Hon'ble BHANDARI, J.—All these writ petitions involve common question of law thus are decided by this judgment. For convenience, facts of CW 2295/2001 – M/s MM Enterprises versus State of Rajasthan & Ors. – have been taken. 2. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 1.11.1997 at annexure-11 and 24.11.1997 at annexure-13 passed by the Tehsildar, Kishangarh so as the orders dated 19.12.2000 at annexure-18 and 19.4.2001 at annexure-19 passed by the Board of Revenue, Ajmer. The prayer is made to direct the respondents to drop the proceedings initiated under sections 90A and 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act of 1956') and, accordingly, allow the petitioner to retain the land for its utilisation for industrial purposes as per section 95(A)(5) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959. 3. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that on 15.3.1996, Patwari of Village – Samwatsar, Tehsil – Kishangarh, District – Ajmer submitted report before Tehsildar that petitioner has unlawfully taken possession of the land of the temple comprised in khasra No.431 and installed cutting machine of marble and even constructed office building apart from godown. 4. The Tehsildar thereafter registered a case under sections 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 with a notice to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted reply to the notice containing, inter alia, that the area in question was declared as industrial area in the Master Plan of Kishangarh and entrusted to the RIICO thus provisions of sections 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 would not be applicable. It was also stated that the land is not of the ownership of the State Government thus also, sections 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 are not applicable. The Tehsildar, Kishangarh passed an order on 1.8.1996 accepting the objections raised by the petitioner, however, it was observed that petitioner could retain the land after conversion of land for use from agriculture to non-agricultural purposes. He, accordingly, granted liberty to move an application for conversion before the Collector, Ajmer within one month. The said order was then amended vide order dated 22.9.1997 on application submitted by the petitioner and others. 5. He, accordingly, granted liberty to move an application for conversion before the Collector, Ajmer within one month. The said order was then amended vide order dated 22.9.1997 on application submitted by the petitioner and others. 5. The petitioner then submitted an application before the Tehsildar, Kishangarh for conversion of the land under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment, Conversion and Regularisation of Agricultural Land for Residential, Commercial and Public Utility Purposes in Urban Areas) Rules, 1981 (for short 'the Rules of 1981') with the request to forward the file to the Collector. The application was returned to the petitioner with a direction to submit it in accordance with the Rules. On 1.11.1997, Tehsildar sent a letter to the concerned Advocate intimating that in absence of title, applicants are not having authority to apply for conversion thus application for conversion is returned and suo motu cognizance for review of the original order was taken and case was then fixed for hearing on 18.11.1997. 6. The petitioner submitted reply to the review petition and prior to it, deposited the amount as required under the Rules of 1981. On 24.11.1997, Tehsildar, Kishangarh held ex parte proceedings against the petitioner and reviewed the order with a direction for dispossession and also imposed penalty. The petitioner was also directed to remove her belongings from the disputed land within a week. 7. The petitioner, along with others, filed revision petition before the Board of Revenue, Ajmer (for short 'the Board') and remained successful where orders passed by the Tehsildar dated 1.11.1997 and 24.11.1997 were set aside with remand of the matter to the Additional Collector, Ajmer to hold enquiry for conversion of land after taking into consideration the Master Plan and Industrial Development Policy of the State Govt. and pass appropriate orders. 8. On receipt of the record from the Board, Additional Collector registered 56 cases and issued notices for appearance on 13.6.2000. On that date, an application was moved under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleadment of RIICO and Murthi Mandir Shri Raghunathji as parties. 9. Before the matter could have been proceeded with the Additional Collector, Ajmer, the State Government filed Special Appeal before the Board of Revenue against the judgment of the Single Bench along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 9. Before the matter could have been proceeded with the Additional Collector, Ajmer, the State Government filed Special Appeal before the Board of Revenue against the judgment of the Single Bench along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Division Bench of the Board of Revenue accepted the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act vide order dated 19.12.2000 and the order of the Single Member of the Board was stayed while admitting the appeals. 10. A writ petition bearing No.937/2000 was filed against the order dated 19.12.2000 passed by the DB of the Board but then it was dismissed as rendered infructuous in view of the fact that subsequently the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue decided the special appeals vide its order dated 9.4.2000. The said order has been impugned herein along with other orders. 11. Learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the land in dispute is of temple Shri Raghunathji with defined share of three Pujaris. They entered into a family settlement as it was a private temple. After family settlement, the land in dispute was given to the petitioners on lease of 99 years for consideration with actual possession. After the lease, another document for agreement to sell was also executed. The petitioners then constructed office rooms and godown and installed cutting machine by construction of shed for it. It was as per the Master Plan of Kishangarh where the area in dispute was shown to be for industrial purpose. The Notification for the aforesaid was published on 25.8.1993. In view of the sale of property in favour of the petitioner, they are continuing with possession. The proceedings under section 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 were thus, not maintainable and the issue aforesaid was decided by the Tehsildar in favour of the petitioner though partly reviewed it in ignorance of section 90A of the Act of 1956. It is even without considering the earlier order dated 11.8.1997 where the petitioners were held entitled to the benefit of section 90A (5) proviso to the Act of 1956. Thus, wrongly passed order dated 1.11.1997 and 24.11.1997 holding that the petitioners are not having khatedari rights in the land so as to seek conversion. The aforesaid orders were challenged by the petitioners by the revision petition before the learned Single Bench of the Board of Revenue, which were rightly accepted. Thus, wrongly passed order dated 1.11.1997 and 24.11.1997 holding that the petitioners are not having khatedari rights in the land so as to seek conversion. The aforesaid orders were challenged by the petitioners by the revision petition before the learned Single Bench of the Board of Revenue, which were rightly accepted. 12. The Division Bench of the Board, however, allowed the Special Appeals by condoning the delay and holding that petitioner had no right to seek conversion of the land. It was in ignorance of the fact that before passing of the order by the Tehsildar on 24.11.1997, principles of natural justice were not followed. In fact, the petitioners had already deposited conversion charges in reference to the order dated 11.8.1997 but aforesaid was also ignored apart from the fact that as per provisions of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Trust Act, 1959, the petitioner became entitled to seek conversion of the land once the Notification along with Master Plan was published showing it to be an industrial area. Section 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 were not applicable. 13. Learned Division Bench of the Board of Revenue further failed to consider that though khatedari of the land is shown to be of Murthi Mandir Shri Raghunathji but then it is a private temple having defined share in favour of the Pujaris. It is for that reason alone, the Additional Commissioner, Devasthan Department issued an order for permission to raise construction but then the DB of the Board made a reference of section 46 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act of 1955') to show that property of the deity, being a perpetual minor, cannot be transferred. The aforesaid was without considering the fact that the temple was not belonging to public trust but a private family temple thus land was accessible to the transfer. Accordingly, prayer is made to set aside the impugned orders by holding that the petitioners have a right to retain the possession of the land and even to seek conversion in accordance with the Rules of 1981. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent – State has contested the writ petitions. It is submitted that the land in dispute belongs to the temple Shri Raghunathji thus is not liable to be transferred in view of section 46 of the Act of 1955. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent – State has contested the writ petitions. It is submitted that the land in dispute belongs to the temple Shri Raghunathji thus is not liable to be transferred in view of section 46 of the Act of 1955. The petitioners have made reference of the transfer of land though no pleading or argument were made before the Tehsildar and the Additional Collector where application for conversion of land was submitted. The petitioners are not khatedars of the land inasmuch as neither the lease deed nor the agreement to sell give them the khatedari rights and the averments regarding purchase of the land is incorrect as no registered deed exist in favour of the petitioners. The rights in the land can be created when name of the petitioner is entered in the revenue record after mutation. It does not exist in the instant cases thus a request for conversion of the land was rightly declined in the hands of those who are not khatedars. The conversion of land cannot be permitted in the hands of a person having no khatedari rights. The aforesaid aspect was considered by the Tehsildar in its order dated 1.11.1997 on the application for conversion of the land under the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Use of Agriculture Land for Non-agricultural Purposes) Rules, 1961 (for short 'the Rules of 1961'). As per rule 3, one needs to be a legal land holders and otherwise rule 5 of the Rules of 1961 requires surrender of land in favour of the government which can be done by the khatedars only. The said order was passed independently on the application and was not liable to be challenged by revision petition as an appeal was maintainable against the said order. Thus, revision petition preferred by the petitioner before the Single Bench of the Board of Revenue was incompetent. 15. It is also stated that merely issuance of Master Plan declaring industrial area does not mean automatic conversion of the land. The conversion of the land is required under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Use of Agriculture Land for Non-agricultural Purposes) Rules, 1961. In fact Rules of 1981 for conversion of land has no application in this case and application for conversion was made under the Rules of 1961. 16. The conversion of the land is required under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Use of Agriculture Land for Non-agricultural Purposes) Rules, 1961. In fact Rules of 1981 for conversion of land has no application in this case and application for conversion was made under the Rules of 1961. 16. The petitioners, while submitted reply to the notice under section 90A and 91 of the Act of the Act of 1956, did not disclose the fact regarding lease or purchase of the land but prayed for automatic conversion of the land for industrial purposes. The subsequent order of the Tehsildar dated 24.11.1997 was passed after giving due opportunity of hearing. It was as per section 86(2) (d) of the Land Revenue Act where revenue court is having power to review its order. The reply to the review was submitted on 18.11.1997 with a request to consider the application under the Rules of 1981. The matter was then fixed on 22.11.1997 and, after hearing the parties, the order was passed though on the date of arguments dated 24.11.1997, no one appeared on behalf of the petitioners despite call given to them. The Single Bench of the Board committed grave illegality while ignoring the fact as to how one can seek conversion of the land without khatedari rights. In view of above, Special Appeal preferred by the official respondents was rightly allowed by the DB of the Board. The condonation of delay was made after due consideration of the facts as well as the judgment of the Apex Court. The petitioners have wrongly referred the provisions of the UIT Act and the Rules without taking note that the agricultural land does not get converted by virtue of the UIT Act without an order. Taking note of legal position, impugned order was rightly passed by the DB of the Board. 17. Learned counsel for respondent No.5 to 7 Shri Anil Sharma submitted that the land in dispute is of a private temple thus was available for transfer. It had been given on lease to the petitioners for 99 years thus they had rightly applied for conversion of land. He has supported the writ petitions for challenge to the impugned orders passed by the Tehsildar as well as the DB of the Board of Revenue. It had been given on lease to the petitioners for 99 years thus they had rightly applied for conversion of land. He has supported the writ petitions for challenge to the impugned orders passed by the Tehsildar as well as the DB of the Board of Revenue. It was added that the land of the temple under public trust are not transferable but, in the present case, land is of private temple thus respondents No.5 to 7 were entitled to transfer it. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the RIICO Mr AK Sharma submitted that if the writ petitions are allowed with a direction to the competent authority to convert the land then the charges applicable to the RIICO may be directed. 19. I have considered rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 20. The facts, which are not in dispute, are that the land in question belongs to Murthi Mandir Raghunathji Maharaj Sakin Dehi Khudkast Pujari Shrinarayan son of Madhodas and Bherumal son of Ambalal one-half share and Mangilal son of Jagannath one-half share. A notice under sections 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 was issued on the petitioners alleging illegal construction on the land apart from encroachment. A reply to the notice was submitted vide Annexure-8 wherein it was stated that possession of land is with the consent of the temple thus it cannot be said to be encroachment. The land otherwise fall in the industrial area thus section 90 A and 91 of the Act of 1956 are not applicable. The fact regarding title of the land in favour of the petitioner had not been mentioned or given as would be clear from bare perusal of annexure-8. The Tehsildar, thereafter, passed order on 11.8.1997 holding that sections 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 have no application in the matter and, thereafter, referring to section 90(5) of the Land Revenue Act, it was held that as per section 90(4), conversion can be sought. The Tehsildar, gave liberty to move an application within one month for conversion. The petitioners, accordingly made an application for conversion and deposited conversion charges. 21. It is also not in dispute that an order was thereafter passed by the Tehsildar on 1.11.1997 and 24.11.1997 adverse to the petitioner followed by a revision petition by the petitioner before the Board of Revenue. The petitioners, accordingly made an application for conversion and deposited conversion charges. 21. It is also not in dispute that an order was thereafter passed by the Tehsildar on 1.11.1997 and 24.11.1997 adverse to the petitioner followed by a revision petition by the petitioner before the Board of Revenue. It was only for seeking conversion of land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purpose. 22. The question for my consideration is as to whether the impugned order passed by the DB of the Board so as the Tehsildar are sustainable in the eye of law or not. I am first referring to the order dated 1.11.1997 passed by the Tehsildar on the application moved by the petitioner for conversion of land. The aforesaid was decided by the following order- vr% mDr izLrqr vkosnuks o blds lyaXu i=kofy;ksa ds izkFkfed ijh{k.k ij izdV vk;k fd :ikarj.k@fu;eu ds lHkh vkosnd ¼vkids eqofDdy½ fu;e] 1961 ds fu;e 3 ds izko/kkukuqlkj d`f"k Hkwfe ds oS|&/kkjd ugha gS vkSj u gh fdlh izdkj dh oS|rk ,oa LokfeRo dk dksbZ izek.k gh lyaXu izLrqr fd;k x;k gS tcfd mDr fu;e ds izko/kkukuqlkj vkosnd dk d`f"k Hkwfe /kkjd gksuk vko';d gS pawfd fu;e 5 esa nh xbZ rkfydk ds [k.M 3 vuqlkj :ikarj.k@fu;eu gsrq Hkwfe dks jkT; ljdkj esa lefiZr djus dk izko/kku gS tks oS| d`f"k Hkwfe /kkjd gh dj ldrk gSA lHkh vkosndksa us Hkwfe fdjk;s ij VªLV )kjk nsuk vafdr fd;k gS ijarq dksbZ izek.k lyaXu ugha fd;s x;s gSA vr% mDr fof/k izko/kku vuq:i lHkh vkosnd :ikarj.k@fu;eu dh ik=rk ugha j[krs gS blfy;s vkids& mDr pkjks i=ks ls izLrqr lwph vuqlkj lHkh i=kofy;ka e; lwph okil bl i= ds lyaXu dj ykSVkbZ tk jgh gSA vkidks ,rn~}kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd mDr pkjks vkosnu o blds lyaXu i=kofy;ksa ds vk/kkj ij jktLFkku Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e] 1956 dh /kkjk 90&, dh lHkh i=kofy;ksa ikfjr vkosnu fnukad 11-8-97 ,oa 29-9-97 ds fodYi dh ikyuk ds vHkko esa lHkh i=kofy;ksa dks mDr vf/kfu;e ds izko/kkukuqlkj iquZfopkj gsrq ¼fjO;w gsrq½ rkjh[k ij fy;k tkdj vkxkeh fnukad 18-11-97 fu;e dh xbZ gSA vr% vki mDr fu;r frfFk 18-11-97 rd fof/k vuq:i lHkh vkosndks ls :ikarj.k@fu;eu dh vFkok ekSds ls vfØe.k gVokus dh dk;Zokgh lqfuf'pr djkosa ,oa U;k;ky; esa mifLFkr gksdj i{k vkfn Hkh izLrqr dj ldrs gSA ckn xqtjus E;kn dksbZ mt~ lek;r ugha gksxkA 23. The perusal of the order shows as to why the application was not maintainable and, subsequently, another order was passed on 24.11.1997. It was held that the review of the order can be caused as per section 86 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956. It was found that the petitioner has failed to submit any documents to show khatedari rights so as to seek conversion and otherwise it is moved through the Advocate thus the order of review was passed accordingly. 24. It is necessary to point out that conversion of land can be sought for industrial purpose under the Rules of 1961 as has been referred in the order dated 11.08.1997 relied by the petitioner. The Rules of 1981 referred therein for conversion of land for commercial purpose. Rules 3 and 5 of the Rules of 1961 and rule 3 of the Rules of 1981 are quoted hereunder for ready reference - “Rule 3. Application for permission to use agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes. - (1) Whenever any person holding any lands for purpose of agricultural (not covered by Rule 2-B) wishes to use the same or any part therefore, for non-agricultural purpose, he may submit an application, in triplicate, in Form A, to the Tehsildar of the Tehsil in which the land is situated. Provided that no application shall be required for conversion were the entire piece of land and building constructed there on is to be used exclusively for setting up of Information Technology Industry with the permission of Empowered Committee of Investment chaired by the Chief Secretary. However, the premium and urban assessment shall be payable under these rules. The Information Technology Department shall submit the list of Project approved by Empowered Committee on Investment chaired by the Chief Secretary, to the Revenue Department for verification. On such payment and verification by the Revenue Department, the land shall be so entered in the revenue record. (2) All applications made under Rule 3 as it stood prior to the 20th December 1963 and still pending shall be rejected. Rule 5. Premium and urban assessment under sub-section (4) of Section 90-A.- (1) The premium and the urban assessment payable under sub-sec. (2) All applications made under Rule 3 as it stood prior to the 20th December 1963 and still pending shall be rejected. Rule 5. Premium and urban assessment under sub-section (4) of Section 90-A.- (1) The premium and the urban assessment payable under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 90-A in respect of land forming the subject matter of an application under R. 3 and the terms and conditions on which permission shall be granted and the restrictions applicable to special areas shall be as shown below- S. No. Particulars of non-agricultural purpose Rates of premium and urban assessment and terms and conditions Restriction applicable to special areas 1 2 3 4 1 Construction at Factory, of Mill, or the setting up of some small industry for Information Technology Industry or a tourism unit. Will have to surrender his Khatedari rights where upon land will be allotted subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in the Raj. Industrial Areas Allotment Rules, 1959, with the modification that cost of the land at 30 times the sanctioned rent rates will be adjusted against development charges and rent and for the purposes of these rules the development charges payable shall be deemed to be premium, and the rent payable shall be deemed to be urban assessment. No conversion of agricultural land for non-agricultural purposes shall be allotted in the area not shown as reser-ved for industries within the approved master plan if any, prepared for the City or town except after prior consultation with the Town Planning Department, provided that of the Master Plan has not been prepared and approved for any of the cities of Jaipur, Udaipur, Jodhpur, Ajmer, Kota, Bikaner and Ganganagar, the conversion of agricul-tural land for non-agricultural purposes would be permitted by the Govt. only after prior consultation with the Town Planning Department. 2 Establishment of brick kiln Will have to surrender his tenancy right where upon land will be allotted on the terms and conditions mentioned in the Raj. Colonisation Porject Areas Brick Kiln (Leases) Conditions, 1959 or the Raj.L.R. (Brick Kiln Leases in Non-Project Areas) Conditions, 1960 whichever may be applicable, subject to the modification that for the first ten years, the rate of rent to be Rs. 40/- (per Bigha per annum, and the rent payable shall be deemed to be urban assessment. Colonisation Porject Areas Brick Kiln (Leases) Conditions, 1959 or the Raj.L.R. (Brick Kiln Leases in Non-Project Areas) Conditions, 1960 whichever may be applicable, subject to the modification that for the first ten years, the rate of rent to be Rs. 40/- (per Bigha per annum, and the rent payable shall be deemed to be urban assessment. Provided that till such time as the master plan is ready no industrial areas within fifteen miles of the limits of the Jaipur Municipality and ten miles of the limits of the municipalities of Jodhpur, Ajmer, Udaipur, Kota, Bikaner and Ganganagar shall be set up. 3 Setting up of Lime Kiln Will have to surrender his tenancy rights whereupon land will be allotted subject to payment of urban assessment Rs. 30/- per acre per annum. Conversion of agricultural land for the establishment of a factory or a mill shall be allowed only if an industrial area within the master plan limits is not available. If an industrial area is available the industry should be allowed to be set up within that area. 4 Manufacture of Salt Will have to surrender his tenancy right whereupon permission will be accorded for use of land for the manufacture of Salt on the terms and conditions mentioned in the Raj. Land Revenue (Saline Areas Allotment) Rules, 1962, with the modification that the rent payable thereunder shall be deemed to be urban assessment payable under these rules. (2) The premium shall be payable in a lump sum immediately on the grant of permission and the urban assessment shall be payable in two half-yearly instalments, along with the agricultural assessment payable in respect of the remaining agricultural land. (3) If the premium and/or urban assessment is not paid in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (2), the same shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue under Section 256 of the Act.” Rule 3 of the Rules of 1981 reads as under - “Purpose for which agricultural land may be permitted to be used.—(1) Subject to other provisions of these rules, agricultural land may be permitted to be used for - (a) construction of a residential house, or (b) for any commercial purpose, or (c) for public utility purpose. (2) No agricultural land shall be converted for residential or commercial purposes referred to in sub-rule (1), unless necessary permission from the authorised officer has been obtained and lease deed under Rule 16 has been executed therefore. (3) If any agricultural land (including government un-occupied agricultural land) has already been used for residential or commercial purposes before the commencement of these Rules without permission of the government in accordance with provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 90-A of the Land Revenue Act such use may on an application be regularised by the Authority Officer by charging the price of land, conversion charges and penalty as provided in these rules and such development charges, peripheral development charges and compounding and other charges as may be prescribed under any other law or rules applicable: Provided that the Authorised Officer may also suo motu, or on the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer/Tehsildar having jurisdiction, take action as provided in these rules.” 25. The petitioner, in the instant case, did not disclose his rights in the land while submitting reply to the notice of Tehsildar as would be clear from the bare perusal of annexure-8 to the writ petition. The documents have been now submitted along with the writ petition, which are, family settlement deed, lease deed and agreement to sell. Those documents were not presented before the Tehsildar so as to consider as to whether petitioners are entitled to seek conversion. 26. In any case, lease deed does not give a right in favour of the petitioner for transfer of the land in favour of the State Government as is required under rule 5 of the Rules of 1961. It is only a lease granted for 99 years. The transfer can be done only by Khatedar. The Rules of 1981 quoted above provides for conversion of land for residential and commercial purpose and not for industrial purpose. 27. So far as agreement to sell is concerned, sale deed was never executed and registered to show khatedari right in favour of the petitioner. If the sale deed followed by registration would have been executed by the parties, they could have prayed for opening of 'naamantaran' (mutation), which also does not exist in the case in hand. Accordingly, petitioners had no locus to maintain the application for conversion of land to use it for agriculture to non-agricultural purposes. If the sale deed followed by registration would have been executed by the parties, they could have prayed for opening of 'naamantaran' (mutation), which also does not exist in the case in hand. Accordingly, petitioners had no locus to maintain the application for conversion of land to use it for agriculture to non-agricultural purposes. So far as UIT Act of 1959 is concerned, it does not provide conversion of land automatically with issuance of the Master Plan and if it would have been so then there was no need for the petitioners to even seek conversion of land by making an application. 28. An argument for automatic or deemed conversion with the notifica-tion of the Master Plan declaring disputed land to be part of the industrial area has been raised by the petitioners in contradiction to their own application for conversion. The petitioners are those who had used the land for non-agricul-tural purposes without conversion and the UIT Act of 1959 does not help the petitioners in any manner for the aforesaid purpose. This is more so when the lease deed and the agreement to sell does not give khatedari rights otherwise mutation proceedings could have been taken to enter name of the petitioners. 29. It is stated that once the Master Plan is declared, Sections 90A and 91 of the Act of 1956 become inapplicable, is an argument without considering the fact that all the impugned order or in reference to the issue of conversion of land. The Master Plan declares the area concerned for its use but it does not provide automatic conversion of land for that purpose, rather, it can be converted on an application by the land holder in accordance with the rules. It is therefore only that petitioner made application for conversion but not being khatedar, the application was rightly declined followed by direction to remove construction as one cannot use the land for non-agricultural purpose, unless converted. 30. I further find that the land has been recorded in the name of Murthi Mandir Raghunathji Maharaj. The order of the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan referred by the petitioner is only to permit construction on the land thus cannot help the petitioners in any manner. 31. At this stage, reference of section 46 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 would be relevant and the aforesaid provision is quoted hereunder - “46. The order of the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan referred by the petitioner is only to permit construction on the land thus cannot help the petitioners in any manner. 31. At this stage, reference of section 46 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 would be relevant and the aforesaid provision is quoted hereunder - “46. Letting or sub-letting in exceptional cases - (1) The restrictions imposed by Section 45 on letting by a holder of Khudkasht and on sub-letting by a tenant shall not apply to - (a) a minor, or (b) a lunatic, or (c) an idiot, or (d) a woman who is unmarried or divorced or separated from her husband, or is a widow, or (e) a person incapable disability of cultivating his holding by reason of blindness or other physical disability or infirmity, or (f) a person who is a member of the armed force of the Union, or (g) a person who is suffering detention or confinement in prison, or (h) a person not exceeding twenty-five years of age, who is a student prosecuting his studies in a recognised institution: Provided that where a holding is held jointly by more person than one the provisions of this section shall not apply unless all such persons are of one or more of the descriptions specified therein. (2) A lease or sub-lease which would be invalid but for the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not remain in force for more than two years after the lessor dies or cease to come within any of the description specified therein.” 32. The provision quoted above, reveals effect of the provision and it does not bifurcate a land belonging to private temple or public temple though finding of fact has been recorded regarding use of the temple by the public. Section 46 of the Act of 1955 has its own impact but, at present, this court is not going in the aforesaid aspect because petitioners are not having khatedari rights so as to claim conversion of land. Accordingly, Division Bench of the Board of Revenue rightly accepted the appeal vide the impugned order. 33. The order dated 19.12.2000 passed by the DB of the Board has also been challenged where delay in maintaining Special Appeal was condoned. Therein, it was found that appeal was preferred on 9.11.2000 against the order dated 10.3.2000 passed by the Single Bench of the Board. 33. The order dated 19.12.2000 passed by the DB of the Board has also been challenged where delay in maintaining Special Appeal was condoned. Therein, it was found that appeal was preferred on 9.11.2000 against the order dated 10.3.2000 passed by the Single Bench of the Board. It was found that after the judgment aforesaid, matter was heard by the Additional Collector on 23.5.2000 thus State was having knowledge of the order passed by the Single Bench of the Board and, prior to it, an application to obtain copy was moved on 4.4.2000 which was given on 29.5.2000. The appeal was maintainable within thirty days from the date of the order. The reason of delay was considered apart from the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court on the issue whereby, considering the similar controversy, it was held that court should render substantial justice. A party cannot be directed to explain delay of each day, hour and minute. The court should take a pragmatic approach which should be justice oriented. The reference of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of AIR 1997 SC 1390 has been given. Relevant part of the said judgment is reproduced hereasunder - “It is a known fact that in transaction of the Government business, none would own personal responsibility and decisions are leisurely taken at various levels. It is not uncommon that delay would be deliberately caused to confer advantage to the opposite litigant, more so when stakes involved are high or persons are will connected influential or due to obvious considerations. The Courts, therefore, do not adopt strict standard of proof of every day's delay.” 34. Similar view was reiterated again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR 2000 SC 2306 . The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment is also quoted hereunder - “when the state is an applicant. praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology. Similar view was reiterated again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of AIR 2000 SC 2306 . The relevant para of the aforesaid judgment is also quoted hereunder - “when the state is an applicant. praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology. imbued with the note making, file pushing, and passing on the buck ethos, delay on the part of the state is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the state represents collective cause of the community, It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by office ers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing it on table for considerable time causing delay – intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of altitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysi's suffers, is public interest . The expression sufficient cause should therefore be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. 35. In the instant case, the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue considered the application for condonation of delay in the light of the facts and the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court which cannot be said to be suffering from any error. A writ petition preferred against the said order has already been dismissed though holding it to be infructuous after acceptance of the Special Appeal. In any case, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order condoning the delay to maintain special appeals. Accordingly, challenge to the order passed by the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue is not sustained. 36. The perusal of final order on the Special Appeals reveals that after condonation of delay, elaborate discussions have been made on the merit. Accordingly, challenge to the order passed by the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue is not sustained. 36. The perusal of final order on the Special Appeals reveals that after condonation of delay, elaborate discussions have been made on the merit. Therein, it was found that after the order passed by the Tehsildar, Kishangarh, an appeal was maintainable before the Collector under section 75 of the Land Revenue Act, 1956 and second appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority under section 76 of the Act of 1956, however, in ignorance of the aforesaid statutory remedies, a revision petition was directly filed before the Board of Revenue under section 84 of the Act of 1956 though it was not even maintainable. Learned Division Bench of the Board had even considered the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1985 NOC 170 and AIR 1957 SC 133 and AIR 1963 SC 1663. However, at this stage again, it is reiterated that even grounds raised before the Board of Revenue are ignored for some time, impugned orders of the Tehsildar suffer from no error because conversion of land was not maintainable in the hands of the petitioners. 37. The perusal rules 3 and 5 of the Rules of 1961, quoted earlier, shows as to who can seek conversion of land and if the facts of this case are taken into consideration, petitioners were not entitled to seek conversion of the land. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned detailed order was passed by the Division Bench of the Board, wherein, orders passed by the SB of the Board was set aside. It is by maintaining the order passed by the Tehsildar on 1.11.1997 and 24.11.1997. It suffers from no error. 38. The court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot cause interference in the impugned order as if it is exercising the jurisdiction of appeal. The limited jurisdiction of the court has been clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.” ( 2003 (3) SCC 524 ). It was held as under:- “7. The limited jurisdiction of the court has been clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.” ( 2003 (3) SCC 524 ). It was held as under:- “7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that since the insurer has a remedy by filing an appeal before the High Court, the High Court ought not to have entertained the petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution and for that reason, the judgment and order under challenge deserves to be set aside. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment and order under appeal. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. However, it would be open to the insurer to file an appeal if it is permissible under the law.” 39. In view of the para quoted above and the limited jurisdiction of this court, I do not find it to be case where interference can be made in the impugned order as it suffers from no error. 40. In the result, all the writ petitions so as the stay applications, if any, are dismissed.