JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioner, Ram Chandra, has laid this writ petition praying therein under mentioned reliefs:- (i) the order dated 1.11.2002 (Anx.9) issued by respondent no.2 ordering prosecution sanction against the petitioner may kindly be quashed. (ii) any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in favour of the petitioners, may kindly be granted and (iii) the cost of the writ petition be allowed in favour of the petitioner. 2. The brief facts, giving rise to this writ petition, are that a First Information Report was lodged against the petitioner, when he was posted as Industries Inspector at District Industries Centre, Nagaur, alleging therein that the petitioner and one Tansukh, the then Commercial Taxes Officer, conspired to extend the undue advantage to Hanumant Cement Pvt. Ltd., under Sales-tax Encouragement Scheme and the said omission and commission of both of them has resulted in huge loss to Government revenue in the form of sales tax. The amount was also quantified as Rs. 98,39,918/-in the FIR. In the FIR, offences under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 420, 467, 471 and 120-B were attributed to the petitioner. After lodging of FIR, some investigation was conducted and on finding, prima facie proof about allegation, sanction for prosecution was sought against the petitioner from the competent authority and the competent authority granted sanction for prosecution for the said offences against the petitioner vider order dated 01.11.2002 (Annex.9). 3. Precisely, in the petition, the petitioner has averred that as a matter of fact, no offence is committed by the petitioner and he has been falsely implicated, therefore, order granting sanction for prosecution is not sustainable. 4. On behalf of the respondents, reply to the writ petition is submitted and action of granting sanction is stoutly defended. In the reply, the respondents have urged specific plea that writ petition suffers from vice of delay and laches inasmuch as the petition against the impugned order has been filed after a lapse of nine years and there is no explanation much less plausible explanation for such delay and laches. The respondent has also pleaded that the order granting sanction can also be questioned by the petitioner and can be examined under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. The respondent has also pleaded that the order granting sanction can also be questioned by the petitioner and can be examined under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, and therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. That apart, it was also averred in the reply that for mere grant of sanction for prosecution, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner. As per the version of the respondent, on investigation, prima facie, it was found that the petitioner was involved in conspiracy with the Commercial Taxes Officer, which has resulted in loss to the Government revenue, and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is called for. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sanjay Mathur, has argued that from the materials, there is no semblance of proof that the petitioner was involved in any manner for commission of the offence, which has resulted in loss to the Government revenue. Mr. Mathur has vehemently urged that the competent authority has not applied its mind, while granting sanction for prosecution, and has acted mechanically, therefore, impugned order cannot be sustained. 6. Per contra, Mr. Rajpurohit, learned learned counsel for the respondent has submitted on the ground of gross delay alone, the petitioner is liable to be non-suited. Learned counsel, Mr. Rajpurohit, has also argued that the competent authority before granting sanction has examined the matter thradebare and as there was prima facie incriminating material against the petitioner, the requisite order has been passed granting sanction for prosecution. With these submissions, the learned counsel has urged that no interference with the impugned order is warranted. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. It is not in dispute that the impugned order granting sanction for prosecution against the petitioner was passed in the year 2002 and the present writ petition has been laid by the petitioner in the year 2011. Therefore, the petitioner has invoked extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under Artile 226 of the Constitution after inordinate delay and laches of nine years and for such delay, there is no explanation much less plausible explanation in the writ petition. The averments contained in the writ petition, in this behalf, are conspicuously silent. It is trite that pristine maxim 'delay defeats equity' is to be applied with full vigour, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. The averments contained in the writ petition, in this behalf, are conspicuously silent. It is trite that pristine maxim 'delay defeats equity' is to be applied with full vigour, while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. Well, it is true that for invoking writ jurisdiction, no period of limitation is prescribed, but then as per dictum of Hon'ble Apex Court, the maximum period for initiating civil action can be taken as a guiding factor. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Municipal Council & Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig & Ors. [ 2000 (2) SCC 48 ] has examined this aspect and has held that if a litigant is indolent about his rights, then he is liable to be non-suited solely on the ground of delay and laches. The Court has made following observations:-It is now a well-settled principle of law that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. 9. Delay in filing the writ petition is of nine years and there is no whisper in the writ petition about such an inordinate delay. Thus, in totality of circumstances, I am not inclined to interfere in the matter solely on the ground of delay and laches. 10. Resultantly, the writ petition fails and the same is, hereby, rejected summarily.Petition Dismissed. *******