JUDGMENT : Tapan Kumar Dutt, J. This Court has heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and has considered the relevant materials on record. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows: The writ petitioners, in the writ petition, have challenged a certain tender process and prayed that the respondents be directed to cancel, rescind, withdraw and/or forebear from giving effect or further effect to the impugned tender process and the said respondents be also directed to finalise the process with the writ petitioners and grant licence in favour of the writ petitioner No.1 for the purpose of fishing, cleaning, and removal of "silt" in respect of the five lakes concerned. 2. It is the case of the writ petitioners that the writ petitioner No.1/ Chittaranjan Locomotive Works Cooperative Stores Limited which was previously known as Chittaranjan Locomotive Works Employees Cooperative Stores Limited was formed and established by the Railway employees with an object primarily to assist its members who are employees of Chittaranjan Locomotive Works (hereinafter referred to as the "CLW" for short) in obtaining their requirements at reasonable rates. The writ petitioners case is that while licensing the borrow pits/tanks for pisciculture, first preference should invariably be given to the writ petitioners as this would encourage the cooperative spirit among Railway employees and also be advantageous to the Railway Administration so that the subject of license could be easily taken back whenever required by the Railway Administration. In this context, the writ petitioners have relied upon a letter dated 19.01.1987 and also a subsequent letter dated 05.04.1988 issued by the Additional Executive Director(L.M.) Railway Board and Executive Director, Land Management, Railway Board respectively to the General Manager, All Indian Railways. It is the case of the writ petitioners that while granting license first preference should invariably be given to the writ petitioners but if the writ petitioners do not come forward, the next best course would be to call "limited tenders" from the Fishermens Cooperative Societies failing which public auction could be held or open tenders could be invited. According to the writ petitioners, the respondent authorities concerned took a decision to invite open tenders from contractors for fishing, cleaning and removal of silt in respect of the four lakes out of those five lakes and the petitioners were completely kept in dark in this regard, quite contrary to the aforesaid letters. 3. According to the writ petitioners, the respondent authorities concerned took a decision to invite open tenders from contractors for fishing, cleaning and removal of silt in respect of the four lakes out of those five lakes and the petitioners were completely kept in dark in this regard, quite contrary to the aforesaid letters. 3. The writ petitioners felt aggrieved by such conduct of the respondent authorities and as such the writ petitioners filed the aforesaid writ petition being W.P. No. 15261(W) of 2012. It appears that the said writ petition was contested by the Railway authorities and Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 23.04.2014 was pleased to dispose of the said writ petition by observing, inter alia, that it would be in the fitness of things to require the Railways to publish fresh notice inviting tenders indicating the break-up with sufficient clarity therein and the entire process initiated by the tender notice bearing No. CE/13/2012-13 is set aside, and the Railways were given liberty to take appropriate steps against the writ petitioners for realisation of license fees or compensation on account of the writ petitioners continuing in occupation of the tanks beyond the tenure of the original licences. His Lordship was pleased to direct that the earnest money deposited by the added respondent should be refunded immediately and the Railway authorities should specifically invite the added respondent to participate in the fresh tender process. It also appears that His lordship was pleased to observe that the fresh tender process to be undertaken by the Railways should be initiated within a stipulated period of time and the writ petitioners would be at liberty to participate in such tender process. It also appears from a perusal of the said order dated 23.04.2014 that His Lordship was pleased to observe that the preference given by the memorandum dated 19.01.1987 as modified on 05.04.1988 does not provide for Railway employees Cooperative Societies obtaining license of tanks for pisciculture at rates below the prevailing market rates. It also appears from the said order dated 23.04.2014 that His Lordship was pleased to record that the railways submitted that the writ petitioners are in illegal occupation of all five lakes since the writ petitioners licences in respect thereof had run out in the year 2010. 4. It also appears from the said order dated 23.04.2014 that His Lordship was pleased to record that the railways submitted that the writ petitioners are in illegal occupation of all five lakes since the writ petitioners licences in respect thereof had run out in the year 2010. 4. Challenging the said order dated 23.04.2014 passed in the said W.P. No. 15261 (W) of 2012 the writ petitioners have preferred the instant appeal. 5. The learned Counsel for the writ petitioners/appellants has submitted that the said CLW has issued the tender notice which was advertised in newspaper behind the back of the writ petitioners and without any information to the writ petitioners quite contrary to the said letters dated 19.01.1987 as modified by another letter dated 05.04.1988. The learned Advocate for the appellants has placed the said two letters and submitted that the writ petitioners/appellants were due to get the first preference in case the CLW decides to grant licence in respect of the said lakes and it is only if the writ petitioners/appellants do not come forward, the next best course would be to call limited tenders from the Fishermens Cooperative Societies and if the Fishermens Cooperative Societies do not come forward then the CLW may hold public auction or invite open tenders. According to the said learned Advocate, the CLW could not have invited open tenders unless there is default on the part of the appellants and the Fishermens Cooperative Societies. The said learned Advocate submitted that leasing of four tanks is not a commercial activity of the Railways and thus even though this Court finds that the Railways will suffer loss by granting licence in favour of the writ petitioners, the Court has no alternative but to follow the guide-lines as it has to be remembered that the purpose of giving licence to the writ petitioners is to foster cooperative spirit among the employees of the Railways. The said learned Advocate further submitted that the Railway Board is the supreme authority which is under the Ministry of Railways. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 3 of "The Indian Railway Board Act, 1905" and also Para 210 of the "Indian Railways Administration and Finance Code". The said learned Advocate further submitted that the Railway Board is the supreme authority which is under the Ministry of Railways. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 3 of "The Indian Railway Board Act, 1905" and also Para 210 of the "Indian Railways Administration and Finance Code". The said learned Advocate also referred to Clause 41 of the Special Specification and Special Conditions of Contract (applicable for licensing part) appearing at page 182 of the paper book in support of his contention that first preference, that is, licence in respect of the lakes will be given to the Cooperative Societies formed by the Railway Employees themselves and in case such Cooperative Societies do not come forward the fishing rights may be licensed to the Registered Fisherman Cooperative Society, as stipulated in the said clause through negotiated basis as in the case of Cooperative Societies of Railway employees subject to terms and conditions safeguarding Railways overall financial interest and commensurate with the prevailing market rate. The said learned Advocate submitted that it would be an anomaly to ask the writ petitioners to participate in the open tender and then giving first preference to the writ petitioners and such approach would also be contrary to the aforesaid two letters dated 19.01.1987 and 05.04.1988. 6. The said learned Advocate referred to the Indian Railways Administration and Financial Code and it will appear in Paragraph 210 of the said Code that the authority has been given to the Executive Director to issue instructions directly to the Railway Administrations and receive and deal with references from them in a direct manner. 7. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 1973 Supreme Court 303 (Union of India v. K.P. Joseph & Others) and referred to Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said reports where the Hon'ble Court was pleased to observe that to say that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition and that there are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties. The Hon'ble Court has further been pleased to observe that it is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that the Court has imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. The Hon'ble Court has further been pleased to observe that it is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that the Court has imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. The said learned Advocate submitted that reading the said two letters dated 19.01.1987 and 05.04.1988 it would appear that the said two letters were issued by the Railway Board under statutory authorisation and it has legal flavor. 8. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2012(2) SCC 1 (Allied Motors Limited v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited) and relied upon Paragraphs 27 and 52 of the said reports. In Paragraph 27 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court was pleased to consider the decision reported at 1979(3) SCC 489 wherein the Hon'ble Court held that it is well-settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. In Paragraph 52 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court was pleased to consider the judgment reported at AIR 1936 PC 253 wherein it has been held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. 9. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 2001 SC 1980 (Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others) and referred to Paragraph 25 of the said reports which has dealt with the cardinal principle of interpretation of Statutes and wherein it has been observed that the provisions of a Statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest to the contrary. It also observed in the said Paragraph that the golden rule is that the words of a Statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning and that when the words of the Statute are clear, plain and unambiguous then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences and it is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law giver. It is also held in the said Paragraph that the Courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute. 10. The said learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that one of the interests of the CLW should be to see that the fish is supplied to all the employees of CLW at a cheaper rate and the concept of market rate is alien to the preferential right of the writ petitioners. The said learned Advocate further submitted that apart from providing fish to the employees of CLW at a low rate there are other considerations which has to weigh with the CLW while granting licence of the tanks. Such considerations are like cleaning of the tanks, encouraging the cooperative spirit amongst employees of CLW, getting back possession of the tanks etc. The said learned Advocate further submitted that it will appear from some of the correspondence copies of which are included in Pages 52, 54 and 56 of the Paper Book that the FA and CAO participates in the tender process. 11. The said learned Advocate submitted that the word "fixed" appearing at Clause 3 of the letter dated 19.01.1987 does not contemplate the process of inviting open tenders. 12. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the added respondent No.9 submitted that if the aforesaid two circulars are read together it will appear that the said two circulars are mere instructions issued by the Railway Board and these are only guidelines without any statutory flavor. According to the said learned Advocate, the said guidelines cannot confer any right on the writ petitioners/appellants. According to the said learned Advocate, the said guidelines cannot confer any right on the writ petitioners/appellants. He submitted that in the letter dated 05.04.1988 it has been clearly mentioned that the letter dated 19.01.1987 contains instructions only and thus the subsequent letter dated 05.04.1988 also contains certain modification of the instructions issued earlier. The said learned Advocate submitted that reading the two letters together will clearly establish that the writ petitioners/appellants have only a participatory preference and in no way it can be called to be a financial preference. The said learned Advocate submitted that the preference which the writ petitioners/appellants have in the matter is in the sphere of participation only, that is, if the writ petitioners/ appellants offer matches with the best offer by any person then only the writ petitioners/appellants are awarded the contract. The said learned Advocate submitted that if there has to be any preference in the matter of finance then sanction is needed from the Finance Ministry, but in this case there has been no such sanction. It may be noted here that the learned Advocate for the appellants has submitted that there has been financial sanction as would appear from the organisation chart appearing at Clause 205 of the Indian Railways Administration and Finance Code. The said learned Advocate pointed out that on the Railway Board there is the presence of Financial Commissioner. The learned Advocate for the added respondent No.9 submitted that the Railway Administration will first have to take into consideration the existing market rates and then only will it be able to effectively negotiate with the appellants or the Fishermens Cooperative Societies, as the case may be, and the Railway Administration will be only able to know the market rate after it undergoes the tender process. The said learned Advocate submitted that the overall financial interest of the Railways has to be looked into and has to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting of the licence. 13. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2006 (13) SCC 382 (Nagar Nigam, Meerut v. Al Faheem Meat Exports (P) Ltd. & Others). The said learned Advocate submitted that the overall financial interest of the Railways has to be looked into and has to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting of the licence. 13. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2006 (13) SCC 382 (Nagar Nigam, Meerut v. Al Faheem Meat Exports (P) Ltd. & Others). In Paragraph 12 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold that it is now a well-settled principle of law that having regard to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, a State within the meaning of Article 12 thereof cannot distribute its largesse at its own sweet will and the Court can ensure that the statutory functions are not carried out at the whims and caprices of the officers of the Government/local body in an arbitrary manner. In Paragraph 13 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has laid emphasis on the need to maintain transparency in grant of public contracts, particularly, by holding public auction upon issuance of advertisement in well-known newspapers. In Paragraph 14 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold that ordinarily the State or its instrumentalities should not give contracts by private negotiation but by open public auction/tender after wide publicity. In Paragraph 15 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold that in rare and exceptional cases, having regard to the nature of the trade or largesse or for some other good reason, a contract may have to be granted by private negotiation, but normally that should not be done as it shakes the public confidences. In Paragraph 18 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to hold that the law is, thus, clear that ordinarily all contracts by the Government or by an instrumentality of the State should be granted only by public auction or by inviting tenders after advertising the same in well-known newspapers having wide circulation. 14. The said learned Advocate cited another judgment reported at 1993(1) SCC 445 (Sterling Computers Limited v. M/s. & N. Publications Limited & Others & United Database (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. M & N Publications Limited & Others & United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. M & N. Publications & Others). 14. The said learned Advocate cited another judgment reported at 1993(1) SCC 445 (Sterling Computers Limited v. M/s. & N. Publications Limited & Others & United Database (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. M & N Publications Limited & Others & United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. M & N. Publications & Others). The said learned Advocate referred to Paragraph 25 of the said reports wherein the Hon'ble Court has taken note of the case where it has been reiterated that once the State decides to grant any right or privilege to others, then there is no escape from the rigour of Article 14 and the executive does not have an absolute discretion; certain precepts and principles have to be followed, the public interest being the paramount consideration. 15. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2001 (8) SCC 491 (Union of India & Others v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation & Another). In Paragraph 12 of the said reports the Hon'ble Court has been pleased to observe as follows: "There is no doubt that this Court has held in more than one case that where the decision of the authority is in regard to a policy matter, this Court will not ordinarily interfere since these policy matters are taken based on expert knowledge of the persons concerned and courts are normally not equipped to question the correctness of a policy decision. But then this does not mean that the courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinise whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discretion or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record. ............................................... ............................Any decision, be it a simple administrative decision or a policy decision, if taken without considering the relevant facts, can only be termed as an arbitrary decision. If it so, then be it a policy decision or otherwise, it will be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution." 16. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1989 Supreme Court 200 (Sher Singh v. Union of India & Others with Gandiban Transports v. Managing Director, Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. and another and Kuldeep Singh and others etc. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1989 Supreme Court 200 (Sher Singh v. Union of India & Others with Gandiban Transports v. Managing Director, Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd. and another and Kuldeep Singh and others etc. v. Union of India and others) in support of his contention that the appellants can only get preference over others if the appellants match the best offer made by some others, that is to say, the question of having preference can arise amongst the equals and not amongst unequals. The said learned Advocate submitted that there is no sufficient ground at all for interference with the order challenged in the instant appeal. 17. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the CLW authorities mainly adopted the argument made on behalf of the added respondent and submitted that if the aforesaid two letters are read together it will be clear that the CLW authorities have rightly proceeded in the matter in accordance with law and Clause 5 of the letter dated 19.01.1987 indicates that there has to be an auction. He further submitted that the Railways overall interest will have to be achieved and safeguarded and the prevailing market situation will have to be ascertained. 18. The said learned Advocate appearing for the CLW cited a decision reported at 2011 (7) SCC 639 (State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan And another) and referred to Paragraph 64 of the said reports is quoted below: "The court should not place reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analysing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. A judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of a decision. A judgment of the court is not to be read as a statute, as it is to be remembered that judicial utterances have been made in setting of the facts of a particular case. One additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper. One additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper. (Vide MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, Govt. of Karnataka v. Government and State of Haryana v. Dharma Singh.)" 19. Having heard the learned Advocates for the respective parties and having considered the materials on record it appears to this Court that the main dispute lies in the interpretation of the two letters dated 19.01.1987 issued by the Additional Executive Director (L.M.) Railway Board and 05.04.1988 issued by the Executive Director, Land Management, Railway Board, as aforesaid. The learned Advocate for the appellants has preferred to call such letters circulars and/or policy guidelines but the learned Advocate for the added respondent No.9 has described such letters as mere letters of instructions and for such purpose he has referred to the letter dated 05.04.1988 which says that the said letter dated 05.04.1988 is in partial modification of the instructions issued under letter dated 19.01.1987. Thus, it will be fit and proper to term the said two letters as letters of instructions. Be that as it may it is important to give a proper construction to the said two letters as the main arguments advanced by the respective learned Advocates have been on the interpretation of the said two letters as already indicated above. It appears from the letter dated 19.01.1987 that it has been clearly mentioned therein that (Clause 3 of the letter) that while giving preference to the Cooperative Societies both the financial return commensurate with prevailing market situation as well as Railways overall interest should be achieved and safeguarded and the licence fee in such cases should be fixed on merits of each case in consultation with the FA and CAO. It is true that Clause 2 of the said letter indicates that first preference should be given to the Cooperative Societies formed by the Railway employees themselves and in case such Cooperative Societies do not come forward the next best course would be to call limited tenders from the fishermens cooperative societies who will be required to register their names with the Railway Administration for the purpose. If the fishermen cooperative societies in the list of approved contractors do not come forth the tanks/borrow pits may be licensed by holding public auction or by inviting tenders. If the fishermen cooperative societies in the list of approved contractors do not come forth the tanks/borrow pits may be licensed by holding public auction or by inviting tenders. It appears to this Court that such clause in the said letter dated 19.01.1987 is subject to the Clause 3 of the said letter which says that the financial return to the railways must be commensurate with the prevailing market situation and the railways overall interest should be achieved and safeguarded. Thus it is clear that the fixation of the license fees cannot be to the detriment of the financial interest and overall interest of the railways. Even if the argument made on behalf of the appellants that giving licence of the tanks and/or borrow pits is not one of the commercial activities of the railways is accepted, it cannot be held that the Railway Administration are free to act to the detriment of the financial and overall interest of the railways. The fostering of cooperative spirit among the railway employees cannot be at the cost of the financial and overall interest of the railways. Even if the said two letters are construed as guidelines which should be followed, it appears to this Court that the said two letters if read together do not give any preference to the appellants in respect of the financial aspect of the matter. 20. The learned Advocate for the appellants cited the K.P. Josephs case (supra) but it appears to this Court that the said case cannot be of any assistance to the said appellants because even if we treat the said two letters as constituting administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties, the said two letters cannot be interpreted to mean that the appellants will have a preferential right to have the license of the tanks in question at whatever price they choose to offer. Even if it is assumed that the said two letters have a statutory authorisation and legal flavor, as argued on behalf of the appellants, the said two letters cannot be construed to mean that the Railway Administration is bound to accept the price and/or licence fees to be offered by the appellants even if such offers are not commensurate with the market rate. The Allied Motors Limiteds case (supra) also does not in any way help the appellants as because this Court finds that even if the said two letters are strictly followed the said two letters cannot be interpreted in the manner it has been sought to be argued on behalf of the appellants for reasons indicated above. There cannot be any dispute with regard to the proposition of law laid down in Gurudevdata VKSSS Maryadits case (supra) with regard to the interpretation of statutes. 21. The argument made by the learned Advocate for the appellants that the word "fixed" appearing in Clause 3 of the letter dated 19.01.1987 does not contemplate the process of inviting open tenders cannot be accepted. The Railway Administration is entitled to invite open tenders and find out the highest offer and/or the prevailing market rate, subject to the satisfaction of the Railway Administration that such offer is not an artificial one, and then, fix the license fee through the process of negotiation with the cooperative societies concerned, as indicated in the aforesaid two letters, in case the appellants become entitled to have the first preference by matching their offer with the best offer available from the market. If this be not done then in that event an element of arbitrariness and whimsicality creeps in. 22. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the added respondent No.9 was right in citing Nagar Nigams case (supra) wherein it has been said that a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India cannot distribute its largesse at its own sweet will and the Court can ensure that the statutory functions are not carried out at the whims and caprices of the officers of the Government/local body in an arbitrary manner. As already indicated above, it has been said in the said reports that there is need to maintain transparency in grant of public contracts, particularly, by holding public auction upon issuance of advertisement in well-known newspapers. As already indicated above, it has been said in the said reports that there is need to maintain transparency in grant of public contracts, particularly, by holding public auction upon issuance of advertisement in well-known newspapers. It has also been said in the said reports that in rare and exceptional cases having regard to the nature of the trade or largesse or for some other good reason, a contract may have to be granted by private negotiation, but normally that should not be done as it shakes the public confidence and ordinarily all contracts by Government or by an instrumentality of the State should be granted only by public auction or by inviting tenders after advertising the same in well-known newspapers having wide circulation. The observations made by the Hon'ble Court in Starling Computers Limiteds case (supra), as already noted above, should also be taken into consideration. 23. Even though the learned Advocate for the appellants referred to Section 3 of the Indian Railway Board Act, 1905, Para 210 of the Indian Railways Administration and Finance Code and Clause 41 of the Special Specification and Special Conditions of Contract, as already noted above, such provisions cannot be of any effective assistance to the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. This Court is of the view that even if it is assumed that the said two letters dated 19.01.1987 and 05.04.1988 have to be strictly complied with by the parties concerned, such letters do not support the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. On the contrary, this Court finds that the said two letters are in full conformity with the argument advanced on behalf of the added respondent No. 9 and the CLW. Even Clause 41 of the Special Specification and Special Conditions of Contract (page 182 of paper book) contemplates that the overall financial interest of the Railways will have to be safeguarded and the offers to be made by the cooperative societies concerned has to be commensurate with the prevailing market rate. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the added respondent No.9 was right in his submission that right of preference which is indicated in the aforesaid two letters is really a participatory preference and not on the financial aspect of the matter. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the added respondent No.9 was right in his submission that right of preference which is indicated in the aforesaid two letters is really a participatory preference and not on the financial aspect of the matter. The said learned Advocate was right in his submission that the question of participatory preference can arise amongst the equals and not amongst unequals. 24. In view of the discussions made above, this Court does not find any merit in the instant appeal which is dismissed. 25. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 26. Urgent certified Xerox copy of this judgement, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance of usual formalities. LATER 27. After the judgment is delivered in open Court, the learned Advocate for the appellants prays for stay of operation of the aforesaid judgment. 28. The learned Advocates for the added respondent and C.L.W. oppose such prayer. 29. However, there shall be stay of operation of the aforesaid judgment for a period of eight weeks from this date. Ranjit Kumar Bag, J. - I agree.