Order : 1. This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in Cr.No.183/2006-07 of Prohibition & Excise Station, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda District. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the period of limitation to take cognizance of offence by competent court is expired long back, no purpose will be served by keeping the crime pending against the petitioner. 3. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the crime was registered within the period of limitation. 4. The factual matrix of the case on hand is that on the complaint lodged by the Prohibition & Excise Inspector, Miryalaguda, the Station House Officer, Prohibition & Excise Station, Miryalaguda registered a case in Cr.No.183/2006-07 under Section 34 (a) of Excise Act, 1968 (for short the Act) against the petitioner herein and others. As per the allegations made in the complaint, on 26.6.2006, the Prohibition & Excise officials intercepted the vehicle bearing No.AP-9-D-1243 and seized different brands of liquor bottles while they were transporting from Settipalem village to Chitumarthy village without proper licence or valid permit. 5. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the period of limitation prescribed under Chapter XXXVI Cr.P.C. relates to the date of institution of criminal proceedings, the date of filing of complaint or the date of taking cognizance of offence by the competent Court. 6. The period of limitation depends upon the punishment prescribed for a particular offence. As per the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner herein and another have committed the offence punishable under section 34 (a) of the Act. Section 34 (a) of the Act defines what constitute the offence. Section 34 (a) (1) of the Act prescribes the period of punishment basing upon the quantity of the contraband seized. If the alleged offence falls within the purview of section 34 (a) (1) (i), the punishment prescribed is up to three years. If the alleged offence falls within the purview of section 34 (a) (1) (ii), the punishment prescribed is up to five years. Therefore, the period of limitation under section 34 (a) of the Act depends upon the quantity of contraband seized by the Excise officials. 7. If the alleged offence falls within the purview of section 34 (a) (1) (ii), the punishment prescribed is up to five years. Therefore, the period of limitation under section 34 (a) of the Act depends upon the quantity of contraband seized by the Excise officials. 7. In view of the pendency of the investigation, it is premature to say whether the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner falls within the ambit of section 34(a)(1)(i) or section 34(a)(1)(ii) of the Act. 8. Chapter XXXVI of Cr.P.C deals with period of limitation for taking cognizance of different offences. Section 467 defines period of limitation. The other provisions of the Chapter XXXVI Cr.P.C deal with the commencement, exclusion and extension of period of limitation. Section 468 (2) Cr.P.C prescribes the period of limitation which reads as under: 468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation:- (1) x x x x x (2) The period of limitation shall be- (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only, (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. A fascicular reading of Section 468 Cr.P.C with Section 34 (a) of the Act clearly demonstrates the period of limitation is three years if the offence falls under section 34 (a) (1) (i). There is no period of limitation if the offence falls within the purview of section 34 (a) (1) (ii) of the Act. 9. Even as per the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner and another committed the alleged offence on 26.06.2006. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the concerned Prohibition & Excise Court has to take cognizance of the offence on or before 25.06.2009 if the offence falls within the purview of Section 34 (a) (1) (i) of the Act. Even assuming without conceding that the quantity of contraband seized by the excise officials is less than the notified one, the Court has to take cognizance on or before 25.06.2009. In the instant case, taking cognizance of the offence by the competent excise Court does not arise in view of non-completion of investigation and non-filing of challan before the concerned Court. 10. In the instant case, taking cognizance of the offence by the competent excise Court does not arise in view of non-completion of investigation and non-filing of challan before the concerned Court. 10. The word taking of cognizance is not defined anywhere in Cr.P.C. In common or legal parlance taking of cognizance of offence means that the concerned court has to satisfy itself with the material placed before it that there are reasonable and justifiable grounds to proceed further in the matter. In other sense, the court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case on hand. 11. To substantiate the argument, the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the principle enunciated in Kimberly Clark Liver Ltd Vs. State. In the said judgment relying on Krishna Pillai Vs. T.A. Rajendran, this Court at para No.16 observed as follows: 16. As noted above in Krishna Pillai 1990 (Supp) SCC 121 (supra), the Supreme Court held that filing of a complaint in the Court did not amount to taking cognizance, that taking cognizance was different from filing of a complaint and since the magisterial action of taking cognizance was beyond the period of limitation calculated from the date of commission of the offence, the Magistrate was not competent to take cognizance of the offence under after the period of limitation. In Bharat Demodar Kale 2003 Cri LJ 4543 (supra), a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, took a contrary view, and held that a cumulative reading of various provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr. P.C. clearly indicated that the limitation prescribed therein was only for the filing of the complaint or initiation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance. P.C. clearly indicated that the limitation prescribed therein was only for the filing of the complaint or initiation of the prosecution and not for taking cognizance. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bharat Damodar Kale 2003 Cri LJ 4543 (supra) is in conflict with the law laid down in Krishna Pillai 1990 (Supp) SCC 121 (supra) and since the earlier three Judge Bench judgment in Krishna Pillai (supra) was not noticed by the subsequent two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Bharat Damodar Kale (supra), the law laid down in Krishna Pillai (supra) is binding on this High Court, and as a result cognizance taken by the Magistrate, beyond the prescribed period of limitation, i.e., the period commencing from the date on which the offence is said to have been committed till the date on which the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance, must be held as beyond limitation and in view of the bar under Section 468(2)(a), Cr.P.C. the proceedings in STC No. 114 of 2003 is required to be quashed on this ground. 12. In the above judgment, this Court, after considering the various judgments of the apex Court held that the period of limitation prescribed under Cr.P.C. relates to the date of taking cognizance by the competent Court and not the date of institution of criminal proceedings or the date of filing of the complaint. 13. On the other hand, the Additional Public Prosecutor has taken me to the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Mrs. Sarah Mathew Vs. The Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, by its Director Dr. K.M. Cherian & Ors. In the said judgment, the following two questions fell for consideration before the five judges Bench of the apex Court. A. Whether for the purposes of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date is the date on which a Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence? B. Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale (which is followed in Japani Sahoo) lays down the correct law. 14. The apex Court, after considering the various provisions of Cr.P.C and catena of case law, held as under: 40. B. Which of the two cases i.e. Krishna Pillai or Bharat Kale (which is followed in Japani Sahoo) lays down the correct law. 14. The apex Court, after considering the various provisions of Cr.P.C and catena of case law, held as under: 40. Having considered the questions which arise in this reference in light of legislative intent, authoritative pronouncements of this Court and established legal principles, we are of the opinion that Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C., primarily because in that case, this Court was dealing with Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 which is a special Act. It specifically stated that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the expiry of one year from the date on which offence is alleged to have been committed. There is no reference either to Section 468 or Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. in that judgment. It does not refer to Sections 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C. which carve out exceptions for Special Acts. This Court has not adverted to diverse aspects including the aspect that inaction on the part of the court in taking cognizance within limitation, though the complaint is filed within time may work great injustice on the complainant. Moreover, reliance placed on Antulay 1984 Case, in our opinion, was not apt. In Antulay 1984 Case, this Court was dealing inter alia with the contention that a private complaint is not maintainable in the court of Special Judge set- up under Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (the 1952 Act). It was urged that the object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant. It was urged that the object underlying the 1952 Act was to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant. It was argued that if it is assumed that a private complaint is maintainable then before taking cognizance, a Special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses as per Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. He will have to postpone issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer and in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by police officers of designated rank for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. It was submitted that this would thwart the object of the 1952 Act which is to provide for a speedy trial. This contention was rejected by this Court holding that it is not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. or direct investigation as therein contemplated. That is matter of discretion of the court. Thus, the questions which arise in this reference were not involved in Antulay 1984 Case: Since there, this Court was not dealing with the question of bar of limitation reflected in Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. at all, in our opinion, the said judgment could not have been usefully referred to in Krishna Pillai while construing provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. For all these, we are unable to endorse the view taken in Krishna Pillai. 41. In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold that Bharat Kale which is followed in Japani Sahoo lays down the correct law. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. 15. Krishna Pillai will have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not the authority for deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. 15. In view of the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, the relevant date for taking cognizance of offence, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C, means the date of filing of complaint or the date of institution of the prosecution, but not the date on which the Court takes cognizance of offence. In the instant case, the alleged offence took place on 26.06.2006 and the complaint was lodged on the even date. Therefore, in view of the principle enunciated in Sarah Mathew case (2nd supra), the law laid down by this Court in Kimberly Clark Liver Ltd (1st supra) relying on Krishna Pillai no more holds good. 16. It is a settled principle of law that the Court can quash the proceedings under section 482 Cr.P.C. in the following circumstances. i. If the allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any offence much less the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused, ii. If there is a legal bar for registration of the criminal case against the accused for the alleged offence. iii. Even if the allegations made in the complaint ex facie are taken to be true and correct, there is no possibility of conviction of the accused, iv. If the registration of the case and continuation of the investigation would amount to abuse of process of law; and v. To secure the ends of justice. 17. Let me consider the facts on hand in the light of the above principles. As per the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner and another had been transporting different types of contraband from Settipalem village to Chitumarthy village without proper licence or valid permit. The Court has to take into consideration the allegations made in the complaint only while deciding the petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry to ascertain the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. Whether the petitioner has committed the alleged offence or not will come to light during the course of investigation. Whether the petitioner has committed the alleged offence or not will come to light during the course of investigation. It is a settled principle of law that the Court shall not stifle the legitimate investigation at the threshold. The allegations made in the complaint prima facie constitute the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and another punishable under Section 34 (a) of the Act. 18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principle enunciated in R.P. Kapoor v State of Punjab and State of Haryana v Bhajanlal , I am of the considered view that it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in Crime No.4 of 2011 at the threshold. However, the Excise officials have not investigated into the matter for the last eight years. No material is placed before this court with regard to the stage of investigation. Hence I am inclined to direct the Station House Officer, Prohibition & Excise Station, Miryalaguda, Nalgonda District to complete the investigation in Cr.No.183/2006-07 as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within two months from the date of receipt of this order. 19. With the above observations, this Criminal Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Criminal Petition, shall stand closed.