JUDGMENT : Nishita Mhatre, J. The petitioner, i.e., the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'ESI Corporation') has challenged the judgment and order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, in O.A. No. 245 of 2003. By its impugned order the Tribunal has allowed the Original Application filed by the respondent employee and set aside the order of punishment dated 30th April, 1991. The Tribunal has directed that the respondent be restored to his original pay from the stage his pay was reduced as a result of the aforesaid order of punishment. The Tribunal further directed that the respondent be considered for promotions to various grades from the date his juniors were promoted. All arrears resulting from such retrospective promotions including revision of pension etc. was directed to be paid within four months from the date of the order. 2. The brief facts in the present case are as follows: The respondent was working as a Lower Division Clerk with the petitioner after his appointment on 2nd September, 1964. He was suspended from service with effect from 14th June, 1976. Pending a disciplinary enquiry, a charge-sheet was issued on 1st December, 1976, in which he was charged for neglecting his duties and committing certain irregularities in the payment of dues to beneficiaries under the Employees' State Insurance Scheme. These irregularities were noticed during an audit inspection. The charge-sheet was issued pertaining to 8 of the 26 irregularities and objections raised during the audit inspection. Another charge-sheet was issued on 11th May, 1978 regarding the 18 other objections raised in the audit report. 3. The disciplinary enquiry proceeded in respect of the charge-sheet dated 1st December, 1976, and the respondent was found guilty of the misconduct alleged against him. He was punished by reduction of his pay by three stages with effect from 1st September, 1981. The respondent preferred a statutory appeal. The appellate authority by its order dated 23rd June, 1982 enhanced the penalty and imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement against the respondent. Being aggrieved by that order the respondent filed a writ petition before this Court. The Writ Petition being C.O. 4021(W) of 1985 was decided on September, 1985. A learned Single Judge of this Court was of the view that the appellate authority had taken into consideration the matters against the employee for which he was not charged. Being aggrieved by that order the respondent filed a writ petition before this Court. The Writ Petition being C.O. 4021(W) of 1985 was decided on September, 1985. A learned Single Judge of this Court was of the view that the appellate authority had taken into consideration the matters against the employee for which he was not charged. It was found that the order of compulsory retirement was therefore illegal as no opportunity to deal with those allegations had been afforded to the respondent because those charges were not contained in the charge-sheet. The Court further directed that since the order of compulsory retirement had been set aside, all salaries as admissible in law should be paid to the respondent employee within a stipulated time. However, the Court observed that the order would not prevent the ESI Corporation from considering the matter afresh in accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The ESI Corporation/challenged this order of the learned Single Judge by preferring FMA 553 of 1985 before the Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench observed that there was no evidence on record to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the delinquent employee had misappropriated any amount from some of the bills prepared by him. However, the Court found that there was evidence to establish that he had failed or neglected to take note of the instructions of the superior authority and had prepared a faulty bill. However, this could not lead to the finding that he had misappropriated the amount under the bill observed the Division Bench, especially when neither the Enquiry Officer nor the disciplinary authority had reached such a conclusion. The Division Bench held that the charge of dereliction of duty and the finding to that effect by the disciplinary authority could not be said to be perverse or contrary to the records. While dismissing the appeal the Division Bench upheld the view of the learned Single Judge that the order of compulsory retirement was illegal. 4. The second charge-sheet which was issued against the petitioner on 11th May, 1978 remained in abeyance and no action was taken in respect of that charge-sheet till 30th April, 1991. The disciplinary authority issued an order after the enquiry was held, withholding one increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect. The respondent preferred an appeal. 4. The second charge-sheet which was issued against the petitioner on 11th May, 1978 remained in abeyance and no action was taken in respect of that charge-sheet till 30th April, 1991. The disciplinary authority issued an order after the enquiry was held, withholding one increment for a period of one year with cumulative effect. The respondent preferred an appeal. However, that appeal was dismissed on the ground of delay. He therefore filed another appeal and a revision petition, both of which were dismissed on 17th September, 2001 and 25th February, 2002 respectively. 5. Aggrieved by those orders the respondent challenged them before the Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 245 of 2003. He also challenged the charge-sheet dated 11th May, 1978 and the consequential order of punishment dated 30th April, 1991. The respondent prayed that because of the departmental proceedings pending against him, his juniors had superseded him and therefore, he should be granted promotions and consequential benefits from the date when his juniors were promoted. 6. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal has allowed the Original Application as aforesaid. It has observed that the charges have been proved against the respondent on the basis of preponderance of probabilities that the respondent was responsible for the preparation of fake benefit payment dockets. The Tribunal was of the view that as the charge was not proved beyond doubt at the enquiry instituted against the respondent, he could not be held liable for the charges levelled against him. It was also observed that when the irregularities occurred, the respondent was only a Lower Division Clerk and not the bill passing authority. The Tribunal noted that there was no material on record to indicate whether the higher authorities who passed the bills was similarly proceeded against by the ESI Corporation or whether the respondent had been singled out for punishment. The Tribunal was of the view that because of the existence of the dispute between the ESI Corporation and the respondent for several years during which period the respondent had already retired, there was no need to remand the matter to the appellate authority. Instead, the Tribunal granted relief to the respondent while noting that the enquiry report was not placed before it. 7. Instead, the Tribunal granted relief to the respondent while noting that the enquiry report was not placed before it. 7. The learned Counsel for the ESI Corporation submitted that the Tribunal has erred in concluding that the respondent could not be held guilty of the charges levelled against him on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. He submitted that in a disciplinary enquiry, a charge is not required to be proved against an employee beyond reasonable doubt as in a criminal trial. The Enquiry Officer in such a case has only to base his findings on the preponderance of probabilities of the delinquent employee having committed the misconduct. 8. It is true that in a disciplinary enquiry, the employer need not prove the charges against an employee beyond reasonable doubt. It is well-settled that such an enquiry which is not regulated by the law of evidence and the enquiry officer must only ensure that the enquiry is conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The charge against the delinquent employee must be proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, this observation of the Tribunal is incorrect. 9. The Tribunal has observed that the second enquiry based on the charge-sheet of 1978 was completed and the enquiry report was submitted on 4th December, 1981. However, no action could be taken against the respondent on the basis of this enquiry report because the order of punishment in respect of the first charge-sheet dated 1st December, 1976 was challenged before this Court. The Court directed the ESI Corporation not to impose any penalty on the employee till the second appeal preferred by the employee to the Chairman of the Standing Committee was disposed of. The first proceeding in respect of the charge-sheet dated 1st December, 1976 resulted in the reinstatement of the respondent pursuant to the orders of the Division Bench of this Court dated 17th September, 1987 which upheld the order of the learned Single Judge on 9th September, 1985. However, as noted by the Tribunal in the judgment impugned before us, the second order of punishment pursuant to the charge-sheet of 1978 was issued only 4 years after the decision of this Court. The punishment imposed was of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect. However, as noted by the Tribunal in the judgment impugned before us, the second order of punishment pursuant to the charge-sheet of 1978 was issued only 4 years after the decision of this Court. The punishment imposed was of withholding of one increment with cumulative effect. The ESI Corporation obviously could not have passed any order during the pendency of the writ petition in this Court and the appeal before the Division Bench in respect of the second charge-sheet as an interim order had been passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ petition directing the Corporation not to pass any order till the second appeal preferred by the respondent was disposed of by the Chairman of the Standing Committee. The Tribunal has noted that there was no material on record to indicate that a copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the respondent in respect of the second charge-sheet of 1978. His representation on the report was not sought for. Therefore, the Tribunal was of the view that the second enquiry held against him was bad. 10. It must be noted here that after the imposition of the penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect the respondent has been promoted as a UDC first on 31st December, 1992 on an ad hoc basis and then on regular basis from 21st June, 1993. He was later promoted as Assistant/Head Clerk from 8th July, 1996. Thereafter he was promoted as an Insurance Inspector on 2nd July, 2003 on an ad hoc basis and he retired on superannuation on 31st December, 2005. 11. It appears from the material on record that despite his request the respondent was not furnished the enquiry report. According to him, he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine certain witnesses. The charges levelled in both the charge-sheets against the respondent were very similar and related to the preparation of fake benefit dockets which had caused financial loss to the Corporation. In the first enquiry, the Division Bench of this Court had noted in FMA 553 of 1985 that although there was dereliction of duty on the part of the respondent, it could not be said that he had misappropriated any money by preparing fake documents. In the first enquiry, the Division Bench of this Court had noted in FMA 553 of 1985 that although there was dereliction of duty on the part of the respondent, it could not be said that he had misappropriated any money by preparing fake documents. In the first enquiry the appellate authority had imposed a higher penalty of compulsory retirement and had not accepted the disciplinary authority s order of reduction of the respondent's pay by 3 stages for a period of 3 years. However, the order of the appellate authority compulsorily retiring the respondent from service was quashed by the judgment and order of this Court in the writ petition, which was confirmed by the Appeal Court. Obviously therefore since the appellate authority's order of compulsory retirement had been set aside, all salaries and benefits due to the respondent as permissible in law were directed to be paid by this Court. 12. On considering the submissions of the learned Counsel for the PJSI Corporation and the respondent in person, in our opinion, the imposition of a pendency of stopping of an increment for one year with cumulative effect is unacceptable as the enquiry report was not furnished to the delinquent employee. This has caused him prejudice as he was unable to submit his representation against that report to the disciplinary authority before it took the decision to impose penalty of stopping of one increment with cumulative effect. There is material on record to indicate that the respondent had sought a copy of the inquiry report but it was not furnished to him. 13. In these circumstances, in our opinion; although the observation contained in the order of the Tribunal with respect to the decision being passed on the basis of preponderance of probabilities is incorrect, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal of allowing the Original Application cannot be faulted. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. Arrears if any including revision of pay, pension etc. as awarded by the Tribunal be paid to the respondent within four months from today. 14. Urgent certified photocopies of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties upon compliance of all formalities. T. Mookherjee, J. : I agree.