JUDGMENT Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jain, J.: - Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that following two questions of law are involved in this appeal:- 1. Whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to set aside the instrument of partition affecting the rights of the minors who were not represented through their natural guardian/Court guardian? 2. Whether a suit for declaration without seeking consequential relief is maintainable? 2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiffs filed suit for declaration alleging that they were co-sharers in the land measuring 506 kanal 4 marlas, comprised in Khewat No.406, Khatauni No.85 to 89, situated in village Dhoka. Defendants no.1 to 7 filed an application for partition before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Charkhi Dadri, in which the plaintiffs, who were minors at that time, were also arrayed as respondents no.9 to 34 through their next friends, i.e. their respective fathers. The respondents in the partition application were proceeded against ex-parte including the plaintiffs as no-one appeared on their behalf after service was effected by way of proclamation. The Assistant Collector 1st Grade decided the partition application vide order dated 07.05.1982 and a mutation of partition was sanctioned on that basis. 3. The plaintiffs have challenged order dated 07.05.1982 passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade and all miscellaneous orders preceding thereto as illegal, null and void because they were not at all represented in the partition proceedings in which they remained ex-parte and unrepresented. The Court had not even appointed Court Guardian on their behalf. 4. The suit was contested by defendants no.1 to 7 who had filed the partition application and the remaining defendants, though represented through their counsel, but did not contest the suit. It was alleged that the suit is not maintainable and the Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the Trial Court:- “1. Whether the partition proceedings and orders dated 5.12.79, 26.12.79, 7.5.82, 11.5.82 and 19.2.1982 passed by Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Charkhi Dadri in respect of the suit land are illegal, against law, null and void and as such not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs and the proforma-defendants?OPP. 2. Whether the property still remains to be joint property of the parties, as alleged?OPP. 3. 2. Whether the property still remains to be joint property of the parties, as alleged?OPP. 3. Whether the mutation No.265 on the basis of the partition is illegal, against law and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs?OPP. 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable?OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit?OPD. 6. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain this suit?OPD. 7. Relief.” 6. The Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence, declared the partition proceedings and the impugned partition order as null and void and not binding upon the rights of the plaintiffs as they were wrongly proceeded against ex-parte as there was no representation on their behalf; the suit property was held to be joint amongst the parties; the mutation no.265 sanctioned on the basis of the impugned partition order was held to be a nullity and not binding on the plaintiffs; the suit was dismissed as not maintainable because the plaintiffs were entitled to the further relief of joint possession which was omitted to have been claimed; and issue no.5 was not pressed, but while deciding issue no.6, it was held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide the suit. 7. The plaintiffs’ appeal was, however, allowed by the lower Appellate Court where, at the first instance, they had assailed the finding recorded by the Trial Court about the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the suit. The Lower Appellate Court held that the judgment in the case of Amar Singh and another v. Ram Singh, AIR 1932 Lahore 236 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and relied upon the judgments in the case of Katikara Chintamani Dora and others v. Guatreddi Annamanaidu and others, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1069, Ram Swarup and others v. Shikar Chand and another, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 893, Sucha Singh and Balwant Singh v. Nand Singh and others, 1976 PLJ (P&H) 183 and Rajender Singh v. Gur Chand and another, 1984 PLJ 360 . It was held that since the plaintiffs were minors and were not represented at all by their guardians, therefore, decree against minors was a nullity and could have been challenged before the Civil Court. It was held that since the plaintiffs were minors and were not represented at all by their guardians, therefore, decree against minors was a nullity and could have been challenged before the Civil Court. Insofar as issue no.4 is concerned, it was held that once the Civil Court has already set aside the partition proceedings and the order of the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, the status quo ante is resumed and the plaintiffs automatically became joint owners in possession of the suit property and were not required to seek the remedy of possession and for that matter, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Saran and another v. Gang Devi, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2685 is not applicable. Consequently, the lower Appellate Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. 8. Counsel for the defendants-appellants has submitted that the lower Appellate Court has committed a patent error in reversing the finding of the Trial Court on issue no.6. It is submitted that the partition proceedings cannot be challenged before the Civil Court in view of Section 158(2)(xvii) & (xviii) of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (for short “the Act”) and has strongly relied upon the Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Amar Singh’s case (supra). On this premise, he has submitted, that the question of law which I have framed in the first paragraph of this judgment arises for determination in this appeal and has prayed that the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court be set aside. It is further submitted that as per Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a mere suit for declaration is not maintainable until and unless consequential relief is prayed for. He has relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Swarup’s case (supra) and has submitted that the second question of law framed by him has also substance in it as it goes to the root of the case. 9. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents has submitted that the plaintiffs being minors could not have represented themselves before the Assistant Grade 1st Class where the application for partition was filed by the defendants. Even if they were impleaded through their natural father but all were proceeded against ex-parte on the basis of a report of service through proclamation by beat of drums. Even if they were impleaded through their natural father but all were proceeded against ex-parte on the basis of a report of service through proclamation by beat of drums. It was for their natural guardian to watch their interest by putting their appearance before the Assistant Grade 1st Class in the partition proceedings but they remained unrepresented, as a result thereof, their interest been seriously prejudiced. It is submitted that the judgment in Amar Singh’s case (supra) is distinguishable on facts and cannot be relied upon because in that case, the minors were, though represented before the Court but their allegation was that they were not properly represented. In this regard, he has relied upon the judgments followed by the lower Appellate Court which are mentioned here-in-above. 10. In respect of the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, it is submitted that before the application for partition was filed, the plaintiffs were admittedly co-sharers and were in joint possession, therefore, when they filed the present suit for declaration seeking setting aside of the order of the Assistant Grade 1st Class and the proceedings recorded by him before the order was passed, they also prayed for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering in their possession on the basis of the aforesaid order, meaning thereby the said order had eclipsed the right of the plaintiffs and as soon as the eclipse was over, their rights as co-sharers re-surfaced, therefore, the suit was very much maintainable, as held by the lower Appellate Court. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12. The facts are not much in dispute because the plaintiffs were minors and co-sharers in the land in dispute, who were arrayed as party respondents in the partition proceedings by the defendants therein through their natural father, but no personal service was effected upon the guardian of the minors and all were served by way of proclamation by beat of the drums and were proceeded against ex-parte, whereas in Amar Singh’s case (supra), the facts were that the minors were duly represented before the Court by their guardian, but they failed to properly safeguard their interest. 13. The question, thus, arises as to whether the Division Bench judgment in Amar Singh’s case (supra) is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case or it is distinguishable. 13. The question, thus, arises as to whether the Division Bench judgment in Amar Singh’s case (supra) is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case or it is distinguishable. There are two situations; the first one is that where the minor is sued through his next friend or natural guardian, who had appeared in the Court, but according to the minor, he did not look after his interest properly and the other one is where minor is represented by his next friend or natural guardian, who did not appear before the Court as he remained ex-parte, may be in connivance with the applicants who had filed the partition proceedings or otherwise they were not served. 14. The question is whether in both the circumstances, the present plaintiffs should have gone to the revenue authorities by way of appeal invoking the provisions of appeal or revision under the Act, in view of the bar under Section 158(2)(xvii) & (xviii) of the Act. In order to appreciate this aspect of the matter, it would be relevant to refer to Section 158(2)(xvii) & (xviii) of the Act, which reads as under:- “158. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts in matters within the jurisdiction of Revenue-officers.— Except as otherwise provided by this Act— (1) a Civil Court shall not have jurisdiction in any matter which the State Government or a Revenue-officer is empowered by this Act to dispose of or take cognizance of the manner in which the State Government or any Revenue-Officer exercises any powers vested in it or him by or under this Act; and in particular— (2) a Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters, namely:- (i) to (xvi) xxx xxx xxx (xvii) any claim for partition of an estate, holding or tenancy, or any question connected with, or arising out of, proceedings for partition, not being a question as to title in any of the property of which partition is sought; (xviii)any question as to the allotment of land on the partition of an estate, holding or tenancy, or as to the distribution of land subject by established custom to periodical re-distribution or as to the distribution of land-revenue on the partition of an estate or holding or on a periodical re-distribution of land, or as to the distribution of rent on the partition of a tenancy; xxx xxx xxx” 15. It is pertinent to mention that the plaintiffs had challenged orders dated 05.12.1979, 26.12.1979, 07.05.1982, 11.05.1982 and 19.02.1982 passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Charkhi Dadri as illegal, null and void. The Trial Court framed issue no.1 in this regard and recorded a categoric finding that the partition proceedings were null and void and were not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. Order dated 05.12.1979 was passed by the Assistant Collector 1st Grade, Charkhi Dadri, to summon the plaintiffs through beat of drums. Order dated 26.12.1979 was passed while proceedings against ex-parte, who were served through beat of drums and did not choose to appear. 16. Be that as it may, the Trial Court, after discussion, held that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector 1st Grade were null and void, meaning thereby the partition proceedings could not have been given effect to as mutation no.265 entered and sanctioned on the basis of the partition proceedings (Ex.P1) was also held to be null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. The suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed by the Trial Court only on the ground that the Civil Court would not have the jurisdiction under Section 158(2)(xvii) & (xviii) of the Act and suit for declaration is not maintainable. The judgment in Amar Singh’s case (supra) followed by the Trial Court and relied upon by the counsel for the appellants herein, is clearly distinguishable because in that case, as the fact has been recorded “the plaintiffs complained that being minors, their interests were not properly safe-guarded by those who represented them before the Revenue Officer”, but in the present case, the minors were not even represented before the Revenue Officer as they were proceeded against ex-parte when they were allegedly served by the beat of drums as no personal service was effected upon their natural guardian. In this situation, it has been held by this Court in Rajinder Singh’s case (supra) that as per Order 32 Rule 3 CPC, it is a sacred duty of the Court to appoint guardian where the defendant is a minor, be it Civil Court or Revenue Court, or Tribunal, to safeguard the interest of a minor in any pending proceedings and if any guardian is not appointed, then the said order is a nullity. If the natural guardian did not appear, presuming for the sake of arguments that they were served by beat of drum, it was for the Court to see as to how the interest of the minor was to be protected and in that matter, the Court should have appointed Court guardian in terms of Order 32 Rule 3 CPC, but once the Court guardian has not been appointed and the minors have been proceeded against ex-parte, the judgment in Amar Singh’s case (supra) is not applicable and is distinguishable on its own facts. 17. Thus, the first question of law raised by counsel for the appellants that as to whether the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to set aside the instrument of partition affecting the rights of the minors, who were not represented through their natural guardian or the Court guardian is decided against the appellants holding that the Civil Court would have the jurisdiction to set aside the order where the rights of the minors are affected by an instrument of partition wherein they remained unrepresented either through the natural guardian or the Court guardian. It is altogether different if the minors are represented before the Court either through the natural guardian or the Court guardian and is not properly represented, then definitely the law laid down by the Lahore High Court in Amar Singh’s case (supra) would apply, but in the facts of the present case, in which the Trial Court itself had held while deciding issue no.1 that the orders passed by the Revenue Officer are null and void, the Civil Court would definitely have the jurisdiction, as has been held by this Court in Sucha Singh and Balwant Singh’s case (supra). 18. As regards the second question with regard to declaration without seeking consequential relief of possession, the Trial Court, while deciding issue no.2, has also held that if the partition proceedings are held to be null and void, then the parties to the suit property would remain co-sharers and once they are held to be co-sharers, they have rightly made a prayer for declaration that the order (Ex.P1) passed by the Revenue Officer is illegal, null and void and prayed for injunction to restrain them from interfering in their possession or dispossessing them forcibly. Thus, there is no error in the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court and accordingly the second question of law raised by counsel for the appellants is devoid of any merit and is, thus, decided against the appellants. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and hence, the same is hereby dismissed. ---------0.B.S.0------------