JUDGMENT : Sambuddha Chakrabarti, J. 1. The petitioner worked as a constable of the Border Security Force (BSF, for short). He joined the Force on February 15, 1990. On July 06, 1996, he was served with a notice of show-cause whereby the Commandant of the concerned Battalion, i.e. the respondent no. 4 herein at which he was working at that point of time had informed him that because of the punishments awarded to him and the adverse entries recorded in the petitioner's service book the authority concerned was of the opinion that he was unsuitable for further retention in the Force and proposed to retire him from service in terms of Rule 26 of the Border Security Force Rules, 1969. In terms of Rule 26 he was given 15 days' time to give a reply to the said notice. 2. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply on July 26, 1996 disputing the allegations made in the show-cause notice. The reply, however, was not found to be satisfactory to the respondent no. 4 and by Order dated August 10, 1996 he was retired from service with effect from August 31, 1996. 3. This order was challenged by the petitioner in an earlier writ petition being C.R. No. 13826 (W) of 1996. By an Order dated July 17, 2002 a learned Single Judge of this Court had, inter-alia, set aside the impugned order dated August 10, 1996 and directed the authority to consider the reply to the show-cause notice by affording adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and by passing a reasoned order. While disposing of the earlier writ petition it was observed that even if Rule 26 of the Border Security Force Rules empowers the authority to compel a member of the Force to retire prematurely on the ground of unsuitability, appropriate opportunity was to be given to the delinquent to explain his conduct in reply to the notice. 4. Pursuant to the said order the respondent no. 4 gave a hearing to the petitioner and passed an order on February 11, 2003 confirming the earlier stand taken by the respondent no. 4 in the order dated August 10, 1996. 5. This subsequent order passed by the respondent no. 4 is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition. 6. One observation made in the order impugned in the present writ petition is both confusing and baffling. 4 in the order dated August 10, 1996. 5. This subsequent order passed by the respondent no. 4 is the subject-matter of challenge in the present writ petition. 6. One observation made in the order impugned in the present writ petition is both confusing and baffling. The respondent no. 4 while passing the subsequent order had observed that the petitioner's reply to the show-cause notice was not received by the respondent no. 4 within the stipulated time and then the Commandant of the concerned Battalion had retired him as per the provisions of the Act. It appears that the Commandant had held (Annexure - P/3 to the writ petition) that "I am not satisfied that the explanation offered by him/it is presumed that you have nothing to urge in your defence in this regard." Again, in the previous paragraph the authorities had recorded "your reply to the said show-cause notice has been perused by me/no reply received from your side." 7. This raises an unfortunate presumption that orders in different forms were kept ready and in regular course they were to be issued after striking out the inapplicable portion. It is time for us to appreciate that when it comes to making a man lose his livelihood and throwing him out of his employment a more meticulous application of mind is the least that can be expected by the authorities. Such pre-arranged format of letters are not to be expected to be used to tell a man that his services are not required. 8. Mr. Dutta, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents also did not appreciate the practise. He says that even if the authorities have a very good ground to proceed against an employee such pre-arranged format should not have been used because there is always a lurking suspicion of non-application of mind by the authorities concerned. 9. Coming to the merits of the case I do not find that the respondent no. 4 has given any detailed reason why he considered the reply given by the petitioner to be not satisfactory. The order impugned can be divided into three parts. The points taken by the petitioner have been summed up in paragraph 3 under different sub-headings which have not been properly dealt with. The points urged by the petitioner were required to be considered and either rejected or accepted with reasons. The respondent no. The order impugned can be divided into three parts. The points taken by the petitioner have been summed up in paragraph 3 under different sub-headings which have not been properly dealt with. The points urged by the petitioner were required to be considered and either rejected or accepted with reasons. The respondent no. 4 had done nothing other than summarising the points raised by the petitioner in his reply. In paragraph 12 of the order he has merely held that he was not satisfied with the explanation offered by the petitioner. This is a subjective conclusion without virtually any objective basis. 10. The only reason that appears to have gone against the petitioner as a member of the Force is that in the past he had committed certain mistakes for which he was adequately dealt with and punished. This was not a new information in the present impugned order. In the show-cause notice dated July 06, 2006 the past punishments received by him were also mentioned as the reason for considering him unsuitable for further retention in the Force. 11. Adverse entries in the service record or past performance which includes the punishment awarded by the employer are most certainly very valid considerations and an employer is entitled to take them into account while considering any further punishment to be imposed upon an employee if he ever commits any further mistake. For example, an employee might have committed two wrong acts for which he was punished twice. This may be a very valid consideration for an employer if in future he is to impose a punishment for any other wrong committed by the employee. But when there is no such occasion, i.e. when he has not committed any fresh misconduct merely because he was punished in the past for certain offences or misconducts might not be a valid ground for not holding him suitable to be retained in the Force. That is not the spirit of the Rule. 12. The submissions of Mr. Dutta that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the past were very serious may not be disputed for once. But the fact remains that the authority did not invoke Rule 26 while imposing the last punishment when they had an occasion so to do. That is not the spirit of the Rule. 12. The submissions of Mr. Dutta that the charges levelled against the petitioner in the past were very serious may not be disputed for once. But the fact remains that the authority did not invoke Rule 26 while imposing the last punishment when they had an occasion so to do. If the petitioner had unauthorisedly absented himself for three days he was already punished under Section 19 of the Act by ten days' rigorous imprisonment. The authorities might at that time have invoked Rule 26 and found him to be unsuitable to be retained in the Force. 13. Therefore, I find no occasion to invoke Rule 26 in the month of July, i.e. about four months after the last punishment was imposed upon the petitioner when he had not committed any fresh offence. It is true that Rule 26 gives sufficient power to the appropriate authority to punish an unsuitable person. But for that there must be an occasion. That a member of the Force was penalised twice or thrice in the past cannot be suddenly taken out of the sleeves and held to be as a ground for chucking him out of the Force when he had not committed any fresh misconduct. The purpose for which Rule 26 had been incorporated appears either not to have been appreciated by the authorities or totally abused by them. 14. Mr. Dutta has drawn my attention to paragraph 8 of the order impugned which speaks of an instruction from the confidential cell emphasising that retention of persons who have had four or more bad entries might become a security risk to the nation and so he should not continue in service and should be retired on the grounds of unsuitability in public interest. 15. This circular was never mentioned either in the show-cause notice or in the first order of compulsory retirement. Mr. Majumder, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner on instruction has submitted that such a confidential circular was an internal circular for the office. Mr. Dutta is not in a position to rebutt this statement. If a circular is invoked for taking a man's means of livelihood the contents of the circular must be made known to him before the authorities may be permitted to apply the same. Mr. Dutta is not in a position to rebutt this statement. If a circular is invoked for taking a man's means of livelihood the contents of the circular must be made known to him before the authorities may be permitted to apply the same. The petitioner's assertion that he had no knowledge about the circular goes entirely unchallenged. That apart, if they had wanted to invoke the circular of 1992 it is not understood why they did not do it when the last punishment was imposed upon him which was after the year 1992. 16. The respondents have not used any affidavit-in-opposition. Assuming that the concerned circular had been received by the appropriate authority it cannot be made applicable retrospectively. Otherwise, an employee will always run the risk of suffering an order for doing something which was not an offence when he did it and his very fundamental right will be affected in the process. If one looks at the list of the past conducts which had weighed with the authorities I find that the first one had taken place in the year 1991, i.e. before the said circular came into effect. The respondent no. 4 before confirming the earlier order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner failed to advert himself to this basic principle of service jurisprudence and made a subsequent order retrospectively applicable to the petitioner which is normally not permissible in law. Therefore, while invoking the said circular of 1992, the authorities should not have taken the misconduct of 1991. 17. I, thus, find sufficient force in the case of the petitioner and equally lack of justification in the order impugned. 18. Since the matter was once remanded to the respondent no. 4 I find no reason to send the matter back to the said authority over again. The order dated April 11, 2003 passed by the respondent no. 4 herein is set aside and quashed. 19. My attention has been drawn to a very interesting aspect of the order. The order of compulsory retirement, passed by the respondent no. 4 on August 10, 1996, had already been set aside and quashed by this Court while disposing of the earlier writ petition. The matter had been sent back to the respondent no. 4 for fresh consideration. The respondent no. The order of compulsory retirement, passed by the respondent no. 4 on August 10, 1996, had already been set aside and quashed by this Court while disposing of the earlier writ petition. The matter had been sent back to the respondent no. 4 for fresh consideration. The respondent no. 4 by the order impugned in this present writ petition found no merit in the representation of the petitioner and rejected it. But he nonetheless forgot to pass any consequential order. Now the result of such a failure is that the earlier order which had been set aside had not been reimposed. In any case, I have found that the presently impugned order is clearly not sustainable assuming that this omission was an inadvertent error. 20. I direct the authorities to allow the petitioner to join the Force within four weeks from the date of communication of the order. The respondents are also directed to pay the petitioner the unpaid full salary for the period during which he was compulsorily kept out of employment. The respondent shall make the payment in six equal instalments, first of such instalment shall be paid to him by the first week of February, 2015. Needless to mention this will be over and above the current salary that the petitioner shall be entitled to after he is taken back to the Force. 21. The writ petition is allowed. 22. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties on the usual undertakings. Petition is allowed.