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2014 DIGILAW 976 (GUJ)

Naynaben Babubhai Hathila v. State of Gujarat

2014-09-02

K.M.THAKER

body2014
JUDGMENT K.M. Thaker, J. 1. In present petition, the petitioner has prayed, inter alia, that: "7B. Your Lordship may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction by quashing and setting aside the order dated 5-11-2011 passed by the Additional Development Commissioner, Gandhinagar in Application No. 151 of 2011 as well as the order dated 11-8-2014 passed by the Development Commissioner, Gandhinagar in Appeal No. 4 of 2011, in the interest of justice." So far as relevant facts are concerned, it has emerged from the record and from the submissions by learned Counsel for the contesting parties that in October, 2010 the petitioner came to be elected as Sarpanch of Dahod Gram Panchayat. Subsequently, an application came to be filed requesting the District Development Officer (hereinafter referred to as "the D.D.O.") to declare that the petitioner is disqualified in view of the provisions under Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), inasmuch as the petitioner had given birth to a third child, which violated the provision under Sec. 30(1)(m) introduced by Local Authorities Amendment Act, 2005 and rendered her (i.e. the petitioner) disqualified from being elected, or to continue, as member of local authority. 1.1. The Taluka Development Officer, Dahod (hereinafter referred to as "the T.D.O.") made inquiry into the said complaint and after making necessary inquiry, the T.D.O. submitted a report which clarified that the petitioner already had two children and that she had given birth to a third child on 16-10-2007, however, the said third child died within three days, i.e. on 19-10-2007, and that on the date of the election and when the petitioner came to be elected as Sarpanch, she had only two children. 1.2. After considering the said report, the D.D.O. appears to have forwarded the communication/report dated 18/23-5-2011. The D.D.O. considered the report wherefrom he noticed that while the petitioner already had two children she had given birth to third child. In that view of the matter, vide notice dated 13-9-2011, the D.D.O. called for petitioner's explanation as to why she should not be disqualified under the provisions of Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. 1.3. The D.D.O. considered the report wherefrom he noticed that while the petitioner already had two children she had given birth to third child. In that view of the matter, vide notice dated 13-9-2011, the D.D.O. called for petitioner's explanation as to why she should not be disqualified under the provisions of Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. 1.3. It appears that the petitioner submitted her reply dated 10-10-2011 stating, inter alia, that the provisions prescribing disqualification in specified circumstances was not attracted and applicable in her case and the complaint was lodged with mala fide intention by the candidate, who lost the election against her. The petitioner also alleged that the said notice and proposed proceedings are instituted out of political rivalry. According to the petitioner, the Additional Development Commissioner, ignored the fact that the third child had died within three days after birth, i.e. on 19-10-2007 and was not alive on relevant date and at the time when she was elected during the election held in 2010, she had only two children. According to the petitioner, the said authority ignored the relevant fact and her reply/explanation and vide order dated 5-11-2011, declared the petitioner as disqualified in view of provisions under Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Act. 1.4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Development Commissioner, Gandhinagar. It appears that, initially, the Development Commissioner entertained the appeal/revision and also passed an order staying the operation and implementation of the said order dated 5-11-2011, however, subsequently, after hearing the petitioner and considering the material on record, the Development Commissioner dismissed the appeal vide order dated 11-8-2014. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said order dated 11-8-2014. Hence, present petition. 2. The learned Advocate for the petitioner would contend that on the relevant date i.e. the date on which the election was notified and also on the date on which the petitioner filed her candidature and also the date of election, the petitioner had only two children and though she had given birth to a third child, the said third child died after three days and was not alive on the relevant date i.e. date of the election or even on the date of nomination, and therefore, the petitioner's case does not come within the purview of the provision. 2.1. 2.1. While assailing the impugned order learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent authority failed to consider that the facts of her case are different from the case on which the respondent authority relied while rejecting the petitioner's appeal. It is claimed that in the said decision ( 2010 (2) GLH 58 : 2010 (1) GLR 686 , Mulchandbhai Jethabhai Parmar v. District Development Officer) election was held in April, 2007 and during the said election the petitioner in that petition was elected as Member of Panchayat and he became father of fourth child on 5-8-2008, i.e. the fourth child was born after the said petitioner was elected as Member of the Panchayat and during the period while his membership continued, and that therefore, the Court held that the said petitioner incurred disqualification though the said fourth child died within short time. According to learned Counsel for present petitioner, her case should not be equated with the case of the petitioner in the cited decision because according to the facts of the said case, the birth of the child took place after the petitioner (in the said case) was elected and during the period he continued to be the member of the Panchayat which was after the amendment came in force whereas in her case, she did not have more than two children either on the date of notification declaring election or on the date of voting and or on the date when she was declared elected, and therefore, the said decision is not applicable in her case. Any other submission is not made. 3. The factual aspects are not in dispute. 3.1. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has two children, viz. Priyanka B. Hathila and Pritesh B. Hathila. 3.2. It is not in dispute that the date of birth of first child - Priyanka - is 23-7-2001 and the date of birth of second child - Pritesh - is 12-6-2003. The cut-off date i.e. the date of commencement of Amendment Act is 4-8-2005. 3.3. It is also not in dispute that on 16-10-2007, the petitioner gave birth to third child. 3.4. It is also not in dispute that the election (when the petitioner came to be elected) of the Panchayat was held in October, 2010. 3.5. The cut-off date i.e. the date of commencement of Amendment Act is 4-8-2005. 3.3. It is also not in dispute that on 16-10-2007, the petitioner gave birth to third child. 3.4. It is also not in dispute that the election (when the petitioner came to be elected) of the Panchayat was held in October, 2010. 3.5. It is not in dispute that the said third child was born after expiry of more than one year from the date on which the previsions under Sec. 30(1)(m) came into force and that the said third child died on 19-10-2007. 3.6. In background of such facts, Mr. Ramesh Bijia Rathod had submitted an application/complaint dated 2-11-2010 to the D.D.O. with a request that Ms. Naynaben, Member of the Panchayat (i.e. the petitioner herein) should be declared as disqualified in light of the provisions under Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Act. 3.7. The competent authority instituted inquiry which, ultimately, culminated into the impugned order dated 11-8-2014 passed by the Development Commissioner, Gandhinagar whereby the petitioner is declared disqualified as Member of the Panchayat and as Sarpanch of the Panchayat. 4. So as to consider the contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner, it would be appropriate to take into account the provisions under Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Act, which reads thus: "Section 30: Disqualification of: (1) no person shall be a member of a Panchayat or continue as such who- (m) has more than two children; Provided that a person having more than two children on the date of commencement of the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 (Gujarat 17 of 2005) shall not be disqualified under this clause so long as the number of children he had on the date of such commencement does not increase; Provided further that a child or more than one child born in a single delivery within the period of one year from the date of such commencement shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of disqualification under this clause." 5. In order to appreciate the submission and so as to examine said provision, it is relevant and necessary to also take into account the object of the amendment which introduced and brought in force the said provision. The statement of objects and reasons of the said Amendment Act of 2005 reads thus: "The growth of the population in India is alarming. The statement of objects and reasons of the said Amendment Act of 2005 reads thus: "The growth of the population in India is alarming. In order to stabilize the rapid growth of population, it is considered necessary to amend the local authorities laws so as to prevent a person having more than two children to be a member of Panchayat, or the Councillor of Municipality or of a Municipal Corporation. This is an important step towards the implementation of national population policy. Since, the proposed legislation has prospective effect, a provision has been made to the effect that a person having more than two children prior to the commencement of the proposed amendment would be saved from incurring such disqualification. This Bill seeks to amend the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, to achieve the aforesaid object." 6. On plain reading of said Sec. 30(1)(m), it emerges that law prohibits a person to be Member of the Panchayat or a Corporator of Municipality or Municipal Corporation or to continue as Member of the Panchayat or Corporator of Municipality or Municipal Corporation, if he has incurred - or if he incurs - any disqualification from amongst the disqualifications specified in clauses (a) to (m) of sub-sec. (1) of said Sec. 30. 6.1. According to clause (m), which is relevant in view of the facts of present case, a person who has more than two children is not entitled to be a Member of the Panchayat or to continue as Member of the Panchayat or as a Councilor of a Municipality or Municipal Corporation. 6.2. The said disqualification will be applicable at the stage when a person contests the election as well as at subsequent stage, i.e. during the period of membership of the person elected as member of the Panchayat or Councillor in Municipality or Municipal Corporation. 6.3. It also becomes clear from plain reading of the said Section that the provision in clause (m) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 is prospective. Since, the said provision is not retrospective, two provisos under clause (m) have been provided and in each of the provisos exception have been carved out. 6.4. 6.3. It also becomes clear from plain reading of the said Section that the provision in clause (m) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 is prospective. Since, the said provision is not retrospective, two provisos under clause (m) have been provided and in each of the provisos exception have been carved out. 6.4. First proviso of clause (m) clarifies and provides that a person having more than two children on the date of commencement of the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 shall not be disqualified by virtue of the said provision provided the number of the children the person had on the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act of 2005 does not increase after the cut-off date. 6.5. Thus, if on the date of the commencement of the said Amendment Act, a person having more than two children is a member of Panchayat or the Councillor of the Municipality or Municipal Corporation he shall not be disqualified under said clause (m) for continuing as member of the Panchayat or Councillor of municipality or Municipal Corporation. Besides this, such person shall not be disqualified to contest election of the Panchayat or Municipality or Municipal Corporation, so long as the number of children he had on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act does not increase after the cut-off date. 6.6. However, if in the interregnum i.e. after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act and till the date of election or till the date the person gets selected as Member of the Panchayat or as Councillor of the Municipality or Municipal Corporation or if during the continuation of his membership, the number of children increases beyond the total number of children such person had on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, then, such person would be disqualified from continuing as member of Panchayat or Councillor of Municipality or Municipal Corporation and from contesting election/s after such increase in the number of children. 6.7. Second proviso of the said clause (m) provides, inter alia, that if a child or more than one child is born in a single delivery within period of one year from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, then it shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining disqualification of any person under clause (m) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30. 7. (1) of Sec. 30. 7. When the clause (m) is read along with the provisos and the explanation, it also emerges that according to the said provision the moment a child is born - after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act - in excess of two children (or in excess of number of children, a person had on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act), the said provision will be immediately attracted and the person will simultaneously and automatically incur the disqualification. 8. In view of the facts of this case, and in light of Sec. 30(1)(m), the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the relevant date i.e. in 2010 when the election was notified and when the petitioner entered her nomination to contest the election and even when she was elected in October, 2010, she had only two children, and that therefore, the provision under clause (m) of Sec. 30(1) will not be attracted and the disqualification will not get attached. 9. At first blush, particularly in light of the expression "has" used in the said clause (m) of Sec. 30(1) of the Act, the submission may sound attractive, however, on reading of the provision in light of its object, it becomes clear that the provision does not admit such interpretation. 10. In view of the object of the provision and also in light of clear language of the said clause (m), there is no scope for such construction of said clause (m) of Sec. 30(1) of the Act and the said submission is not sustainable and cannot be accepted. 10.1. When the said provision is introduced with the object to "prevent a person having more than two children to be a Member of Panchayat or the Councillor of Municipality or Municipal Corporation" and for implementation of "National Population Policy", the said provision has to be read in consonance with the said object and in a manner which would advance the legislative intention. 10.2. When the provision is read in light of the object with which the amendment came to be introduced, it becomes clear that the moment a child in excess of two children (or in excess of existing children on the cut-off date) is born, after the commencement of the amendment act, the provision would be immediately attracted, and thereby, the disqualification will automatically get attached to the said person. 11. 11. It is also pertinent that the only relevant date - so far as this clause (m) of Sec. 30(1) is concerned - is the date of commencement of the amendment Act i.e. 4-8-2005. Any other date e.g. the date when election is notified or the date on which nomination is filed or the date fixed for voting etc. is neither contemplated nor relevant. 12. The provision merely provides that any person who has more than two children shall not be a Member or Councillor in Panchayat or Municipality or Municipal Corporation. The Section does not contain other qualification and does not provide that any person who has more than two children "on the date when election is notified" or "on the date when nomination is filed" etc. Therefore, such qualification cannot be read into the provision. That would be adding words to the provision otherwise, the legislature would have appropriately qualified the provision. Plain reading of the said provision indicates that the only requirement for the provision being applicable, is "birth of a child" (after the commencement of the Amendment Act) in excess of two children (or in excess of the number of children on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act). 13. Further, the said Sec. 30(1)(m) does not provide for or contemplate that for applicability of the said provision and for attracting the disqualification a child born (after the commencement of the Amendment Act, i.e. after 4-8-2005) should be alive at the time of election. According to the provision, the moment any child is born - after the date of commencement of the Amendment Act - in excess of existing two children (on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act) or in excess of the number of children the person had on the cut-off date, then, immediately the provision will be applicable and the disqualification will be automatically and immediately attracted. This aspect becomes all the more clear when the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act of 2005 is taken into account. 13.1. In this context, it is pertinent that the said provision is introduced and brought in effect as a "step towards implementation of National Population Policy". One of the objects of the said amendment and introduction of said clause (m) of Sec. 30(1) of the Act is to "stabilize the rapid growth of population". 13.1. In this context, it is pertinent that the said provision is introduced and brought in effect as a "step towards implementation of National Population Policy". One of the objects of the said amendment and introduction of said clause (m) of Sec. 30(1) of the Act is to "stabilize the rapid growth of population". Another object is to "prevent a person having more than two children" from becoming member of local authority. For the said reason and object, the legislature considered it appropriate and necessary to make provision which would "prevent a person having more than two children to be a member of the Panchayat or Councillor of Municipality or of a Municipal Corporation". With the said laudable object, the clause (m) in Sec. 30(1) came to be introduced and has been brought in force w.e.f. 4-8-2005. 13.2. The said clause (m) thus, also aims at igniting awareness, consciousness and sense of responsibility, amongst the person holding such post or desiring to get elected to such posts, to not beget more than two children and not have more than two children. Instead, they should lead a life which would set an example by restricting the number of children and thereby the number of family members and contribute in implementation of the national policy. 14. True, it is that untimely death of a child is very unfortunate occurrence, but it nonetheless is a fortuitous circumstance or event. However, a fortuitous circumstance cannot affect, and cannot be taken into account in, construction of a provision and/or in determining applicability of a provision. 14.1. As mentioned earlier, if, after the amendment Act came in force a child is born in excess of two children (or in excess of the number of children the person had at the time of commencement of the Amendment Act) then the moment the child in excess of two children is born the provision and prohibition will be immediately attracted and the disqualification will immediately and automatically get attached. Fortuitous circumstance cannot influence or affect the object and effect of the provision and intention of legislation cannot be understood or determined by taking into account such fortuitous circumstance. 15. When the petitioner's submission or explanation are examined keeping in focus the object of the Amendment (i.e. clause (m) of Sec. 30(1)), it comes out that the contentions are not sustainable and cannot be entertained. 16. 15. When the petitioner's submission or explanation are examined keeping in focus the object of the Amendment (i.e. clause (m) of Sec. 30(1)), it comes out that the contentions are not sustainable and cannot be entertained. 16. In present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner gave birth to third child on 16-10-2007 i.e. after the commencement of the Amendment Act w.e.f. 4-8-2005. 17. Thus, no sooner the said third child was born on 16-10-2007, then, the provision immediately got attracted and the disqualification automatically got attached to the petitioner on 16-10-2007, i.e. the date of birth of the said third child namely Vajrajbhai (being a child in excess of existing two children viz. Priyankaben and Priteshbhai). 17.1. Thus, the birth of the said third child attracted the provision and rendered the petitioner disqualified with immediate effect i.e. from 16-10-2007 to be a member of the Panchayat or Councillor of a Municipality or Municipal Corporation (ii) or continue as a member or Councilor of said body/local authorities. 17.2. In this view of the matter, the submission that at the relevant time, the petitioner had only two children (since the third child was not alive at relevant time), and that therefore, the petitioner cannot be declared disqualified under Sec. 30(1)(m) of the Act is not sustainable. The said contention and the petition are not tenable and deserves to be rejected. 18. The impugned order does not suffer any error and does not warrant interference. It is neither arbitrary nor contrary to the provisions of the Act. There is no infirmity in the order. In light of the facts of the case and in view of the above discussion and for the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.