JUDGMENT : Vijay Manohar Sahai, J. The short question that arises for consideration in this petition is, whether service of order would confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court to consider validity of the order passed in a different State. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Sipoi in CRPF on 5.5.1993. He was posted at various places. Thereafter, the petitioner was posted at Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir), but for the medical reasons, as the petitioner was suffering from hypertension, the Unit Doctor sent the petitioner to C.H.,Gandhinagar for medical review on 29.3.2011. The medical check-up of the petitioner was reviewed by the Medical Board at Gandhinagar on 13.4.2011 and the petitioner was advised to get regular medical treatment. On 30.4.2011, the petitioner was relieved to resume duty at Jammu, however, the petitioner did not resume his duty on 1.5.2011 and reported on 27.7.2011 at Jammu. According to the medical certificate issued by the Medical Officer, Primary Health Center, Chorimala, Taluka Bhiloda, District Sabarkantha (Gujarat), the petitioner was under the treatment from 1.5.2011 to 26.7.2011 and became fit to join his duty on 27.7.2011 as per the certificate dated 25.7.2011. 3. According to the petitioner, he was medically ill, though this period has been treated by the respondent authority as the period to be absent from duty. According to the respondents, the petitioner over-stayed in Gujarat which is unauthorized absence for which he was charge-sheeted. This medical certificate, prima facie, does not inspire confidence as the petitioner was member of the disciplined force which had medical hospital also at Gandhinagar. If the petitioner was sick, then he could have gone to the medical hospital as directed by the CRPF. Instead, going to the Primary Health Center and getting the certificate of the Medical Officer, Primary Health Center, Chorimala does not inspire confidence, on the contrary, it shows that intention of the petitioner was mala fide as he wanted to take unauthorized leave. The charge-sheet was issued to him on 10.9.2011. The Inquiry Officer was appointed. The inquiry was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and on the basis of the inquiry report, the petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 14.12.2011 passed at Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir) which was served on the petitioner in Gujarat. 4. The charge-sheet was issued to him on 10.9.2011. The Inquiry Officer was appointed. The inquiry was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and on the basis of the inquiry report, the petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 14.12.2011 passed at Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir) which was served on the petitioner in Gujarat. 4. The appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Range CRPF, Greater Noida which has dismissed the appeal by order dated 14.5.2013. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred the revision application before the revisional authority which has also been dismissed vide order dated 20.6.2014 by the Inspector General of Police, N/s C.R.P.F., West Block No. 8, R.K.Puram, New Delhi. Those orders have been challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. 5. The first question that arises for consideration is, whether the Court in Gujarat has territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition wherein the order has been passed in Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir), appellate order in UP and revisional order in New Delhi. According to learned advocate for the petitioner, since he has remained unauthorized absent from duty when he was under medical treatment in Gujarat, therefore, part cause of action has arisen in Gujarat. It is relevant to point out over here that the petitioner was posted at Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir) and while he was posted at Jammu, he was sent for medical treatment at Gujarat. Therefore, merely because in “A” city, an employee is sent for medical treatment and was in receipt of the order there, territorial jurisdiction cannot be said to be arisen at “A” city. Just for example, if the petitioner is sent for medical treatment at PHC, Chandigarh, it would not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court at Chandigarh. The petitioner was employee and he was dismissed from service at Srinagar and, therefore, cause of action has arisen at Srinagar (Jammu & Kashmir) and not at Gujarat where the order was served. Relying on the Full Bench’s decision of the Kerala High Court, the Apex Court in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. and others, (2006) 3 SCC 658 in paragraph 23 considered and held that : “In Nakul Deo Singh v. Dy. Relying on the Full Bench’s decision of the Kerala High Court, the Apex Court in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. and others, (2006) 3 SCC 658 in paragraph 23 considered and held that : “In Nakul Deo Singh v. Dy. Commandant, a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court speaking through one of us, R.K. Balasubramanyan, J. while considering the question as to whether receipt of an order passed by an Appellate Authority in a disciplinary proceeding would constitute cause of action, upon noticing the definition thereof as stated in Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure, 15th Edn., Vol. 1 at p.251 and a decision of the Court of Appeal in Paragon Finance v. D.B. Thakerar & Co, opinied : (KLT p.646, para 21). “The fact that a person who was dismissed from service while he was in service outside the State would have to suffer the consequence of that dismissal when he is in his native place by being rendered jobless, is not a fact which constitutes the bundle of facts giving rise to a cause of action in his favour to challenge his dismissal. That right accrued to him earlier when he was dismissed from service outside the State and he lost his employment. Similarly, when an appeal is filed by him to an Appellate Authority who is outside the jurisdiction of this High Court and that appeal is dismissed by the Appellate Authority, the merger in the decision of the Appellate Authority takes place when the appeal is dismissed and not when the appellant receives the order. What a writ petitioner need plead as a part of his cause of action is the fact that his appeal was dismissed wholly or in part and not the fact that the order was communicated to him. That plea is relevant only to show when the right of action arose in his favour. The receipt of the order only gives him a right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. That the consequences of a proceeding in the larger sense are suffered by a person in his native place is not a ground to hold that the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the native place is situate is also competent to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person is dismissed or reduced in rank, he suffers the consequences where he was employed at the relevant time and not in his native place to which he might have retired on his dismissal.” 6. The dismissal order would show that right of action accrued in favour of the petitioner. Receiving the order at Gujarat only gave the petitioner right of action on the already accrued cause of action and enables him to meet a plea of laches or limitation raised in opposition. It does not confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court. Mr.Pathak appearing with Mr. Shivang Shukla has placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Nathabhai Bhaijibhai v. Union of India and another, decided on 16.11.2011. We have carefully gone through the said decision and in the said decision, though the impugned order was passed in Ajmer (Rajasthan), the employee was posted at Palanpur in State of Gujarat. Therefore, part of cause of action had arisen in State of Gujarat and part of cause of action had arisen in State of Rajasthan. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench was of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the said petitioner was maintainable in State of Gujarat as the employee was serving in Gujarat but the order reducing him in pay was passed at Rajasthan. Therefore, the said decision does not help the petitioner. Mr.Pathak also placed reliance on another Division Bench’s decision in the case of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. v. M.D. Juwekar, 1988(1) GLH 232 . In this decision, no doubt, the Division Bench has held that service of dismissal order in the State where the petitioner resides would also confer the cause of action and has to be included in the basket of facts constituting the cause of action. In this decision, no doubt, the Division Bench has held that service of dismissal order in the State where the petitioner resides would also confer the cause of action and has to be included in the basket of facts constituting the cause of action. But, this view of the Division Bench does not lay down a good law in view of the Apex Court’s decision including the decision in the case of Mosaraf Hossain Khan (supra) and the Division Bench’s decision in the case of Sarjeet Singh Maidhan v. Union of India through Secretary and others decided on 18.2.2011 wherein various decisions have been relied upon and it has been held that the service of order at the residence in a particular State would not confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court of that particular State where the petitioner resides when the order passed in different State is served on him. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench’s decision in Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd (supra) no longer can be said to be a good law. 7. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find that this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable with a liberty to the petitioner to seek his remedy before the appropriate forum. Petition dismissed.