JUDGMENT : - Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The defendants, who are the appellants, before this Court have filed this Regular Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.11.1998 passed by learned District Judge, Solan, in Civil Appeal No.3-NS/13 of 1992 whereby he set aside the judgment and decree dated 18.01.1992 passed by learned Sub Judge Ist Class, Arki, in Case No.53/1 of 1988. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiffs for possession by way of redemption of suit land was decreed on payment of mortgage amount of `800/-. 2. The plaintiffs/respondents (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs) filed a suit for redemption and it was averred by the plaintiffs that they are owners of land comprising Khewat No.30, Khatauni No.120, Khasra No.992, measuring 17 bighas 13 biswas, situate in Village Mangoo, Pargana Matyanj Kalan, Tehsil Arki, District Solan ( hereinafter referred to as the suit land). It was further averred that the suit land was mortgaged with Dhanu by plaintiffs for a consideration of `400/- in the year Sambat 2004 BK and the suit land was redeemed in early 1951 and the mutation to this effect was entered and attested at serial No.839 on 18.04.1951. It was also averred that the suit land was again mortgaged on 18.04.1951 for a consideration of `800/-with Dhanu alone and the mutation to this effect was also entered at serial No.840 which was attested on 18.04.1951. There was a partition between plaintiff No.1 and 2 during consolidation and the land comprising Khewat No.32, Khatauni No.40, Khasra No.3, measuring 6 bighas, out of the aforesaid suit land had fallen to the share of plaintiff No.2 and the land comprised in Khewat No.38, Khatauni No.45, Khasra No. 563, measuring 8 bighas 17 biswas fell to the share of plaintiff No.1. Though mortgagees were shown common over the above suit land but actually Dhanu possessed the suit land on the spot as mortgagee and on the suit land Dhanu had inducted Masta joint mortgagee without the consent of the plaintiffs. It was also averred that the plaintiff No.2 paid a sum of `400/-to the legal heirs of Dhanu mortgagee i.e. proforma defendants No.2 to 13 before the trial Court through Mansu, who delivered the possession in respect of the land comprising Khewat No.32, Khatauni No.40, Khasra No.3, measuring 6 bighas and since then the plaintiff No.2 is owner in possession of the land. 3. 3. Further, it was averred that the plaintiffs approached defendant No.1 to receive the mortgage amount of `400/-, though not entitled to receive the money but in order to settle the dispute amicably the offer was made to deliver the possession of land comprising Khewat No.38, Khatauni No.45, Khasra No.563, but he did not agree and so the plaintiff No.1 was compelled to file application for restitution of the said mortgaged land before Collector on 04.02.1980 which was decided on 19.08.1983. An appeal was also filed against the order of Collector, Arki before Divisional Commissioner which was also rejected on 29.08. 1987 on the ground of limitation by both the revenue Officers. According to the plaintiffs, the orders passed by the Collector, Arki and Divisional Commissioner, are illegal, wrong, void and not tenable under the law. Hence, suit for redemption of the suit land and for declaration that the plaintiff No.2 is owner in possession of the part of the suit land as he has paid mortgage amount and the entries in the revenue record showing Mastia joint mortgagee with Dhanu and after his death as Parma defendant No.1 are void and plaintiffs are not bound by the same. 4. The suit was contested by the defendant No.1 alone and preliminary objections with regard to suit being time barred, jurisdiction of the Civil Court, maintainability of suit and that the defendants have become owners in possession by efflux of time, were taken. On merits, it was admitted by the defendant No.1 that the plaintiffs mortgaged the suit land with possession with the predecessors of the defendants namely Dhanu and Mastia in equal shares and mutation No 700 sanctioned and attested on 07.02. 2004 BK to this effect, though report was made to the Patwari on 02.01.2004 BK. It was averred that the predecessors of the defendants occupied the suit land in the year 2003 BK and thus the plaintiffs have lost the right to redeem the suit land and the proforma defendants are not in possession of the suit land as owners. It was further averred that by mistake the name of Shri Mastia was not entered and attested in the mutation and when the mistake was discovered, mutation No. 735 was attested to this effect on 25.03.2004 BK, whereas, the report was made immediately on 30.02.2004 BK. It was further averred that by mistake the name of Shri Mastia was not entered and attested in the mutation and when the mistake was discovered, mutation No. 735 was attested to this effect on 25.03.2004 BK, whereas, the report was made immediately on 30.02.2004 BK. As per the defendant No.1, in the year 1951, the plaintiffs took more loan of `400/- and a formal mutation to show that he land stood mortgaged on an enhanced sum of `800/-was attested which was described as mutation of ‘Izadi Rehan’ clarifying the fact of only enhancement of the sum secured and possession continued that of the mortgagees and the mutation of ‘Izadi Rehan’ and the ‘Tartibi Faqual Rehan’ were attested on the same date i.e. 18.04.1951 on the basis of the report No.291. 5. The plaintiffs filed replication and reiterated the averments made in the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, the previous mortgage stood extinguished and a fresh mortgage was created on 18.04.1951 of the suit land. 6. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court on 15.05.1990:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the suit land, as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit is time-barred? OPD 3. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred, as alleged? OPD 4. Whether the defendants have become owners in possession by efflux of time? OPD 5. Relief. 7. After recording and evaluating the evidence adduced by the parties, the learned trial Court on 18.01.1992 dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the learned lower appellate Court, who vide his judgment and decree dated 23.11.1998 accepted the appeal thereby setting aside the judgment and decree dated 18.01.1992 passed by the learned trial Court and decreed the suit filed by the plaintiffs for possession by way of redemption of suit land on payment of `800/- 8. It is this judgment and decree which are under challenge before this Court. On 08.01.1999, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. It is this judgment and decree which are under challenge before this Court. On 08.01.1999, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. When the mortgage was created more than 30 years prior to the filing of the suit, could the suit be held to be within limitation merely on the fact that the Report was made to the Revenue Officer by increasing the amount of mortgage, particularly when such report was not proved in accordance with law? 2. Whether the Report made to the Revenue Officer which does not either bear the signatures or thumb impression of the Mortgagee could be said to be an acknowledgement within the provisions of Limitation Act, so as to extend the period of limitation for redemption of mortgage, could the Lower Appellate Court rely upon the mutation which evidence the increase in the mortgage money to give a fresh period of limitation to the Mortgagor? 3. Whether the orders passed by the competent officers exercising under the H P Redemption of Mortgage whether such orders bars the filing of the suit which is hit by the principle of constructive resjudicata? 4. Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court has wrongly relied upon the provisions of H.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1953 by putting reliance on the Judgment of this Hon’ble Court rendered under the provisions of such Act, particularly when such Act was repealed much prior to the filing of the suit by the Plaintiff-Respondent? 5. Whether the learned Lower Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction in sitting over the orders of the competent authorities exercising powers under the H.P. Redemption of Mortgage Land Act, 1971 assuming it to be a court of appeal, could the said findings be set aside by the civil court by holding that the mortgage was subsisting by taking erroneous view of law? Questions of Law No.1 to 5. 9. For convenience, all the substantial questions of law are taken up together. The facts as emerge are that the suit land was mortgaged by the plaintiffs during or before ‘Kharif Girdawari’ Samvat 2003 and the mutation No.700 Ex.DW1/E was attested on 07.02.2004 BK. Questions of Law No.1 to 5. 9. For convenience, all the substantial questions of law are taken up together. The facts as emerge are that the suit land was mortgaged by the plaintiffs during or before ‘Kharif Girdawari’ Samvat 2003 and the mutation No.700 Ex.DW1/E was attested on 07.02.2004 BK. Though, it has been mentioned in mutation No.700 that the suit land was mortgaged with Dhanu mortgagee, but the perusal of mutation No.735 Ex.DW1/F shows that the report was made immediately on 30.02.2004 BK to the effect that Mastia is also co-mortgagee with Dhanu and is also in possession as co-mortgagee of the suit land and the mutation to this effect was attested on 25.03.2004 BK and thereafter reflected in the jamabandi for the year 1946-47 Ex.PW1/C. 10. After the death of Mastia, mutation No.786 Ex.PW1/E was entered and attested in the name of defendant No 1 on 27 03 1949 and reflected in the jamabandi 1950-51 Ex.PW1/F. The entry continued for number of years which belied and falsified the stand of the plaintiffs that the suit land was not mortgaged with Mastia by the plaintiffs. In this background, the learned Senior counsel for the appellants has rightly contended that the plaintiffs could not have challenged the order passed by the Collector, Arki, on 19.08.1983 Ex.PW1/T and the order passed by the Divisional Commissioner on 29.08.1987 as the same were in fact passed by the competent authorities constituted under the H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976, in view of clear-cut bar imposed under Section 13 of the said Act which reads as follows:- “13. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any claim to enforce any right under a mortgage declared extinguished under this Act, or to question the validity of any proceedings under this Act.” In view of the aforesaid provisions, the question regarding validity of the proceedings of the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner could not have been challenged by way of the present suit and was required to be dismissed as such. 11. That apart, both the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner have come to a categorical conclusion that there was no subsisting mortgage on the date of the application and, therefore, they were not entertaining the same. 12. 11. That apart, both the Collector and the Divisional Commissioner have come to a categorical conclusion that there was no subsisting mortgage on the date of the application and, therefore, they were not entertaining the same. 12. The report No.291 in ‘Roznamcha Wakayati’ Ex.DW1/D in the year 1950-51 of the Halqua Patwari was made by Dhanu mortgagee and the plaintiff Gulab Singh wherein it is clearly written that the suit land mortgaged for a consideration of `400/-will be treated as mortgage for a consideration of `800/- and the possession of the Kabza Bastoor’ was used. Mutation No.840 shows that the same was attested and entered on the basis of the report No.291 on 18.04.1951 Ex.DW1/J which reflects that Keshab Ram etc. mortgagees have taken `400/-again from mortgagees and the suit land would be deemed to be mortgaged for a consideration of `800/-. Similarly, mutation No.839 Ex.DW1/H also depicts the same entry. 13. In this background, the learned trial Court has rightly held that there was no necessity of even attesting mutation Nos.839 and 840 in view of the provisions contained in Para-7, Point No.18 of the Punjab Land Record’s Manual which provides that cases of mere increase of mortgage money on a previous mortgage which is otherwise maintained unchanged should not be entered in the mutation register. In fact, even the learned Divisional Commissioner has held that there was no need for the Patwari to have even entered a fresh mutation and report No.291 an entry in the ‘Roznamcha’ ibid was sufficient to record the increase of the mortgage money. Since, there was no iota of evidence on record that the earlier mortgage consideration of `400/- was returned to the mortgagees and thereafter the suit land was again mortgaged with the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant and proforma defendants. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that no fresh mortgage was created on 25.03.2004 BK. 14. Shri Anupinder Rohal, learned counsel for respondents No.1(a) to 1(e) and 2, on the other hand, contended that the learned lower appellate Court has correctly held the mortgage to have been created in the year 1950-51. Since the word used in the mortgage is ‘Izadinama’ and the word ‘Izad’ means addition. 14. Shri Anupinder Rohal, learned counsel for respondents No.1(a) to 1(e) and 2, on the other hand, contended that the learned lower appellate Court has correctly held the mortgage to have been created in the year 1950-51. Since the word used in the mortgage is ‘Izadinama’ and the word ‘Izad’ means addition. To my mind, the learned lower appellate Court has completely without taking into consideration that incase two mortgagees were totally separate and independent of each other, then why a reference of `400/-in addition to `400/- of the so-called earlier mortgage is being made. It needs no imagination to conclude that if two transactions are totally independent of each other, then the question of comparison or reference to an earlier transaction would normally not be made. For this reason, the findings as recorded in Para-16 of the impugned judgment passed by the learned lower appellate Court are not at all sustainable. Incase the mortgagors had received an additional amount of `400/- as is noticed by the learned lower appellate Court, then for all intents and purposes, the mortgage was in continuity and not an independent mortgage. 15. Though, the learned lower appellate Court has reversed the findi ngs of the learned trial Court, but it has not at all adverted to the reasoning as recorded by the learned trial Court and has, therefore, not discharged its duty as cast upon it under the law. The learned lower appellate Court while reversing a finding of act was required to come into close quarters with reasoning assigned by the learned trial Court and then assigns its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This was the duty expected to be discharged by the learned first appellate Court being not only a final Court whose findings remain immune from challenge before this Court, but being also a final Court of law because even an erroneous decision may not be vulnerable before this Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of this Court has now ceased to be available to correct mere errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even on questions of law unless the question of law be a substantial one. This was so held in Santosh Hazari versus Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRS (2001) 3 SCC 179 . “15. This was so held in Santosh Hazari versus Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRS (2001) 3 SCC 179 . “15. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v.Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 . We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai (1983) 1 SCC 35 ). The rule is – and it is nothing more than a rule of practice – that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge’s notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 ). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 16. Shri Rohal, learned counsel for respondents No.1 (a) to 1(e) and 2, would then contend that since there was a ‘rapat’ entered later on which was in writing wherein the presence of the respective parties had been marked, the same would be an acknowledgement in terms of Section 18 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, limitation would be required to be computed from the date of such acknowledgement and not from the date of the initial mortgage. I am afraid that this plea cannot be accepted for the reason that for the purpose of Section 18, is also required to be signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf. Section 18 of the Limitation Act reads thus:- “S.18. Effect of acknowledgement in writing. – (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. (2) Where the writing containing the acknowledgement is undated, oral evidence may be given of the time when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,- (a) an acknowledgement may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to a person other than a person entitled to the property or right; (b) the word “signed” means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorized in this behalf; and (c) an application for the execution of a decree or order shall not be deemed to be an application in respect of any property or right.” 17. A perusal of the above would show that the essential requirements of the valid acknowledgement are:- (i) an admission or acknowledgement; (ii) that such acknowledgement must be in respect of a liability in respect of a property or right; (iii) that it must be made before the expiry of the period of limitation; and (iv) that it should be in writing and signed by the party against whom such. 18. In absence of any of the aforesaid conditions, the entry in the ‘rapat’ cannot be termed to be an acknowledgement in writing. The reason for this is obvious because the person acknowledging must be conscious of his liability as this commitment is essentially towards the liability. Admittedly, in this case, apart from the other requirements, there is no acknowledgment signed by the party against whom such liability or right was claimed. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents would then place reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Jagdish Dutt Samnol & Ors. versus M/s Ralla Ram Charanji Lal & Ors. 1994 (1) Current Law Journal (H.P.) 636 to contend that the recitals in a deed of transfer would amount to acknowledgement of mortgage. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents would then place reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Jagdish Dutt Samnol & Ors. versus M/s Ralla Ram Charanji Lal & Ors. 1994 (1) Current Law Journal (H.P.) 636 to contend that the recitals in a deed of transfer would amount to acknowledgement of mortgage. The reliance placed on this judgment is totally misplaced because the document Ex.PA therein was a sale deed wherein the jural relationship of the mortgagor and mortgagee had been mentioned and the plaintiff therein was held to be entitled to redeem the property on the payment of mortgage amount of `2,900/-and was held entitled to the possession. This document was duly signed by both the parties and, therefore, was held to be an acknowledgement of the mortgage. Infact the Court specifically held that the act was not unilateral and, therefore, qualified for being termed as an acknowledgement in writing. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents thereafter placed reliance upon Bai Sakinabai and others versus Gulam Rasul Umarbhai Shaikh AIR 1981 Gujarat 142. I have gone through the judgments referred above, but I do not find any observation which may be in favour or helpful to the respondents. 21. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents would then rely upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Inder Singh and others versus Mst. Kishno and others, 1966 Punjab Law Reporter 408, to contend that in case of unregistered mortgage, right to recover possession did not accrue after the execution of the mortgage deed and such rights accrue only after expiry of 12 years when valid mortgage deed comes into existence by virtue of expiry of prescriptive period of 12 years. He has further relied upon the observation of the learned lower appellate Court, who too has placed reliance on this case, to contend that the limitation of 30 years for the purpose of redemption would only commence in 1963 after expiry of 12 year s of acknowledgement of mortgage in 1951 which comes to 1993 and the suit had been instituted on 18.04.1988 and, therefore, was within the period of limitation. 22. 22. I am afraid that even this plea of the respondents cannot be accepted because admittedly the oral mortgagees in old Himachal were legally permissible as per laws prevalent that time and, therefore, the benefit of prescriptive period of 12 years is not available to the respondents. 23. There is yet another reason to non-suit the plaintiffs-respondents from filing this suit. The plaintiffs-respondents had admittedly two options at the time when the mortgage was subsisting of either approaching the Civil Court or approaching the authorities constituted under the H.P. Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1976. After having elected and taken chance before the authorities constituted under the Act, the plaintiffs-respondents were estopped from filing the present suit. All the questions of law are answered accordingly. 24. Consequently, I find merit in this appeal and the same is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court are restored, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.