JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. Agricultural lands comprised in survey Nos. 119, 120, 121, 136 and 146, measuring, 60, .07, .06, .08 and .04 hectares respectively (hereafter the said lands), in School Line Village, Port Blair Tehsil, Andaman District were purchased by the respondents along with 4 (four) others [which included Smt. Valsamma Varghese (hereafter Varghese)] from Shri Raghbans Lall and Shri Harbans Lall by a registered sale deed executed on June 9, 1997. Since the purchasers wished to build dwelling units on the said lands, they formed a co-operative, viz. Mini India Housing Co-operative Society Limited (hereafter Mini India), and approached the Sub-divisional Officer, South Andaman with a prayer for conversion thereof to non-agricultural lands. The prayer was allowed by an order dated November 20, 1998 and the said lands were treated as house-sites. Soon thereafter, a portion of land comprised in survey No. 146 purchased by Varghese and a portion of land comprised in survey No. 121 purchased by the first respondent were acquired and awards were made on June 9, 1999 and May 31, 2001 respectively treating the same as house-sites. More than 2 (two) years after conversion was allowed, the said sub-divisional officer suo motu issued a notice dated April 17, 2001 seeking to review the order passed in relation thereto. Mini India and others presented a writ petition [W.P. No. 7226(W) of 2001] challenging the authority of the sub-divisional officer to issue such notice. The challenge failed before the learned single judge. The order dismissing the writ petition dated August 9, 2001 was carried in appeal (M.A.T. No. 22 of 2001). By judgment and order dated October 9, 2001, the writ appeal was allowed. It was held that the sub-divisional officer acted without jurisdiction in issuing the impugned notice and accordingly, the same was quashed. Since during the pendency of the writ appeal the sub-divisional officer had disposed of the proceeding for review by recalling his earlier order allowing conversion, the Hon'ble Division Bench also quashed the order on review. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, the balance of the said lands were also acquired to set up defence establishment and an award dated September 19, 2002 for Rs. 6,21,740/- on account of compensation, solatium and interest was made by the Additional District Magistrate (L.A.), being the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter the L.A. Act) treating the same as agricultural lands. 6,21,740/- on account of compensation, solatium and interest was made by the Additional District Magistrate (L.A.), being the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter the L.A. Act) treating the same as agricultural lands. The said award was challenged in a writ petition [C.R. 14 of 2002], which was disposed of on September 30, 2002 granting liberty to the aggrieved petitioners, if they so desire, to file an appropriate application under section 18 of the L.A. Act. 2. It appears that on October 30, 2002, an application under section 18(1) of the L.A. Act was received by the appellant from the respondents for referring the matter to the competent Court for determination of compensation and other relief as admissible under the law. By filing an application dated April 10, 2003 under section 31(2) of the L.A. Act before the learned District Judge on May 19, 2003, the appellant deposited in court the award amount i.e. Rs. 6,21,740/-. Such application was accompanied by the Collector's statement under section 19 of the L.A. Act. 3. In the meanwhile, however, the judgment and order dated October 9, 2001 of the Hon'ble Division Bench had been challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India by the Union of India, vide SLP (Civil) No. 1977 of 2002 [renumbered Civil Appeal No. 2771 of 2002], and stay of operation of the same was granted. The civil appeal was ultimately rejected by an order dated April 27, 2010 keeping the question of law raised therein open for argument in an appropriate case. By the selfsame order, Civil Appeal No. 6225 of 2004 preferred by Mini India against the order dated September 30, 2002 in C.R. 14 of 2002 was disposed of. The material part of such order reads as follows: "Aggrieved by the orders passed by the High Court of Calcutta in C.R. No. 14 of 2002, the appellant is before us in this appeal. There was a connected appeal bearing Civil Appeal No. 2771 of 2002. In that appeal we have taken a view that the lands in question are no more agricultural lands, but non-agricultural lands. It is now for the appellant to make an appropriate application before the Reference Court for fixing the higher rate of compensation in view of the fact that the lands in question are the non-agricultural lands. In that appeal we have taken a view that the lands in question are no more agricultural lands, but non-agricultural lands. It is now for the appellant to make an appropriate application before the Reference Court for fixing the higher rate of compensation in view of the fact that the lands in question are the non-agricultural lands. In that view of the matter, we do not intend to interfere with the order passed the High Court. Accordingly, we dispose of the appeal. However, we grant liberty to the appellant, if it so desires, to make an appropriate application before the Reference Court within four weeks from today. If such an application is filed, the Reference Court will entertain the application and pass appropriate orders after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties." 4. Availing the liberty granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the respondents filed a petition before the learned District Judge on October 11, 2010, titling it as "Amended Claim Petition", and prayed that compensation ought to be worked out treating the balance of the said lands as non-agricultural lands. 5. The case was transferred to the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Andaman & Nicobar Islands on February 21, 2011 and was re-registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 01 of 2011. The respondents, as claimants, claimed compensation @ Rs. 2640/- per sq.m. of acquired lands, which according to them was the market value thereof at the time of publication of notification under section 4 of the L.A. Act. Such claim was sought to be buttressed by contending that the award dated June 9, 1999 relating to acquisition of Varghese's land proceeded to determine compensation after the market value thereof was reckoned as Rs. 1,068/- per sq.m. and there has thereafter been steep enhancement of value of landed property near about the acquired lands. Certified copy of the award, insofar as the land acquisition case of Varghese is concerned, was marked as an exhibit (Ext. 11) on being tendered by the P.W.2, a patwari in the office of the Tehsildar of Port Blair Tehsil. Another award determining compensation payable to the respondent No. 1 for acquisition of the plot of land bearing survey No. 121, which was part of Ext. 13 series, was taken on record and has been referred to in the impugned judgment and order as Ext. 13/22. Another award determining compensation payable to the respondent No. 1 for acquisition of the plot of land bearing survey No. 121, which was part of Ext. 13 series, was taken on record and has been referred to in the impugned judgment and order as Ext. 13/22. The learned judge in his judgment dated July 4, 2012 recorded unavailability of any evidence to accept the version of the claimants that the market value of the acquired lands at the time acquisition was effected was Rs. 2,046/- per sq. m., but determined compensation reckoning Rs. 1,068/- per sq. m. as the market value based on the document being Ext. 13/22. Taking into account statutory benefits to which the claimants were entitled for acquisition of 7950 sq. m. of lands, Rs. 2,24,63,100/- was awarded. Deducting Rs. 6,21,740 that had been deposited in Court earlier, the appellant was directed to deposit an account payee cheque for an amount of Rs. 2,18,41,360/- as excess compensation within a month from date failing which the claimants were granted liberty to have the order executed according to law. 6. The judgment and decree dated July 4, 2012 is the subject matter of challenge before us in the instant appeal under section 54 of the L.A. Act. 7. Mr. Tabraiz, learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the learned judge committed gross errors in determining the claim of the respondents and arrived at findings, which are unsustainable in law. 8. First, it was urged that the principles for determination of compensation were given a complete go-bye. According to Mr. Tabraiz, the learned judge did not at all consider that more than 1,000 sq. m. had been earmarked for construction of roads by the members of Mini India and since no development thereof had taken place, at least 1/3rd deduction from market value while determining compensation ought to have been effected based upon the situation of the land and the need for development. Reliance in this connection was placed on the decisions in Basant Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 542 ; Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acqn., Visakhapatnam v. Smt. A. Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666 ; Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona & Anr., (1988) 3 SCC 751 ; and Smt. Tribeni Devi & Ors. v. Collector of Ranchi, (1972) 1 SCC 480 . 9. Secondly, Mr. v. Union of India & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 542 ; Spl. Tehsildar, Land Acqn., Visakhapatnam v. Smt. A. Mangala Gowri, AIR 1992 SC 666 ; Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona & Anr., (1988) 3 SCC 751 ; and Smt. Tribeni Devi & Ors. v. Collector of Ranchi, (1972) 1 SCC 480 . 9. Secondly, Mr. Tabraiz contended that the contents of Ext. 13/22 were not proved and a mere tender of the document and marking thereof as an exhibit was not proper, and such document per se was inadmissible in evidence. The decision in Special Deputy Collector & Anr. v. Kurra Sambasiva Rao & Ors., (1997)6 SCC 41 , was relied on in support of the contention. 10. Thirdly, relying on the decision in State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu & Ors., (1996)10 SCC 635 , it was argued by Mr. Tabraiz that any discussion in the judgment under appeal for the basis for relying on the award (Ext. 13/22) as regards the relevant land location and user thereof is conspicuous by its absence and, therefore, the approach of the learned judge was wholly incorrect. Reliance was also placed on the decision of an Hon'ble Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Natwarbhai Sakarabhai & Ors. v. Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, Ahmedabad, AIR 1992 Gujarat 63, for the proposition that mere production of a map along with the judgment of the Civil Court in another group of land acquisition cases would not by itself be sufficient to enable the Court to find out the comparable instances or to evaluate the land on a particular basis. 11. Finally, Mr. Tabraiz contended that the presence of the requiring body was absolutely necessary for proper determination of compensation and failure to put it on notice resulted in breach of principles of natural justice and rendered the entire proceeding vitiated. The decisions in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (1995)2 SCC 326, and Neyvely Liginite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely & Ors., (1995)1 SCC 221 , were relied on in this regard. 12. He, accordingly, prayed for our interference in exercise of appellate powers to set aside the impugned judgment and order and to restore the award of the Collector. 13. Ms. & Ors., (1995)2 SCC 326, and Neyvely Liginite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely & Ors., (1995)1 SCC 221 , were relied on in this regard. 12. He, accordingly, prayed for our interference in exercise of appellate powers to set aside the impugned judgment and order and to restore the award of the Collector. 13. Ms. Nag, learned advocate representing the respondents, contended that absolutely no case for interference had been set up. Taking us to the Memorandum of Appeal, she urged that the appellant has not urged in the grounds of appeal that the learned judge failed to consider the area earmarked for construction of roads by the members of Mini India and that since no development thereof had taken place, at least 1/3rd ought to be deducted from the market value while determining compensation. In this regard she submitted that since there was no such ground in the memorandum of appeal and forming the impression that it would not be a matter in issue, she advised the respondents not to challenge the omission of the learned judge to award interest on solatium that they were entitled to in law by filing a cross-objection. Insofar as the contention of Mr. Tabraiz that the contents of the award (Ext. 13/22) not being proved, she contended that such award became a part of the records without any objection being raised on behalf of the Collector and since it is a public document the learned judge was justified in placing reliance thereon. Answering the contention that any discussion on land location and use is absent in the impugned judgment and order, she contended that once the award was admitted in evidence, the onus shifted on the Collector to prove that Rs. 1,068/- could not have been reckoned as the market value and that some other yardstick ought to adopted. Regarding the question of absence of the requiring body, it was first submitted by her that no point was raised earlier that the defence establishment (requiring body) is a necessary party. Next, it was urged referring to section 20of the L.A. Act that the only mandatory statutory requirement is to put the Collector on notice and the mandate was strictly followed. Next, it was urged referring to section 20of the L.A. Act that the only mandatory statutory requirement is to put the Collector on notice and the mandate was strictly followed. Finally, she argued that the Collector was acting on behalf of the requiring body and whatever arguments were raised had been duly dealt with leaving absolutely no scope for voicing any grievance. While concluding, she submitted that the appeal being devoid of merit deserved dismissal with costs. 14. We have heard the parties at length and would now embark on our journey to deal with the contentions advanced from the bar, one by one. 15. Regard being had to the fact that the learned judge relied on a certified copy of an award in ascertaining what could be the probable market value of the lands under acquisition and thereafter to determine the quantum of compensation payable to the respondents considering Rs. 1,068/- sq. m. as the rate, but the contents of the documentary evidence had allegedly not been proved, we propose to deal with the second point raised by Mr. Tabraiz first. 16. It is deemed necessary at this stage to take note of certain provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereafter the Evidence Act). Part II read with Chapter V of the Evidence Act deals with proof of documentary evidence. Section 63(1) says that secondary evidence includes certified copies given under the other provisions of the Evidence Act. Although some of the clauses of section 65 require satisfactory proof of non-availability of primary evidence prior to admissibility of secondary evidence, an exception has to be made when the original document happens to be a 'public document'. When secondary evidence of a public document i.e. a certified copy of the original public document is produced, most certainly the same would be admissible in evidence even though the original document may still be in existence and available. Section 74(1)(iii) clarifies that 'public documents' includes documents forming the acts, or records of the acts of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India. Our understanding of the law is that documents forming the records of the acts of the executive in connection with proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act would obviously include an 'award', which is the formal expression of the compensation that a land owner is entitled to receive on his land being acquired by the State. Our understanding of the law is that documents forming the records of the acts of the executive in connection with proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act would obviously include an 'award', which is the formal expression of the compensation that a land owner is entitled to receive on his land being acquired by the State. Further, a certified copy of the public document prepared under section 76 of the Evidence Act is admissible in evidence under section 77 thereof without being proved by calling witness. If any authority is required to support this principle, one may profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 425 . 17. Bearing in mind these principles, let us exam me who between the parties is entitled to succeed on the point. 18. The award No. 5-21/LA/ADM/99 dated May 31, 2000 was not even referred to by the PW-2, who was the patwari then posted at the office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, South Andaman, Port Blair in course of his examination-in-chief. Mere tendering of certified copies of certain documents, without anything more as to what it relates to and/or whether it is a notice or an office note or an order or an award, cannot in our considered opinion be regarded as documentary evidence worthy of being admitted in evidence for consideration, within the scope and ambit of the Evidence Act. The said award was not even specifically marked as Ext. 13/22 while the PW-2 was deposing before the learned judge; all that was done is to mark all the documents produced in a bunch as "Ext. 13 series". The document subsequently marked Ext. 13/22 was an inadmissible piece of evidence and the learned judge erred in taking the same into consideration thereon. Reliance placed on the decision in Kurra Sambasiva Rao (supra) is apt. 19. However, nothing substantial turns on it. Even if Ext. 13/22 was inadmissible, there is no dispute in regard to Ext. 11. The certified copy of the award, bearing No. 515/LA/ADM/99 dated June 9, 1999 was marked Ext. 11 and such marking is not vitiated by any procedural flaw. 19. However, nothing substantial turns on it. Even if Ext. 13/22 was inadmissible, there is no dispute in regard to Ext. 11. The certified copy of the award, bearing No. 515/LA/ADM/99 dated June 9, 1999 was marked Ext. 11 and such marking is not vitiated by any procedural flaw. The PW-2 produced the certified copy of award No. 5/15/LA/ADM/99 dated June 9, 1999 in course of examination-in-chief upon being authorised by the Land Acquisition Collector and the Sub-divisional Officer, South Andaman, who had been called upon to produce documents. The fact that the document marked Ext.11 was the certified copy of the said award had been proved by him and the same was taken on evidence without objection from the side of the Collector. In view of the dictum in Jaswant Singh (supra), the contents of the award, being a public document, were not even required to be proved by the witness. Over and above such position, it is evident from the records that Sri M. Natarajan (hereafter Natarajan), being the Secretary of Mini India while deposing as PW-1, had also filed copy of the award dated June 9, 1999 along with his examination-in-chief on affidavit dated February 3, 2011 and in course of proving its contents claimed parity on the ground that all the concerned plots were to be treated as house-sites. Also, PW-1 in cross-examination denied the suggestions that there was gulf of difference between the land of Varghese and the balance of the acquired lands and that adequate compensation had been determined by the Collector for acquisition of the latter. Despite the onus shifting to the Collector to prove that the respondents were not entitled to claim parity, it does not appear from the deposition of the sole witness for the Collector, Smt. N. Shobana Devan, Tehsildar, Port Blair Tehsil, OPW-1, that such onus was discharged. 20. The Collector had made his award treating the acquired lands as agricultural lands. With the dismissal of the civil appeal of the Union of India by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by order dated April 27, 2010, the acquired lands had to be treated as house-sites and compensation determined accordingly. The award of the Collector, for all intents and purposes, was rendered ineffective w.e.f. April 27, 2010. It had to be modified and stood modified by the judgment and decree under challenge. The award of the Collector, for all intents and purposes, was rendered ineffective w.e.f. April 27, 2010. It had to be modified and stood modified by the judgment and decree under challenge. Legal niceties apart, the basic question that now arises for an answer is what ought to have been reckoned as the rate for determining the market value of the acquired house-site lands, which were the subject of acquisition? Is it Rs. 2,046/- (claimed by the claimants) or Rs. 1,068/- (as in Ext. 13/22) or Rs. 1020/- (as in Ext. 11) or any other rate? 21. No evidence in relation to the claim for reckoning Rs. 2,046/- per sq. m. for calculation of market value having been produced by the claimants, the learned judge was justified in negating such claim. The respondents before us did not prefer any cross-objection and have thus, by their conduct, relinquished such claim. 22. The learned judge proceeded to determine compensation taking Rs. 1,068/- per sq. m. as the appropriate rate relying on Ext. 13/22. Apart from the fact that Ext. 13/22 could not have been relied on for reasons discussed above, we have noticed a patent fundamental error in the judgment of the learned judge and it is this. Ext. 11, being the certified copy of award No. 5-15/LA/ADM/99 dated June 9, 1999 passed by Sri Ram Chander, the L.A. Collector pertaining to "Comp. F:\CCDRAIN-Nain)" (Comp. F. being the abbreviated version of compensation file) was tendered in evidence by the PW-2. In terms of this award, Varghese was awarded compensation for acquisition of her plot of land bearing survey No. 146 measuring 0.40 hectares treating it as "house-site', @ Rs. 1,020/- per sq.m. The market value was thus determined as Rs. 4,08,000/-. The PW-2 in course of examination-in-chief had also produced "as many as 31 pages of certified to be true copy of documents", which were marked as Ext. 13 series. Undisputedly, these 31 pages of documents, which were not proved, included certified copy of the award, bearing No. 5-21/LA/ADM/99 dated May 31, 2000 passed by the said Ram Chander, the Collector, pertaining to "Comp. File : Utkrosh". This award, as noticed earlier, was marked Ext. 13/22. The said award dated May 31, 2000, inter alia, dealt with acquisition of a plot of land of the respondent No. 1, bearing survey No. 121 measuring 0. 150 hectares and classified as 'house-site', @ Rs. File : Utkrosh". This award, as noticed earlier, was marked Ext. 13/22. The said award dated May 31, 2000, inter alia, dealt with acquisition of a plot of land of the respondent No. 1, bearing survey No. 121 measuring 0. 150 hectares and classified as 'house-site', @ Rs. 1,068/- sq. m. The market value was thus determined as Rs. 1,60,200/-. The learned judge observed in his judgment, at page 9, that the PW-2 "proved certified copy of award passed in connection with award No. 5-15/LA/ADM/98 dated 09.06.1999" and that the learned lawyer for the claimant "explained that the lands in connection with this case i.e. No. 5-15/LA/ADM/99 dated 09.06.1999 are located adjacent to this case lands and some case lands are part of award No. 5-15/LA/ADM/99 dated 09.06.1999 having similar nature and character with the case lands and after acquisition of that land as per that award i.e. award No. 5-15/LA/ADM/99 dated 09.06.1999, market value of the land was fixed and in that case LA Collector obtaining a report from the Sub-Registrar concerned fixed market value at the rate of Rs. 1068/- per sq. meter with classification of lands as house sites and the LA Collector passed the award accordingly." Rs. 1,068/- per sq. m. was not the rate at which market value of the land acquired from Varghese had been calculated and compensation payable determined; it was Rs. 1,020/- per sq. m. Therefore, while actually referring to Ext. 11, the learned judge mistakenly relied on Ext. 13/22 and considered the rate mentioned therein i.e. Rs. 1,068/- and proceeded to calculate compensation @ Rs. 1,068/- per sq. m instead of and in place of Rs. 1,020/- per sq. m. 23. Would it be proper to determine compensation payable to the respondents taking into consideration Rs. 1,020/- per sq. m. as the proximate rate for determination of market value of the acquired lands? We intend to examine the question here. 24. The decision in Basant Kumar (supra) cited by Mr. Tabraiz lays down certain tests that ought to be kept in view while calculating the market value of the acquired lands. Relevant portions of such decision are extracted below: "5. ***The question is whether the appellants are entitled to the same compensation as was determined by the High Court in the appeals arising out of Raghuvir Singh case and Chet Ram case? Relevant portions of such decision are extracted below: "5. ***The question is whether the appellants are entitled to the same compensation as was determined by the High Court in the appeals arising out of Raghuvir Singh case and Chet Ram case? It has been firmly settled law by beadroll of decisions of this Court that the Judge determining the compensation under section 23(1) should sit in the armchair of a willing prudent purchaser in an open market and see whether he would offer the same amount proposed to be fixed as market value as a willing and prudent buyer for the same or similar land, i.e., land possessing all the advantageous features and to the same extent. This test should always be kept in view and answered affirmatively, taking into consideration all relevant facts and circumstances. If feats of imagination are allowed to sway, he out-steps his domain of judicial decision and lands in misconduct amenable to disciplinary law. We have gone through the record and judgments in Chet Ram case and Raghuvir Singh case decided by the two Division Benches. The learned Judges have adopted the principle that the entire lands in the village shall be treated as one unit and the compensation shall uniformly be determined on that basis. The principle is wholly unsustainable in law and cannot be a valid ground for determination of compensation. It is common knowledge that even in the same village, no two lands command same market value. The lands abutting the main road or national highway command higher market value and as the location goes backward, market value of interior land would be less even for the same kind of land. It is a settled legal position that the lands possessed of only similar potentiality or the value with similar advantages offer comparable parity of the value. It is common knowledge that the lands in the village spread over the vast extent. In this case, it is seen that land is as vast as admeasuring 1669 bighas, 18 biswas of land in the village. So, all lands cannot and should not be classified as possessed of same market value. Burden is always on the claimant to prove the market value and the court should adopt realistic standards and pragmatic approach in evaluation of the evidence. No doubt, each individual had different parcels of the land out of that vast land. So, all lands cannot and should not be classified as possessed of same market value. Burden is always on the claimant to prove the market value and the court should adopt realistic standards and pragmatic approach in evaluation of the evidence. No doubt, each individual had different parcels of the land out of that vast land. If that principle is accepted, as propounded by the High Court, irrespective of the quality of the land, all will be entitled to the same compensation. That principle is not the correct approach in law. The doctrine of equality in determination and payment of same compensation for all claimants involved in the same notification is not a good principle acceptable for the aforestated reasons. When both the lands are proved to be possessed of same advantages, features etc., then only equal compensation is permissible." 25. The respondents appear to have discharged the burden of proving that the status of the plot of land of Varghese, which was the subject matter of acquisition proceedings for construction of drain, was in no way different from the balance of the acquired lands, being the subject matter of acquisition proceedings for setting up defence establishment. All these plots of land were house-sites. That apart, Natarajan as PW-1 had pleaded in his affidavit that the acquired lands "were situate within Port Blair Municipal area with high potentialities and market value and having frontage on the main road". This assertion could not be dislodged. Now, if the learned judge determining compensation under section 23(1) of the L.A. Act were to transpose himself as the willing purchaser and thereafter ponder as to whether he would be willing to buy the lands in question at the same amount proposed as the market value thereof, we as judges of the appeal court seized of the continuing lis between the parties have no option but to place ourselves in the same position and to decide the question from the same perspective. 26. Irrespective of whatever reason the learned judge had assigned for acceptance of the rate of Rs. 1,068/-, but based on the evidence led before the learned judge by the parties we do not see reason to hold that the market value of the acquired plot of land of Varghese, as found by the Collector in the award being Ext. 26. Irrespective of whatever reason the learned judge had assigned for acceptance of the rate of Rs. 1,068/-, but based on the evidence led before the learned judge by the parties we do not see reason to hold that the market value of the acquired plot of land of Varghese, as found by the Collector in the award being Ext. 11, does not afford any guidance and cannot thus form the basis for determination of compensation payable to the respondents. Plot of land bearing survey No. 146 i.e. Varghese's plot along with other plots of land owned by the members of Mini India comprised the properties that were transferred by the registered sale deed executed on June 9, 1997. It is true that substantial tracts of land were acquired for different public purposes and one plot comprised therein may not offer with precision equal benefits and advantages that another plot can potentially offer, but it cannot be lost sight of that all such plots of land belonging to the respondents were sought to be acquired by a single notification dated December 29, 2000- January 7, 2001 issued under section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and they are at least entitled to calculation of market value of their acquired lands at par with the market value of the plot of land of Varghese, which was acquired pursuant to a notification issued under section 4(1) more than two years ago i.e.: October 28, 1998, during which period property prices may have increased substantially. While considering this issue, one has to take into account the fact - a fact of which judicial notice has to be taken -that real estate prices had started soaring from the sixties of the last century and had been constantly soaring all over the country and Port Blair has been no exception during the last 30 (thirty) years. That the Court can take judicial notice of escalating real estate prices is clear from the decisions in Rajalakshmi Narayanan v. Margarete Kathleen Gandhi, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 296; Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills v. Virendra, (1998)5 SCC 718 ; and Udho Dass v. State of Haryana, (2010)12 SCC 51 . Although Mr. That the Court can take judicial notice of escalating real estate prices is clear from the decisions in Rajalakshmi Narayanan v. Margarete Kathleen Gandhi, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 296; Modi Spinning & Weaving Mills v. Virendra, (1998)5 SCC 718 ; and Udho Dass v. State of Haryana, (2010)12 SCC 51 . Although Mr. Tabraiz valiantly endeavoured to impress us that the location, nature and character as well as user potential of the comparable lands ought to have been taken into consideration, we are not impressed because not only this exercise ought to have been undertaken before the learned judge but even before us it has not been shown that the acquired lands of the respondents did not possess the same advantages as the plot of land of Varghese. In any event, the time-gap of more than 2 (two) years between issuance of the two notifications under section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and that property and land prices constantly appreciate with time is sufficient for a ruling in favour of the respondents that they deserve to be treated, if not at par with the awardee of award No. 5-21/LA/ADM/99 dated May 31, 2000, but at least at par with Varghese. 27. On reading paragraph 4 of the report of Ratan Lal Sahu (supra), we find that neither was there any material on record before the Supreme Court nor any discussion in the impugned judgment for the basis for reliance as regards the relevant value of the land, etc. That is not the case here and, therefore, the decision in Ratan Lal Sahu (supra) does not aid the appellant. For similar reasons as discussed in the preceding paragraph, Natwarbhai (supra) also does not lend any assistance to the appellant. 28. In answer to the second and third contentions raised by Mr. Tabraiz, we thus hold that market value of the acquired lands of the respondents ought to be calculated @ Rs. 1,020/- per sq. m., being the proximate rate traceable in the evidence on record, and compensation necessarily has to be determined accordingly. 29. Attention may now be adverted to the contention of Mr. Tabraiz that the requiring body ought to have been put on notice and in its absence there cannot be proper and effective determination of the compensation that is payable. We are afraid, the contention has not impressed us. 30. 29. Attention may now be adverted to the contention of Mr. Tabraiz that the requiring body ought to have been put on notice and in its absence there cannot be proper and effective determination of the compensation that is payable. We are afraid, the contention has not impressed us. 30. Section 20 of the L.A. Act is the provision relating to service of notice by the Court after receiving the Collector's statement under section 19 thereof. Section 20 reads thus: "20. Service of notice.-The Court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day to be served on following person, namely:- (a) the applicant; (b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded; and (c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of compensation, the Collector." 31. Clause (a) relates to notice to be served on the objector, while clause (c) requires the Court to serve notice on the Collector if the objection is of the specified kind. The important words for the present discussion are all persons interested in the objection,...", as in clause (b). Question is, whether the requiring body can be comprehended to be a 'person interested in the objection' that is filed under section 18 of the L.A. Act or not on whom notice should have been served. 32. The words "person interested" has been defined in the L.A. Act as follows: "3. Definitions- In this Act unless there is something repugnant in the subject to context, *** (b) the expression "person interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land; ***" 33. The words "person interested" or "persons interested" appear in different sections of the L.A. Act, viz. The words "person interested" or "persons interested" appear in different sections of the L.A. Act, viz. section SA [providing for hearing of objections by "any person interested" after the notification under section 4 is issued], section 9 [providing for issuance of notice to "all persons interested" after the land in question has been marked out, measured and planned in terms of section 8], section 11 [requiring the Collector to enquire into the objection (if any) filed by "any person interested" pursuant to notice given under section 9 as well as execution of an agreement by "all the persons interested" in terms of sub-section (2) thereof, thus enabling the Collector to dispense with the requirement of making an award under sub-section (1)], section 12 [requiring the Collector to give immediate notice of his award to such of "the persons interested" as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made], section 13A, [whereby power is reserved to correct clerical errors in an award on the application of "any person interested" or "a local authority" and to give notice of corrections made in the award to "all the persons interested"], section 17 [requiring tender of payment to "the persons interested" when land is possessed for a public purpose in a case of urgency without taking recourse to the process that is initiated by section 4 thereof], and section 18 [authorising "any person interested", who has not accepted the award to require the Collector to refer the matter of determination of compensation to the Court]. 34. There are some other provisions in the L.A. Act which do not exactly employ the words "person interested" but use words that carry the same meaning. Section 14 refers to the power of the Collector to enforce the attendance of witnesses, including the "parties interested" or any of them, whereas section 19, while requiring the Collector to refer the issue of determination of compensation by the Court, obliges him to state for the information of the Court in writing, inter alia, "the names of the persons whom he has reason to think interested in such land" and to attach thereto "statements in writing made or delivered by the parties interested respectively". 35. 35. From the scheme of the L.A. Act, it is clear that the same is the recognition of the State's power of eminent domain to acquire land required for a public purpose or for a company. It also provides for compensation for property acquired under eminent domain. However, such power is to be exercised within the limits imposed by the statute. From the references to the statutory provisions applicable at different stages of the process of acquisition, it is clear that the persons interested in the lands which is/are the subject matter of acquisition has/have to be given notice and his/their objections heard. It is in this backdrop that the words "all persons interested in the objection" in section 20 of the L.A. Act have to be construed. Does it mean that the requiring body in all cases is to be put on notice, or does it refer to all such persons other than the objectors (except those who have without protest consented to receive payment of the compensation awarded) having an interest in the land forming the subject matter of the acquisition who is/are required to be put on notice? 36. To answer this question, it would be useful at this stage to also consider the provisions of section 50 of the L.A. Act. It reads as under: "50. Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or Company.- (1) Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed By a local authority or of any Company, the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or Company. (2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or Company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation: Provided that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18." It may be noted that in view of the definitions of 'company' in section 3(e) of the L.A. Act and 'local authority' in section (aa) of the L.A. Act and section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the defence establishment is neither a company nor a local authority. 37. The provision of sub-section (2) of section 50 is important for the present purpose. 37. The provision of sub-section (2) of section 50 is important for the present purpose. Since a local authority or a company, for whose benefit land is acquired, has been conferred the right to appear before a Collector (before or at the time the award is made) or a Court (when it is seized of a reference) and to adduce evidence for the purpose of determination of the amount of compensation, is the law to be interpreted to comprehend such local authority or such company within the meaning of "all persons interested in the objection" in clause (b) of section 20? We think not, for, the option for the local authority or the company to appear before the Collector or the Court is always open. It is for such local authority or such company to elect whether it would wish its version on the compensation aspect to be placed before the Collector and/or the Court, as and when the occasion would arise. That the legislature is deemed not to waste words is well recognised by law. If indeed notice is to be given on the local authority or the company for whose benefit the land is being acquired, sub-section (2) of section 50 would attract the vice of redundancy. It is axiomatic that a person who is entitled to appear before a Collector or a Court, as of right, is entitled to adduce evidence and place its version in relation to the subject matter of enquiry. In our view "all persons interested in the objection" in clause (b) of section 20 cannot be torn out of context to include a requiring body particularly in a case of the present nature where the objection being relatable to the amount of compensation, the Collector was put on notice and such Collector being the protector of the interest of the Union Territory was supposed to and did in fact stick to his stand that the compensation was correctly assessed. 38. The requiring body i.e. the defence establishment did neither approach the learned judge seized of the reference nor this Court in course of hearing of this appeal with a plea that it ought to be heard. 38. The requiring body i.e. the defence establishment did neither approach the learned judge seized of the reference nor this Court in course of hearing of this appeal with a plea that it ought to be heard. One must remember that the acquisition process in question was initiated by the Collector not for any autonomous body, local authority or company unconnected with the civil administration but for the defence establishment of the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Although the Collector and the defence establishment are distinct identifiable departments of such Union Territory, both are under the administrative control of the President of India acting through an administrator, i.e. the Lieutenant Governor. It would, therefore, not be unreasonable to presume that the Collector had/has been protecting the interest of the defence establishment, more so when the objection relating to the amount of compensation assessed by the Collector was considered and decided upon hearing him in consonance with section 20 of the L.A. Act. 39. We are in agreement with Ms. Nag that section 20(b) of the L.A. Act cannot be construed in a manner to require service of notice on the requiring body. If there has been no failure to follow the statute, what legitimate grievance could the Collector have for non-service of notice on the requiring body? The requiring body did not seek to intervene either before the Court while it was in seisin of the section 18 proceedings, or before us. 40. In our view, "any person interested in the objection" referred to in section 20(b) could mean the requiring body, if it had participated in the proceedings before the Collector. If the requiring body does not participate, is it for the Court hearing a reference under section 18 to ascertain whether the requiring body intends to participate in the proceedings before it or not? That could not have been the legislative intent. Ms. Nag is right in her submission that no notice was required to be served on the defence establishment. 41. Mr. Tabraiz sought to draw inspiration from the dicta in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) and Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra). That could not have been the legislative intent. Ms. Nag is right in her submission that no notice was required to be served on the defence establishment. 41. Mr. Tabraiz sought to draw inspiration from the dicta in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra) and Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra). Unfortunately for the appellant, in both the reported decisions, section 50 of the L.A. Act was under consideration, which gives the right to a local authority or a company to participate in proceedings where the award of the Collector is objected to and to oppose the claim for enhanced compensation. The beneficiaries of the process of land acquisition prayed for intervention before the High Courts but their claims were spurned. It is in such circumstances that the decisions were rendered holding that the beneficiaries were interested parties and had a right to participate in the proceedings. But in this case no such intention was ever evinced by the requiring body. 42. It is now time to deal with the first contention raised by Mr. Tabraiz. Ms. Nag is again right in her stand that no ground in relation thereto has been urged in the memorandum of appeal. However, there is no bar in law for the Court to step out of the grounds urged in such memorandum and to rest its decision on a new ground of law, or to allow the appellant to raise a new ground of law in course of hearing of an appeal; the only rider in such case is that the respondent ought not to be taken unawares and he should be extended the opportunity to contest such ground. Since the respondents were made aware of our inclination to hear such ground, Ms. Nag opposed it and the nature of her objection has been noted above. Having considered the versions on either side, we observe that the stand of the appellant has merit and hold that the contention deserves acceptance. The deductions for the areas earmarked for building roads, leaving of open spaces and other developmental works as well as the building/development charges were not allowed. It is in such circumstances that the quantum of compensation that is payable to the respondents must be modified bearing in mind the settled legal position that at least 1/3rd of the compensation has to be deducted in this regard [see Basant Kumar (supra)]. 43. It is in such circumstances that the quantum of compensation that is payable to the respondents must be modified bearing in mind the settled legal position that at least 1/3rd of the compensation has to be deducted in this regard [see Basant Kumar (supra)]. 43. Insofar as the submission of Ms. Nag relating to her advice to the respondents for not filing cross-objection for non-awarding of interest on solatium is concerned, we are of the opinion in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Prem Nath Kapur v. National Fertiliser Corporation of India Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 71 , and State of Haryana v. Joginder Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 628 , that no interest on solatium is payable. The ground for not filing cross-objection, therefore, does not commend to us to be sound. However, we find that the learned judge had not specifically dealt with the aspect of 'interest on solatium'. There is thus no observation in the impugned judgment that could be construed as express or implied refusal of the learned judge to award interest on solatium. In view of the later Constitution Bench decision in Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 457, the respondents are left free to seek interest on solatium in course of execution proceeding, which has been initiated. 44. Moving on to the arithmetic part, 7.950 sq. m. of lands were acquired. Taking Rs. 1,020/- sq. m. as the market value as on date the notification under section 4(1) of the L.A. Act was published, compensation amount works out to 7,950 x 1,020 = Rs. 81,09,000/-. Taking away 1/3rd out of it for the purposes mentioned in paragraph 43 supra, what remains is Rs. 54,06,000/-. The claimants are entitled to interest @ 12% under section 23(1A) of the L.A. Act for the time gap between the date of publication of notification under section 4(1) thereof and the date of the award, which is one year as well as 30% solatium under section 23(2) of the L.A. Act. Interest @ 12% for a year on Rs. 54,06,000/- and solatium @ 30% on the same amount work out to Rs. 6,48,720/- and Rs. 16,21,800/- respectively. Rs. 54,06,000/- + Rs. 6,48,720/- + Rs. 16,21,800/- totals to Rs. 76,76,520/-. Payment of Rs. 6,21,740/- by cheque had been made by the Collector and deducting such sum from Rs. Interest @ 12% for a year on Rs. 54,06,000/- and solatium @ 30% on the same amount work out to Rs. 6,48,720/- and Rs. 16,21,800/- respectively. Rs. 54,06,000/- + Rs. 6,48,720/- + Rs. 16,21,800/- totals to Rs. 76,76,520/-. Payment of Rs. 6,21,740/- by cheque had been made by the Collector and deducting such sum from Rs. 76,76,520/-, the excess payment that the Collector has to make works out to Rs. 70,54,780/-. In terms of section 28 of the L.A. Act, the respondents are entitled to interest @ 9% on the excess amount for a year i.e. Rs. 6,34,930.20p (rounded off to Rs. 6,34,930/-). That apart, in terms of the proviso thereof, interest @ 15% on the excess amount for about a decade has to be borne by the appellant, which is equivalent to Rs. 1,05,82,170/-. The total amount payable on the date of the impugned judgment and decree is thus: Rs. 70,54,780/- + Rs. 6,34,930/- + Rs. 1,05,82,170/- = Rs. 1,82,71,880. We are inclined to award further interest @ 9% on such sum from the date of the impugned judgment and decree till actual payment. It is ordered accordingly. With the aforesaid modifications, the present appeal stands disposed of. Parties shall bear their respective costs. Girish Chandra Gupta, J. - I agree.