JUDGMENT NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH, J. The present appeal has been filed by the sole appellant being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.04.1991 passed by the Ist Additional Sessions Judge, Darbhanga in Sessions Trial No. 211 of 1989/11 of 1989. 2. It may be noted here that the appellant was charged under section 302, read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘I.P.C.’). Upon investigation, Police submitted charge-sheet against the appellant Saukhi Yadav and one Bhogi Yadav showing the latter as an absconder. He remained an absconder and we are informed that even till today he is an absconder. That is why charge under section 34 of the I.P.C. 3. The prosecution case is based upon the fardbeyan of one Biltu Yadav (P.W.6) as recorded at Keoti Police Station, Sadar, District Darbhanga at 6.30 am in relation to the alleged murder of Muneshwar Yadav, the uncle of the informant. The fardbeyan alleges that in the early hours at about 4.30 am on 21.05.1988, the informant and his uncle-Muneshwar Yadav left their village for going to Madhubani court to make necessary pairwi in a case on that day. When they were about half a kilometer outside the village, suddenly the appellant and Bhogi Yadav, both armed with farsa, appeared and attacked upon them. Bhogi Yadav chased his uncle Muneshwar Yadav for some distance while the informant was being chased by the appellant, as a result of which, Muneshwar Yadav fell down, whereupon Bhogi Yadav allegedly first assaulted him by the farsa on his head, followed by an assault on his left forearm and then on the left leg below knee. Seeing this, the appellant stopped chasing the informant, turned back, went near his uncle and assaulted twice on his right leg below the knee by farsa. On hearing hulla and shouts raised by the informant, P.W. 1 Ram Dayalu Yadav, PW.2 Ram Briksha Yadav, P.W. 3 Saryug Yadav, P.W. 4 Ramashish Yadav and P.W.5 Rudal Yadav came running from the village and saw the incident including the accused persons running away. They then put the victim-Muneshwar Yadav on a cot and carried him to State Dispensary at Keoti, but the Doctor issued a paper and seeing the grievous nature of the injury referred him to Darbhanga Medical College Hospital (for short ‘D.M.C.H.’) for treatment. They then put the victim-Muneshwar Yadav on a cot and carried him to State Dispensary at Keoti, but the Doctor issued a paper and seeing the grievous nature of the injury referred him to Darbhanga Medical College Hospital (for short ‘D.M.C.H.’) for treatment. Soon thereafter the victim Muneshwar Yadav succumbed to the injuries and his dead body was then taken to the Police Station, where the fardbeyan was recorded. Motive behind the incident is said to be the litigations amongst the two parties including the case in which they were going to Madhubani court for doing pairwi on the day of the occurrence. Upon first information report being registered, the Police took up investigation. In course of investigation, it appears that 2-3 more people were named as assailants, but on conclusion of the investigation, charge sheet was submitted only against the appellant and Bhogi Yadav, showing the latter as an absconder. Cognizance having been taken, the case was then committed to the court of session and charge was framed as against the appellant. The appellant having pleaded not guilty was tried, convicted and sentenced as stated above. Hence, this appeal. 4. In order to establish the charge, the prosecution has examined 9 witnesses. P.W. 1 Ram Dayalu Yadav, P.W. 2 Ram Briksha Yadav, P.W. 3 Saryug Yadav, P.W. 4 Ramashish Yadav and P.W.5 Rudal Yadav were named in the F.I.R. as witnesses to the occurrence. P.W.1 Ram Dayalu Yadav is also an attesting witness to the fardbeyan. P.W. 6 Biltu Yadav is the informant himself. P.W. 7 is Anil Kumar Singh, who is concluding Investigating Officer and who submitted the charge-sheet. He has actually not conducted the investigation. The Investigating Officer, in fact, has not been examined and there is no explanation for the same. P.W. 8 is Dr. V.C.S. Verma, who conducted the post-mortem examination and proved the post mortem report as Ext.2. P.W.9 Binay Kumar Jha is an Assistant to an Advocate Clerk and has been brought to prove and bring on record the entire case-diary from paragraphs 1 to 121 and the case-diary has been marked as Ext.3 as a whole. We will deal this aspect of the matter and evidence of this witness at an appropriate stage. We are scandalized to say the least. Prosecution has, thus, examined nine witnesses to prove its case and exhibited the F.I.R. as Ext. 1, post mortem report as Ext. We will deal this aspect of the matter and evidence of this witness at an appropriate stage. We are scandalized to say the least. Prosecution has, thus, examined nine witnesses to prove its case and exhibited the F.I.R. as Ext. 1, post mortem report as Ext. 2 and the entire case-diary as Ext. 3. 5. In turn, the defence examined four witnesses in order to establish enmity and alibi. They are not necessary for being considered as per the view being taken by us. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant first urged that the place of occurrence being about half a kilometer or so away from the village, non-examination of the I.O. has caused serious prejudice to the defence. There is no objective finding available to the Court as to the place of occurrence. This has caused serious prejudice to the defence. He then points out that though inquest report was available on record, but it was not proved and as such is not a part of the evidence. It was purposely so done to cause prejudice to the defence. The prosecution has also not examined the Doctor, who had first examined the victim in State Dispensary at Keoti nor has it brought on record the paper issued by the Doctor after examining the victim as mentioned in the fardbeyan, which has caused serious prejudice to the defence. 7. In our view, to establish that serious prejudice is caused to the defence, the defence must show what prejudice has been caused, what is the fact the defence has not been able to challenge and in what manner the defence case has been prejudiced in absence thereof. Therefore, we would not consider this aspect of the matter to be of much consequences in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. Coming to the evidence, before we proceed, as noticed above, P.W.9 has been examined to prove the entire case-diary. We are indeed scandalized by the manner, in which the trial court proceeded. That is not enough. We would quote one line from the judgment of the trial court as hereunder : “I have gone through the case diary for the purposes of the appreciation of the evidence on record.” 9. We fail to appreciate as to which law permits such a thing and how a Judge of standing of Additional Sessions Judge could do such a thing. We fail to appreciate as to which law permits such a thing and how a Judge of standing of Additional Sessions Judge could do such a thing. First thing we must notice that P.W.9 is an Assistant to an Advocate Clerk, who has nothing to do with the case, yet the Court permits him to step in as a prosecution witness. More over we have coined such witness as “Sankat Mochan witness”. What more scandalized us is the trial court, which permits a person, who was no body, to pick up the entire case diary from paragraphs 1 to 121 and prove it and make it a part of evidence. The court then proceeds further to mark it as Ext. 3 and then the court sits down to read entire case-diary in order to appreciate evidence. Nothing can be more scandalous. No such step is permissible in law. The trial court forgot the true import of section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’), which clearly states that any criminal Court may use such diaries, not as evidence in the case, but to aid it in such enquiry or trial. What the trial court has done is using it as evidence, making it as evidence and appreciating it as evidence, which is wholly impermissible in law. The diary can never be proved in a Court, for it cannot be used as evidence. No part of diary can be proved because if any one is proving it for the purposes of making it an evidence, such act is prohibited by law. The law contemplates a reference to the diary only for the purposes of refreshing memory or contradicting the statements of witnesses in the Court with the statements made during the course of investigation. Only when it is used for refreshing memory, the procedure as envisaged under section 145 of the Evidence Act is to apply but that does not mean that diary can become evidence. Law prohibits such thing. We have found in cases after cases that in the State of Bihar, the Sessions Courts do not know or understand this distinction in law and in cases after cases the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. are proved as evidences or other materials in the case-diary are proved as evidence and marked as exhibits. We have found in cases after cases that in the State of Bihar, the Sessions Courts do not know or understand this distinction in law and in cases after cases the statements of witnesses recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. are proved as evidences or other materials in the case-diary are proved as evidence and marked as exhibits. This is a practice that should end, the sooner the better. The other thing is that as to who is permitted to prove a document. It appears that in this State every Tom, Dick and Harry, the expression we have formed now “Sankat Mochan Witness”, could come and prove any official document. In this case, an Assistant to Clerk of an Advocate, who has nothing to do in the case, has been permitted by the trial court to prove the entire case-diary and mark it as exhibit. This practice is deprecated and it must come to an end. A person, who is author of a document or in absence of author, which absence has to be explained, a person familiar with the handwriting of the author can only prove the document. The procedure adopted by the trial court is unknown to law. No sooner this practice ends than better it would be. 10. Now coming to the evidence of the substantive witnesses, we find that P.W. 6 Biltu Yadav is the informant. He clearly states that there were litigations between his family and the appellant. There were several rounds of civil litigations. There were also proceedings under section 107 of the Cr.P.C. and there was a criminal case, in which the two i.e. the informant and his uncle, were going to do Pairvi in Madhubani court, which was in between the parties. He then states that having left the village and gone a distance of a half kilometer, the appellant and Bhogi Yadav suddenly appeared. Appellant and his accomplice chased them, thereupon uncle of informant fell down. Bhogi Yadav assaulted his uncle by farsa on his head, then on his left forearm and then on his left leg below knee. Seeing this, the appellant left chasing the informant and went back near the uncle of the informant and assaulted by farsa on his right leg twice and, thereafter, escaped. Bhogi Yadav assaulted his uncle by farsa on his head, then on his left forearm and then on his left leg below knee. Seeing this, the appellant left chasing the informant and went back near the uncle of the informant and assaulted by farsa on his right leg twice and, thereafter, escaped. He then names P.W.1 Ram Dayalu Yadav, P.W. 2 Ram Briksha Yadav, P.W. 3 Saryug Yadav, P.W. 4 Ramashish Yadav and P.W.5 Rudan Yadav, all of whom had arrived at the spot and seen the alleged assault. He then states that they all carried his uncle on a cot to the State Dispensary at Keoti and from there after being referred he was being taken to D.M.C.H. for treatment, but in the way he succumbed to the injuries. Thereafter, his dead body was taken to the Police Station, where the fardbeyan of the informant was recorded. In the lengthy cross-examination, the defence has not been able to shake his evidence. He proves the fardbeyan and the F.I.R. 11. We then have the evidence of five prosecution witnesses i.e. P.Ws. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, who have all basically corroborated the evidence of the informant though in fairness to the learned counsel for the appellants, some of them have tried to improve by adding one or two other names. That does not make much of a difference; inasmuch as in material particulars as stated by the informant, rest of the five witnesses are consistent. 12. We then have P.W. 7 Anil Kumar Singh, who is the second Investigating Officer, who submitted the charge-sheet, but has not conducted any investigation. His evidence is of no consequence to the prosecution. There is no explanation why the Investigating Officer, who recorded the fardbeyan, registered the F.I.R. and investigated the case, has not been examined. We may also notice that the inquest report, though was available on record was not proved nor marked as an exhibit. 13. We then have P.W.8 Dr. V.C.S. Verma, who conducted the post-mortem examination. The post-mortem examination has been proved as Ext. 2 and it corroborates the injuries as alleged in the fardbeyan and in the evidence of P.W. 6. There is a small simple injury on the forehead, which the Doctor attributes to sharp cutting weapon. 13. We then have P.W.8 Dr. V.C.S. Verma, who conducted the post-mortem examination. The post-mortem examination has been proved as Ext. 2 and it corroborates the injuries as alleged in the fardbeyan and in the evidence of P.W. 6. There is a small simple injury on the forehead, which the Doctor attributes to sharp cutting weapon. There are five wounds, one on the head as above, one on the left forearm, one on left leg below knee and remaining two on right leg below knee, which, in the opinion of the Doctor, are grievous injuries, which, in ordinary course, could cause death. They have been caused by sharp cutting heavy weapon like farsa. This is all the evidence on record. 14. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that apart from the prejudice caused by non-examination of the Investigating Officer and non-proving and non-marking of inquest report as exhibit, if one looks to the evidence as a whole, there is one striking feature to the effect that there was no intention of the appellant to kill. The intention was to cause at best grievous injuries. He submits that if there was intention to kill, then the appellant and his accomplice had enough time and weapons in their hands to kill the uncle of the informant then and there. There was none there to resist the appellant and his said accomplice, who were armed with farsa and they were freely using them. The injury on the forehead was not attributed to farsa, which was the only weapon they were carrying. If they wanted to kill the uncle of the informant, they could have easily used the farsa to cut the neck or split head of his uncle, but the injuries inflicted were on the forearms or on the legs below the knee. 15. Having given our anxious consideration, we agree that if the appellant had any intention to kill, he or his accomplice would have straightway struck the farsa upon his head as many times as they wanted but they did not do so. Nothing came in between to prevent them from doing so and, thus, there was absence of intention to kill, though the intention was to cause grievous injury so as to maim the person. 16. Nothing came in between to prevent them from doing so and, thus, there was absence of intention to kill, though the intention was to cause grievous injury so as to maim the person. 16. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. submits that in terms of section 300 of the I.P.C. where a person causes, such bodily injury, which is likely to cause death in ordinary course of life, he cannot escape the charge of murder i.e. culpable homicide amounting to murder. In our view, there being no intention to kill as is apparent from the facts noted above, it can hardly be said that the appellant had intention to cause such bodily injury knowingly, which would, in ordinary course, cause death of a person. The prosecution has not proved, much less through the Doctor P.W.8, that the injuries were such that they were likely to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Thus, in our view, the appellant cannot be held guilty of culpable homicide amounting to murder. We, accordingly, alter the conviction of the appellant from section 302, read with section 34 of the I.P.C. to section 304, Part 1 of the I.P.C. read with section 34 of the I.P.C. There cannot be any prejudice to the appellant caused by this alteration of charge. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant points out that the appellant had already remained in custody for over three years and would be about 70 years old now. 18. Considering the aforesaid matter and the special facts and circumstances of the case, we convict the appellant under section 304, Part 1 of the I.P.C. read with section 34 of the I.P.C. and sentence him to the period already undergone by him with no fresh liability. Accordingly, the appellant is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds. 19. In the result, this appeal is, thus, dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the conviction and sentence.