ORDER I. A. No. 196 of 2010 Heard the parties on interlocutory application i.e. I.A. No. 196 of 2010, which has been filed for condoning delay in filing the appeal. In filing appeal, delay of four months & 12 days has occurred. 2. After hearing the parties and considering the ground set-forth in the petition, the limitation petition stands allowed and delay in filing the appeal stands condoned. 3. The present appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “M.V.Act”) has been preferred against judgment and award dated 07-11-2008 and 18-11-2008 respectively passed by learned District Judge-cum-Claims Tribunal, Darbhanga (hereinafter referred to as “Claims Tribunal”) in Claim Case No. 41 of 2006. By the said judgment, the Claims Tribunal has allowed the petition, filed under Section 140 of the M.V.Act by the claimant/respondent no. 1 and directed the appellant/owner of the vehicle i.e. Tata Maxi 407, bearing registration no. BR-06A-0916 (hereinafter referred to as “offending vehicle”) to pay compensation amount of Rs. 50,000/- (fifty thousand) within a period of thirty days of preparation of award, failing which, the appellant was directed to pay the compensation amount with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing of the application till its realization. 4. Short fact of the case is that on the basis of ferdbeyan of father of the deceased, an F.I.R., vide L.N.M.U.P.S. Case No. 56 of 2005 was registered on 26-05-2005. In the said accident, son of respondent no. 1 died. After the death of son of the respondent no. 1, claim case was filed, in which, a petition under Section 140 of the M.V.Act was filed for grant of interim compensation. The claimant had brought on record certain relevant documents, such as; F.I.R., Charge-sheet, Post-Mortem Report, Driving Licence, Registration of Offending Vehicle, Certificate of Dependency issued by the Circle Officer etc. After hearing and considering the fact that appellant was registered owner of the offending vehicle, the Claims Tribunal allowed the petition filed under Section 140 of the M.V.Act and directed the appellant/owner of the offending vehicle to make payment of Rs. 50,000/-, as indicated here-in-above. The said judgment is under-challenge in the present appeal. 5. After hearing and considering the fact that appellant was registered owner of the offending vehicle, the Claims Tribunal allowed the petition filed under Section 140 of the M.V.Act and directed the appellant/owner of the offending vehicle to make payment of Rs. 50,000/-, as indicated here-in-above. The said judgment is under-challenge in the present appeal. 5. Sri Durga Nand Jha, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that much prior to the date of accident, the appellant had already sold the offending vehicle in the joint name of Manish Kumar and Lakhindra Rai. He asserts that sale letter was prepared on 27-10-2004, which was also affidavited with specific clarification that the new transferee shall be responsible for all types of liability of vehicle in question. He submits that after the sale of offending vehicle to Manish Kumar and Lakhindra Rai, the appellant was having no connection with the offending vehicle. In the said accident, which had occurred after the purchase of vehicle, the transferees of the vehicle were liable to pay compensation, not the appellant. He further submits that steps were also taken for getting the name changed from the registration record lying in the office of District Transport Officer, Muzaffarpur. Sri Jha emphasized that appellant had sold the offending vehicle on 27-10-2004, whereas, accident in the case had occurred on 24-05-2005 and accordingly, the appellant is not at all liable to pay any compensation. Sri Jha has placed reliance on Annexure ‘5’ to the memo of appeal. He submits that appellant had sought information from the Public Information Officer-cum-District Transport Officer, Muzaffarpur in respect of steps taken by the appellant for getting the offending vehicle transferred. He submits that as per Annexure ‘5’ i.e. photocopy of Memo No. 3212 dated 13-12-2008, it is evident that office has reported that due to accident of fire in the office, certain forms relating to sale and affidavits were not available. Sri Jha tried to persuade the Court that appellant had taken all steps immediately after selling the offending vehicle to Manish Kumar and Lakhendra Rai for getting the name changed in the record lying in the office of District Transport Officer, Muzaffarpur. He further submits that even after the accident, one of the co-purchasers, namely; Lakhendra Rai had got the vehicle released in his favour on Jimmanama. He further submits that even after the accident, one of the co-purchasers, namely; Lakhendra Rai had got the vehicle released in his favour on Jimmanama. He has specifically referred to Annexure ‘2’ to the memo of appeal to corroborate his submission that after the accident, the offending vehicle was released in favour of actual purchaser i.e. Lakhindra Rai. Sri Jha, learned counsel for the appellant has placed heavy reliance on a Division Bench judgment of Kerala High Court, reported in 1996 ACJ 477 (Said Mohammed Vs. Rema). He submits in the aforesaid judgment, it has been held that when the registered owner is not real owner of the vehicle on the date of accident, the said registered owner has no vicarious liability for paying compensation. Accordingly, it has been argued that on the date of accident, the appellant was not real owner, but the real owner of the vehicle was Manish Kumar and Lakhendra Rai. On aforesaid ground, learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the judgment and award. 6. Mr. Ataul Haque, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1/claimant as well as Mr. Sanjay Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 2/United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (in short “Insurance Co.”) have vehemently opposed the prayer of the appellant. It was submitted on behalf of the claimant that merely on the plea that offending vehicle was sold by the appellant, the appellant may not be absolved from paying the compensation amount, since the appellant was registered owner on the date of accident. He submits that in view of provisions contained in M.V.Act, the registered owner in case of accident is required to compensate the claimant. He further submits that in the present case, the learned Claims Tribunal has allowed the petition filed under Section 140 of the M.V.Act, whereas, there is no requirement to plead and establish that death of son of the claimant has occurred due to neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle. Learned counsel for the claimant and Insurance Co. have placed heavy reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of the Apex Court, reported in AIR 2011 SC (Civil) 392 (Pushpa alias Leela and others Vs. Shakuntala and others). Referring to aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, learned counsel for both respondents have argued that for making payment of compensation, the registered owner is liable to pay. have placed heavy reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of the Apex Court, reported in AIR 2011 SC (Civil) 392 (Pushpa alias Leela and others Vs. Shakuntala and others). Referring to aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court, learned counsel for both respondents have argued that for making payment of compensation, the registered owner is liable to pay. It has been argued that on the date of accident the offending vehicle was not insured. 7. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, I have also perused the materials available on record. It is not in dispute that at the time of accident, the offending vehicle was not insured. So far as liability to pay compensation under Section 140 of the M.V.Act is concerned, Section 140(3) is itself clear that for claiming compensation under Section 140 of the M.V.Act, no detail inquiry is required to be done. It would be appropriate to quote Section 140(3) of the M.V.Act, which is as follows:– “140(3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.” 8. Accordingly, in view of statutory provision at the time of allowing such compensation, on the principle of no fault, the learned Claims Tribunal was not required to go into detail and ask the claimant to specifically establish the case with plausible evidence. In the present case, the pertinent question is as to whether compensation is to be paid by actual owner or registered owner. It is true that the Division Bench of Kerala High Court, in case of Said Mohammed (supra) has recorded that real owner is liable to pay compensation instead of registered owner, but the Apex Court repeatedly has held that registered owner is liable to pay compensation under the provisions of the M.V.Act. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to notice regarding the meaning of the owner of a vehicle under the provisions of M.V.Act. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to notice regarding the meaning of the owner of a vehicle under the provisions of M.V.Act. Section 2(30) of the M.V.Act describes about the ownership, which is quoted here-in-below:– “2(30) “owner” means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement;” 9. On perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that owner of the vehicle is required to pay compensation, in whose favour, vehicle in question is registered. 10. The question for payment of compensation in vehicular accident has been settled and it has been held that the registered owner shall be liable to pay compensation. The Apex Court in Pushpa?s case (supra) has reiterated the law, which was settled in (2001) 8 SCC 748 (Dr. T.V. Jose Vs. Chacho P.M.). I may quote paragraph 12 and 13 of the Apex Court judgment in Pushpa’s case (supra), which is as follows:– “12. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of a vehicle after its sale to another person was considered by this Court in Dr. T.V. Jose Vs. Chacko P.M., (2001) 8 SCC 748 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3939 ). In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision, the Court observed and held as follows:– “9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the Appellant submitted that the High Court was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on record. He submitted that the oral evidence clearly showed that the Appellant was not the owner of the car on the date of the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely because the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. did not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been transferred. Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Mr. Roy Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy Thomas had been made party-Respondent No.9 to these Appeals. He pointed out that an Advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He pointed out that Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Mr. Roy Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy Thomas had been made party-Respondent No.9 to these Appeals. He pointed out that an Advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had chosen not to appear in these Appeals. He submitted that the liability, if any, was of Mr. Roy Thomas. 10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right in holding that the Appellant continued to be the owner as the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. There can be transfer of title by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. The evidence on record shows that ownership of the car had been transferred. However, the Appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as his name continued in the records of R.T.O. as the owner. The Appellant could not escape that liability by merely joining Mr. Roy Thomas in these Appeals. Mr. Roy Thomas was not a party either before MACT or the High Court. In these Appeals we cannot and will not go into the question of inter se liability between the Appellant and Mr. Roy Thomas. It will be for the Appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings against Mr. Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so.” (Emphasis added) 13. Again, in P.P. Mohammed Vs. K. Rajappan & Ors., (2008) 17 SCC 624, this Court examined the same issue under somewhat similar set of facts as in the present case. In paragraph 4 of the decision, this Court observed and held as follows:— “4. These appeals are filed by the appellants. The Insurance Company has chosen not to file any appeal. The question before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter to Respondent 5, the appellant got absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) Vs. The question before this Court is whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to Respondent 4 and thereafter to Respondent 5, the appellant got absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) Vs. Chacho P.M. (reported in 2001 (8) SCC 748 ) wherein it is held that even though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO records, he remains liable to a third person.” (Emphasis added) 11. Accordingly, in view of the Apex Court judgment, there is no ambiguity to held that the registered owner in the present case was liable to pay compensation, as directed by the Claims Tribunal. Ofcourse, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on Annexure ‘5’ to the memo of appeal, which in normal course is not required to be noticed, but since it was placed by learned counsel for the appellant, this Court has minutely perused the same. On perusal of Annexure ‘5’, it is evident that the offending vehicle was transferred on 12th July, 2005 in the name of one Lakhendra Rai, as per column 3 of Memo No. 3212 dated 13-12-2008 (Annexure ‘5’). In the present case, accident had occurred on 24-05-2005. According to own document of the appellant, it is evident that on the date of accident, the vehicle was not under the ownership of transferee, namely; Lakhendra Rai. Moreover, learned Claims Tribunal, while directing the appellant to pay interim compensation of Rs. 50,000/- to the claimant/respondent no. 1, had granted liberty to the appellant to realize the said amount from the alleged purchasers in case of establishing the valid transfer of vehicle at relevant time in a separate proceeding, if so filed. 12. In view of the facts and circumstances and law laid down by the Apex Court, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and award, which has been assailed in the present appeal. 13. Accordingly, the appeal stands rejected. 14. 12. In view of the facts and circumstances and law laid down by the Apex Court, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment and award, which has been assailed in the present appeal. 13. Accordingly, the appeal stands rejected. 14. In view of dismissal of this appeal, the statutory amount, which was deposited at the time of filing of the appeal, is directed to be remitted back to the court below for its payment/adjustment against the award amount. ?