JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, Judge Petitioner Vijay Kumar, Sole Proprietor of M/s Vijay Traders, undisputedly, is engaged in the business/trade of sale of food items. He has a shop at Tauni Devi, District Hamirpur, Himachal Pradesh. On 8.3.2013, officials of the Food and Supplies Department (hereinafter referred to as the Department) inspected his shop. After issuing a show cause notice and affording two opportunities to file response, which petitioner failed to do so, the authorities passed an order dated 6.12.2013, asking him to deposit fine for having violated the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Trade Articles (Licensing and Control) Order, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the “Order 1981”). 2. On 17.1.2014, petitioner’s shop was inspected by the Officers/officials of the Department. Again, he was found to have violated the mandatory provisions of “Order 1981”. Without license, he had stored for sale essential commodity, i.e. edible food items. Explanation furnished by the petitioner, in his defence, was found to be incorrect; hence, his premises were again inspected on 18.1.2014. Prima facie finding him to have violated the statutory provisions, he was issued a show cause notice. Vide impugned order dated 30.5.2014 (Annexure P-7), the District Collector, District Hamirpur, holding the petitioner to have contravened the provisions of “Order 1981” and the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), in exercise of his power under Section 6-A of the “Act” directed confiscation and sale of such food items. 3. Petitioner’s appeal filed before the Appellate Authority stands rejected vide impugned order dated 22.5.2014 (Annexure P-9). 4. Assailing these two orders, Mr. T.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, has made the following submissions,- (i) prior to issuance of impugned orders (Annexures P-7 & P-9), petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing by the authorities; (ii) confiscated food items, i.e. oil seeds, edible oils and pulses, are not “essential commodity” falling within the purview of the provisions of the “Act”; hence, action of the respondent-authorities is ultra vires the “Act” and petitioner’s constitutional right of earning his livelihood; (iii) in the absence of compliance of mandatory provisions of sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the “Act”, notification, if any, bringing such items within the purview of the “Act” or “Order 1981” is neither binding nor enforceable. 5. 5. While dilating on the scope of judicial review, learned Advocate General, ably assisted by his team, has defended the action of the District Collector, being totally legal, just and fair. He has placed on record various orders and notifications issued from time to time. 6. It cannot be disputed that confiscated essential commodities, i.e. oil seeds (98.61 quintals), edible oils (68.871 quintals) & pulses (155.95 quintals), were recovered from the petitioner’s premises. 7. The issue, which arises for consideration, in the present petition, is as to whether petitioner’s activity of storage and sale of such food items is governed and regulated under the provisions of the “Act” and orders issued thereunder or not. In our considered view, answer to the question lies in various provisions of the Act and the notifications issued by the State Government from time to time. 8. The Legislative intent behind the “Act” is evidently clear. In the interest of general public, for the control of production, supply and distribution of certain commodities, after enactment, the “Act” was notified by the Central Government. The object was to deter a person from illegally, dealing in any essential commodity. It is also to impose a deterrent penalty against the person, who violates the provisions, more so with impunity. 9. Section 2(a) of the “Act”, defines “essential commodity” to mean a commodity specified in the schedule. The Central Government is empowered to add or remove any such commodity from the schedule. 10. Section 3 of the “Act” empowers the Central Government to regulate or prohibit production, supply and distribution of any essential commodity. Activity of storage, transportation, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential commodity can be regulated by the Central Government by issuing licenses/permits etc. 11. By virtue of provisions of Section 5 of the “Act”, Central Government can delegate its powers and functions to be performed under the “Act” to the State Government(s) or its Officers. 12. By virtue of non abstante clause, so contained in Section 6 of the “Act”, any order made under the “Act” is to have an overriding effect over any other enactment. 13. By virtue of provisions of Section 6-A of the “Act”, the District Collector is empowered to confiscate the essential commodity, so seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3. 13. By virtue of provisions of Section 6-A of the “Act”, the District Collector is empowered to confiscate the essential commodity, so seized in pursuance of an order made under Section 3. However, before taking such action, in terms of Section 6-B of the “Act”, prior notice is required to be issued to the aggrieved party. 14. Now, in the instant case, we find that by virtue of Section 5 of the “Act”, powers of Central Government to be exercised under the provisions of Section 3, stand delegated to the State Government vide order dated 9.6.1978, issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India. Pursuant thereto, and in exercise thereof, State of Himachal Pradesh notified “Order 1981”, prohibiting any dealer from carrying on the business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any trade article mentioned in Schedule-I, except in accordance with law, i.e. the terms and conditions of license issued by the Licensing Authority. “Order 1981” prescribes a proper procedure for grant of license in favour of a dealer, desiring to deal in any essential commodity/trade article. In exercise of such delegated powers, the Government of Himachal Pradesh has also notified the Himachal Pradesh Hoarding and Profiteering Prevention Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as “Order 1977”). 15. Insofar as essential commodities in question, i.e. oil seeds, edible oils and pulses, are concerned, we find the same to have been included in Schedule-I of “Order 1981”. Last of such notification was issued on 23.10.2013 which was to remain in force till 30.9.2014 (Page 133). Petitioner’s premises were inspected on 17-18.1.2014 and the commodity was seized on 18.1.2014 (Page-27). 16. The issue, which further arises for consideration, is as to whether this notification dated 23.10.2013 would become operative only after it is laid before both the Houses of Parliament or not. 17. Much emphasis is laid on non-compliance of subsection (6) of Section 3 of the Act, which reads as under: “3(6) Every order made under this section by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, as soon as may be, after it is made.” 18. In our considered view, the issue is no longer res integra. In our considered view, the issue is no longer res integra. Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India, in M/s Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. And others v. The State of Haryana, (1979) 2 SCC 196 , while dealing with interpretation of very same provisions, categorically held that Legislature never intended that non-compliance of the requirement of laying the notification before Parliament under the provisions of subsection (6) of Section 3 of “the Act” would render the same to be inoperative or void. The Court took into account its earlier decision rendered in Jan Mohammad Noor Mohamad Bagban v. The State of Gujarat and another, AIR 1966 SC 385 . 19. In the very same decision, the Court further observed that: “21. Now the policy and object underlying the provisions relating to laying the delegated legislation made by the subordinate law making authorities or orders passed by subordinate executive instrumentalities before both Houses of Parliament being to keep supervision and control over the aforesaid authorities and instrumentalities, the "laying clauses" assume different forms depending on the degree of control which the legislature may like to exercise. As evident from the observations made at pages 305 to 307 of the 7th Edition of Craies on Statute Law and noticed with approval in Hukam Chand etc. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 601 there are three kinds of laying which are generally used by the Legislature. These three kinds of laying are described and dealt with in Craies on Statute Law (Supra) as under.- (i) Laying without further procedure, (ii) Laying subject to negative resolution, (iii) Laying subject to affirmative resolution. (i) Simple laying.- The most obvious example is in section 10(2) of the 1946 Act. In earlier days, before the idea of laying in draft had been introduced, there was a provision for laying rules etc., for a period during which time they were not in operation and could be thrown out without ever having come into operation (compare Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, Section 417; Inebriates Act 1898, Section 21) but this is not used now. (ii) Negative resolution.- Instruments so laid have immediate operative effect but are subject to annulment within forty days without prejudice to a new instrument being made. The phraseology generally used is "subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament." This is by far the commonest form of laying. (ii) Negative resolution.- Instruments so laid have immediate operative effect but are subject to annulment within forty days without prejudice to a new instrument being made. The phraseology generally used is "subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament." This is by far the commonest form of laying. It acts mostly as a deterrent and sometimes forces a Minister (in Sir Cecil Carr's phrase) to "buy off opposition" by promising some modification. (iii) Affirmative resolution.- The phraseology here is normally "no order shall be made unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament. Normally, no time limit is fixed for obtaining approval - none is necessary because the Government will naturally take the earliest opportunity of bringing it up for approval - but section 16(3) of the Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1946 did impose a limit of forty days. An old form (not much used nowadays) provided for an order to be made but not to become operative until a resolution of both Houses of Parliament had been obtained. This form was used in section 10(4) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 (cf. Road Traffic Act, 1960, Section 19(3) … …………………. The affirmative resolution procedure necessitates a debate in every case. This means that one object of delegation of legislation (viz. saving the time of Parliament) is to some extent defeated. The procedure therefore is sparingly used and is more or less reserved to cases where the order almost amounts to an Act, by effecting changes which approximate to true legislation (e.g. where the order is the meat of the matter, the enabling Act merely outlining the general purpose) or where the order replaces local Acts or provisional orders and, most important of all, where the spending, etc. of public money is affected. Sometimes where speedy or secret action is required (e.g. the imposition of import duties), the order is laid with immediate operation but has to be confirmed within a certain period [cf. Import Duties Act, 1958, Section 13(4)]. This process of acting first and getting approval after has also been adopted in the Emergency Powers Act, 1920 under which state of emergency can be proclaimed and regulations made. Import Duties Act, 1958, Section 13(4)]. This process of acting first and getting approval after has also been adopted in the Emergency Powers Act, 1920 under which state of emergency can be proclaimed and regulations made. The proclamation must be immediately communicated to Parliament and does not have effect for longer than a month: but it can be replaced by another proclamation. Any regulations made under the proclamation are to be laid before Parliament immediately and do not continue in force after the expiration of seven days from the time when they are so laid unless a resolution is passed by both Houses providing for their continuance." 20. Further, the apex Court in Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh, Tahsil Bemetra and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, (1981) 4 SCC 471 , has held that: “7. The submission that the amendment was invalid because it had not been placed before the Legislature within six months is totally misconceived. The amendment was not an Ordinance and it was not required to be placed before the Legislature within six months. We are also not able to appreciate why the amendment should have been placed before the Parliament. What is required to be placed before the Parliament under S. 3, sub-section (6) of the Essential Commodities Act is an order made by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government. An order made by the State Government in exercise of the powers delegated to it by Central Government under S. 5 is not required to be placed before Parliament.” 21. In K.T. Plantation Private Limited and another v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, while holding that nonlaying of notification before the State Legislature, being curable defect, would not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder, observed as under: “73. Following is the procedure generally followed when an order or notification is laid before the legislature: (1) Laying which requires no further procedure; (2) Laying allied with the affirmative procedure; and (3) Laying allied with negative procedure. 74. The object of requirement of laying provided in enabling Acts is to subject the subordinate lawmaking authority to the vigilance and control of the legislature. 74. The object of requirement of laying provided in enabling Acts is to subject the subordinate lawmaking authority to the vigilance and control of the legislature. The degree of control the legislature wants can be noticed on the language used in such laying clause.” [See also: Accountant General, State of Madhya Pradesh v. S.K. Dubey and another, (2012) 4 SCC 578 ; Prohibition & Excise Supdt., A.P. and others v. Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally and others, (2003) 12 SCC 738; Bank of India and others v. O.P. Swaranakar and others, (2003) 2 SCC 721 ; and State of M.P. and others v. Hukum Chand Mills Karamchari, (1996) 7 SCC 81 ]. 22. Thus, by virtue of provisions of the “Act” and “Order 1981”, storage and sale of essential commodities, i.e. the confiscated items, is mandatorily prohibited and regulated. Now, in the instant case, it is not disputed before us that since December, 2003, petitioner neither applied nor was he issued any license to deal with such essential commodity/food article/edible items. He was fully aware of the provisions of law. His explanation of ignorance of law, in our considered view, rightly stands rejected by the District Collector. Activity of storage and sale of confiscated edible items stood regulated by the provisions of the “Act” and “Order 1981” and various notifications issued by the State from time to time of which, perhaps he was aware, as he had earlier obtained a license to deal with the same. Hence, the District Collector rightly exercised the jurisdiction so vested in him, in confiscating the food items stored for sale, in a totally illegal manner. 23. We do not find any favour with the petitioner’s submission that prior to passing of impugned orders, neither any notice to show cause was issued nor any adequate opportunity of hearing afforded to him. The District Collector has observed that premises of the petitioner were inspected on 8.3.2013. The authorities issued notice dated 21.5.2013 and when petitioner failed to respond, reminder was sent on 21.11.2013. Yet petitioner failed to respond. Consequently order was passed against him on 6.12.2013, when he was directed to deposit certain amount of penalty. But, the matter did not end there. 24. Perhaps this was not enough to wake him up from his slumber or is it that he chose to ignore or infringe the provisions of law. Yet petitioner failed to respond. Consequently order was passed against him on 6.12.2013, when he was directed to deposit certain amount of penalty. But, the matter did not end there. 24. Perhaps this was not enough to wake him up from his slumber or is it that he chose to ignore or infringe the provisions of law. Be that as it may, again on 17.1.2014, his premises were inspected. He misled the authorities by furnishing false information of possessing a license, valid uptill 31.12.2014. Only when such fact was not found to be true did the District Collector issue him a notice to show cause on 21.1.2014 (Page 20). Perusal of this notice, composite in nature, also reveals that the authority contemplated action for violating the provisions of “Order 1977”; “Order 1981” and the “Act”. In fact, Sections 6-A and 6-B of the “Act” are clearly mentioned in this notice. Further, petitioner filed reply and also adequate opportunity of hearing was afforded him. Hence, it cannot be said that impugned order dated 13.5.2014 was passed by the District Collector without affording any adequate opportunity or in due haste. 25. Recording his satisfaction of the petitioner having violated the mandatory provisions of law, in not obtaining the license and storing essential commodities in violation of mandatory provisions, the competent authority, i.e. District Collector, directed confiscation and sale of the edible items so recovered and seized from the premises. 26. We find that even the Appellate Authority decided the appeal after affording adequate opportunity of hearing to all concerned. 27. We do not find the judgment rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India in Kailash Prasad Yadav and another v. State of Jharkhand and another, (2007) 5 SCC 769 , to be of any help to the petitioner. Facts are totally different. There the Court was dealing with the Order issued under the Act, which did not deal with a “matter dealing in wheat or transportation thereof”, unlike in the present case where edible food items are specifically regulated by the provisions of the “Act” and the orders issued thereunder. 28. Scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for reviewing the orders passed by the authorities below, is now well settled. It needs no elaborate discussion. 28. Scope of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for reviewing the orders passed by the authorities below, is now well settled. It needs no elaborate discussion. If there is manifest error in exercise or power or that the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts, which do not exist and are patently erroneous, interference is called for. Also, it is for the petitioner to show that the orders suffer from malafide, dishonest or corrupt practices. That illegality, irrationality and procedural ambiguity have been committed, while passing the impugned order, is required to be manifestly exhibited by the petitioner from the record. Scope of judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merits, by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority. (See: S.R. Tewari v. Union of India and another, (2013) 6 SCC 602 ). 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the statement of law, we do not find any merit in the present petition, as the impugned orders, passed by the competent authority, in no manner, can be said to be illegal, perverse, harsh, unreasonable, unjust or inequitable, warranting interference by this Court. Hence, for all the aforesaid reasons, present petition stands dismissed. All interim orders stand vacated and pending application(s), if any, disposed of.