ORAL ORDER 1. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner invokes supervisory jurisdiction of this Court questioning the correctness and validity of revisional order dated 30/08/12 passed by the Commissioner, Surguja, Division - Ambikapur by which petitioner's revision against order dated 30/05/07 passed by the Collector, Ramanujganj has been dismissed. 2. The relevant factual matrix giving rise to this petition are stated infra-Respondents filed an application purporting to be under Section l70-B of the C.G. Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Revenue, Ramanujganj for direction to return land from the petitioner alleging that Munga Sao, father of the petitioner fraudulently got a sale deed executed in favour of Sukni Devi by their father late Bucha. It was alleged that the transaction was fraudulently intended to deprive their fattier, a tribe, from his property without there being any permission from the Collector as required under Section 165 (6) of the Code. The application was moved in the year 2005. After making enquiry, the Sub-Divisional Officer passed an order of return of land on 30/03/05 on the findings that the seller Bucha was a tribe and sale deed was executed on 04/07/85 by late Bucha in favour of Sukni Devi which was a benami transaction, Munga being the ostensible owner. This was done without obtaining permission of the Collector, though the transaction was between the non-tribe and a tribe, thus, the transaction being fraudulent in nature. Aggrieved by the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Collector which was dismissed, against which, revision was preferred, though unsuccessfully. Thus, giving rise to instant petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Collector as well as the Commissioner exceeded their jurisdiction in directing return of land and affirmation thereof that late Bucha belonged to 'Nagesia' tribe. The Sub-Divisional Officer, without authority of law held that 'Kissan' is a sub-caste of notified tribe 'Nagesia'. Proceeding on this erroneous assumption of law and fact, the Sub-Divisional Officer held the tram, action fraudulent on the ground that the transaction of sale required permission of the Collector as required under Section 165 (6) of the Code. The Collector affirmed the order by holding that 'Kissan' was merely a title and infact, 'Kissan' is nothing but 'Nagesia'. Therefore, 'Kissan' and 'Nagesia' are one and the same. The Collector affirmed the order by holding that 'Kissan' was merely a title and infact, 'Kissan' is nothing but 'Nagesia'. Therefore, 'Kissan' and 'Nagesia' are one and the same. On this reasoning, the Collector also held that the transaction being one between a tribe and a non-tribe, it required permission of the Collector under Section 165 of the Code. 4. He further contended that the revisional authority though held that 'kissan' cannot be treated as sub-caste of 'Nagesia' and included as part of 'Nagesia', without there being any such stipulation in the notification of the scheduled tribes, committed apparent illegality in holding-that the old transaction cannot be re-opened in view of State Government's circular dated 04/02/11 (Annexure P/5). According to him, it was not permissible under the law to hold 'Kissan' as sub-caste or part of scheduled tribe 'Nagesia' by any process of reasoning. This is exclusively within the domain of the parliament to include, exclude or amend the notification declaring the tribe under the constitutional scheme. Therefore, the order of return of land has been passed and affirmed in excess of jurisdiction. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the community known as 'Kissan' is nothing but 'Nagesia' tribe only. The Revenue Courts traced the history as to how title 'Kissan' came to be attached to members of 'Nagesia' tribe in the tribal areas of Jashpur district. By such a reasoning, notified list of scheduled tribe, in relation to the State of Chhattisgarh has neither been amended nor modified but all that has been done is to explain as to who are historically included as part of 'Nagesia' tribe. Therefore, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and affirmed by the appellate and revisional authority does not suffer from any illegality whatsoever. 6. The seminal issue of importance arising for consideration in this petition is whether it was permissible for the Sub-Divisional Officer and other Revenue Courts to declare that 'Kissan' community is included in the scheduled tribe 'Nagesia'. 7. The line of reasoning which appears to have been adopted by the Sub-Divisional Officer is that 'Kissan' community is only sub-tribe of 'Nagesia' tribe. The Collector, while affirming the order in appeal, has recorded a finding that 'Kissan' is only a title but in effect 'Kissan' is a community in Nagesia tribe only. 7. The line of reasoning which appears to have been adopted by the Sub-Divisional Officer is that 'Kissan' community is only sub-tribe of 'Nagesia' tribe. The Collector, while affirming the order in appeal, has recorded a finding that 'Kissan' is only a title but in effect 'Kissan' is a community in Nagesia tribe only. The revisional authority though held that this exercise of equating a community as part of another tribe community is not permissible under the law, the revision was dismissed by holding that whatever benefits have been given, cannot be withdrawn as ordered by the State Government vide circular dated 04/02111. 8. On the issue as to whether it is permissible for any authority or even Court of law to declare a particular caste as part of a notified tribe, it has been set at rest and no longer res integra in view of authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind (2001) 1 Supreme Court 4. The Supreme Court, after examining the constitutional scheme of declaring a particular caste or tribe as scheduled caste or scheduled tribe having regard to the provisions contained in Article 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India and the ratio of two earlier Constitution Bench judgments in the case of Basavalingappa Vs. D. Munichinnappa AIR 1965 SC 1269 , and Bhaiya Lal Vs. Harikishan Singh AIR 1965 SC 1557 , held as under: (at page 24 of the report) "28. Being in respectful agreement, we reaffirm the ratio of the two Constitution Bench judgments aforementioned and stated in clear terms that no inquiry at all is permissible and no evidence can be let in, to find out and decide that if any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is included within the scope and meaning of the entry concerned in the Presidential Order when it 'is not so expressly or specifically included. Hence, we answer Question 1 in the negative." Legal position was summarized in para 36 of the judgment which is quoted here-in-below- "36. In the light of what is stated above, the following positions emerge: 1. Hence, we answer Question 1 in the negative." Legal position was summarized in para 36 of the judgment which is quoted here-in-below- "36. In the light of what is stated above, the following positions emerge: 1. It is not at all permissible to hold any inquiry or let in any evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is included in the general name even though it is not specifically mentioned in the entry concerned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. 2. The Scheduled Tribes Order be read as it is. It is not even permissible to say that a tribe, sub-tribe, part of or group of any tribe or tribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned in the Scheduled Tribes Order if they are not so specifically mentioned in it. 3. A notification issued under clause (1) of Article 342, specifying Scheduled Tribes, can be amended only by law to be made by Parliament. In other words, any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe can be included or excluded from the list of Scheduled Tribes issued under clause (1) of Article 342 only by Parliament by law and by no other authority. 4. It is not open to State Governments or courts or tribunals or any other authority to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the notification issued under clause (1) of Article 342. 5. Decisions of the Division Benches of this Court in Bhaiya Ram Munda Vs. Anirudh Patar, (1970) 2 SCC 825 and Dina Vithoba Naronwara Vs. Narain Singh, 38 ELR 212 did not lay down law correctly in stating that the inquiry was permissible and the evidence was admissible within the limitations indicated for the purpose of showing what an entry in the Presidential Order was intended to be. As stated in Position (1) above no inquiry at all is pern1issible and no evidence can be let in, in the matter." 9. The exercise which was undertaken by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector in appeal in the instant case runs contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Milind's easel. As stated in Position (1) above no inquiry at all is pern1issible and no evidence can be let in, in the matter." 9. The exercise which was undertaken by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector in appeal in the instant case runs contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Milind's easel. It was not at all open for the two authorities or for that matter, any other authority, except the parliament to include or exclude, amend or vary the list of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe notified under Article 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India. It is the parliament and parliament alone which can amend the list or declare by making any amendment or addition in a particular entry that a particular community, caste or tribe is a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. No amount of enquiry, historical or otherwise, can authorize the Revenue Courts to declare that any particular group or tribe or tribal community or part or group within any tribe or tribal community is included in the general name even though it is not specifically mentioned in the entry concerned in the Constitution (scheduled tribes) order 1950. The scheduled tribes order must be read as it is. It is not even permissible to say that the tribe, sub-tribe, part or group of any tribe or tribal community is synonymous to the one mentioned in the scheduled tribes order if they are not so specifically mentioned in it. A notification issued under clause (1) of Article 342 specifying scheduled tribes, can be amended only by law to be made by the parliament. Any kind of inclusion or exclusion from the list of scheduled tribe issued under clause 1 of Article 342 of the Constitution of India can take place only by the parliament and by no authority. It is not permissible for the Revenue Courts or Tribunals or any other authority to modify, amend or alter the list of scheduled tribes specified under the notification issued under Clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. The orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector were, therefore, clearly without sanctity and authority of law and in complete ignorance of the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on the Courts and Tribunals under Article 341 of the Constitution of India. The revisional authority adopted a peculiar approach. The orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Collector were, therefore, clearly without sanctity and authority of law and in complete ignorance of the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on the Courts and Tribunals under Article 341 of the Constitution of India. The revisional authority adopted a peculiar approach. Though it held that in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Milind (Supra), it was not open to enter into any such enquiry, taking recourse to the circular dated 04/02/11 passed by the State Government, it went on to hold, though erroneously, that constitutional benefits which had already been conferred prior to circular dated 04/02/11 could not be reopened. This reasoning and conclusion of revisional authority has no legal basis. It is not a case where late Bucha was conferred some benefit as scheduled tribe on the basis of circular dated 13/03/01 issued by the State Government which was sought to be withdrawn. Infact, the transaction of sale had taken place in the year 1985. Even at that point of time, the scheduled tribes order notified under clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution of India did not include 'Kissan' as sub-tribe of scheduled tribe 'Nagesia'. In the absence of any such inclusion, 'Kissan' could never be treated as scheduled tribe. Bucha stated to be belonging to 'Kissan' community. Thus, there was no requirement of seeking permission of the Collector as required under Section 165 (6) of the Code. The State Government's circular dated 13/03/01 itself was completely misconceived and it could not confer any benefit to one who is not included in the list of scheduled tribe notified under clause (1) of Article 342 of the Constitution of India. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Milind (Supra) re-affirmed the earlier view taken by earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Basavalingappa (supra) and Bhaiya Lal (supra). It appears that on the basis of the order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the State Government of Chhattisgarh issued circular dated 16/03/01 directing that the 'Kissan' community be treated as part of 'Nagesia' tribe. This course of action was wholly impermissible under the law and clearly in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Basavalingappa (supra) and Bhaiya Lal (supra) reaffirmed in Milind's easel. This course of action was wholly impermissible under the law and clearly in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of Basavalingappa (supra) and Bhaiya Lal (supra) reaffirmed in Milind's easel. The State Government rightly withdrew communication dated 16/03/01 vide its order 04/02/11 (Annexure PIS). Merely because an application for return of land was filed by the respondent claiming it to be a tribe on the strength of circular dated 16/03/01, the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer cannot be said to be in accordance with law declared by the Supreme Court which is binding on all Courts and Tribunals. The circular dated 16/03/01 could not have conferred any benefit on 'Kissan' community by treating them as scheduled tribe being part of 'Nagesia' scheduled tribe. Moreover, the order of Sub-Divisional Officer was under challenge in the review petition which was pending before the Board of Revenue when circular dated 04/02111 was passed. 10. Viewed from any angle, the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Collector and Commissioner have no sanctity of law. The orders are clearly in excess of jurisdiction and authority vested under the law. In the result, this petition has to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the Commissioner in revision affirming the orders of the Collector and Sub-Divisional Officer is set aside and the respondents' application under Section 170-B of the Land Revenue Code is dismissed. Petition Allowed.