment and, secondly, that she did not require the house bonafide for her residence. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and do not find merit in contention. It is not disputed that the aforesaid two ingredients were taken by the landlady in her replication filed in reply to the written statement. It is an established proposition of law that replication is a part of pleadings. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the two ingredients of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) have not been pleaded by the landlady.” Questions No.2 and 3. 12. There can be no dispute that normally the custom is required to be pleaded and proved. It is an established proposition of law that replication is a part of pleadings. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the two ingredients of Section 13 (3) (a) (i) have not been pleaded by the landlady.” Questions No.2 and 3. 12. There can be no dispute that normally the custom is required to be pleaded and proved. However, at the same time, it has to be remembered that judicial notice of the custom under Section 57 of the Evidence Act can be taken especially when a custom has been repeatedly recognized by the Courts, it passes into law of the land and the proof of it becomes un-necessary. This was so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ujagar Singh versus Mst. Jeo AIR 1959 SC 1041 which reads thus:- “14. It therefore appears to us that the ordinary rule is that all customs, general or otherwise, have to be proved. Under S. 57 of the Evidence Act however nothing need be proved of which courts can take judicial notice. Therefore, it is said that if there is a custom of which the courts can take judicial notice, it need not be proved. Now the circumstances in which the courts can take judicial notice of a custom were stated by Lord Dunedin in Raja Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur, 45 Ind App 148 at pp. 154, 155: (AIR 1918 PC 81 at p.83), in the following words, “When a custom or usage, whether in regard to a tenure or a contract or a family right, is repeatedly brought to the notice of the Courts of a country, the Courts may hold that custom or usage to be introduced into the law without necessity of proof in each individual case.” When a custom has been so recognized by the courts, it passes into the law of the land and the proof of it then becomes unnecessary under S.57(1) of the Evidence sense, namely, that a custom has by repeated recognition by courts, become entitled to judicial notice as was said in Bawa Singh v. Mt. Taro, AIR 1951 Punj. 239; and Sukhwant Kaur v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1951 Punj 242.” 13. Taro, AIR 1951 Punj. 239; and Sukhwant Kaur v. Balwant Singh, AIR 1951 Punj 242.” 13. The plaintiff in her replication has specifically pleaded the custom and has given detailed averments regarding her marriage with Manglu having been dissolved, according to the, custom prevailing amongst the ‘Koli’ community and the same being duly recognized in the ‘Rewaj-i-Am’ of the Kullu Sub Division Settlement 1945-46. Infact, such recognition of the custom itself proves that the custom had not only been practiced but even prevailed amongst the community continuously and was also in the knowledge of the general public. At this stage, it is relevant to reproduce question No.16, 18 and 21 and answers thereto of the ‘Rewaj-i-Am’ which reads thus:- “Question 16. Ceremonies of marriage-With what ceremonies is a marriage celebrated and what ceremonies make the marriage binding? Is it customary to execute writing to that effect? Answer.(i) All the tribes reply that marriages in the whole of the Sub-Division excluding Waziri Lahaul and Spiti, are performed by giving meals to the marriage party. In very few cases amongst high classed Brahmins, Khatris and Rajputs, vedic rites are performed; but generally it is only completed with Ganesh Puja. Amongst poorer people it is only performed by the execution of deed. Agreement deeds are usually executed in Tahsil Kulu whereas in Sub-Tahsil Seraj, Rupi and Lahaul, this custom exists, but rarely. (ii) In Lahaul, Rajputs generally invite a Lama, and Brahmins invite a Prohit, who recites Shlokas and marriage is performed. (iii) In Spiti, before the marriage is performed, the parents of the boy go to the parents of the girl to settle about the After this is settled, a date for marriage is fixed and the marriage procession of the boy, excluding; however, the bridegroom and his father, go to the house of the girl with a bamboo arrow, which is placed in a Patha of grain and the girl is made to sit by this arrow. The girl’s head hair are so dressed that 5 pleats (Mandhis) are placed on the back, and 5 pleats on her left cheek. Other hair are left untied. The head ornament (called Feroza) which the unmarried girls invariably wear on the forehead is withdrawn. The girl’s head hair are so dressed that 5 pleats (Mandhis) are placed on the back, and 5 pleats on her left cheek. Other hair are left untied. The head ornament (called Feroza) which the unmarried girls invariably wear on the forehead is withdrawn. On the next day, the bride is taken to the house of the bridegroom and there the husband and wife take Lugri, or curd from the same cup, after which the entire hair of the girl are tied in the form of pleats (Mandhis) which completes the marriage. Instances, Diloo Ram, Brahmin, who had migrated to Kulu from Palampur, married Mst. Ram Devi, daughter of Sentoo, of Dobhi, but executed no agreement deed. In court the marriage could not be proved. Exceptions. Nil.” “Question 18. Divorce by husband-Can a husband divorce his wife and under what circumstances? Answer. A husband can divorce his wife on account of immorality. In Waziri Spiti change of religion is also a reason for divorce. In cases of strained relations also custom permits divorce. Instances. (1) Bhagirath, son of Anup Ram, Rajput of Phati Buchhari (Sub-Tahsil Seraj), divorced his wife Mst. Ghomlu on account of immorality. (2) Budh Ram of Kothi Kardang (Sub-Tahsil Lahaul) divorced his wife on account of immorality. Exceptions. Nil.” “Question 21. Remarriage of a divorced woman-Can a divorced woman remarry in the lifetime of her previous husband without his consent? Answer. All the tribes reply in the affirmative. A divorced woman may remarry in the lifetime of her previous husband without his consent. Instances. (1) Tek Ram, Rajput of Kothi Naggar, divorced his wife Mst. Jito; She thereafter remarried one Moti Rajput of Kothi Naggar, without taking consent of her previous husband. (2) Nathu, Harijan of Naggar, divorced his wife Mst. Bodhi, who later on married Kalu, Harijan of Shan, Kothi Naggar, without obtaining consent of her previous husband. (3) Mst. Champa Dolman, daughter of Samjor Charring, son of Gawa, of Village Luling, Kothi Burji, Waziri Spiti, remarried Chhiwang Magmar of Kothi Pin, after her divorce from her first husband. (4) Mst. Angman, daughter of Chhiwag, of Kothi Karding, Waziri Lahaul was divorced by Tashi and she remarried Rup Singh of Village Khankhsar without the consent of her previous husband. Exceptions. Nil.” 14. (4) Mst. Angman, daughter of Chhiwag, of Kothi Karding, Waziri Lahaul was divorced by Tashi and she remarried Rup Singh of Village Khankhsar without the consent of her previous husband. Exceptions. Nil.” 14. The dissolution of marriage is effected through a document Ex.P1 and the plaintiff entered into remarriage with Shobhu, brother of Manglu, vide writing Ex.PW2/A. These documents meet with the requirement and infact are complete answers to question No.16 and 18 (supra). The deed Ex.PW2/A has otherwise been proved on record by its scribe Kesru and one of the margi nal witnesses Jawala Dass (PW-2), member of the Gram Panchayat. 15. There is yet another very strong reason to uphold the claim of the plaintiff that she was the wife of Shobhu because admittedly after having entered into matrimonial bond on June 16, 1976 vide Ex.PW2/A, she continuously lived and cohabited with Shobhu till his death in the year 1980, though no children were born out of this woman as husband and wife give rise to a presumption as to marriage and reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gokal Chand versus Parvin Kumari A.I.R. 1952 SC 231 wherein the following observations have been made:- “10. As to the evidence of the 4 persons who claim to have been present at the plaintiff's marriage, we find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the High Court. the evidence of the other witnesses undoubtedly establishes the fact that for some years the plaintiff and Ram Piari lived together as husband and wife and were treated as such, that Paras Ram, brother of Ram Piari, addressed the plaintiff as 'jija' (a common name for sister's husband), and that the plaintiff acted as Paras Ram's guardian when the latter was admitted to D. A. V. School and was described as his brother-in-law in some of the entries in the school register. The learned Judges of the High Court considered that the evidence of certain witnesses who deposed to some of the facts on which the lower Court relied, did not strictly comply with the requirements of S. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, firstly because the witnesses had no special means of knowledge on the subject of relationship between the plaintiff and Ram Piari, and secondly because what S. 50 made relevant was no mere opinion, but opinion "expressed by conduct" of persons who as members of the family or otherwise, had special means of knowledge. It seems to us that the question as to how far the evidence of those particular witnesses is relevant under S. 50 is academic, because it is well-settled that continuous cohabitation for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage. In the present case, it seems clear that the plaintiff and Ram Piari lived and were treated as husband and wife for a number of years, and , in the absence of any material pointing to the contrary conclusion, a presumption might have been drawn that be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable, and if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them. We agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that in the present case, such circumstances are not wanting and their cumulative effect warrants the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the factum of his marriage with Ram Piari. In the first place, the plaintiff has not examined any of his near relations such as his brother, or collaterals living in Ajnoha, or any co-villagers, whose presence at the marriage would have been far more probable than the presence of the witnesses examined by him. He has also not examined any of the witnesses residing in or round about Holta estate in spite of the fact that his own case is that the marriage was celebrated with great pomp and show. He has also not examined any of the witnesses residing in or round about Holta estate in spite of the fact that his own case is that the marriage was celebrated with great pomp and show. It was suggested in the Courts below that since defendant No.2 is an influential person, no local witnesses would be available to support the plaintiff's case, but the High Court has very fully dealt with this aspect and pointed out firstly that Raj Kumari had had litigation with a number of persons belonging to Palampur and such persons would not be under her influence, and secondly that no good reason has been shown why Raj Kumari, who is alleged to have brought about the marriage between the plaintiff and Ram Piari, should take a completely hostile attitude towards him. Then again, neither the presents nor any of the relations of Ram Piari have been examined to support the plaintiff. On the other hand, Ram Piari's own mother, Ganga, has deposed that the former was never married to the plaintiff, and the statement made by Ram Piari in her will, which is a very valuable piece of evidence, is to the same effect. It is also incredible that in spite of the love which Ram Piari is said to have had for the plaintiff, she left him and went away to live with Raj Kumari, and that during the long period when Ram Piari was away, the plaintiff should never have visited her or made enquiries Ram Piari continued to love him and that she and Raj Kumari inwardly hated each other. Parvin Kumari says in her deposition that she had never seen her father and that when she reached the age of discretion she found herself living at Palampur. The conduct of the plaintiff in showing such complete indifference to his wife and daughter as is disclosed in his evidence is most unnatural, and no less unnatural is his conduct in instituting a suit to deprive her of properties which had come into her hands not by reason of anything done by him but as a result of the generosity shown towards her by a stranger. The plaintiff's case that the properties in dispute were acquired by Ram Piari with the aid of his money is wholly untrue and it has been rightly found by both the Courts that they were acquired for her by Raj Kumari. The plaintiff's witnesses have tried to exaggerate his means to support his case, but the truth appears to be that he had hardly any means of his own beyond the somewhat meager salary which he used to draw as a Court typist.” 16. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that Ex.P1 and Ex.PW2/A are mere statements recorded without any oath and cannot be termed to be the documents purporting to be evidence or establishing the dissolution of marriage or remarriage, is equally without any merit. No doubt, Ex.PW2/A has been recorded in the form of a statement, but the sum and substance of the same is that it was a document prepared to evidence the marriage of Smt. Chepri and Shobhu and, therefore, the form in which it is prepared is not very material, more particularly, when the same meets the requirement of the ‘Rewaj-i-Am’. 17. The learned counsel for the appellants, at this stage, would then contend that the entries in the ‘Parwari’ register Ex.DW6/A to Ex.DW6/D with effect from 1978 to 1993 shows Smt. Chepri as wife of wherein again Chepri has been shown as the wife of Manglu in the year 1983. Likewise, she has also been shown as wife of Manglu in Ex.D2 in the year 1988. Placing reliance on such documents, it is argued by learned counsel for the appellants that the documentary record belies the claim of the plaintiff that she is wife of Shobhu. 18. At this stage, it may be relevant to refer to statement of Ganga Singh (DW-6), who was examined before the learned lower appellate Court and in his cross-examination has categorically stated that the records of the Panchayat could only be changed in case a specific request to this effect was given to the Panchayat. Therefore, in this background, it is obvious that the factum of divorce of remarriage of Smt. Chepri had not been reported to the concerned Gram Panchayat and she continued to be shown as the wife of Manglu in many of the records so maintained. Therefore, in this background, it is obvious that the factum of divorce of remarriage of Smt. Chepri had not been reported to the concerned Gram Panchayat and she continued to be shown as the wife of Manglu in many of the records so maintained. But the moot question is whether such entries would negate the plea of the plaintiff-respondent Smt. Chepri regarding her divorce with Manglu in the year 1974 and her claim of having remarried with Shobhu in the year 1976. 19. Here it will be useful to refer to Ex.PA/1 which is copy of the voter list wherein plaintiff-respondent has been shown to be the wife of Shobhu. Incase, she had no relation with Shobhu or was not his wife as is alleged by the appellants then how such records exist. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that though in certain records Smt. Chepri has been shown to be the wife of Manglu and sometimes to be the wife of Shobhu, but the fact remains that she divorced Manglu in the year 1974 whereafter she married with Shobhu in the year 1976. 20. The documents Ex.P1 and Ex.PW2/A have been appreciated in their right perspective and in fact these documents duly comply with the requirements of the custom as applicable to the parties. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered. 21. Resultantly, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed along with pending application(s), if any. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.