Ramsinghbhai (Ramasangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat
2014-08-26
S.R.BRAHMBHATT, Z.K.SAIYED
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : S.R. Brahmbhatt, J. Heard learned counsels for the parties. 2. The petitioner claimant has approached this Court by way of this petition preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order dated 30.07.2012, passed by the respondent no.2, rejecting the petitioner's application made under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act' for the sake of brevity) on the ground of it being delayed as it was filed beyond the period of 90 days prescribed. 3. Facts in brief leading to filing this petition, as could be culled out from the memo of the petition, deserve to be set out as under. 4. The petitioner was original land owner bearing Survey No.586/02 on the record of the Village Vitthalgadh, Taluka Lakhtar, District-Surendranagar, admeasuring 1 Hector-38 Are-61 Sq.Mtr. As submitted by the petitioner, the land admeasuring 1 Hector 30 Are 83 Sq. Mtr. of Survey No.586/02 was acquired by respondent no.2 i.e. Special Land Acquisition Officer (Narmada Project), Unit-1, Surendranagar for the purpose of construction of Saurashtra Branch Canal, which is covered in LAQ Case No.139 of 1992. The Award under Section 11 of the Act was declared on 03.11.1995 and the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner on 30.03.1996 indicating the compensation admissible to the petitioner. The petitioner has made following averments in the paragraph nos. 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, which would indicate the development and incidence in the matter of acquisition. Para 3.2:-The petitioner states that as the petitioner Ramsangbhai Jerambhai is the owner and having possession of the said land as mentioned in para-3.1 above and aforesaid land being Survey No.586/02 paiki land admeasuring 1 Hector 30 Are 83 Sq.Mtr. was acquired by the respondent no.2-Special Land Acquisition Officer (Narmada Project), Unit No.1, Surendranagar for the purpose of construction of Saurashtra Branch Canal which is covered in LAQ Case No.139 of 1992. Respondent no.2 authority has declared award under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 03.11.1995 in the LAQ Case No.139 of 1992. Accordingly, Special Land Acquisition Officer (Narmada Project), Unit-11, Ellisbridge, Ahmedabad had issued notice under the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the petitioner on 30.03.1996 and decided that petitioner is entitled for compensation for the land in question of Rs.17,004.38/- paise.
Accordingly, Special Land Acquisition Officer (Narmada Project), Unit-11, Ellisbridge, Ahmedabad had issued notice under the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to the petitioner on 30.03.1996 and decided that petitioner is entitled for compensation for the land in question of Rs.17,004.38/- paise. It is pertinent to note that the land in question is irrigated land as per the notice issued by the respondent no.2 under Section 12(2) of the Act. Para 3.3:- The petitioner states that respondent no.2 authority has published notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in official gazette on 03.09.1992 and notification under Section 6 of the Act was published on 12.10.1993. The Special Land Acquisition Officer has passed award on 03.11.1995 offering compensation to the claimants at the rate of Rs.0.97 paise per sq.mtr. for irrigated land and Rs.0.65 paise per sq.mtr. for non irrigated land. The claimants of Land Ref. Case No.364/1997 to 369/1997 were of the opinion that the offer of compensation made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was totally inadequate. Therefore, they submitted applications under section 18 of the Act requiring the Special Land Acquisition Officer to refer their cases to the competent court for the purpose of determination of just amount of compensation payable to them. Accordingly, references were made to the District Court, Surendranagar where they were registered as Land Ref.Case Nos.364/97 to 369/97. All the above mentioned land references were consolidated by the learned Judge of the Reference Court, Surendranagar and common evidences were recorded. All reference cases were disposed of by common award dated 20.10.2004. Para 3.4:- The petitioner states that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had preferred First Appeal Nos.2665 to 2670 of 2006 under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against the common judgment and award dated 20.10.2004 rendered by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Surendranagar in Land Reference Case Nos.364/97 to 369/97 before the High Court of Gujarat. It is pertinent to note that First Appeal Nos. 2665 to 2670 of 2006 were put up before the Division Bench of this Court on 16.01.2007 for final hearing.
It is pertinent to note that First Appeal Nos. 2665 to 2670 of 2006 were put up before the Division Bench of this Court on 16.01.2007 for final hearing. This Court was pleased to decide the subject matter of Land Reference Case No.364/97 to 368/97 modifying the common judgment and order dated 20.10.2004 and it is held that the claimants in all would be entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.13 per Mtr. for the lands acquired, which are subject of Land Reference Case Nos.364/97 to 368/97. In para-10 and 11 of the judgment this Court has observed as follows: "10. For the foregoing reasons, all the appeals partly succeed. The common judgment and award dated October 20, 2004 rendered by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Surendranagar in Land Reference Case Nos. 363/97 to 368/97 awarding additional amount of compensation to the claimants at the rate of Rs.15.02/- Ps.per Sq.Mtr. for irrigated lands and Rs.5.35 Ps. per Sq.Mtr. for non irrigated lands, over and above the compensation awarded to them by the Special Land Acquisition Officer at the rate of Rs.0.97 Ps. per Sq.Mtr. for irrigated land and Rs.0.65 Ps. per Sq. Mtr. for non-irrigated land by his award dated November 3, 1995 is hereby modified and it is held that the claimants in all would be entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.13/- per Sq.Mtr. for the lands acquired, which are subject matter of Land Reference Case Nos.364/97 to 368/97. The other benefits granted to the claimants by the impugned award are not interfered with at all and are hereby confirmed. The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated herein above. There shall be no orders as to costs. The registry is directed to draw the decree in terms of this judgment. 11. It may be mentioned that First Appeal Nos.2670/2006 arising out of Land Reference case No.369/97, is not decided along with these appeals because it stands on a different footing and on different evidence. Therefore, it is clarified that the judgment rendered in these appeals would not govern the First Appeal No.2670/2006, which will have to be decided on its own merits." Para 3.5:- The petitioner states that First Appeal No.2670/2006 was put up for final hearing before the Division Bench of this Court on 07.02.2012 and this Court was pleased to hold in paras-6, 7 and 8 of the judgment as under: "6.
Had the Division Bench in case of Jivabhai Sondabhai and ors. (First Appeal Nos.2665 to 2669 of 2006) applied yield method by accepting more than one crop per year for irrigated lands, situation would have been drastically different in the present case. However, as noted, Division Bench had applied yield method by adopting only one crop per year. We are of course conscious of the fact that irrigated lands would give better yield since it would largely eliminate vagaries of uncertain monsoon. Never the less, when the entire working out of Division Bench in earlier cases was on the bases of one crop even for irrigated lands, we do not see any scope for further reducing the compensation fixed by the Reference Court in case of present Land Reference Case which involves acquisition of non-irrigated land. To recall, Land Reference Court had granted additional compensation at the rate of Rs.5.35/- per Sq.Mtr. or Rs.6/- per Sq.Mtr. in all taking into consideration Rs.0.65 paisa per Sq.Mtr. granted by the Special Land Acquisition Officer for such non-irrigated lands. This is quite comparable to Rs.13/- per Sq.Mtr. rate adopted by the Division Bench for irrigated lands. 7. We do not find any possibility for any reduction. To put the two cases in comparison, Division Bench in case of lands acquired under the same notification in same vicinity granted Rs.13/- per Sq.Mtr. for irrigated lands. In the present case even after upholding the award of the Reference Court, the owner of non-irrigated land would get compensation at the rate of Rs.6/- per Sq.Mtr., even applying the yield method, no reduction would be justified. 8. In the result, appeal is dismissed." Thus, after the decision was rendered in the First Appeal No.2670 of 2006 on 07.02.2012, the petitioner moved an application under Section 28-A of the Act on 19.04.2012 and on that basis it was contended that 90 days period was not over, despite that the concerned respondent no.2 rejected the same on ground of same having not been filed within 90 days of the Award, whereon reliance was placed. It was rendered on 20.10.2004. 5.
It was rendered on 20.10.2004. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relying upon the decision in case of Union of India and Another, v. Pradeep Kumari and Others, reported in AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2259, contended that Section 28-A permits bringing an application on the basis of the Award for re-determination and the 90 days period should have been reckoned from the date when this Court rendered its decision in the appeal after considering the award dated 20.10.2004. Reliance whereupon was placed for seeking redetermination. Therefore, the observations and law laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) should have weighed with the concerned authority in considering the period of limitation. The authority has committed error and, therefore, the order impugned is required to be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited this Court's attention to the decision in case of Union of India v. Munshi Ram (D) by L.Rs. and Ors., reported in AIR 2006 Supreme Court 1716, and contended that the Bench has in unequivocal terms stated that the Award on which the re-determination is sought, should be treated as it is stood modified by the superior Court, as other view would be inequitable and unfair. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited this Court's attention to the observations in case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) and submitted that these observations have not been either whittled down or overruled by any Court and it is misconception to canvass submission that the said judgment is overruled or whittled down. In order to answer the contention raised by learned AGP based upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R.Rodriguese and another, v. Land Acquisition Collector and another, reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1915(1), that the decision or the reference sought to be made basis for seeking re-determination would not enlarge the limitation, it was answered by the counsel for the petitioner that this judgment cannot be said to be laying down a ratio as it is sought to be canvassed on behalf of the State. In fact, the decision rendered in Pradeep Kumari (supra), was earlier in point of time, has not been disturbed, so far as the aspect of limitation and reckoning of limitation period is concerned.
In fact, the decision rendered in Pradeep Kumari (supra), was earlier in point of time, has not been disturbed, so far as the aspect of limitation and reckoning of limitation period is concerned. In submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, the reliance in case of Jose Antonio (supra), on the part of the State is not tenable for canvassing the submission that the limitation period would run only from the date of the reference i.e. on 20.10.2004. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited this Court's attention to the decision relied upon by the learned AGP and submitted that the plain and simple reading of the observations of the Court in case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) and as followed by in case of Munshi Ram (supra), the other interpretation would be uncalled for and Court may, therefore, hold that the limitation in the instant case should have been treated to have started from 07.02.2012 and not from 20.10.2004, as it is sought to be made out by the authority for rejecting the application for re-determination under section 28-A of the Act. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon decision in case of State of Assam v. Ripa Sarma, reported in (2013) 3 Supreme Court Cases 63, contended that the principle of precedent as enshrined in the Constitution under Section 141 would also indicate that the judgment rendered in ignorance of earlier judgment of the Benches of Court in its strength would render the same per incuriam and therefore, in the instant case, as the Pradeep Kumari's judgment is not whittled down or overruled by any other subsequent larger bench, the same shall be treated to have governed the field and on that basis it was submitted that the decision of the respondent no.2 in reckoning the period of limitation fully from 20.10.2004 being illegal and is required to be quashed and set aside. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the judgment in case of Pradeep Kumari was rendered by three Judges' Bench and this being co-equal bench, could not have made any departure from the law laid down and hence relying upon decision in case of State of Assam v. Ripa Sarma (supra), it was contended that the same should be treated as binding precedent. 11.
11. Learned AGP submitted that the close reading of the decision rendered in case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) as well as in case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) would make it abundantly clear that the proposition sought to be canvassed on behalf of the petitioner is ill-conceived and required to be rejected. 12. Learned AGP invited this Court's attention to the observations of Pradeep Kumari's case and submitted that those observations cannot be said to be supporting the submission canvassed on behalf of the petitioner for enhancing the period of limitation. It was further submitted that the Supreme Court in case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) has in terms dealt with this aspect, as could be seen from the observations of the Court in paragraph nos.3, 4, 5 and 6. The three Judges' bench was in fact aware and apprised of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court's another bench in case of Pradeep Kumari and therefore, the subsequent decision of the co-equal strength on a very aspect of law is precedent to be followed. The case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) is the case on which there was a specific observation of the Supreme Court in respect of the decision rendered by the appellate court and therefore that judgment shall be a guiding factor for examining the issues on hand. 13. Learned AGP invited this Court's attention to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others, reported in (2010) 15 Supreme Court Cases 483, and submitted that this judgment is a judgment subsequent in point of time, wherein also relying upon case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra), the Supreme Court held that the decision, which is sought to be made basis for redetermination, would not enlarge the period of limitation. The latest judgment is rendered in 2010 in case of Hansoli Devi (supra), which may govern the field and therefore the attempt on the part of the counsel for the petitioner to interpret the case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) being not applicable and attaching more weight than it is there in the judgment of Pradeep Kumari (supra), may not help the petitioner's cause in any manner. 14.
14. Learned AGP submitted that the judgment in case of Munshi Ram (supra) does not elaborately discuss the case of Jose Antonio Cruz's case, which was pronounced by the larger bench and if one looks at the decision cited at the bar on behalf of the petitioner in case of Ripa Sarma (supra), then on that principle also, the observations in Jose Antonio Cruz would govern the field so far as the present case is concerned and therefore this Court may not interfere with the order impugned in this petition. 15. Learned AGP further submitted that the plain and simple reading of Section 28-A of the Act would indicate that the order rendered by the appellate court on the award would be of no avail as the simple language indicate that the reference Award should be with context to part- III, whereas the appellate court's order would be governed by one which is rendered under section 54 of the Act. 16. This Court has heard learned counsels appearing for the parties and perused the papers appended thereto. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be most appropriate to mention few facts governing the matter which could be culled out from the proceeding itself namely; (i) So far as the present petitioner is concerned, in his case there was an Award way back in the year 1995 on which there was no further proceedings as the petitioner did not choose to seek any reference under Section 18 of the Act. (ii) There was reference proceedings in case of exactly similarly situated covered by the same notification wherefrom Section 18 reference was answered on 20.10.2004, resulting into enhancement of the award. These proceedings did not end at their end. There was subject matter of consideration by this Court in First Appeal No.2670 of 2006, wherein the Court dismissed the appeal vide order dated 07.02.2012, meaning thereby the decision rendered on 20.10.2004 was confirmed. That give a cause of action for invoking Section 28-A and petitioner was prompted to prefer an application for re-determination under Section 28-A, which came to be made on 19.04.2012. This date being in proximity of the decision in First Appeal, which was rendered on 07.02.2012 and within 90 days period. The same, it was urged, could not have been treated as beyond limitation period.
This date being in proximity of the decision in First Appeal, which was rendered on 07.02.2012 and within 90 days period. The same, it was urged, could not have been treated as beyond limitation period. Against the aforesaid factual backdrop, the Court is to examine the question that in light of the provision of Section 28-A of the Act, the period of 90 days limitation would start from the date of Award in reference which is made basis for seeking re-determination or the appellate order rendered thereon. This question is required to be answered in light of the observation of the Apex Court cited at the bar. 17. Before adverting to the rival submission and the decision cited at the bar, it would be most appropriate to set out the provision of Section 28-A of the Act, which reads as under; Section 28-A:- Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.
(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under section 18. Bearing this provision in mind, now let us examine the observations of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) in context of the facts prevalent thereunder. Para 9- We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object underlying the enactment of Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. This is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference Court under Section 18 of the Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent provision intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Act. In relation to beneficent legislation, the law is well settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation the Court should adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, b e construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision. 18.
The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, b e construed keeping in view the object underlying the said provision. 18. The entire judgment though proceeds on a premise that Section 28, a benevolent section, is required to be read appropriately so as to offer benefit of the enhanced compensation in the similar land cases or the land covered by the same notification. But that judgment, in our view, cannot be stretched to cover the aspect of limitation and its enhancement on the basis of the judgment that may be rendered in the appeal proceedings. Hence, in our view, this judgment cannot be stretched to support the submission that this would also cover the appeal proceedings. The judgment of course, deals with the subsequent awards after section 28 is introduced on the book, but at the best, that could be said to be an award rendered after introduction of section 28-A, but it cannot be read into the judgment as if it were covering the cases or the decisions rendered on the appeal so as to enhance the period of limitation. In fact, the limitation aspect was not discussed at all in the context of the facts, if one looks at it. Therefore, when the entire decision is not on the aspect of enhancing the limitation or reckoning the period of limitation, the reliance upon this judgment would be of no avail to the petitioner. 19. In juxtaposition with earlier judgment of Supreme Court in case of Pradeep Kumari (supra), if one reads the judgment of Supreme Court on the equal strength in case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) and observations one would have to accept the proposition that in terms the observation, of the Supreme Court in Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) could be said to have been negatived the scope of enhancing the limitation period. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court deserve to be set out as under; Para 3:- Before examining the decisions of this Court on which the High Court has placed reliance, we deem it appropriate to first examine the plain language of Section 28-A extracted earlier. Section 28-A was inserted as the last section in Part III entitled `Reference to Court and Procedure thereon' by Act 68 of 1984.
Section 28-A was inserted as the last section in Part III entitled `Reference to Court and Procedure thereon' by Act 68 of 1984. Part III begins with Section 18 which provides that if an interested person does not accept the award made by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act, he may, by a written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred for determination of the court. Section 2(d) defines the expression `Court' to mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction unless a Special Judicial Officer has been appointed. Therefore, the court referred to under Section 18 can only mean the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Section 23 then sets out the matters to be taken into consideration in determining the compensation to be awarded for the acquired land, and Section 24 indicates the matters to be omitted from consideration. Section 26 provides that the award shall be in writing signed by the Judge which shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of clauses (2) and (9) of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Section 27 provides for costs to be awarded and Section 28 provides for payment of interest on excess compensation. We then come to Section 28-A. The first part of the section begins with the words `Where in an award under this part, Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 which clearly indicate that the legislature was talking of an award made under the provisions of Part III, i.e., an award under Section 11 and therefore, in that context, reference to `Court' can only mean the court to which a reference is made by the Collector under Section 18. This position is further clarified when the section refers to compensation awarded in excess of the amount awarded under Section 11 of the Act. The second part of the section then addresses `the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification ...
This position is further clarified when the section refers to compensation awarded in excess of the amount awarded under Section 11 of the Act. The second part of the section then addresses `the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification ... and who are also aggrieved by the award' and permits them to make a written application to the Collector `within three months from the date of the award of the Court' requiring him to redetermine the amount of compensation on the basis of the amount awarded by the Court, notwithstanding the fact that they had not sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, the newly added section seeks to give the same benefit, which a person who had sought a reference and had secured the Court's award for a higher amount of compensation had received, to those who had, on account of ignorance or financial constraints, not sought a reference under Section 18. In the latter part of the section also, reference is to the award under Section 11 and later, to the award of the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the court referred to therein is again the court referred to in Section 2(d) of the Act, i.e., the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The plain language of Section 28-A, therefore, prescribes the three months' period of limitation to be reckoned from the date of the award by the Court disposing of the reference under Section 18, and not the appellate court dealing with the appeal against the award of the Reference Court. Para 4:- We may now refer to the case-law. A two- Judge Bench of this Court in Babua Ram v. State of U.P. (1995) 2 SCC 689 : dealt with this precise question and held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the first award made on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, and successive awards cannot save the period of limitation; vide paragraphs 19 and 20 of the reporter.
This view was reiterated by the same Bench in Union of India v. Karnail Singh (1995) 2 SCC 728 , wherein this Court held that the limitation of three months for an application for redetermination of compensation must be computed from the date of the earliest award made by a civil court, and not the judgment rendered by an appellate court. This was followed by the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) (2) SCC 736, wherein it was held that the benefit under Section 28-A can be had within three months from the date of the award of the Reference Court on the basis whereof redetermination is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua Ram and Karnail Singh were overruled on the limited question that they sought to confine the right to seek redetermination to the earliest award made by the Court under Section 18 of the Act after the introduction of Section 28-A into the Act. There is, however, no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the date of the Court's award under Section 18 on the basis whereof redetermination is sought. Admittedly, in both the cases at hand, the applications for redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A were made long after the expiry of three months from the date of the award of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking redetermination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in taking the view that a both the applications were timebarred. Para 5:- However, the counsel for the appellants drew our attention to an order made in the present proceedings by a two-Judge Bench on November 13, 1995, reported in (1996) 1 SCC 88 , referring two questions to a five-judge Bench, namely: "1. Whether the award of the Court, i.e., Civil Court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate court under Section 54 . 2.
Whether the award of the Court, i.e., Civil Court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include judgment and decree of the appellate court under Section 54 . 2. Whether each successive award or judgment and decree (if answer on Question No. 1 is positive) would give cause of action to file application under Section 28-A; if so construed, does not such a construction violate the language used in Section 28-A when Parliament advisedly did not use such expressions " So far as the first question is concerned, there is no difference of opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run from the date of the Reference Courts order on the basis whereof the redetermination is sought. In the present case, the redetermination was sought on the basis of the Reference Court's order long after three months even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the applications were clearly time-barred. We, therefore, do not see any need to keep these matters pending for decision by a five- Judge Bench. Para 6:- On the second question, there was a difference of opinion as the three- Judge Bench in Pradeep Kumari's case (1995 AIR) SCW 1834), had departed from the view taken earlier in two cases by the two-Judge Bench. If and when that question arises in an appropriate case, perhaps a reference to a five- Judge Bench may become necessary. These observations would indicate that the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that successive judgments and decisions and decrees would not render cause of action in favour of the claimants and the period of limitation in terms discussed, as could be seen from the observations made in paragraph no.5. Therefore, when this judgment is a judgment on point under consideration, the Court will have to accept the same. This judgment is in fact relied upon by various benches in subsequent cases. 20.
Therefore, when this judgment is a judgment on point under consideration, the Court will have to accept the same. This judgment is in fact relied upon by various benches in subsequent cases. 20. The decision of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India and another v. Hansoli Devi and others, reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 3240 is also relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner, which in our view is of no avail, as according to the counsel, the said judgment did not disturb Pradeep Kumari's case, but as we have also expressed hereinabove the judgment rendered in Pradeep Kumari's case is not precisely on the point of limitation, whereas the judgment rendered in case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra) being precisely on the aspect of limitation, the same is required to be followed. 21. The decision relied upon by the petitioner in case of Munshi Ram (supra), would in our view not help the petitioner's case as the latest decision of two Judges' bench in case of Hansoli Devi (supra) is containing a specific view based upon the view expressed by the Supreme Court in three Judges' bench in case of Jose Antonio Cruz (supra). Therefore, in light of the law precedent, the latest judgment which relies upon the larger bench judgment would be safe proposition to follow rather than following the decision of the two judge's bench. Therefore, we are unable to accept the submission canvassed on behalf of the petitioner that the decision in case of Pradeep Kumari as well as that of Munshi Ram would help the cause of petitioner in reckoning the period of limitation. In our view, the period of limitation cannot be said to have started only from the date when this Court in First Appeal rendered its decision i.e. on 07.02.2012, but, in fact, the limitation in the case of the petitioner should have started to run from 20.10.2004, when the reference Court renders its decision which would have made basis for seeking re-determination by the petitioner. Therefore, petition being bereft of merits, deserves rejection and is accordingly rejected. However, there shall be no order as to cost. Petition Dismissed.