JUDGMENT : BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. This appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is at the instance of an Insurance Company and is directed against an award dated 14th March 2007 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Main), Sabarkantha at Himatnagar in M.A.C.P. No. 632 of 2003 thereby the learned Tribunal below allowed the application under section 166 of the M.V. Act, awarding an amount Rs. 371,800/- with interest the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of application till its realisation, with proportionate costs. 2. It appears from the records that on 17th April 2003, the deceased was travelling as a pillion rider on motor cycle No. GJ.9.L.413, being driven and owned by the opponent No.1. When the said motor cycle reached the turning on Kishangadh in the sim of village Kishangadh, a dog came in front of the motor cycle, the driver applied sudden brake but due to the excessive speed, rash and negligent driving, the motor cycle came off the road and collided with a tree, and due to the impact, the deceased sustained serious injuries all over his body, to which he later on succumbed during the treatment. 2.1 According to the claimants, the victim was aged 32 years and used to earn Rs. 5000/- a month as Electrician and also from agricultural activities. The claimants, thus, prayed for compensation of Rs. 4 lakh. 3. The aforesaid claim-application was opposed by the Insurance Company thereby denying all the allegations made in the application, and a plea was also taken that at the time of the accident, the owner-cum-driver of the motor cycle had no valid licence. The learned Tribunal, as indicated earlier, by the impugned award, has awarded a sum of Rs. 3,71,800/-. 4. Mr. Gade, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company has strenuously contended before me that it would appear from the driving licence filed by the claimants that the driver had a valid licence to drive LMV, HGV, HPV and TRA, and submits that by virtue of such licence, one is not entitled to drive a two-wheeler, and, therefore, according to Mr. Gade, his client is not liable to pay the amount awarded by the Tribunal. 5. Mr. Apurva Jani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant has, however, opposed the aforesaid contention of Mr. Gade, his client is not liable to pay the amount awarded by the Tribunal. 5. Mr. Apurva Jani, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant has, however, opposed the aforesaid contention of Mr. Gade and has contended that in the proceedings under section 140 of the MV Act, an amount of Rs. 50,000/- had been awarded in favour of his clients with a finding that the Insurance Company was liable to pay the amount, and pursuant to such award, the amount has also been paid to his client by the Insurance Company. By relying upon such order, Mr. Jani contends that the Insurance Company having not raised such a plea in the proceedings under section 140 of the M.V. Act, is precluded from taking the said plea in the subsequent stage of Section 166 of the Act. In other words, according to Mr. Jani, the plea now sought to be taken is hit by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record, I find that in the Written Statement, a specific plea was taken that at the time of the accident, the driver of the offending vehicle had no valid licence, but what was the defect in the licence, was not indicated. Before the Tribunal, when issues were framed, no such specific issue was framed as to the validity of the driving licence. Even when the sole witness for the claimant gave deposition, no suggestion was given to her in cross-examination that the driver of the motor cycle had no valid licence. It is needless to mention that the Insurance Company, of its own, did not adduce any evidence raising such point. 7. The learned Tribunal, as it appears from the findings recorded in the award, has recorded that the learned advocate for the Insurance Company took a plea that the driver had no valid licence but he overruled the said plea by stating that copy of driving licence was produced which showed that driving licence was valid at the time of the accident. 8. It further appears from the record that the claimants had filed an application under section 140 of the M.V. Act, and in that proceedings, on a contested hearing, the learned Tribunal below awarded a sum of Rs. 8. It further appears from the record that the claimants had filed an application under section 140 of the M.V. Act, and in that proceedings, on a contested hearing, the learned Tribunal below awarded a sum of Rs. 50,000/- after holding that the opponents are jointly and severally liable to pay the same, vide order dated 2nd February 2005 passed below Exh.5. A copy of the said order is produced in this proceedings at pages 18-20. It is stated at the bar that the Insurance Company has not challenged the said order but has paid the said amount in compliance of the said award. 9. From the aforesaid fact, it is clear that the question as to whether there has been a breach of condition of the Insurance policy at the instance of the owner of the vehicle cannot be reopened in this proceedings under section 166 of the M.V. Act once it is found that in an earlier proceeding under section 140 of the Act arising out of the selfsame accident, the liability of the Insurance Company to pay the amount payable by the insured has been upheld and the said findings are not challenged. The question whether there has been breach of condition of the existing policy is basically a question of fact, and such plea was available to the Insurance Company at the time of hearing of the application under section 140 of the M.V. Act. The Insurance Company not having raised such question, and after suffering the order, having made payment of that amount, in my opinion, it is now precluded from raising the above question regarding breach of condition of the policy at the stage of the proceedings under Section 166 of the Act. The aforesaid question is hit by the doctrine of constructive res judicata. 10. It is now settled by the Apex Court that an award under section 140 of the Act is an appealable one See Yallwwa v. National Insurance Company reported in AIR 2007 SC 2582 and therefore, the parties, by not preferring any appeal, has accepted the position that the vehicle was involved in the accident, that there was no breach of any condition of insurance in respect of the vehicle involved in the accident and that the same was insured by the concerned Insurance Company. Those three facts cannot be reopened in the proceedings under Section 166 of the Act either at the instance of the owner of the vehicle or the Insurance Company. At this stage it will be profitable to refer to the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal And Others v. Smt. Deorjin Debi And Another reported in AIR. 1960 SC 941 where a Bench consisting of three Judges specifically held that even if Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable in a judicial proceeding, the principles of res judicata is nevertheless applicable: "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation, When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law-has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S. 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original court as well as any higher court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct." (Emphasis supplied). 11. I, thus, find that the only question raised by Mr. Gade, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Insurance Company, is devoid of any merit, and consequently, this appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs. By order dated 17th August 2007, only 10% amount was disbursed to the claimants and balance 90% was ordered to be kept in Fixed Deposit. The Tribunal is directed to forthwith disburse the balance amount with interest accrued thereon to the claimants, after proper verification, in the proportion indicated in its impugned award, by accounts payee cheque.