Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Burhanpur v. Mohammad Khan
2014-08-11
SANJAY YADAV
body2014
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. Heard on admission. 2. Award-dated 29.4.2006 passed by the Labour Court, Khandwa is being assailed vide this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. Vide impugned Award, reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as to ^^D;k Jh eksgEen [kkW firk lqYrku [kkW dks lsok i`Fkdhdj.k oS/k ,oa mfpr gS ;fn ugh rks os fdl lgk;rk ds ik= gS bl laca/k esa fu;ksDrk dks D;k funsZ’k fn;s tkus pkfg,** has been answered in favour of respondent No.1-workman who has been directed to be reinstated without backwages. 4. The workman had raised the dispute that despite of his working continuously without any break, he has been retrenched without adhering to the provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 5. Discarding the defence by the petitioner-employer that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not applicable to Municipal Corporation, dispensation of service of a daily wager does not tantamount to retrenchment, Labour Court found the dispensation being an illegal retrenchment and in violation of principles laid down under section 25F, accordingly, while setting aside retrenchment, directed for reinstatement. However, taking into consideration that the Corporation was undergoing a financial stringency, declined to grant backwages. 6. Assailing the impugned Award, learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the grounds as raised before the Labour Court. 7. As to the contention that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not applicable to Municipal Corporation. 8. Section 2(j) of 1947 Act defines ‘Industry’ to mean “any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen”. 9. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers AIR 2000 SC 1274 , it is held :- 33. Taking into consideration the enunciation of law as settled by this Court as also the High Courts in various decisions referred to above, the activity of the Delhi Municipal Corporation by which construction work is undertaken or roads are laid or repaired or trenches are dug would fall within the definition of “industry”.
Taking into consideration the enunciation of law as settled by this Court as also the High Courts in various decisions referred to above, the activity of the Delhi Municipal Corporation by which construction work is undertaken or roads are laid or repaired or trenches are dug would fall within the definition of “industry”. The workmen or, for that matter, those employed on muster roll for carrying on these activities would, therefore, be “workmen” and the dispute between them and the Corporation would have to be tackled as an industrial dispute in the light of various statutory provisions of the Industrial Law, one of which is the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. This is the domestic scenario. Internationally, the scenario is not different.” 10. First contention that the provisions of 1947 Act are not applicable to the Municipal Corporation fails and is, therefore, negatived. 11. As regard to second contention that being a casual labour the provisions of 1947 Act are not applicable to the respondent-workman. 12. Section 2(s) of 1947 Act defines “workman” to mean any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. 13. In M. E. Corpn. Employees’ Union v. Mineral Exploration Corpn. Ltd. 2006 AIR SCW 3865, it is held : “36.
13. In M. E. Corpn. Employees’ Union v. Mineral Exploration Corpn. Ltd. 2006 AIR SCW 3865, it is held : “36. The respondent-management itself effected transfer of employees from one project to another and granted them benefit e.g. T.A., D.A. etc. The term contingent employee is totally unknown to Industrial Law. To deny the benefits available to regular employees, certain employees are termed as contingent workers. Once an employee completes 240 days, he is deemed to be a permanent employee. The term contingent employee is not included in Standing Orders.” 14. In view whereof, since petitioner has failed to establish that respondent No.1 was employed in supervisory category, it is rightly held to be a workman entitled for all the benefits which enure from the Act of 1947. 15. Furthermore, the Award reveals that respondent-workman having continuously discharged for number of years and that the provisions contained under section 25F of the 1947 Act having not been followed, the Labour Court rightly held that disengagement as illegal retrenchment. 16. Section 25F of the 1947 Act stipulates :- 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until - (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette. 17. In Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division No.1 Panipat (2010) 5 SCC 497 , it has been held - “16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of section 25F of the Act are satisfied.
An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of section 25F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 17. This Court has repeatedly held that section 25F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and noncompliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity. ... 18. This Court has used different expressions for describing the consequence of terminating a workman’s service/employment/engagement by way of retrenchment without complying with the mandate of section 25F of the Act. Sometimes it has been termed as ab initio void, sometimes as illegal per se, sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non est. Leaving aside the legal semantics, we have no hesitation to hold that termination of service of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the requirement of giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof and compensation in terms of section 25F(a) and (b) has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as nullity and the employee is entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated.” 18. Having thus considered, this Court is of the opinion that there is no illegality in the Award as would warrant an interference. 19. Consequently, petition fails and is dismissed. No costs. ..................