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2014 DIGILAW 948 (KER)

Viswambaran Nair v. Union of India

2014-11-19

DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU

body2014
JUDGMENT : Introduction: 1. This Writ Petition is taken up for consideration having been remanded by a learned Division Bench of this Court through its judgment dated 18.06.2014 in W.A.No. 761/2013. Facts in Brief: 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner joined the service of the fifth respondent (Railway Protection Force) as Constable on 30.08.1974. While he was serving under the fifth respondent at Thiruvananthapuram, the petitioner was charge-sheeted through Exhibit P5 on the ground that the petitioner had been found sleeping on duty on 05.03.2002, and that when his superior officer questioned him of dereliction of duty, he assaulted the said officer. It could be seen from the record that the altercation between the petitioner and his superior officer, the Sub Inspector of Police, resulted in a case and a counter case in Crime Nos. 15 and 19 of 2002 respectively on the file of the Railway Police Station. 3. To dilate further on the issue of criminal proceedings, it can be stated that the crime registered by the petitioner was tried as C.C.No.122/2002 for the offences under Sections 323 and 506(i) of Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.), whereas the crime registered by the Sub Inspector of Police against the petitioner was tried as C.C.No.75/2002 for the offences under Sections 341, 323, 294(b) and 506(i) of I.P.C. The record further reveals that both the cases ended in acquittal through Exhibit P4 judgment. 4. In fact, while the trial in the criminal matters was pending, the fifth respondent initiated disciplinary proceedings by conducting departmental enquiry against the petitioner. Sri.K.P.James, Inspector, Protection Force, Thiruvananthapuram, who was appointed as Enquiry Officer, having conducted the enquiry, submitted Exhibit P20 enquiry report. Based on Exhibit P20 report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, the fifth respondent, the disciplinary authority, passed Exhibit P8 dismissal order. Questioning the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal in Exhibit P9 before the fourth respondent, who in turn dismissed it through Exhibit P10. Further aggrieved, the petitioner filed Exhibit P11 revision before the third respondent who, too, dismissed the said revision through Exhibit R1. Under those circumstances, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition. 5. Through judgment dated 03.01.2013, a learned single Judge of this Court allowed the Writ Petition on the ground that the petitioner, during the course of enquiry, had not been paid subsistence allowance despite the fact that he had been under suspension. Under those circumstances, the petitioner filed the present Writ Petition. 5. Through judgment dated 03.01.2013, a learned single Judge of this Court allowed the Writ Petition on the ground that the petitioner, during the course of enquiry, had not been paid subsistence allowance despite the fact that he had been under suspension. When the respondents filed an intra-court appeal in W.A.No.761/2013, a learned Division Bench of this Court set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and remanded the matter with an observation that only one singular aspect of many objections raised by the petitioner had been considered and that there ought to be a comprehensive adjudication. Accordingly, now the matter is taken up for consideration and disposal. Submissions: Petitioner’s: 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there are grievous and incurable procedural lapses on the respondents’ part, especially the Enquiry Officer’s. To begin with, the learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that there is a gross violation of the principles of natural justice committed by the Enquiry Officer. Even the appellate authority and the revisional authority have, contends the learned counsel, dismissed the appeal and the revision respectively in a very mechanical manner, without paying attention to the substantive objections raised by the petitioner. 7. Expatiating on his submissions, the learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner, as has rightly been held by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the first instance, had not been paid subsistence allowance. When the petitioner cited eleven witnesses, the Enquiry Officer allowed only five witnesses to be examined on petitioner’s behalf. Even regarding the documents the petitioner desired to place on record, out of fifty one, only three documents were allowed to be marked. The learned counsel has also submitted that during the course of enquiry, when the Enquiry Officer marked certain documents, copies of which had not been supplied to the petitioner, a specific request for the supply of those copies was rejected by the Enquiry Officer without assigning any reason. 8. As soon as the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 12.11.2011, the petitioner on 03.12.2002 submitted Exhibit P7 representation to the fifth respondent, the disciplinary authority, comprehensively complaining about the procedural irregularities and also the statutory violations in conducting the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer. 8. As soon as the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 12.11.2011, the petitioner on 03.12.2002 submitted Exhibit P7 representation to the fifth respondent, the disciplinary authority, comprehensively complaining about the procedural irregularities and also the statutory violations in conducting the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer. According to the learned counsel, without considering Exhibit P7 objections, the fifth respondent concluded the enquiry proceedings by imposing a capital punishment of dismissal from service. 9. The learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on what is said to be the rejection of the petitioner’s claim to have a defence assistance in terms of Rule 153(8) of Railway Protection Force Rules. The said rejection is said to be on the premise that the employee whose assistance sought to be taken by the petitioner has been under suspension for a long time. On this count, the learned counsel has submitted that though the said employee has been under suspension, still he is an employee of the respondent and so long as there is no cessation of the relationship of the employer and employee, there ought not have been any bar against the petitioner’s taking the services of the said employee. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.K. Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd. ( AIR 1991 SC 1221 ) and Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni ( AIR 1983 SC 109 ). 10. The learned counsel has submitted that the petitioner studied only up to eighth class and is not well versed in English. Despite the objection time and again taken by the petitioner that the enquiry should be conducted in Malayalam, his mother tongue, the Enquiry Officer persisted with conducting it in English without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to understand the proceedings. According to the learned counsel, it is a serious lacuna which goes to the root of the matter, thus vitiating the proceedings on account of lack of proper opportunity for the petitioner to defend himself in the enquiry proceedings. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Manager, Venture Estate v. General Secretary, Thennala Plantation Labour Union (ILR 2010 (1) Ker. 598). 11. The learned counsel has also raised serious objection with regard to the manner of conducting the enquiry. In support of the said submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Manager, Venture Estate v. General Secretary, Thennala Plantation Labour Union (ILR 2010 (1) Ker. 598). 11. The learned counsel has also raised serious objection with regard to the manner of conducting the enquiry. To dilate on the said issue, the learned counsel has submitted that the Enquiry Officer himself acted as a Prosecutor, thus all through cross-examining the petitioner and other witnesses he has submitted, as well as examining the witnesses of the management. In other words, the Enquiry Officer has never bothered to appoint the Presenting Officer; resultantly, he himself has acted as a Presenting Officer, which is grossly illegal. Contending that such a course adopted by the Enquiry Officer vitiates enquiry proceedings, the learned counsel has placed reliance on Moni Shankar v. Union of India ( (2008) 3 SCC 484 ). 12. The learned counsel has submitted that despite his repeated requests, certain vital documents have not been supplied to him. According to the learned counsel, denial of access to material documents vitiates the trial, as has been declared by this Court in Jet Airways India Ltd. v. The Labour Court & Anr. ( 2012 (1) KLT 646 ). Eventually, the learned counsel has urged that the entire enquiry has been vitiated and that the punishment imposed on the petitioner cannot be sustained. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has brought to the notice of this Court the fact that pending the writ proceedings the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation and deemed to have retired from service. At this juncture, for whatever reason, if this Court is convinced that the enquiry has been vitiated and that the matter ought to be remanded to the primary stage to have a de novo enquiry, it would not, according to the learned counsel, serve any purpose, except prolonging the agony of the petitioner, who has been dismissed from service without any valid reason. The petitioner is presently said to be sixty five years old. Having contended thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that, if the Court is not inclined to allow the Writ Petition in toto, it may, at least, remand the matter to the departmental authorities for a de novo enquiry. The Respondents’: 14. The petitioner is presently said to be sixty five years old. Having contended thus, the learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that, if the Court is not inclined to allow the Writ Petition in toto, it may, at least, remand the matter to the departmental authorities for a de novo enquiry. The Respondents’: 14. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondents has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioner. He has submitted that though the petitioner was working in a Uniformed Service, he manhandled his superior officer when he had been questioned about his dereliction of duty. The charges faced by the petitioner, according to the learned Standing Counsel, are very grave in nature. He has further contended that there is no force in the submission of the petitioner’s counsel that there was infraction of principles of natural justice while the departmental enquiry was conducted. He has submitted that initially the authorities conducted a preliminary enquiry and found that there was sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner. In terms thereof, Exhibit P5 charge-memo was issued to the petitioner. Later, in the course of enquiry, the petitioner was allowed not only to cross-examine the witnesses of the department but also to examine his own witnesses, apart from marking the documents. 15. Meeting the contention that the petitioner had been denied opportunity to mark all the documents as well as to examine all the witnesses at his disposal, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the Enquiry Officer, in his own discretion, has excluded the documents which are irrelevant and the witnesses whose depositions would not have any bearing on the proceedings. In this regard, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the Enquiry Officer in his report has listed out the documents that have been excluded from marking, and witnesses who are felt not relevant to depose as defence witnesses. 16. The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that there is no force in the contention of the petitioner that the entire proceedings were held in English, a language unknown to the petitioner, and that his repeated requests for having the enquiry conducted in Malayalam was rejected. 16. The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that there is no force in the contention of the petitioner that the entire proceedings were held in English, a language unknown to the petitioner, and that his repeated requests for having the enquiry conducted in Malayalam was rejected. In defence, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the very petitioner, all through, has filed before the Enquiry Officer each and every representation only in English, apart from signing every deposition which was in fact read over and explained to him. 17. On a technical front, the learned Standing Counsel has strenuously contended that the writ is barred by severe laches, since the petitioner, after a lapse of three years and four months from the date of disposal of the revision, chose to file the present Writ Petition without explaining the reason why such an inordinate delay occurred in his approaching the court. He has further submitted that in the entire pleadings of the petitioner he has not whispered any cause, leave alone sufficient cause, for the delay in his approaching the court about 3½ years subsequent to the final order passed in revision. On this ground alone, contends the learned Standing Counsel, the Writ Petition is to be dismissed. 18. Addressing the contention of the petitioner that there was inordinate delay in concluding the enquiry proceedings, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that given the gravity of the charges, the respondents took every precaution in ensuring that the proceedings were not hurried through and a fair opportunity was given to the petitioner. If any delay had occurred, that was only after the disposal of the revision on 24.06.2003. When seven witnesses were examined by the employer, six witnesses were examined by the petitioner in his defence. He has further contended that if at all the petitioner was aggrieved by any procedural lapse at the time when the enquiry had been in progress, nothing prevented him from seeking a judicial review of such lapses, provided it had the impact of affecting his substantive right in the domestic enquiry. According to the learned Standing Counsel, only after his meeting failure at every stage, including the one in revision, as an afterthought, did the petitioner choose to lay challenge against the proceedings in the name of procedural infraction. 19. According to the learned Standing Counsel, only after his meeting failure at every stage, including the one in revision, as an afterthought, did the petitioner choose to lay challenge against the proceedings in the name of procedural infraction. 19. Concerning the issue of denying the petitioner an opportunity of appointing a defence assistant, the learned Standing Counsel would contend that it is not a case of total denial of the services of a defence assistant is concerned; on the contrary, the Enquiry Officer has provided the petitioner ample opportunities to engage the services of any other employee in the service of the respondent, rather than the one who has been suspended. On this count, in further elaboration of his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel would contend that unless manifest prejudice has been caused, every minor infraction in procedure, if any, cannot vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. At any rate, the petitioner has failed to establish before this Court what prejudice has actually been caused to him, is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel. 20. Touching upon the past conduct of the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that on earlier two occasions, the petitioner was punished for misconduct. On one occasion for the misconduct of sleeping in duty, punishment of postponement of increment was imposed on the petitioner. On another occasion, the petitioner was reduced to a lower rank for the proven misconduct of assaulting a colleague. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the petitioner is a habitual offender having no respect for law, much less for the departmental decorum and discipline. Summing up his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the Writ Petition deserves to be dismissed summarily. Finally, opposing any possibility of this Court remanding the matter for de novo enquiry on the ground of procedural lapses, the learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance on Anant R. Kulkarni v. Y. P. Education Society & Others (2013) 6 SCC 515 ). 21. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, apart from perusing the record. Issues: I. Whether any principles of natural justice have been violated during the course of departmental enquiry? II. Whether the petitioner has been denied opportunity to place reliance on all the documents, as well as in examining all the witness, at his disposal during the course of enquiry? III. Issues: I. Whether any principles of natural justice have been violated during the course of departmental enquiry? II. Whether the petitioner has been denied opportunity to place reliance on all the documents, as well as in examining all the witness, at his disposal during the course of enquiry? III. Whether non-payment of subsistence allowance while the petitioner was under suspension in any manner vitiated the departmental proceedings? IV. Whether the petitioner has been put to any manifest prejudice on the ground of having an enquiry been conducted in English, a language allegedly not known to the petitioner? V. Whether the petitioner has been prejudiced on account of denial of opportunity to him to engage the services of a specific employee as defence assistant? VI. Whether the Writ Petition suffers from incurable laches? In re, Issues Nos.I & II: 22. Touching upon the first issue, I may observe that though Evidence Act per se does not apply to the departmental proceedings, they are, however, bound to be held with due observance of the principles of natural justice. Any infraction thereof affecting the substantive rights of the delinquent employee would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. In this case, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the issue of denial of fair opportunity are that the petitioner was not allowed to mark all the documents, nor was he permitted by the Enquiry Officer to examine all the witnesses at his disposal. Before adverting to the merits of the rival submissions, it is to be observed that the Writ Petition is being considered for the second time owing to the remand of the matter through judgment dated 18.06.2014 in W.A.No.761/2013 by a learned Division Bench. On earlier occasion, a learned single Judge allowed the Writ Petition through judgment dated 03.01.2013 on the solitary ground that non-payment of subsistence allowance while the petitioner had been under suspension vitiated the disciplinary proceedings. 23. Indeed, as could be seen from the enquiry report, when the petitioner as a delinquent employee decided to mark about forty eight documents, only three were marked and the rest were rejected on the ground that they did not throw any light on the controversy. To his credit, the Enquiry Officer has listed out all the documents that have been excluded from marking. To his credit, the Enquiry Officer has listed out all the documents that have been excluded from marking. A perusal of those documents would indicate that most of them are related to accident said to have occurred involving the petitioner while in duty and the treatment he has undergone. Some of the documents are also related to copies of F.I.R., entry of night check register, etc. Even when it comes to the witnesses, the petitioner was permitted to examine six witnesses and some of the witnesses have been excluded on the ground that their deposition may not have any material bearing on the charges faced by the petitioner. 24. It is not in controversy that the petitioner had been charged with the misconduct of assaulting his superior officer on duty. There is no denial of the event from either side. In fact, the petitioner took only the plea that his superior officer had assaulted him, thus his being the victim. The incident resulted in both parties filing case and counter-case in a criminal court, and the eventual acquittal of all accused on either side. Thus, the issue of assault is not in dispute; what is in dispute was who assaulted whom. In that context, I do not see much relevance of the excluded documents. 25. In so far as the criminal proceedings are concerned, as has already been stated, both have ended in acquittal. The eye witnesses, who are examined on behalf of the department, have consistently spoken about the attitude of the petitioner and also the actual incident said to have taken place on the fateful day. 26. On the issue of the respondents having no separate presenting officer and the enquiry officer himself conducting the enquiry on behalf of the department, the Honourable Supreme Court in Moni Sahankar (supra) has held as follows: “We have been taken through the evidence of Shri S.B.Singh by Dr.Padia. Significantly the examination-in-chief was conducted by the enquiry officer himself. As the proceeding was for imposition of a major penalty, why the presenting officer, who must have been engaged by the Department, did not examine the witness is beyond any comprehension. Even the minimum safeguard in regard to the manner in which examination-in-chief was conducted has not been preserved. The questions posed to him were leading questions. As the proceeding was for imposition of a major penalty, why the presenting officer, who must have been engaged by the Department, did not examine the witness is beyond any comprehension. Even the minimum safeguard in regard to the manner in which examination-in-chief was conducted has not been preserved. The questions posed to him were leading questions. It is interesting to note that in answer to a question as to whether he had asked the appellant to return Rs.5, he not only answered in the negative but according to him the said statement was made by him as instructed by the Vigilance Inspector. He although proved Exhibits P1 and P2 which were written in English language but also stated that he did not know what had been written therein. Strangely enough, the enquiry officer started re-examining him. Even in the re-examination he accepted that he could not read and write English.” 27. Indeed, the departmental proceedings are quasi-judicial. In Moni Shankar (supra) the observation is to the effect that the enquiry officer, donning the role of a presenting officer, has not preserved even the minimum safeguard in regard to the manner in which the examination-in-chief was to be conducted. It is further observed that the questions posed to him were leading questions and that the delinquent expressly stated that Exhibits P1 and P2, which the deliquent had been confronted with, being in English, could not be understood by him. At any rate, in Moni Shanker’s case (supra) no proposition has been laid down that on account of the enquiry officer doubling himself as the presenting officer, the disciplinary proceedings would be vitiated. All that the petitioner contended before this Court was that the enquiry officer ought to have allowed the petitioner to mark all his documents and examine all his witnesses. 28. I have already observed in the foregoing paragraphs that given the nature of the incident which had been enquired into, the enquiry officer in his Exhibit P20 report provided cogent reasons why all the documents, save those that have been marked, have not been allowed to be marked and how he has felt that examining other witnesses than six was not required to aid the enquiry. It is to be reiterated that the enquiry officer in his report has listed out the documents that have been omitted from consideration as well as the proposed witnesses who were not taken into account. In my considered view, Moni Shanker (supra) may not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 29. In Union of India v. Prakash Kumar Tandon (2009) 2 SCC 541 ) the Honourable Supreme Court has held that the principles of natural justice demand that an application for summoning the witnesses by the delinquent officer should be considered by the enquiry officer. It is further observed that it is obligatory on the part of the enquiry officer to pass an order in the said application. He could not refuse to consider the same. Eventually their Lordships have held that the enquiry officer is a quasi-judicial authority and is therefore required to perform his function fairly and reasonably, lest it should violate the requirements of principles of natural justice. On examination of the facts of the case, it is evident that the delinquent desired to examine the officer who conducted 100% test check. His request was rejected. The Tribunal has held that the said officer ought to have been the principal witness to throw light on the controversy, but he was not examined. Under those circumstances, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that not allowing the delinquent to examine the principal witness has vitiated the enquiry. 30. In the present instance, the petitioner, I am afraid, has not established before this Court that any of the excluded witnesses could have thrown sufficient light on the controversy. Accordingly, the contention of the petitioner with regard to the alleged illegality on the part of the enquiry officer in rejecting the petitioner’s request for examining the other witnesses cannot be sustained. 31. Eventually, placing reliance on Jet Airways India Ltd. (supra), the petitioner has submitted that the entire trial has been vitiated on account of non-supply of documents. Indeed, a learned Division Bench of this Court in Jet Airways India Ltd. (supra), has held that non-supply of material documents to the delinquent employee in advance would cause prejudice to him as he would miss the opportunity to confront the witness with their contents and test their veracity, for fair hearing involves right to cross examine effectively and properly. Regrettably, this contention, too, cannot be countenanced. Regrettably, this contention, too, cannot be countenanced. The petitioner could not establish convincingly what documents have not been supplied to him, and what sort of prejudice has been caused to him on that count. 32. Every procedural infraction, trivial as it is, cannot vitiate the domestic enquiry. The infraction, without doubt, ought to have resulted in manifest and demonstrable prejudice to the delinquent. Further, the burden is on the delinquent to establish before the appellate or revisional forum the manner of prejudice he has suffered on account of denial of material. In re, Issue No.III: 33. I may have to address the issue of denial of subsistence allowance to the petitioner while he had been placed under suspension. Though on an earlier occasion a learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition on the said ground, in view of the fact that now the said judgment stands set aside by a learned Division Bench, the issue once again is open for adjudication. Indisputably, the petitioner was denied subsistence allowance when he had been under suspension. 34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indra Bhanu Gaur v. Committee, Management of M.M. Degree College ((2004) 1 SCC 281), has held that unless prejudice is shown and established, mere non-payment of subsistence allowance cannot ipso facto be held to vitiate the disciplinary proceedings in every case. It has to be specifically pleaded and established in what way the affected employee is handicapped because of non-receipt of subsistence allowance. Unless that is done, it cannot be held as absolute proposal in law that non-payment of subsistence allowance amounts to denial of opportunity and vitiates departmental proceedings. Going by the above proposition of law, I do not see any specific plea having been taken by the petitioner in the manner indicated above. As such, the contention on account of non-payment of subsistence allowance is required to be and is accordingly rejected. In re, Issue No.IV: 35. Another contention of the petitioner is that he has studied only up to eighth standard, but, despite his repeated requests, the authorities have persisted on conducting the departmental enquiry in English, a language the petitioner has been unfamiliar with. In re, Issue No.IV: 35. Another contention of the petitioner is that he has studied only up to eighth standard, but, despite his repeated requests, the authorities have persisted on conducting the departmental enquiry in English, a language the petitioner has been unfamiliar with. In this regard we may examine the proposition of law as laid down in Venture Estate (supra), in which this Court has held that once the delinquent is not conversant with English, recording of the proceedings as well as examination of witnesses in English amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. In the present instance, it is the specific case of the petitioner that he has no acquaintance with the English language and that despite his request, the authorities have proceeded to conduct the enquiry only in that language. Though a plea was taken by the respondents that the petitioner had filed all his pleadings in English, it is, to my mind, not a substantial defence, for the petitioner, left with no other option, has been forced to plead, presumably with the help of others, in English. On that count, the ratio of Venture Estate (supra) squarely applies to the case. In re, Issue No.V: 36. On the issue of denial of opportunity to have the assistance of a fellow workman, the defence put forward by the employer is that the said employee, whose assistance was sought by the petitioner had been suspended from service and that the petitioner could have had the services of an ‘in-service’ employee. This defence, I am afraid, cannot be sustained. It is too well established a proposition to cavil about that the relationship of master and servant continues between the employer and the employee during the suspension of the said employee, though he is forbidden to perform his official duties. Thus, a suspension order does not put an end to the service. Suspension means the action of debarring for the time being from a function or privilege or temporary deprivation of working in the office (vide Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal ((2013) 16 SCC 147)). It is, therefore, evident that the denial of petitioner’s request to have the assistance of a suspended employee during the domestic enquiry is prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner, especially given his educational standards. In re, Issue No.VI: 37. It is, therefore, evident that the denial of petitioner’s request to have the assistance of a suspended employee during the domestic enquiry is prejudicial to the interest of the petitioner, especially given his educational standards. In re, Issue No.VI: 37. On the issue of delay of about 3½ years in the petitioner’s approaching this Court by filing the present Writ Petition after the dismissal of the revision, it is required to be examined whether such delay, which in fact remained unexplained, is fatal to the maintainability of the proceedings. In State of Kerala v. A.K. Gopakumar (2013) 11 SCC 606 ), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that in the absence of any explanation forthcoming from the petitioner, the delay shall be fatal to the maintainability of the proceedings. In the said case, the respondent employee was terminated from service by way of punishment on account of the proven misconduct. He approached the court after two years and eight months without providing any explanation why he was constrained to approach the court with that much delay. In the present instance, the delay is about 3½ years and it remains unexplained. 38. Similarly, in Chennai Metroploitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T.Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108 , the Honourable Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of laches in laying challenge against the departmental findings and held as follows: 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 39. Indisputably, there is, what can be safely called inordinate, delay in the petitioner’s approaching this Court, in the first instance. Delay, well established though, is not an invariable ground to non-suit a person. Notwithstanding the length of duration, it may have its justification. Further, at times, the subsequent events may countervail the aspect of delay or latches. Here, the Writ Petition was filed in 2006, initially it was allowed on 03.01.2014, subsequently the said judgment was appealed against, matter was remanded by the learned Division Bench, and thus the present adjudication is taken up. Proverbially, much water has flowed, as it is said, under the judicial bridges. At this juncture, non-suiting the petitioner on the technicality of delay is, in my view, inequitable. 40. In the totality of circumstances, though on most counts the petitioner has failed to establish his case, on the count of linguistic limitations and on the count of denial of defence assistance, his contentions merit attention and judicial acceptance. Having said that, I am of the considered opinion that remanding the matter to the employer for a fresh domestic enquiry only will result in another procedural rigmarole. It is at best a statistical justice, to be avoided. 41. A legion are the judicial precedents that once an appellate or revisional Court—for that matter this Court, too, sitting in judicial review—has been seized of the matter, instead of remanding it, that court can as well decide the issue, provided there is sufficient material on record, and provided such a course of action meets the ends of justice. 41. A legion are the judicial precedents that once an appellate or revisional Court—for that matter this Court, too, sitting in judicial review—has been seized of the matter, instead of remanding it, that court can as well decide the issue, provided there is sufficient material on record, and provided such a course of action meets the ends of justice. In the same reckoning it can be said that owing to changed circumstances, especially with the efflux of time, to meet the ends of justice guided by the equitable considerations, more particularly under Article 226 of Constitution of India, this Court can decide the issue in the interest of justice, instead of asking the primary or appellate tribunals to adjudicate the issue once again. 42. The alleged incident of indiscipline is said to have taken place in 1999; memo of charges was issued in 2002; in the domestic enquiry, order of dismissal was passed on 09.12.2002; departmental appeal was dismissed on 31.01.2003; the revision was dismissed on 14.03.2003; when the Writ Petition was filed in 2006, a learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition on 03.01.2014, and the learned Division Bench on 18.06.2014 set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and remanded the matter. Now, remanding the matter may result in a pyrrhic victory to the petitioner. Conclusion: 43. In the facts and circumstances, taking into account the fact that there have been procedural irregularities, that the incident happened long ago, that about a decade and half has already passed from the date of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, that the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation in the meanwhile, and that the petitioner has already been punished on two occasions for dereliction of duty-on one occasion for assaulting a colleague or fellow employee, which instance, I make clear, may not be essential for the present adjudication-this Court in the interest of justice has decided against remanding the matter. 44. In the totality of circumstances, the order of petitioner’s removal or termination from service is hereby modified to that of compulsory retirement. Treating the date of the petitioner’s termination as the date of his compulsory retirement, the respondent employer shall pay to the petitioner all the terminal benefits, as if he had continued in service till then, save the period of his suspension, for which he is entitled to subsistence allowance. Treating the date of the petitioner’s termination as the date of his compulsory retirement, the respondent employer shall pay to the petitioner all the terminal benefits, as if he had continued in service till then, save the period of his suspension, for which he is entitled to subsistence allowance. It is, however, made clear that the petitioner should not be made to suffer on account of the employer’s delay in paying the subsistence allowance. As an equitable measure, the petitioner shall be paid 6% on the accumulated amount of subsistence allowance from the date of petitioner’s suspension from service till the date the amount is actually paid, if at all the petitioner has so far not been paid the subsistence allowance. Subject to the above directions, the Writ Petition is disposed of. No order as costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.