JUDGMENT : Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. These two appeals were heard together as those arise out of the same accident and the Tribunal below also disposed of the matters by a common judgment. 2. These two appeals are at the instance of an Insurance Company and is directed against a common award dated 31st January 2008 passed in M.A.C.Ps No. 1583 of 1990 and 1584 of 1990 and other allied matters. 3. The only question that falls for determination in these appeals is whether the Insurance Company, in the facts of the case, is liable to pay the amount for the death and/or injuries of the passengers carrying goods in a 'goods vehicle' by virtue of section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [the Act, hereafter]. 4. There is no dispute that the accident occurred on 24th May 1990, that is to say, after coming into operation of the Act of 1988 but before the amendment of the provisions of section 147 in the said Act, which came into force with effect from 14th November 1994. 5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the point involved in these appeals is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani And Others reported in AIR 2003 SC 607 , as would appear from paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment, which are quoted below: "8. Under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 the requirements of policies and limits of liability had been provided in Section 95. Proviso to Section 95(1) of the said Act unequivocally states that the policy shall not be required in case of a goods vehicle for passengers being carried in the said vehicle. In Mallawwa (Smt.) and others v. Oriental Insurance Co. Proviso to Section 95(1) of the said Act unequivocally states that the policy shall not be required in case of a goods vehicle for passengers being carried in the said vehicle. In Mallawwa (Smt.) and others v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (supra), while approving the earlier decision of the Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi's case, (1977) 2 SCC 749, the Court construed the provisions of Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and held that while the expression 'any person' and the expression 'every motor vehicle' are in wide terms but by proviso (ii) it restricts the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, therefore, the vehicle had to be vehicle in which passengers are carried. The Court further held that the goods vehicle cannot be held to be a passenger vehicle even if the vehicle was fond to be used on some stray occasions for carrying passengers for hire or reward. Undoubtedly Mallawwa's case (supra) (was dealing with a situation under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939.. 9. In Satpal's case (supra), the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amended Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46 of Act 6 of 1991 by which expression 'injury to any person' in the original Act stood substituted by the expression 'injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle' the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1994, even if widest interpretation is given to the expression 'to any person' it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also states that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the Insurance Policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression 'including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existed expression 'injury to any person' is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury. The judgment of this Court in Satpal's case, therefore must be held to have not been correctly decided and the impugned judgment of the Tribunal as well as that of the High Court accordingly are set aside and these appeals are allowed. It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. [emphasis supplied by me] 6. Thus, it appears that the learned Tribunal below committed substantial error of law in fixing the liability upon the Insurance Company in ignorance of the above decision of the Supreme Court. 7. I, therefore, allow these appeals and modify the award to the extend that the award impugned will be executable only against the owner of the vehicle, but not against the Insurance Company - the appellant in these appeals before this Court. 8. It appears that by order dated 16th May 2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Application No. 6259 of 2008 and 6263 of 2008, the appellant Insurance Company was directed to deposit the entire awarded amount before the Tribunal and the amount deposited before this Court was also ordered to be transmitted to the Tribunal. Subsequently, by order passed in these two Civil Applications on 11th July 2008, the claimants were permitted to withdraw 30% of the amount and the remaining 70% was ordered to be invested in Fixed Deposits. In view of the fact that now these appeals are allowed, it is needless to mention that the aforesaid interim directions passed in the above Civil Applications will abide by the final outcome of the appeals, and, as such, the benefit taken by the claimants-respondents should be refunded to the appellant- Insurance Company. The claimants are, therefore, directed to refund the 30% amount received by them with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of receipt of the amount till refund. 9. The Tribunal is directed to release the amount lying in the Fixed Deposit with interest accrued thereon in favour of the appellant- Insurance Company, after the period of two months from today. 10. 9. The Tribunal is directed to release the amount lying in the Fixed Deposit with interest accrued thereon in favour of the appellant- Insurance Company, after the period of two months from today. 10. In these appeals, the appellant has deposited Rs.25,000/- each in terms of section 173(1) of the Act before the Registry of this Court. The amount is ordered to be refunded to the appellant by Accounts Payee cheque in the name of the appellant, to be handed over to the learned advocate for the appellant, if not already transmitted to the Tribunal. 11. These appeals are allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. Appeals Allowed.