JUDGMENT Civil Misc. Review Application No. 241265 of 2013 Ram Surat Ram (Maurya),J. Heard Sri Salil Kumar Rai holding brief of Sri Rajesh Kumar, for the petitioner/ review applicant. 2. The writ petition was filed for quashing the order of Consolidation Officer dated 24.06.2003 and Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 28.02.2011, arising out of the proceeding under Section 12 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). After exchange of the pleading and hearing the arguments of the parties the writ petition was decided by judgment dated 01.08.2013. The petitioner has filed this review application. 3. The dispute was in respect of property of khata 107 of village Nabi Nagar, tahsil Anoop Shahar district Bulandshahar, which was recorded in the name of Tunda, who died on 24.09.1994. Kunwarpal Singh (respondent-3) filed an application under Section 12 of the Act for mutating his name as an heir of Tunda, on the basis of registered will dated 12.05.1982. Smt. Asharfi Devi (respondent-4) contested the aforesaid case on the ground that Tunda had two sons Madan Lal and Kunwarpal. She was widow of Madan Lal as such she inherited 1/2 share in the land in dispute on the death of Tunda and Tunda had not executed any will. The Consolidation Officer, by his order dated 24.06.2003, found that due execution of the will was proved by attesting witness Khan Chand. As such Kunwarpal Singh alone inherited the property in dispute after death of Tunda and directed for recording his name alone as an heir of Tunda. Smt. Asharfi Devi (respondent-4) filed an appeal from the aforesaid order. The appeal was allowed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, by order dated 06.01.2010 on the ground that statement of Khan Chand was not recorded by Consolidation Officer rather his affidavit has been relied upon without giving any opportunity to cross examine him. Kunwarpal Singh filed a revision from the aforesaid order. In the meantime Smt. Asharfi Devi (respondent-4) executed a sale deed dated 09.02.2010 in favour of the petitioner Smt. Pushpa Devi. The Consolidation Officer by order dated 12.05.2010 mutated the name of the petitioner. Kunwarpal Singh filed another revision from the order dated 12.05.2010. Both the revisions were heard together and allowed by Deputy Director of Consolidation by judgment dated 28.02.2011. Hence the writ petition was filed. 4. The Consolidation Officer by order dated 12.05.2010 mutated the name of the petitioner. Kunwarpal Singh filed another revision from the order dated 12.05.2010. Both the revisions were heard together and allowed by Deputy Director of Consolidation by judgment dated 28.02.2011. Hence the writ petition was filed. 4. Before this Court, the petitioner argued that the will was highly suspicious document as Smt. Asharfi Devi was widow daughter-in-law of Tunda and was residing with him but no provision has been made for her maintenance. Khan Chand, the attesting witness had already died on 25.11.1994 and in his place some imposter was examined before Consolidation Officer as such due execution of the will was not proved. This Court in the judgment dated 01.08.2013 found that death certificate of Khan Chand as produced by the petitioner was a forged document while death certificate produced by the respondent it was proved that Khan Chand died on 16.06.2002 while his statements was recorded before Consolidation Officer on 30.12.1998. It was found that statement of Khan Chand was recorded before Consolidation Officer. As the litigation was going on between Smt. Asharfi Devi and Tunda for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as such relation between them was not good. In order to save his property from a widow daughter-in-law who was in litigating term, the registered will was executed by Tunda on 12.05.1982. Tunda died on 24.09.1994 but he did not cancel his will which proved that he did not change his opinion for Smt. Asharfi Devi. On these findings writ petition was dismissed. 5. In the review application, the counsel for the petitioner argued that the will is required to be attested under Section 63 (C) of Indian Succession Act, 1925. Due execution of the will is required to be proved according to the provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872. From the statement of Khan Chand attestation of the will was not proved as such no order could be passed on its basis. A perusal of the judgment of Deputy Director of Consolidation as well as the writ petition shows that no such point was ever raised by the petitioner. From the statement of Khan Chand attestation of the will was not proved as such no order could be passed on its basis. A perusal of the judgment of Deputy Director of Consolidation as well as the writ petition shows that no such point was ever raised by the petitioner. As mentioned above, in the writ petition, the petitioner on the basis of fabricated documents raised a point that Khan Chand, the attesting witness had already died on 25.11.1994 and in his place some imposter was examined before Consolidation Officer as such due execution of the will was not proved, which was not accepted by the Court. Now in review application a totally different point is being raised. 6. Indian Succession Act, 1925 came into force on 30.09.1925. Section 63 provides the mode of execution of 'unprivileged will'. By Amendment Act No. 27 of 1926, definition of word "attested" has been inserted in Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Relevant provisions are quoted below:- Section 63. Execution of unprivileged wills.- Every testator, not being a solder employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare or an airman so employed or engaged or a mariner at sea, shall execute his will according to the following rules,- (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his marks to the will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. (b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. (c) The will shall be attested to two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; and each of the shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. Section 3. Section 3. Interpretation clause.- "attested" in relation to an instrument means and shall be deemed always to have meant attested by two or more witnesses each of whom has seen the executant sign or affixed his mark to the instrument, or has seen some other person sign the instrument, in the presence and by the direction of the executant, or has received from the executant a personal acknowledgment of his signature or mark, or of the signature of such other person; and each of the shall sign the instrument in the presence of the executant, but it shall not be necessary that more than one of such witnesses shall have been present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. Section 68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.- If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence. 7. The word "execution" has not been defined under these Acts. Dictionary meaning of 'execution'" is " the completion of an act or instrument". 8. Section 61 of the Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the contents of a document may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. Primary evidence is the document itself. Section 67 requires to prove signature and handwriting of the persons by whom documents is alleged to be signed. Section 68 provides for proving execution of a document, required by law to be attested by at least one attesting witness. Supreme Court in N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy, (2001) 7 SCC 503 , held that the definition of the term ''attested' which is almost identical with that contained in Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, has been the result of an amendment introduced by Act 27 of 1926. The amending Act 27 of 1926 modified the definition of the term in the Transfer of Property Act so as to make a person who merely obtains an acknowledgement of execution and affixed his signature to the document as a witness, an attestor. It will be noticed that although Section 3 purports to define the word ''attested' it has not really done so. It will be noticed that although Section 3 purports to define the word ''attested' it has not really done so. The effect of the definition is only to give an extended meaning of the term for the purpose of the Act; the word ''attest' is used as a part of the definition itself. It is, therefore, necessary first to ascertain the meaning of the word ''attest' independent of the statute and adopt it in the light of the extended or qualified meaning given herein. The word ''attest' means, according to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary ''to bear witness to, to affirm the truth of genuineness of, testify, certify'. After the amendment of Section 3 by Act 27 of 1926, a person can be said to have validly attested an instrument, if he has actually seen the executant sign, and in a case where he had not personally witnessed execution, if he has received from the executant a personal acknowledgement of his signature, mark etc. Thus of the two significant requirements of the term ''attest', namely, (1) that the attestor should witness the execution, which implies his presence, then, and (2) that he should certify or vouch for the execution by subscribing his name as a witness, which implies a consciousness and an intention to attest, the amending Act modified only the first; the result is that a person can be an attesting witness, even if he had not witnessed the actual execution, by merely receiving personal acknowledgement from the executant of having executed the document and putting his signature. But the amendment did not affect in any way the necessity for the latter requirement, namely, certifying execution which implies that the attesting witness had the animus to attest." 9. Supreme Court again in Savithri Vs. Karthyayani Amma, (2007) 11 SCC 621 held that Section 63 of the Succession Act lays down the mode and manner of execution of an unprivileged will. Section 68 of the Evidence Act postulates the mode and manner of which proof of execution of document which is required by law to be attested. It in unequivocal terms states that execution of will must be proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. It in unequivocal terms states that execution of will must be proved at least by one attesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. A will is to prove what is loosely called as primary evidence, except where proof is permitted by leading secondary evidence. Unlike other documents, proof of execution of any other document under the Act would not be sufficient as in terms of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, execution must be proved at least by one of the attesting witnesses. While making attestation, there must be an animus attestandi, on the part of the attesting witness, meaning thereby, he must intend to attest and extrinsic evidence on this point is receivable. 10. In this case, Khan Chand, in his statement has stated that Tunda executed registered will dated 12.05.1982 in favour of his son Kunwarpal. After looking to the original will he had stated that this will was executed by Tunda. The original registered will dated 12.05.1982 was produced in evidence. Due execution of the will by Tunda was proved by Khan Chand who was attesting witness. Mode of execution of the will has been given under Section 63 of Indian Succession Act, 1925. In the absence of any format of attestation, signing of the will by the attesting witness with the animus to attest is sufficient compliance. Finding of fact recorded by consolidation authorities that due execution was proved, does not required to be interfered by this Court. 11. There is no analogous provision like Article 137 of the Constitution, which provides jurisdiction of review to a writ Court. In view of Explanation added to Section 141 C.P.C., a writ Court cannot invoke the provisions of Section 114 read with Order 47 C.P.C., for review. Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 also does not gives jurisdiction of review to a writ Court. In exercise of inherent powers only error apparent can be corrected in the final judgment. Even if the judgment is erroneous, it cannot be reviewed in the absence of any specific provision in this respect. Jurisdiction of review, even under C.P.C. is also very limited. In exercise of inherent powers only error apparent can be corrected in the final judgment. Even if the judgment is erroneous, it cannot be reviewed in the absence of any specific provision in this respect. Jurisdiction of review, even under C.P.C. is also very limited. Supreme Court in Haridas Das v. Usharani Banik, (2006) 4 SCC 78 , held in order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit". The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the Explanation to Rule 1 of Order 47 which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. 12. Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise v. RDC,Concrete (India) Private Ltd. (2011) 12 SCC 166, held a mistake apparent on record must be an obvious and patent mistake and the mistake should not be such which can be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning. Again in Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. 12. Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise v. RDC,Concrete (India) Private Ltd. (2011) 12 SCC 166, held a mistake apparent on record must be an obvious and patent mistake and the mistake should not be such which can be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning. Again in Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Mawasi, (2012) 7 SCC 200 , a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the review application has no merit and is rejected. _______________