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2015 DIGILAW 100 (MAN)

State of Manipur and Ors. v. Saroz Khan and Ors.

2015-07-27

N.KOTISWAR SINGH

body2015
JUDGMENT N. Kotiswar Singh, J. 1. Heard Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned senior PP for the State and Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents in these two revision petitions. 2. These two revision petitions have been filed by the State being aggrieved by the orders dated 3.9.2014 passed by the Special Court (ND & PS), Manipur at Lamphelpat in Cril. Misc.(B) No. 97 of 2014 and in Cril. Misc. (B) No. 98 of 2014 by which the respondents were granted bail. These revision petitions are heard together as these arise from the identical impugned orders dated 3.9.2014 relating to the same cause of action and FIR, and disposed of by this common judgment. 3. Before we proceed to examine the correctness of the order releasing the respondents on bail by the learned Special Judge, this Court would like to deal with the preliminary objection raised by the respondents that the present revision petitions preferred by the State are not maintainable. It has been submitted by Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents that these revision petitions were filed by the State under Section 397 read with Sec. 439(2) and 401 of Cr.P.C. for setting aside or quashing the orders dated 3.9.2014 passed by the Special Court (ND & PS), Manipur. According to Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents, since an order granting bail amounts to an interlocutory order, no revision would lie against an interlocutory order under Section 397 Cr.P.C. As regards Section 439(2)Cr.P.C., it has been submitted that Section 439(2) could be invoked for cancellation of bail which could be only on the limited grounds when the accused has been found to be tampering with the evidence or that he has committed similar offence during the period of bail or has absconded and such alike misconduct or emergence of new grounds warranting cancellation of bail. It has been submitted that since no such grounds have been raised in these revision petitions and as these petitions, filed under Section 439 Cr.P.C. for cancellation of bail granted by the Court below, are not maintainable. It has been also submitted that the High Court's power of revision u/s. 401 Cr.PC is limited and can not be invoked to challenge the order granting bail. It has been also submitted that the High Court's power of revision u/s. 401 Cr.PC is limited and can not be invoked to challenge the order granting bail. It has been submitted that if the State Government is really aggrieved by the orders granting bail to the respondents on 3.9.2014, they could have invoked the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. for exercise of the inherent power of the High Court. In this regard, Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 , State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 contending that revision would not lie against an order granting bail and the only option for the State is to approach the Special Court for cancellation of the bail order, as the High Court can not sit in appeal or revision over an order of the Court of Session. Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents has also relied on a number of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court to show that the present applications filed by the State are in effect for cancellation of the bail orders passed by the learned Special Judge on 3.9.2014 but without pleading the permissible grounds for cancellation. In this regard, Mr. Mahendra has drawn attention of this Court to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e., 1) Dolat Ram & ors. v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 ; 2) the State through the Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 961 ; 3) Sami Ullaha v. Superintendent, Narcotic Central Bureau, (2008) 16 SCC 471 ; 4) Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B. & anr., (2004) 11 SCC 165 ; 5) State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi, (2005) 8 SCC 21 and has submitted that the order of bail should be sparingly interfered with and that also only on the limited grounds that the accused respondents have misused their bail as explained in detail in the aforesaid cases. Further, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court rendered in the case of Hadiani Dei v. State of Orissa & Ors., (1994) Cr.L.J. 660, it has been submitted that once an order for grant of bail has been passed even by applying wrong principles by the Court, the only option before the State is to approach the Court by filing an application for cancellation of the bail order. In the said case, the Hon'ble Orissa High Court observed as follows:- "11. If the aforesaid be the position in law when a person is released even with the aid of proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code, we are of the opinion that the same view is required to be taken when during investigation a person is released on bail, which order of bail has to be treated as one under Section 437(1) or (2) of Section 439(1), because of which cancellation could be made under the corresponding provisions of Section 437 or Section 439 and on the grounds germane to such cancellation. May it be stated here that power of release on bail under the Act either by the Magistrate or a Special Court is same as that visualised by Section 167, Cr.P.C., as would appear from clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 36-A of the Act. No doubt, Section 37 of the Act starts with a non obstante clause: ("Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973"); what has been stated in clause (b)(ii) of Section 37 of the Act would be applicable, according to us, when the question of release on bail is being considered. No doubt, Section 37 of the Act starts with a non obstante clause: ("Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973"); what has been stated in clause (b)(ii) of Section 37 of the Act would be applicable, according to us, when the question of release on bail is being considered. But, once an accused has been released even without satisfying the requirements in question the normal criminal law would spring into action and bail would be open to be cancelled only on the grounds on which bail can be otherwise cancelled, the important grounds relating to which have been mentioned in paragraph 11 of Salaam Babalal's case, the same beings: (i) where the accused misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity: (ii) interferes with the course of investigation; (iii) attempts to tamper with evidence of witnesses;(iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper smooth investigation; (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country; (vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; (vii) attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are of course illustrative and not exhaustive. Remand to custody merely because of non- fulfilment of the requirements of sub-clause (ii) would really amount to review of the earlier order, which is not permissible, in view of what has been stated in Section 362 of the Code, which provision applies to proceedings before the Special Court (or till constitution of such Courts before the Court of Session). This is what has been held by the Single Judge of this Court in Ramesh Chandra's case also." Accordingly, it has been submitted that the present revision petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of non maintainability. 4. As regards this preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents, it may be observed that it is by and large accepted position of law that order granting bail is an interlocutory order and in view of that, normally revisional powers u/s. 397 cannot be invoked, as revision is barred against interlocutory orders. To that extent the submission of Mr. Mohendra can not be faulted. To that extent the submission of Mr. Mohendra can not be faulted. However, as regards the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents that Section 439(2)Cr.P.C. can be invoked only for cancellation of bail order on the limited grounds, the same cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 which has been also relied on by the counsel for the respondents. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puran (supra) referring to earlier decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), (1978) 1 SCC 118 that where an order granting bail has been passed in patent violation of the principles of law and is perverse, such patent error or wrong exercise of discretion can be corrected by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 439(2) Cr.PC as held in para Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13 thereof, which are reproduced hereinbelow. "10. Mr. Lalit next submitted that once bail has been granted it should not be cancelled unless there is evidence that the conditions of bail are being infringed. In support of this submission he relies upon the authority in the case of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC(Cri) 237. In this case it has been held that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. It has been held that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail already granted. It has been held that generally speaking the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly are interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. It is, however, to be noted that this Court has clarified that these instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. One such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime of this nature and that too without giving any reasons. It is, however, to be noted that this Court has clarified that these instances are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. One such ground for cancellation of bail would be where ignoring material and evidence on record a perverse order granting bail is passed in a heinous crime of this nature and that too without giving any reasons. Such an order would be against principles of law. Interest of justice would also require that such a perverse order be set aside and bail be cancelled. It must be remembered that such offences are on the rise and have a very serious impact on the society. Therefore, an arbitrary and wrong exercise of discretion by the trial court has to be corrected. 11. Further, it is to be kept in mind that the concept of setting aside the unjustified illegal or perverse order is totally different from the concept of cancelling the bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such cancellation. This position is made clear by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 : AIR 1978 SC 1979. In that case the Court observed as under: (SCC p. 124, para 16) "If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the State and necessarily, therefore, to that court. The State may as well approach the High Court being the superior court under Section 439(2) to commit the accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have cropped up except those already existing, it is futile for the State to move the Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-à-vis the High Court." 12. It must be mentioned that in support of the above submission Mr. This position follows from the subordinate position of the Court of Session vis-à-vis the High Court." 12. It must be mentioned that in support of the above submission Mr. Lalit had also relied upon the authorities in the cases of Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra, 2000 SCC (Cri) 1508 : 1999 Cri.L.J. 4063, State (Delhi Admn.) v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 223 and Bhagirathsinh v. State of Gujarat, (1984) 1 SCC 284 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 63. These need not be dealt with separately as they are of no assistance in a case of this nature where bail has been cancelled for very cogent and correct reasons. 13. Our view is supported by the principles laid down in the case of Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 : AIR 1978 SC 1979. In this case it has been held by this Court that under Section 439(2), the approach should be whether the order granting bail was vitiated by any serious infirmity for which it was right and proper for the High Court, in the interest of justice, to interfere." In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puran (supra), the decision of the Hon'ble Orissa High Court in Hadiani Dei (supra) can not be said to have laid down the correct position of law in this regard. Thus, in the present case, if it is found that there has been non-application of mind or that bail had been granted illegally or improperly by wrong or arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion or by ignoring well settled principles, the bail granted can be cancelled under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C. and commit the accused to custody by this Court. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the present revision petitions would be maintainable in the eventuality of finding that the bail orders granted by the learned Special Judge are perverse, or are patently illegal passed by ignoring well settled principles of law governing the field. In that event, we may not deal with the applicability of Section 401 of Cr.P.C. now. 5. We will now deal with the facts of the case. The respondents and three others were arrested on 27.4.2014 by the personnel of the Narcotics Bureau Police Station (NAB-P.S.) led by the complainant/Sub-Inspector, Th. Achouba Singh. In that event, we may not deal with the applicability of Section 401 of Cr.P.C. now. 5. We will now deal with the facts of the case. The respondents and three others were arrested on 27.4.2014 by the personnel of the Narcotics Bureau Police Station (NAB-P.S.) led by the complainant/Sub-Inspector, Th. Achouba Singh. At the time of arrest, the respondents and three others were travelling in a tata truck from which 2.480 kgs. of powder suspected to be brown sugar were recovered. The said powder was shown to be seized from the possession of Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba, another accused. The police also seized Indian currency notes amounting to Rs. 1,00,000/- along with one mobile handset (Lemon) with SIM card (Airtel No. 8974196574) from the possession of Md. Saroz Khan, the respondent in Cril. Revn. Petn. No. 19 of 2014 and a sum of Rs. 50,000/- along with one mobile handset (Nokia) with SIM card (Aircell No. 8794180120) from the possession of the respondent in Cril. Revn. Petn. No. 20 of 2014. Subsequently, FIR case No. 31(4) 2014 NAB PS u/s. 21(c)/29/60(3) of the ND& PS Act was registered against them. They were produced before the learned CJM, Imphal East on 28.4.2014 who remanded them to police custody till 5.5.2014 and were directed to be produced before the Special Court (ND&PS) on 5.5.2014. Subsequently, they were produced on 5.5.2014 before the Special Court (ND&PS) for further remand on which date, one of the accused, namely, Nongthombam Bishworjit Singh @ Lumba was released on bail by the Special Court and the remaining 4 accused including the present respondents were remanded to police custody. On the day of remand on 5.5.2014, the learned Special Judge, who also happened to be same Judge who passed the impugned bail orders, observed that examination of materials on record collected and found out by the investigation, prima-facie show a conspiracy amongst the 4 accused persons for commission of the offence. Accordingly, they were further remanded to custody. Thereafter, these two respondents filed a joint application being Cril.Misc. (B) No. 83 of 2014 under section 37 of the ND & PS Act read with Section 439 Cr.P.C. for release on bail, which, however, was rejected by the learned Special Judge vide order dated 26.7.2014. Accordingly, they were further remanded to custody. Thereafter, these two respondents filed a joint application being Cril.Misc. (B) No. 83 of 2014 under section 37 of the ND & PS Act read with Section 439 Cr.P.C. for release on bail, which, however, was rejected by the learned Special Judge vide order dated 26.7.2014. Though the respondents pleaded in their bail application that they had been arrested on mere suspicion and there is no material on the part of the prosecution to substantiate the allegations against them as no incriminating substance was recovered from either of the accused persons or at their instances, the learned Special Judge noted the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor that as per the investigation in the case, one Md. Akbar Khan, a lawyer by occupation, is said to be owner of the seized drug and the present respondents brought the said drugs for transportation to Imphal. The learned Special Judge then observed that that being the finding of the investigating agency that both the respondents are found involved in committing offences mentioned in the above referred FIR case, there are reasons to believe that they are also involved in the present case. Accordingly, their bail applications were rejected by the Ld. Special Judge vide order dated 26.7.2014. Thereafter, the respondents filed the two separate bail applications again on 6.8.2014 before the Special Court (ND & PS), Manipur. The common plea taken by the respondents in their bail applications was that while these two respondents were proceeding to Mantripukhri along with the said amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- for payment to one Md. Siraj, who is living in Mantripukhri as the price/consideration for purchasing a piece of land at Mantripukhri and while they were waiting for bus, they happened to meet one Md. Feroz Khan @ Thoiba who was proceeding in a tata truck towards Imphal who offered them a lift. Accordingly, they travelled as gratuitous passengers of the tata truck and as such, had nothing to do with the brown sugar so seized from the truck, which has been shown to be seized from the said Md. Feroz Khan @ Thoiba. 6. In the meantime, on 1.8.2014, before consideration of the bail applications, relevant forensic reports were submitted to the Special Court on 1.8.2014 which showed that the seized powders were indeed brown sugar, a contraband item. Feroz Khan @ Thoiba. 6. In the meantime, on 1.8.2014, before consideration of the bail applications, relevant forensic reports were submitted to the Special Court on 1.8.2014 which showed that the seized powders were indeed brown sugar, a contraband item. In the bail objection report dated 11.8.2014 submitted before the Special Court, the investigating authority had submitted that after the investigation, the accused respondent Md. Saroz Khan had revealed that the seized Indian currency notes of Rs. 1,00,000/- was handed over to him by one Md. Akbar Khan at Moijing Awang Leikai, Thoubal District who was suspected to be the owner of the seized drug who directed him to wait for further instruction while he reached Imphal. Similarly, the accused/respondent, Md. Feroz Khan @ Fero also revealed that the seized Indian currency note amounting to Rs. 50,000/- was handed over to him by Md. Akbar Khan of Moijing Awang Leikai, who also happens to be his elder brother, and suspected to be owner of the seized drug who similarly directed him to wait for further instruction while he reached Imphal. Accordingly, the investigating authority submitted that there was ample evidence that both the respondents were involved in transaction of huge illegal drugs and releasing them on bail would hamper the smooth investigation of the case. 7. The learned Special Judge passed impugned bail orders on 3.9.2014, of identical nature, the relevant portions of which are quoted as below:- "3. The materials on record are also examined. The bail objection reports submitted by the I.O. of the case are also examined. Also heard ld. Counsel moving this application and also ld. Addl. P.P. Ld. Addl. P.P. objects vehemently for the release of the accused person on bail on the basis of the police bail objection report coupled with the extension of time for full investigation. 4. The seizure memo dated 27.4.2014 prepared by the investigation about the seizure of the contraband brown sugar is also examined. Upon such examination the seizure was made from the possession of the accused person at Serial No. 1. Namely Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba against whom, as such, a strong prima facie case under section 21(c) read with section 35 and 54 of the ND PS Act is made out. Upon such examination the seizure was made from the possession of the accused person at Serial No. 1. Namely Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba against whom, as such, a strong prima facie case under section 21(c) read with section 35 and 54 of the ND PS Act is made out. The first bail objection report dated 5.8.2014 has also stated : "As of now, special source man were have been deployed to know that the main culprit is actually a resident of Moijing Awang Leikai, Thoubal not to find out the exact location of the main culprit." It means that the real culprit is still at large. 5. In cases under NDPS involving commercial quantity, refusal of bail is the general principle and grant of it is the exception. However, right to bail is a right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In other words, bail in such cases is to be considered vis-à-vis this right to personal liberty. In view of NDPS Act Section 35 and 54, only the persons form whom the seizure is made are prima facie liable and punishable, unless other co-accused persons can be booked under Section 29 of the Act. Investigation has not so far made out a strong prima facie case against the present accused person under Section 29. 6. For this observations, reasons and findings, it is held that the present accused person namely Md. Saroz Khan may be allowed bail on his executing a personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees on lakh) with one surety of the like amount subject to the condition that he must present himself before the I.O. of the case as and when required by him." 8. Mr. Mahendra has strenuously argued that the respondents are innocent and no incriminating material had been recovered from them. What had been recovered from them were certain amount of money which were for their personal use which had nothing to do with the drugs so seized. Neither, they were associated with the truck from which the drugs were seized. It has been submitted that they were mere gratuitous passengers. It has been also argued that contraband drugs, viz., the brown sugar were seized from another accused Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba and not from them. The owner of the truck had been also released. It has been submitted that one Md. It has been submitted that they were mere gratuitous passengers. It has been also argued that contraband drugs, viz., the brown sugar were seized from another accused Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba and not from them. The owner of the truck had been also released. It has been submitted that one Md. Akbar Khan is the main accused whom the Investigating Authority has identified as the owner of the drugs who was still at large and there is no material to show that the respondents are involved in the transportation of the said drugs. Hence, it has been submitted that release of the two respondents on bail by the learned Special Judge cannot be faulted with. 9. Perusal of the impugned orders would clearly indicate that the learned Special Judge was persuaded to grant bail to the respondents primarily because of the reason that the main culprit or the owner of the drugs was still at large, the offending drugs were seized from another person, Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba and two of the accused were released on bail. It is to be noted that the accused from whom the drugs were seized had not been released on bail at the relevant time. The learned Special Judge observed that though in cases under NDPS Act involving commercial quantity, refusal of bail is the norm and grant of it is an exception, the right to bail is a personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The learned Special Judge held that in view of Sections 35 and 54 of NDPS Act, only the person from whom the seizure is made is prima-facie liable unless other co-accused persons can be booked under section 29 of the Act. The learned Special Judge held that investigation so far made, has not made any strong prima facie case against the respondents and accordingly, released the respondents on bail. 10. As regards grant of bail under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the "NDPS Act"/"Act"), we may examine the principles governing it. The learned Special Judge held that investigation so far made, has not made any strong prima facie case against the respondents and accordingly, released the respondents on bail. 10. As regards grant of bail under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the "NDPS Act"/"Act"), we may examine the principles governing it. Section 37 of the Act which deals with bail provides that no person accused of an offence under Section 19 or 24 or 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless:-- (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release and (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 36A(4) provides that in respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving commercial quantity the reference in sub-sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall be read as 180 days and it has been further provided that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of 180 days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to 1 year on the report of Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. It has been provided that these are in addition to the other limitations provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. From the above, it is clear that at the time of grant of bail under the NDPS Act, where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, there must be specific satisfaction arrived at by the Court that (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused is not guilty of such offence and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Unless these two conditions are satisfied, any bail order granted would be in plain violation of the provisions of law as mentioned above. Unless these two conditions are satisfied, any bail order granted would be in plain violation of the provisions of law as mentioned above. Further, mere inability of the Investigating Authority to complete the investigation within 180 days would not automatically entitle the accused to be released on bail as provided under Section 167 of Cr.P.C. as specifically mentioned in Section 36A(4) of the Act. Accordingly, it has to be examined in the present case whether such statutory requirements had been complied with when the bail orders were passed by the learned Special Judge. 11. Reading of Para No. 5 of the impugned orders passed by the Ld. Special Judge quoted above, shows that the learned Special Judge was clearly swayed by the consideration that the main accused was still at large, the seizure of the drugs was made from another person, Md. Firoz Khan @ Thoiba and two other accused were released on bail and investigation has so far not made strong prima facie case against the present respondents, though the requirement of law is that the Court below allowing bail must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondents are not guilty of such offence. 12. We may briefly pause here to understand the scope and meaning of the expression "there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence" as mentioned in sub-clause (b)(ii) of the Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act. Section 37 of the Act reads as follows : "37. Offences to be cognizable and non-available.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for [offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor oppose the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail." Because of the non-obstante clause mentioned in Section 37 of the ND&PS Act, that provision will prevail over any such provision under the Cr.P.C. which would be contrary to the provisions of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act. Further, these conditions will be in addition to other provisions relating to grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code and bail cannot be granted unless the stipulations mentioned in Section 37 are satisfied. Section 437 Cr.P.C. deals with grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code. The principle underlying the section is towards granting of bail except in cases where there appear to be reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and also when there are other valid reasons to justify refusal of bail. It is interesting to note that Section 437 Cr.P.C. uses both the expressions, "there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence" in Sub-section (7) of Section 437 which is also used in Section 27 of the NDPS Act and "there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence........... " in sub-section 1(1) of Section 437 Cr.P.C. These two expressions, obviously, carry different meanings and have been employed by the Legislature to deal with two different situations. The expression "there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence........... " as used in Section 437(1)(i) Cr.P.C. is applicable at the pre-trial stage where the onus is more on the prosecution to show that there are sufficient grounds for holding the accused appearing to be guilty to deny bail. There is a presumption of innocence of the accused till proven guilty, applicable at this stage which is the universal norm in criminal jurisprudence. In such pre-trial stage, the burden is on the Investigation/Prosecution to show that there are strong materials/reasons against the accused to deny him bail. There is a presumption of innocence of the accused till proven guilty, applicable at this stage which is the universal norm in criminal jurisprudence. In such pre-trial stage, the burden is on the Investigation/Prosecution to show that there are strong materials/reasons against the accused to deny him bail. However, in the case of Sub-section (7) of Section 437 Cr.P.C. which deals with the stage where the trial has been already concluded, but before the judgment is delivered, the legislature has used the expression "there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence", the onus shifts to the accused to demonstrate that inspite of the evidences against him, there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty. At this stage, all the evidences collected during investigation must have been placed on record and lead against the accused which would indicate his guilt. It is to be noted that a trial would proceed only when there are sufficient materials/evidences collected on which basis charge sheet was filed. As such, on conclusion of trial, sufficient evidence must have been produced and brought on record against the accused. In the teeth of such evidences placed on record, the accused must argue that inspite of such evidences, he is not guilty of such offence. Obviously, the onus will lie heavily on the accused to discharge the same to demonstrate that there are stronger materials to show he is not guilty inspite of the evidence produced by the Prosecution. Therefore, the bail application at the conclusion of the trial as contemplated under Section 437(7) Cr.P.C. will be mere arduous and difficult to the accused as more stringent considerations would start operating. By the end of trial, the presumption of innocence will slowly give way to guilt by the weight of evidences brought against the accused. The burden will be gradually shifted to the accused to show that inspite of the evidences against him, there are reasonable grounds based on reliable materials to show that the accused is not guilty of such offence. The burden will be gradually shifted to the accused to show that inspite of the evidences against him, there are reasonable grounds based on reliable materials to show that the accused is not guilty of such offence. Only when such heavy burden/onus is discharged by the accused that he can be released on bail on conclusion of trial under Section 437(7) Cr.P.C. This stringent principle which is contemplated and applicable at the conclusion of the trial under Section437(7) Cr.P.C. has been also made applicable for bail in case of NDPS Act but at the pre-trial/investigation stage, thus making it difficult to obtain bail in drug related cases also. The onus is on the accused to show that even at the investigation stage, where admissibility of evidences are yet to be considered, if there are materials against the accused, he has to convince the Court that "there are reasonable grounds" to show that he is not guilty of such offence. The onus is not on the Investigation to show that there are grounds to show that the accused is not guilty of such offence, on the accused to show that even at the investigation stage, while the investigation is in full swing, the accused is not guilty of such offence, inspite of the materials against him found in course of the investigation. This construction of Section 27 of NDPS Act is clearly supported by the operative part of the Section which starts in the negative in proscribing the enlargement on bail of any person accused of the offence mentioned therein. Section 37(1)(b) starts with the wording "no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on which own bond unless.............. ". This clearly indicates that bail shall not be granted unless the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. 13. Section 37(1)(b) starts with the wording "no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on which own bond unless.............. ". This clearly indicates that bail shall not be granted unless the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. 13. In Union of India v. Thamisharasi and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 190 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborately dealt with the provision of Section 37 of NDPS Act, and the difference in the application of Section 37 of the NDPS Act and Section 437 Cr.P.C. by holding that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused under Section 437 Cr.P.C. is displaced only on the prosecution showing the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty while under the NDPS Act it is the accused who has to show that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty and the accused shall not be released on bail unless the conditions mentioned in Section 27 are fulfilled, as held in paras 11 and 12 which are reproduced hereinbelow : "11. Sub-section (3) of Section 36-A provides that the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall not be affected by anything contained in Section 36-A of the NDPS Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 CrPC has been expressly applied by Section 36-A of the Act and the scheme of the Act is that the provisions of the Code would apply except where there is any inconsistent provision in this Act in relation to arrests made under this Act. It is this context in which Section 37(1)(b) has to be construed wherein are specified the limitations on granting of bail. We must, therefore, look to the corresponding provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure with which Section 37(1)(b) of the Act can be treated to be inconsistent. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is Section 437 and not Section 167 which is the corresponding provision for this purpose. We must, therefore, look to the corresponding provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure with which Section 37(1)(b) of the Act can be treated to be inconsistent. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is Section 437 and not Section 167 which is the corresponding provision for this purpose. The corresponding limitation on grant of bail in case of non-bailable offences under Section 437 is as follows: "(i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;" In other words, under Section 437 of the Code the person is not to be released on bail "if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence ..." while according to Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the accused shall not be released on bail unless "the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence ...". The requirement of reasonable grounds for belief in the guilt of the accused to refuse bail is more stringent and, therefore, more beneficial to the accused than the requirement of reasonable grounds for the belief that he is not guilty of the offence under Section37 of the NDPS Act. Under Section 437 CrPC the burden is on the prosecution to show the existence of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is guilty while under Section 37 of the Act the burden is on the accused to show the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief that he is not guilty of the offence. In the first case, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is displaced only on the prosecution showing the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty while under the NDPS Act it is the accused who has to show that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty. 12. The limitation on the power to release on bail in Section 437 CrPC is in the nature of a restriction on that power, if reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the accused is guilty. 12. The limitation on the power to release on bail in Section 437 CrPC is in the nature of a restriction on that power, if reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the accused is guilty. On the other hand, the limitation on this power in Section 37 of the NDPS Act is in the nature of a condition precedent for the exercise of that power, so that, the accused shall not be released on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty. Under Section 437 CrPC it is for the prosecution to show the existence of reasonable grounds to support the belief in the guilt of the accused to attract the restriction on the power to grant bail; but under Section 37 NDPS Act it is the accused who must show the existence of grounds for the belief that he is not guilty, to satisfy the condition precedent and lift the embargo on the power to grant bail. This appears to be the distinction between the two provisions which makes Section 37 of the NDPS Act more stringent." 14. As to how the Court has to deal with bail applications relating to such stringent laws has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of State of Gujarat v. Gadhvi Rambhai Nathabhai, (1994) 5 SCC 111 . This case arose out of a case under the TADA Act, where similar stringent provision for bail has been provided. Sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the TADA Act provide as follows: "20. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.- (1)....................................................... (2)....................................................... (3)....................................................... (4)....................................................... (5)....................................................... (6)....................................................... (7)....................................................... (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (9) The limitations on granting of bail specified in sub-section (8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail." (emphasis supplied). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case of Gadhvi Rambhai (supra) held that at the stage of consideration of bail, the Designated Court is expected to apply its mind as to whether accepting the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution on their face, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of the offences, as observed in para 8 of the judgment: "8. It is true that for the purpose of grant of bail, the framers of the Act require the Designated Court to be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of such offence but this power cannot be exercised for grant of bail in a manner which amounts virtually to an order of acquittal, giving benefit of doubt to the accused person after weighing the evidence collected during the investigation or produced before the court. At that stage the Designated Court is expected to apply its mind as to whether accepting the allegations made on behalf of the prosecution on their face, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused concerned was not guilty of the offence. At that stage the Designated Court is not required to weigh the material collected during the investigation. The Designated Court itself while dealing with the submission of the counsel for the State regarding the involvement of the accused persons in Bombay bomb blast has observed: "...it would be too early to involve any person in the recent event of the country without probable nexus." Still while examining as to whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that the accused were not guilty of such offence, the Designated Court has passed an order of acquittal even before conclusion of the investigation." 15. The Legislature has intentionally inserted this stringent provision regarding bail in NDPS Act considering the seriousness of the crimes involving drugs. Drug is a serious problem having a deleterious effect on the society, transcending national boundaries. Considering the pernicious effect it has not only at the national but the international level also, stringent laws have been enacted. The Legislature has intentionally inserted this stringent provision regarding bail in NDPS Act considering the seriousness of the crimes involving drugs. Drug is a serious problem having a deleterious effect on the society, transcending national boundaries. Considering the pernicious effect it has not only at the national but the international level also, stringent laws have been enacted. Similar stringent provisions relating to bail are also to be found in other laws dealing with terrorism, blue collar crimes, viz., Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA), Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA), Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA), etc. Similar provisions have also incorporated in Indian Forest Act, 1927 in the States of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal to discourage smuggling in precious forest produce, Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 to prevent smuggling wildlife objects, Companies Act, 2013 to deal with fraudulent financial transactions, Drugs & Cosmetics Acts, 1940 etc. to prevent dealing with spurious products causing health hazards. In all these statutes obtaining bail has been made more stringent and difficult considering the seriousness of the offences. 16. In the light of the judicial pronouncements discussed above and the intention of the legislature, what can be deduced is that for the purpose of consideration of bail under the NDPS Act at the pre-trial/investigation stage, the Court must consider the materials so gathered during the investigation on their face and must come to the conclusion that inspite of these materials, there are sufficient materials to believe that the accused is not guilty. The accused must be able to demonstrate before the Court that there are substantial materials or strong reasons which, inspite of the incriminating materials relied upon by the Investigating Agencies/Prosecution, the Court would believe that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged. The nature of the materials relied upon by the accused must be of such high order as to override the materials collected by the Investigating Authority against the accused, so as to indicate his innocence, to believe that he is not guilty of such offence. The onus is on the accused to show that, inspite of the materials so relied upon by the Investigating Authority, there exists substantial materials which would show that the accused is not guilty. The onus is on the accused to show that, inspite of the materials so relied upon by the Investigating Authority, there exists substantial materials which would show that the accused is not guilty. It will not suffice to contend that there are not sufficient materials to implicate him in the offence as the mandate of Section 27 of the NDPS Act is to reverse the burden and shift the onus to the accused to demonstrate his innocence. 17. It has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that "reasonable grounds" mentioned in section 37 NDPS Act contemplates something much more than prima facie grounds but substantial grounds, which requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 , held that, "7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(i) is "reasonable grounds". The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word "reasonable" has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". "7. ... In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word 'reasonable'. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy." (See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 (SCC p. 504, para 7) and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 9. "9. ... The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy." (See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 (SCC p. 504, para 7) and Gujarat Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 9. "9. ... It is often said that 'an attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is trying to count what is not number and measure what is not space'. The author of Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.) has quoted from Nice & Schreiber, In re 123 F 987 at p.988 to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He says 'the expression "reasonable" is a relative term, and the facts of the particular controversy must be considered before the question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined'. It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly something more than that." 10. The word "reasonable" signifies "in accordance with reason". In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact, whether a particular act is reasonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd., (2003) 6 SCC 315 ) 11. The court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty." In Union of India v. Rattan Mallik, (2009) 2 SCC 624 , Narcotics Control Bureau v. Dilip Pralhad Namade, (2004) 3 SCC 619 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court adopted similar approach. 18. In the present case, the respondents had claimed that they are innocent and they were carrying Rs. 1,50,000/- in cash which were meant to be the price/consideration for purchase of land to be paid to someone else. 18. In the present case, the respondents had claimed that they are innocent and they were carrying Rs. 1,50,000/- in cash which were meant to be the price/consideration for purchase of land to be paid to someone else. However, there is nothing on record about the details of the alleged sale deed nor any material/evidence produced by the respondents to support such a plea, which could have perhaps indicated that the money so seized had nothing to do with the drugs and thus provide reasonable grounds to show that they were not guilty of the offence, in spite of the incriminating materials against them gathered by the Investigating agency. Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents has strenuously argued that the contraband drugs have been shown to have been seized from only person namely, Feroz Khan @ Thoiba and not from the other members of the group including the respondents travelling in the said tata truck which clearly indicates that the two respondents are not at all involved with the transportation of the said drugs. It has been contended that, if at all anyone else other than the said Feroz Khan @ Thoiba is involved, it could be the driver and owner of the truck against whom the investigation has not made out any case, but have maliciously implicated the two respondents, though nothing has been found against them. Referring to para No. 4 of the impugned bail orders wherein the Special Judge has made a reference to the first bail objection report dated 5.8.2013 which stated that special source men have been deployed to know that the main culprit is a resident of Moijing Awang Leikai and to find out his whereabouts, the Ld. Counsel submitted that this indicates that the real culprit is somebody else who was still at large. It has been also contended that there is no material to implicate the present respondents as co-conspirators in the transportation of the drug items. Therefore, the observations made by the learned Special Judge that Investigation has not so far made out a strong prima facie case against the respondents under Section 29cannot be faulted with. It has been also contended that there is no material to implicate the present respondents as co-conspirators in the transportation of the drug items. Therefore, the observations made by the learned Special Judge that Investigation has not so far made out a strong prima facie case against the respondents under Section 29cannot be faulted with. This Court, however, is not able to understand how the learned Special Judge could come to such a conclusion in the teeth of the materials gathered in course of the investigation, in which it has been clearly mentioned that in course of the investigation it has been stated that the seized drugs were handed over by one Md. Akbar Khan who directed the respondents to wait for further instructions when they reached Imphal. In the Police Report dated 11.8.2014, of which no reference at all has been made by the Ld. Special Judge in the impugned bail orders, it has been alleged on the basis of interrogation that the seized currency notes were handed over to them by Md. Akbar Khan, the suspected owner of the drugs. The fact that these huge amount of currency notes were seized from the respondents has not been denied by the respondents. It has been also alleged that the said Md. Akbar Khan is the elder brother of one of the respondents, Md. Feroz Khan @ Fero. Therefore, in the light of these material findings in course of the investigation, which clearly indicate that the respondents are involved with the trafficking of drugs, onus was on the respondents to show with reliable and substantive materials to show that they were not guilty of the offence. The relevant portion of the bail objection report dated 11.8.2014 is reproduced herein below: "On thorough interrogation, the accused persons, namely, Md. Saroz Khan (23) yrs S/o. Md. Samaru Rehman of Moijing Wangma Taba Khongmanung, PS-Thoubal, District- Thoubal revealed that the seized Indian currency notes amounting to Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) was handed over to him by one Md. Akbar Khan of Moijing Awang Leikai, Thoubal District (presumed to be the owner of the seized drug) told him to wait for further instructions while he reached at Imphal. And the accused person, namely, Md. Feroz Khan @ Fero (34) yrs S/o. Md. Kashim Ali of Moijing Awang Leikai, PS-Thoubal, District revealed that the seized Indian currency notes amounting to Rs. And the accused person, namely, Md. Feroz Khan @ Fero (34) yrs S/o. Md. Kashim Ali of Moijing Awang Leikai, PS-Thoubal, District revealed that the seized Indian currency notes amounting to Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) was handed over to him by his elder brother Md. Akbar Khan of Moijing Awang Leikai, Thoubal District (owner of the seized drug) directed him to wait for further instructions while he reached at Imphal. From the above facts and circumstances the two accused persons had committed the crime for their wrongful gain. As there is ample proof that both of them were involved in trafficking of huge illegal drugs, letting them out on bail may hamper the smooth investigation of the case. Therefore, the Hon'ble Special Judge, NDPS, Manipur is prayed kindly to reject the bail motion moved on behalf of the two accused persons by the petitioner and necessary action were being taken up for the arrest of main culprit of the case for the ends of justice." Unfortunately, the learned Special Judge, by ignoring the finding of the Investigating Authority, though at a preliminary stage, went on to practically discharge the respondents by holding that there is no strong prima facie case against the respondents. The learned Special Judge observed that the person from whom the seizure of drug is made prima facie liable. The learned Special Judge also seems to have been influenced by the fact that the main culprit is still at large.. However, the Ld. Special Judge seems to have completely ignored the statements made by the respondents in course of the investigation of their interactions with the owner of the drugs who was still at large indicating complicity of the Respondents in the illegal transaction. The learned Special Judge seems to have considered these, it at all noticed by him, not to constitute as strong prima facie material against the respondents. In the opinion of this Court, this approach of the learned Special Judge is contrary to the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPs Act as discussed above. The Ld. Special Judge had ignored the incriminating materials against the respondents, thus revealing non-application of mind. The Ld. In the opinion of this Court, this approach of the learned Special Judge is contrary to the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPs Act as discussed above. The Ld. Special Judge had ignored the incriminating materials against the respondents, thus revealing non-application of mind. The Ld. Special Judge ought not have ignored the contention, finding (though yet to be proved) of the Investigating Authority that the aforesaid amounts were handed over to the respondents by owner of the drugs and the respondents were in touch with the owner of the drugs who were instructed to meet at Imphal, clearly indicating that the respondents were also involved. 19. The learned Special Judge has applied the normal principle of bail as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such a satisfaction could perhaps been permissible for enlarging any accused person on bail in normal criminal cases under the Cr.P.C. unlike the special Act like NDPS Act where the provisions have been made more stringent by mandating that Court must come to a satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused is not guilty of such offence before enlarging an accused on bail which is quite different from the satisfaction that strong prima facie case has not made against the accused person to hold that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of such an offence. The scheme of Section 37 of NDPS as discussed above, clearly shows that the onus is not only to the prosecution to show that there is a strong prima facie case against the accused but more on the accused to show with substantial probable reasons to persuade the Court to believe that he is not guilty of such an offence. The onus is more on the accused that he is not guilty of such an offence inspite of the materials against him so that the Court may arrive at the satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. Therefore, till the accused is able to discharge this heavy onus, bail can not be granted, even if other conditions are favourable to him. 20. Because of the stringent nature of requirement for enlargement on bail under the NDPS Act, the Court has to scrupulously examine the records to arrive at a satisfaction as mentioned above. Therefore, till the accused is able to discharge this heavy onus, bail can not be granted, even if other conditions are favourable to him. 20. Because of the stringent nature of requirement for enlargement on bail under the NDPS Act, the Court has to scrupulously examine the records to arrive at a satisfaction as mentioned above. In the present case, as discussed above, there is no such finding or satisfaction arrived at by the learned Special Judge that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondents are not guilty of such offence. It is on record and not denied by the respondents that a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- had been recovered from them and they were arrested while they were travelling in a tata truck from which 2.480 kgs of brown sugar were recovered. In fact, the Investigating authority contended as mentioned in the last bail objection report dated 11.8.2014 that it has been revealed in course of investigation that these two respondents were in touch with the suspected owner of the drugs namely, Md. Akbar Khan who was still at large who had instructed the respondents to wait for further instructions at Imphal after handing over the money to them. If the investigating authority are contending, on the basis of investigation and materials gathered, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondents are involved with such offence, it can not be said to unreasonable, which has to be neutralised by the accused on the basis of substantial grounds to show his innocence. At this stage, it cannot be said that if the allegations of the prosecution/Investigating Authority are believed, the respondents are not guilty of the offence. Further, there is no such recording of satisfaction by the learned Special Judge that the respondents are not likely to commit any such offence while on bail. Interestingly, in the impugned order there is no reference even to the seizure of the large amount of money from the possession of the respondents and the fact that the seized drugs were found to be brown sugar, a contraband item by the Forensic report. This Court also fails to understand how the provision of Article 21 of the Constitution of India could be invoked to grant bail by ignoring the stringent mandatory provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. This Court also fails to understand how the provision of Article 21 of the Constitution of India could be invoked to grant bail by ignoring the stringent mandatory provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked to grant bail by ignoring the mandatory provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. This Court is of the view that the learned Special Judge has allowed the bail of the respondents on convoluted premises and by ignoring the mandate of law as provided under section 37 of the NDPS Act which has not been clearly followed. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the impugned orders granting bail to the respondents are vitiated as perverse having passed by ignoring the mandate of law and non-application of mind is also quite apparent, hence, patently illegal and unsustainable in law. In view of the above finding, the judgements relied on by Mr. N. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents that the conditions required for cancellation of bail applications have not been satisfied in the present case need not be considered as these revision petitions are not for cancellation of bail applications on the grounds explained in the aforesaid judgements but cancellation of bail as a result of the finding arrived at by this Court that the orders passed by the learned Special Judge are perverse and in plain violation of the mandate of law in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puran (supra). 21. There is yet another ground because of which these impugned orders can not be sustained. It is well settled principle of law that successive bail applications are not permissible unless there are changes in the circumstances ["State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673 ]. It is on record that the respondents had earlier moved a joint bail application by filing Cril. Misc. (B) No. 83/2014 which was dismissed by the Special Court on 26.7.2014 by holding as follows : "This is to dispose of the application filed under Section 37 of ND&PS Act read with section 439 Cr.P.C. by the petitioners/accused persons, namely Md. Saroz Khan and Feroz Khan respectively for admitting both for them to be on bail in connection with the above referred FIR case. Perused the application, I.O's report along with case diary. Saroz Khan and Feroz Khan respectively for admitting both for them to be on bail in connection with the above referred FIR case. Perused the application, I.O's report along with case diary. Heard the Ld. Counsel for the petitioners/accused persons and Ld. Special Public Prosecutor for the State. The case of the prosecution may, in brief, be stated that on 27-4-2014 at about 4:35 p.m., the complainant/Sub-Inspector Shri Th. Achouba Singh and his team from NAB P.S. arrested 5 (five) accused persons following recovery of substances weighing 2.480 kgs. Suspected to be brown sugar from inside the rear side portion of a Tata Truck bearing registration No. AS 01EC-6416 which was intercepted on the northern side of Lilong Bridge. Both the petitioners/accused persons were found to be occupants of the said seized vehicle and a sum of Rs. 1,00,000. (Rupees one Lakh) only and another sum of Rs. 50,000.00 (Rupees fifty thousand) only were recovered from the accused persons namely Md. Saroz Khan and Md. Feroz Khan respectively. According to ld. Counsel for the petitioner/accused persons. The two accused persons have been arrested only on the ground of suspicious and there is no material on the part of the prosecution to substantiate the allegation made against them as no recovery of any incriminating substance or article has been made by the police either from the accused persons or at their instance. However, Ld. Special Public Prosecutor for the State has pointed out that as per investigation into the case one Md. Akbar Khan, a Lawyer by occupation is found to be owner of the said seized drugs and the present petitioners/accused persons brought the said drugs for transportation to Imphal and this being the finding of the investigating agency, both the petitioners/accused persons are found involved in committing offences mentioned in the above referred FIR case. Having reason for believing that both the petitioners/accused persons are more or less, involved in the present case, their application stands rejected. Announced." This factum, however, has not been denied by the respondents. The subsequent bail applications of the respondents in which the impugned orders dated 3.9.2014 were passed were filed on 6.8.2014, about 2 (two) weeks after their earlier bail applications were rejected on 26.7.2014 without disclosing the changed circumstances, if any. The Ld. Announced." This factum, however, has not been denied by the respondents. The subsequent bail applications of the respondents in which the impugned orders dated 3.9.2014 were passed were filed on 6.8.2014, about 2 (two) weeks after their earlier bail applications were rejected on 26.7.2014 without disclosing the changed circumstances, if any. The Ld. PP has contended that there has been no change in the circumstances after the earlier bail application was rejected on 26.7.2014. The Ld. counsel for the respondents have not been able to show either that there had been changed circumstances. In view of the above, the subsequent bail applications filed by the respondents in which the impugned orders were passed were not maintainable. 22. It has been also contended by Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned PP that these bail orders were passed by the learned Special Judge who was not the regular Judge but when he was looking after the Court of Special Court (ND & PS), Manipur while the regular Judge was on leave and ought not have heard the bail applications. Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned senior Public Prosecutor submitted that bail applications of the respondents were filed on 6.8.2014 which was adjourned to 11.8.2014. Thereafter, the matter was fixed on 16.8.2014 for hearing on which date, the bail objection report was furnished by the I.O. and the case was partly heard and the matter was fixed for further hearing on 21.8.2014. But it was adjourned at the instance of the respondents to 25.8.2014 and thereafter to 27.8.2014 and the matter was fixed on 3.9.2014 for hearing. It has been submitted by Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned senior Public Prosecutor for the State that the earlier Presiding Judge, namely, Shri K. Brajakumar Sharma had taken casual leave of two days on 02.9.2014 and 03.9.2014 and subsequently, he was granted leave w.e.f. 04.9.2014 to enable him to attend a training programme at the National Judicial Academy at Bhopal, which was held on 6th and 7th September, 2014. However, though the matter was heard in part by the regular Judge, Sri K. Brajakumar Sharma, the in-charge Judge Sri. Th. Ibohal Singh, who was looking after the charge of the Judge, Special Court (ND & PS) during the leave of the regular Judge, took up the matter on 3.9.2014 and allowed the bail applications, which indicates that Sri Th. Ibohal Singh had taken undue interest in the matter. Th. Ibohal Singh, who was looking after the charge of the Judge, Special Court (ND & PS) during the leave of the regular Judge, took up the matter on 3.9.2014 and allowed the bail applications, which indicates that Sri Th. Ibohal Singh had taken undue interest in the matter. It has been submitted by Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned senior Public Prosecutor that Mr. Th. Ibohal Singh, who was functioning as the in-charge Special Judge, who was given the additional charge of Special Court, (ND& PS) during the absence of the regular incumbent, Shri K. Brajakumar Sharma, ought not to have taken up the said case and ought to have deferred till joining of the said K. Brajakumar Sharma. Ld. Public Prosecutor has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in Runu Roy v. State of Assam, 2005 (2)GLT 566, wherein relying on the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in Babubhai Bachubhai Bhabhu v. State of Gujarat, 2005 GLT 1618, it was held that similar repeated applications under Section 438 Cr.P.C. should be placed before the same Bench that passed the order. Accordingly, it has been submitted that in the present case the in-charge Judge should have placed the bail application before the Regular Judge who had earlier passed the order on 26.7.2014. Though Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Public Prosecutor has taken serious objection to the undue interest shown by the in-charge Judge who passed the bail orders during the leave of regular Judge and doubted the bonafide of the in-charge Judge in passing the impugned orders, this Court refrains from making any observation in that regard as this Court is not inclined to make any adverse comment without hearing the concerned Judge. Nevertheless, this Court cannot but observe that it is highly unfortunate that a Judge of such experience having held the post of Manipur Judicial Service Grade-I on ad-hoc basis for a long period and who had also the occasion to preside over the Court of Special Judge, (ND & PS) was either ignorant of or had ignored the mandate of law contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act while dealing with serious offences involving such a large quantity of drugs which already are having a pernicious effect on the society. Therefore, this Court feels appropriate that a copy of this order may be communicated to Sri Th. Therefore, this Court feels appropriate that a copy of this order may be communicated to Sri Th. Ibohal Singh, MJS, who had passed the impugned orders for his further reference. 23. Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned Sr. PP further submits that the impugned bail order passed by the learned Special Judge on 3.9.2014 virtually amounts to review of the earlier order passed on 26.7.2914 quoted above in which the regular Special Judge had accepted the plea of the Public Prosecutor that as per investigation into this case, one Md. Akbar Khan, a lawyer by occupation, is suspected to be owner of the said seized truck and the respondents brought the said drugs for transportation to Imphal and this being the finding of the Investigating Agency, both the accused persons are found involved in committing the offences mentioned in the above referred FIR cases. It has been submitted by Mr. R.S. Reisang, learned senior Public Prosecutor that after the specific finding arrived at by the learned Special Judge earlier in rejecting their previous bail application on 26.7.2014, there has not been changes in the circumstances in favour of the respondents accused warranting any review of the previous order dated 26.7.2014. However, the learned Special Judge while passing the impugned order dated 3.9.2014 has virtually reviewed the earlier order passed on 26.7.2014 by another Judge, without disclosing any new fact or evidence which according to the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners, is not permissible. This Court accepts this contention of the Ld. Senior Public Prosecutor as no new fact or material have been brought to the notice of this Court. 24. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, this Court holds that the impugned orders dated 3.9.2014 granting bail to the respondents are perverse, patently illegal and are the result of wrong exercise of discretion by the Special Judge by ignoring the mandate of law stipulated in Section 27 of the NDPS Act which need to be corrected. 25. As regards the contention of Mr. Mahendra, learned counsel for the respondents that two other accused had been released on bail, it is observed that, it could have been one of the grounds for consideration by the Special Court but it must be in conjunction with the statutory requirements as mandated in Section 37 of the ND&PS Act as discussed above which the Court could not have ignored. Further, as regards the contention that the person namely Md. Feroz Khan @ Thoiba from whom the drugs were shown to have been seized has been subsequently released on bail after passing of the impugned order dated 3.9.2014, this Court is of the view that such subsequent development is not relevant to the present issue being considered as to whether the impugned orders dated 3.9.2014 were validly passed by following the mandate of law contained in Section 27 of the NDPS Act or not. 26. In the result, for the reasons discussed above, these revision petitions are allowed. The impugned orders dated 3.9.2014 passed in Cril. Misc. (B) No. 97 of 2014 and Cril. Misc. (B) No. 98 of 2014 in connection with FIR No. 31(4)2014 NAB PS u/s. 21(c)/29/60(3) of the ND & PS Act enlarging the respondents on bail are set aside and their bail cancelled. The bail bonds also stand cancelled. The respondents namely, Md. Saroz Khan and Md. Feroz Khan @ Fero are directed to surrender to custody within 7 (seven) days from today, failing which the Special Court will take appropriate steps for their arrest and committing them to judicial custody. It is also clarified that even if the respondents apply for grant of bail before the Court of Special Judge (NDPS) in connection with the aforesaid case, in accordance with law, their bail applications shall not be considered till they surrender to custody and undergo the consequential legal process as directed above.