JUDGMENT : C.L. Soni, J. By the present petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, initially the order at Annexure-D dated 31.8.1990 passed by the Urban Land Tribunal (‘Tribunal’) in Appeal No.Ahmedabad-352 of 1988 was challenged with a further prayer to hold that the petitioner does not hold any excess vacant land. Before the Tribunal, the order dated 6.5.1988/13.6.1988 passed by the competent authority and the Deputy Collector, Urban Land Ceiling, Ahmedabad was challenged. The competent authority considered 1642.45 Sq. Mtrs. of land to be the holding of the petitioner and after allowing the petitioner to retain 1000 Sq. Mtrs. of land, it declared 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. vacant land as surplus land. 2. It appears that the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution somewhere in the month of December 1991. The petitioner, then preferred restoration application, being Misc. Civil Application No. 2575 of 2011, which was allowed and the petition was ordered to be restored to file. It was thereafter the petitioner was permitted to amend the petition to add following further prayers being para 13(BB), (BBB) as well as 13(DD) and (DDD) : (BB)Your Lordships may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction and quashing and set aside the order dated 6.5.1998/12.6.1988 passed by the respondent no.2 as being illegal, unjust, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (BBB)Your Lordships may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the proceedings have stood abated in view of provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and no further action is permissible to be taken by the authority in respect of subject property being plot of land admeasuring 642.45 sq.mtrs. forming part of final plot No.38 T.P. Scheme No.8 Dariapur Kaipur together with the construction thereon, in the interest of justice and equity. (DD)Your Lordships may be pleased to stay the implementation, operation and execution of the order dated 6.5.1988/ 12.6.1988 passed by respondent no.2 pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition. (DDD) Your Lordships may be pleased to restrain the respondent authorities, their agents and servants from taking any coercive action in respect of the subject property being plot of land admeasuring 642.45 sq.mtrs. (DDD) Your Lordships may be pleased to restrain the respondent authorities, their agents and servants from taking any coercive action in respect of the subject property being plot of land admeasuring 642.45 sq.mtrs. forming part of Final Plot No.38 T.P. Scheme No.8, Dariapur Jazipur together with the construction thereon owned by the petitioner, pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition. The petitioner accordingly supplied the amended the petition. 3. The petitioner filled declaration form under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 (Act) declaring one- fourth share in the land bearing Sub-plot No.38-1-1, Final Plot No.38 of Town Planning Scheme No.8 admeasuring 2775.52 Sq. Mtrs. with construction thereon admeasuring 277.59 Sq.Mtrs., 80.26 Sq.Mtrs., 38.46 Sq.Mtrs. and 25.08 Sq.Mtrs. One-fourth share from 2775.52 Sq.Mtrs. of land shown is of 693.88 Sq.Mtrs. This land is shown to be situated at Dariapur-Kajipur. One-fourth share of one more of Dariapur-Kajipur Sub-Plot No.38-1-3, Final Plot No.38, Town Planning Scheme No.8, admeasuring 601.70 Sq.Mtrs. with construction thereon of 42.14 Sq.Mtrs. and 15.05 Sq.Mtrs. was declared. The other lands declared were land admeasuring 877.17 Sq.Mtrs. of Sub-Plot No.4, Final Plot No.240, Town Planning Scheme No.21 and shown to be situated at Paldi, land admeasuring 219.14 Sq.Mtrs. of sub-Plot No.11, Final Plot No.240, Town Planning Scheme No.21 and shown to be situated at Paldi, lands of equal measurements of Sub-plot Nos.2 and 9 respectively of Final Plot No.240 situated at Paldi area, lands admeasuring 43.47 Sq.Mtrs., 56.85 Sq. Mtrs., 1366.10 Sq.Mtrs., 16.72 Sq.Mtrs., 775.00 Sq.Mtrs. and 647.14 Sq.Mtrs., total of which would come to 2905.44 Sq.Mtrs. of different city survey numbers shown to be situated in Kalupur-3 and the land of Hansol of Town Planning Scheme No.8 admeasuring 6069.36 Sq.Mtrs. 4. The competent authority while deciding the holding of the petitioner also considered the share of the petitioner in land bearing Sub-Plot No. 38-1-2, 38-1-5 and 38-1-4, which were not declared by the petitioner in the declaration form. The total measurement of Final Plot No. 38 of Town Planning Scheme No.8 situated at Dariapur-Kajipur was taken at 5442.99 Sq. Mtrs., of which the share of the petitioner was taken at 1360.74 Sq. Mtrs. of land and from the land of Kalupur, share of the petitioner was taken at 281.17 Sq. Mtrs. From 1360.74 Sq. Mtrs. of Dariapur-Kajipur, the competent authority allowed retainable land of 718.29 Sq. Mtrs. Mtrs., of which the share of the petitioner was taken at 1360.74 Sq. Mtrs. of land and from the land of Kalupur, share of the petitioner was taken at 281.17 Sq. Mtrs. From 1360.74 Sq. Mtrs. of Dariapur-Kajipur, the competent authority allowed retainable land of 718.29 Sq. Mtrs. and declared open land of 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. as surplus land. The Kalupur land, i.e. 281.71 Sq. Mtrs. was allowed to be retained by the petitioner. The Tribunal has confirmed such order of the competent authority. 5. After the petition was dismissed for non-prosecution, as stated above, and before it was restored in the year 2014, the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 came to be repealed in 1999 by Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (Repeal Act). 6. At this stage, it is required to note that in the application seeking condonation of delay, being Civil Application No. 5758 of 2012 filed with restoration application, the petitioner averred that she learnt about the disposal of the writ petition somewhere in the month of December 2010 when some officers from the office of the competent authority visited her residential property and threatened to dispossess her from the subject property and since she apprehended immediate threat, she filed Civil Suit No. 1 of 2011 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad. It is further averred that in such suit, the Court Commissioner was appointed to draw panchnama of the subject property and the Court Commissioner’s report was prepared on 4.2.2011 showing the entire property as constructed property and in occupation of the petitioner and her family members. While opposing the said application, the competent authority, in its affidavit-in-reply, stated that after issuing notification under Section 10(5) of the Act, on 8.2.1991, the respondent authority took possession of the land on 30.4.1991 by carrying out the panchnama. 7. As per the Repeal Act, proceedings of the present petition would abate. Learned advocate Mr. Pahwa appearing for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that by virtue of the Repeal Act, proceedings of the present petition abated, however, possession of the surplus land since was not legally taken, such possession would not be saved under Section 3 of the Repeal Act and the petitioner would be entitled to retain such possession of the land. Mr. Pahwa appearing for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that by virtue of the Repeal Act, proceedings of the present petition abated, however, possession of the surplus land since was not legally taken, such possession would not be saved under Section 3 of the Repeal Act and the petitioner would be entitled to retain such possession of the land. Mr. Pahwa submitted that the possession stated to have been taken by drawing panchnama was not of vacant land as the land declared as surplus of Dariapur-Kajipur was fully constructed upon as back as in the year 1960 pursuant to the permission granted under the Town Planning Act. Such construction since was before coming into force of the Act, there was no question of taking possession of such constructed property of the petitioner. Mr. Pahwa submitted that in any case, possession of the land shown to have been taken by panchnama cannot be said to be legally taken as mandatory requirement of issuing notice under Section 10(6) of the Act was not followed and thus, it cannot be said that de-facto possession of the land was taken from the petitioner. 8. As against the above arguments, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Thakore submitted that the competent authority declared vacant-open land admeasuring 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. as surplus land from the land of Dariapur-Kajipur bearing Final Plot No.38 Paiki. Ms. Thakore submitted that such order of the competent authority has become final and now it is not open to the petitioner to contend after a period of more than 22 years that what was declared as excess land was not vacant/open land. Ms. Thakore submitted that as per the declaration made by the petitioner, the constructed properties have been well considered and excess land declared of 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. would not include any constructed property and therefore, it is not correct to say that the possession taken was not of the open land. Ms. Thakore submitted that the concerned authority followed due procedure before taking possession of the open surplus land under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. Ms. Thakore submitted that the petitioner was served with notification under Section 10(5) of the Act asking her to deliver the possession of the excess land and putting her to notice that if the possession was not delivered, same would be taken forcibly by exercising the powers under Section 10(6) of the Act. Ms. Thakore submitted that the petitioner was served with notification under Section 10(5) of the Act asking her to deliver the possession of the excess land and putting her to notice that if the possession was not delivered, same would be taken forcibly by exercising the powers under Section 10(6) of the Act. The petitioner since did not surrender the possession of the surplus land after receipt of 10(5) notification, the concerned authority took possession of such land by exercising the powers under Section 10(6) of the Act by drawing panchnama and therefore, it cannot be said that possession of the surplus land from the petitioner was legally taken. 9. Having heard learned advocates for the parties, it appears from the order of the competent authority that the petitioner declared that she had one-fourth share in 2775.52 Sq. Mtrs. of land of Sub-plot No. 38-1-1 of Final Plot No. 38 situated at Dariapur-Kajipur and that four different constructions admeasuring 277.59 Sq. Mtrs., 80.26 Sq. Mtrs., 38.46 Sq. Mtrs. and 25.08 Sq. Mtrs., total 421.39 Sq. Mtrs. existed on the land of sub-plot No. 38-1-1. Another constructed area shown was of 42.14 Sq. Mtrs. and 15.08 Sq. Mtrs. on land admeasuring 601.70 Sq. Mtrs. declared by her of Sub-plot No. 38-1-3 of Final Plot No. 38 of Dariapur-Kajipur. Here also, she claimed one-fourth share. Now, the competent authority found that the petitioner did not show other three sub-plots, being Nos. 38-1-2, 38-1-5 and 38-1-4 in her declaration. The competent authority therefore considered these three different subplots with Sub-Plot Nos. 38-1-1 and 38-1-3, and from total measurement (area) of 5442.99 Sq. Mtrs. of Final Plot No. 38, it considered the share of the petitioner at 1360.74 Sq. Mtrs. From such share determined by the competent authority, the competent authority decided to allow the petitioner to retain 718.29 Sq. Mtrs. and to declare 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. vacant/open land as surplus land. It is pertinent to note that after considering the constructed property shown by the petitioner in her declaration form from Sub-plot Nos.38-1-1 and 38-1-3, open land admeasuring 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. was declared as surplus land. Total constructed areas of land of Dariapur-Kajipur as declared by petitioner on two sub-plots would come to 421.39 Sq. Mtrs. Mr. It is pertinent to note that after considering the constructed property shown by the petitioner in her declaration form from Sub-plot Nos.38-1-1 and 38-1-3, open land admeasuring 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. was declared as surplus land. Total constructed areas of land of Dariapur-Kajipur as declared by petitioner on two sub-plots would come to 421.39 Sq. Mtrs. Mr. Pahwa, therefore, was not right to submit that the total constructed area shown by the petitioner on the land of Dariapur-Kajipur would match with the land admeasuring 642.45 Sq. Mtrs., declared as surplus land. It clearly appears from the order of the competent authority that the competent authority has declared only vacant/open land admeasuring 642.45 Sq. Mtrs.. Such issue finally concluded by the order of the competent authority and confirmed by the Deputy Collector in the year 1991 cannot be allowed to be re-opened after a period of more than 22 years on the ground that the possession of the land shown to have been taken by panchnama was not of vacant land but of constructed properties. It appears that to make an attempt to show that the possession of the land taken by the panchnama was not of vacant land, the petitioner preferred civil suit in the year 2011, wherein as per the order of the Civil Court, the Commissioner made report showing the site inspection of the land bearing Survey Nos. 139/1 Paiki and 138/1 Paiki to be exactly of measurement of 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. so as to match with the land declared as surplus vacant land. It was thereafter, the petitioner preferred restoration application to restore the present petition to file with application for condonation of delay making reference about filing of the civil suit preferred by the petitioner and of drawing panchnama by the Court Commissioner. 10. The Court finds that once the competent authority declared vacant/open land admeasuring 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. as surplus land and confirmed by the Tribunal, the panchnama drawn by the Court Commissioner in the civil suit filed almost after a period of more than 22 years cannot be considered to hold that the land declared as surplus was constructed property. In any case, the petitioner herself had shown in her declaration form the constructed property of Dariapur-Kajipur as of 421.39 Sq. Mtrs. In any case, the petitioner herself had shown in her declaration form the constructed property of Dariapur-Kajipur as of 421.39 Sq. Mtrs. and such constructed property was considered by the competent authority and therefore, it could not be said that what was declared surplus was not open land. 11. Mr. Pahwa however, raised legal contention that the possession of the land declared as surplus land was not legally taken. It is his contention that even after section 10(5) notification was issued to the petitioner and the petitioner had not voluntarily given possession of the land declared as surplus land and therefore, before forcibly taking possession of the land in exercise of powers, under Section 10(6) of the Act, notice to the petitioner was mandatorily required to be issued which was not issued and therefore, possession could not be said to be legally taken. The petitioner is therefore, entitled to retain possession of the land by virtue of Repeal Act. 12. For such purpose, Mr. Pahwa has relied on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Hari Ram reported in (2013)4 SCC 280 . 13. In the case of Hari Ram (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 18 to 37, 41 and 42 as under:- 18. Legislature is competent to create a legal fiction, for the purpose of assuming existence of a fact which does not really exist. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 contained two deeming provisions such as "deemed to have been acquired" and "deemed to have been vested absolutely". Let us first examine the legal consequences of a 'deeming provision'. In interpreting the provision creating a legal fiction, the Court is to ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created and after ascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited v. State of Rajasthan held that what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands. 19. James Lords Justice in Ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy (1881) 17 Chance. This Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Limited v. State of Rajasthan held that what can be deemed to exist under a legal fiction are facts and not legal consequences which do not flow from the law as it stands. 19. James Lords Justice in Ex-parte, Walton, In re, Levy (1881) 17 Chance. D. 746 speaks on deeming fiction as: "When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to". 20. In Szoma v. Secretary of State for the Department of Work and Pensions, Court held: 25. ..... it would be quite wrong to carry this fiction beyond its originally intended purpose so as to deem a person in fact lawfully here not to be here at all. The intention of a deeming provision, in laying down a hypothesis is that the hypothesis shall be carried so far as necessary to achieve the legislative purpose but no further. 21. Let us test the meaning of the expression "deemed to have been acquired" and "deemed to have been vested absolutely" in the above legal settings. The expression "acquired" and "vested" are not defined under the Act. Each word, phrase or sentence that we get in a statutory provision, if not defined in the Act, then is to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act. As held by this Court in Organo Chemical Industries v. Union of India that a bare mechanical interpretation of the words and application of a legislative intent devoid of concept of purpose will reduce most of the remedial and beneficial legislation to futility. Reference may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan. Words and phrases, therefore, occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner, it is associated on the context but are read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Act. 22. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. held : "12. Words and phrases, therefore, occurring in the statute are to be taken not in an isolated or detached manner, it is associated on the context but are read together and construed in the light of the purpose and object of the Act. 22. This Court in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. held : "12. it is well known rule of interpretation of statutes that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in a statute. The Courts must look to the object, which the statute seeks to achieve while interpreting any of the provisions of the Act. A purposive approach for interpreting the Act is necessary." 23. In Jugal Kishore Saraf v. M/s. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd. Justice S.R. Das stated : "6. ....The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally that is, by giving to the words used by legislature their ordinary natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation." 24. The expression "deemed to have been acquired" used as a deeming fiction under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can only mean acquisition of title or acquisition of interests because till that time the land may be either in the ownership of the person who held that vacant land or to possess such land as owner or as a tenant or as mortgagee and so on as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act. The word "vested" has not been defined in the Act, so also the word "absolutely". What is vested absolutely is only the land which is deemed to have acquired and nothing more. The word "vest" has different meaning in different context; especially when we examine the meaning of vesting on the basis of a statutory hypothesis of a deeming provision which Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise Commissioners v. Zielinski Baker and Partners Ltd., All ER at 11 described as "heroic piece of deeming". 25. The word "vest" or "vesting" has different meaning. Legal Glossary, published by Official Language (Legislative) Commission 1970 Edition at Page 302: "Vest: 1. 25. The word "vest" or "vesting" has different meaning. Legal Glossary, published by Official Language (Legislative) Commission 1970 Edition at Page 302: "Vest: 1. To give a person a legally fixed, immediate right or personal or future enjoyment of (an estate), to grant, endow, clothe with a particular authority, right of property, 2. To become legally vested; (T.P. Act.) "Vesting order: An order under statutory authority whereby property is transferred to and vested, without conveyance in some person or persons; 26. Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) 1990 at page 1563: "Vested: Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete; Having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent, not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent. Rights are "vested" when rights to enjoyment present or prospective has become property of some particular persons or persons as present interest; mere expectancy or future or contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws does not continue "vested right" Vaughan v. Nadel; See also Accrue Vest and specific typed of vested interest infra." 27. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, of the English Language unabridged, Volume III S to Z at page 2547 defines the word "vest" as follow: "vest" vest .... To place or give into the possession or discretion of some person or authority (the regulation of the waterways ?. to give to a person a legally fixed immediate right of present or future enjoyment of (as an estate) (a deed that vests a title estate in the grantee and a remainder in his children), (b) to grant endow, or clothe with a particular authority right or property ?.. to put (a person) in possession of land by the feudal ceremony of investiture ?.. to become legally vested (normally) title to real property vests in the holder of a property executed deed.)" 28. Vest/vested, therefore, may or may not include "transfer of possession" the meaning of which depends on the context in which it has been placed and the interpretation of various other related provisions. 29. What is deemed "vesting absolutely" is that "what is deemed to have acquired". In our view, there must be express words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that the legislature intended to divest possession also, since the owners or holders of the vacant land is pitted against a statutory hypothesis. 29. What is deemed "vesting absolutely" is that "what is deemed to have acquired". In our view, there must be express words of utmost clarity to persuade a court to hold that the legislature intended to divest possession also, since the owners or holders of the vacant land is pitted against a statutory hypothesis. Possession, there is an adage "nine points of law" In Beedall v. Maitland Sir Edward Fry, while speaking of a Statute which makes a forcible entry an indictable offence, stated as follows: "this statute creates one of the great differences which exist in our law between the being in possession and the being out of possession of land, and which gave rise to the old saying that possession is nine points of the law. The effect of the statute is this, that when a man is in possession, he may use force to keep out a trespasser; but if a trespasser has gained possession, the rightful owner cannot use force to put him out, but must appeal to the law for assistance." 30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in hands of few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words 'acquired' and 'vested' have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary Surrender 31. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent. Voluntary Surrender 31. The 'vesting' in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The court in Maharaj Singh v. State of UP and others while interpreting Section 117(1) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 held that 'vesting' is a word of slippery import and has many meanings and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (dead) by LRs. held as follows: "28. We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a "vesting" certain. "To vest, generally means to give a property in." (Per Brett, L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th edn. Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorization cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To "vest", cannot be termed to be an executor devise. Be it noted however, that "vested" does not necessarily and always mean "vest in possession" but includes "vest in interest" as well." 32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word "vesting" takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act. 33. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word "vesting" takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act. 33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land. Peaceful dispossession 34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of "possession" which says where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorized by the State Government. 35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) to Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression "where any land is vested" under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) to Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) to Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualizes a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession. Forceful dispossession 36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) to Section 10 again speaks of "possession" which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force - as may be necessary - can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) to Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations, i.e. taking possession by giving notice that is "peaceful dispossession" and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), than "forceful dispossession" under sub-section (6) of Section 10. 37. Requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word 'may' has been used therein, the word 'may' in both the sub-sections has to be understood as "shall" because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result the land holder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word 'may' has to be read as 'shall'. Effect of the Repeal Act 41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33 of 1976. Effect of the Repeal Act 41. Let us now examine the effect of Section 3 of the Repeal Act 15 of 1999 on sub-section (3) to Section 10 of the Act. The Repeal Act 1999 has expressly repealed the Act 33 of 1976. The Object and Reasons of the Repeal Act has already been referred to in the earlier part of this judgment. Repeal Act has, however, retained a saving clause. The question whether a right has been acquired or liability incurred under a statute before it is repealed will in each case depend on the construction of the statute and the facts of the particular case. 42. The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under sub-section (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under sub-section (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. 14. Mr. Pahwa submitted that following the judgment in the case of Hari Ram (supra), learned Single Judges of this Court in two different petitions have taken a view that before taking possession, under Section 10(6) of the Act, notice is required to be issued. 15.Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Thakore however, relied on another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Assam Vs. Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma and others reported in (2015)5 SCC 321 and submitted that the decision in the case of Hari Ram (supra) was considered in the later judgment by Hon’ble Supreme Court and it is held that if possession was duly taken long back, question whether the possession was legally taken or not cannot be amenable for determination of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para 6 to 8 and 11 to 19 as under:- 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1999 repealed the Principal Act w.e.f. The date the State adopted the Repeal Act. In terms of a resolution passed under clause (2) Article 252 of the Constitution, the Repeal Act was adopted by the State of Assam w.e.f. 6th August, 2003. We may at this stage usefully extract Sections 2 and 3 of the Repeal Act which have a direct bearing on the questions that arise for our determination: “2. Repeal of Act 33 of 1976 – The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) is hereby repealed. 3. Saving. – (1) the repeal of the principal Act shall not affect – (a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; (b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary; (c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20. (2) Where – (a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and (b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.” 8. A bare reading of Section 3 (supra) makes it clear that repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession whereof has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in that behalf or by the competent authority. A bare reading of Section 3 (supra) makes it clear that repeal of the Principal Act does not affect the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession whereof has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in that behalf or by the competent authority. In the case at hand, the appellant claims to have taken over the possession of the surplus land on 7th December, 1991. That claim is made entirely on the basis of a certificate of handing over/taking over of possession, relevant portion whereof reads as under: “Certificate of handing over/taking over possession : Today on this 7th December, 1991, we took over possession of 70.32 Are of acquired land as scheduled below vide order of the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup’s ULC Case No. 343 dated 2-3-91 and as per Assam Gazette notification dated 1-1-87 in the case No. ULC343/76. Schedule of land xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx Received the possession (Taken over possession unilaterally) Sd/- Illegible Given the possession Designation – (G) Designation Dated 7.12.1991 Dated 7.12.1991 Countersigned Sd/- Illegible Circle Officer, Guwahati Revenue Circle” 8. Relying upon the above document it was strenuously argued on behalf of the appellants that actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner as early as in December, 1991, no matter relevant official record does not bear testimony to any notice having been issued to the land owners in terms of Section 10, sub-section (5) of the Act. It was argued that so long as actual physical possession had been taken over by the competent authority title to the land so taken over stood vested absolutely in the State Government under Section 10(3) and could not be claimed back no matter the Principal Act stood repealed after such vesting had taken place. In support of the contention that actual physical possession had been taken over by the competent authority, the appellant places heavy reliance upon the fact that challenge to the proceedings under the Act mounted in Writ Petition No.2568 of 1992 by the purchasers of a part of the disputed land had failed right up to this Court and the allotment of a substantial part of the surplus land in favour of the 8 families affirmed. This, according to the appellant, proves that possession of the surplus land had indeed been taken over from the erstwhile owner in terms of proceedings held on 7th December, 1991. 11. Section 3 of the Repeal Act postulates that vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, is subject to the condition that possession thereof has been taken over by the competent authority or by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government. The expression "possession" used in Section 3 (supra) has been interpreted to mean “actual physical possession” of the surplus land and not just possession that goes with the vesting of excess land in terms of Section 10(3) of the Act. 12. The question, however, is whether actual physical possession of the land in dispute has been taken over in the case at hand by the competent authority or by the State Government or an officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government. 13. The case of the appellant is that actual physical possession of the land was taken over on 7th December, 1991 no matter unilaterally and without notice to the erstwhile land owner. That assertion is stoutly denied by the respondents giving rise to seriously disputed question of fact which may not be amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But assuming that any such determination is possible even in proceedings under Article 226 of the constitution, what needs examination is whether the failure of the Government or the authorised officer or the competent authority to issue a notice to the land owners in terms of Section 10(5) would by itself mean that such dispossession is no dispossession in the eye of law and hence insufficient to attract Section 3 of the Repeal Act. Our answer to that question is in the negative. 14. We say so because in the ordinary course actual physical possession can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to the State Government, or the authorised officer or the competent authority. Our answer to that question is in the negative. 14. We say so because in the ordinary course actual physical possession can be taken from the person in occupation only after notice under Section 10(5) is issued to him to surrender such possession to the State Government, or the authorised officer or the competent authority. There is enough good sense in that procedure inasmuch as the need for using force to dispossess a person in possession should ordinarily arise only if the person concerned refuses to cooperate and surrender or deliver possession of the lands in question. That is the rationale behind Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But what would be the position if for any reason the competent authority or the Government or the authorised officer resorts to forcible dispossession of the erstwhile owner even without exploring the possibility of a voluntary surrender or delivery of such possession on demand. Could such use of force vitiate the dispossession itself or would it only amount to an irregularity that would give rise to a cause of action for the aggrieved owner or the person in possession to seek restoration only to be dispossessed again after issuing a notice to him. It is this aspect that has to an extent bothered us. 15. The High Court has held that the alleged dispossession was not preceded by any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all that it would mean is that on 7th December, 1991 when the erstwhile owner was dispossessed from the land in question, he could have made a grievance based on Section 10(5) and even sought restoration of possession to him no matter he would upon such restoration once again be liable to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver or surrender such possession. In reality therefore unless there was something that was inherently wrong so as to affect the very process of taking over such as the identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstance of a similar nature going to the root of the matter hence requiring an adjudication, a person who had lost his land by reason of the same being declared surplus under Section 10(3) would not consider it worthwhile to agitate the violation of Section 10(5) for he can well understand that even when the Court may uphold his contention that the procedure ought to be followed as prescribed, it may still be not enough for him to retain the land for the authorities could the very next day dispossess him from the same by simply serving a notice under Section 10(5). It would, in that view, be an academic exercise for any owner or person in possession to find fault with his dispossession on the ground that no notice under Section 10(5) had been served upon him. 16. The issue can be viewed from another angle also. Assuming that a person in possession could make a grievance, no matter without much gain in the ultimate analysis, the question is whether such grievance could be made long after the alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual physical possession was taken over from the erstwhile land owner on 7th December, 1991 as is alleged in the present case any grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to have been made within a reasonable time of such dispossession. If the owner did not do so, forcible taking over of possession would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of time. In any such situation the owner or the person in possession must be deemed to have waived his right under Section 10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to make a grievance not because he has suffered any real prejudice that needs to be redressed but only because the fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act tempted him to raise the issue regarding his dispossession being in violation of the prescribed procedure. 17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. 17. Reliance was placed by the respondents upon the decision of this Court in Hari Ram’s case (supra). That decision does not, in our view, lend much assistance to the respondents. We say so, because this Court was in Hari Ram's case (supra) considering whether the word ‘may’ appearing in Section 10(5) gave to the competent authority the discretion to issue or not to issue a notice before taking physical possession of the land in question under Section 10(6). The question whether breach of Section 10(5) and possible dispossession without notice would vitiate the act of dispossession itself or render it non est in the eye of law did not fall for consideration in that case. In our opinion, what Section 10(5) prescribes is an ordinary and logical course of action that ought to be followed before the authorities decided to use force to dispossess the occupant under Section 10(6). In the case at hand if the appellant's version regarding dispossession of the erstwhile owner in December 1991 is correct, the fact that such dispossession was without a notice under Section 10(5) will be of no consequence and would not vitiate or obliterate the act of taking possession for the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. That is because Bhabadeb Sarma-erstwhile owner had not made any grievance based on breach of Section 10(5) at any stage during his lifetime implying thereby that he had waived his right to do so. 18. Mr. Goswamy drew our attention to a decision of this Court in State of Gujarat and Anr. V. Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega (2013) 11 SCC 486 to argue that a Writ Court could also examine the question of dispossession as was the position in that case which too arose out of a proceeding under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. This Court in that case remanded the matter back to the High Court to determine the question whether possession of the land had been taken over before the Repeal Act came into force. This Court in that case remanded the matter back to the High Court to determine the question whether possession of the land had been taken over before the Repeal Act came into force. In the instant case the Single bench of the High Court had while dismissing the writ petition filed by the respondents relied upon the fact that the writ petition filed by the purchasers of a portion of the surplus land had been dismissed and the allotment of a portion of the surplus land in favour of separate family affirmed not only by the Division Bench of the High Court but also by this Court in a further appeal. The possession of land purports to have been taken over from the erstwhile owner in terms of proceedings dated 7th December, 1991. Inference drawn appears to be that if allotment of substantial part of the surplus land to the third parties has been affirmed, it only means that possession was indeed taken over for otherwise there was no question of allotting the land to third parties nor was there any question of such allottee-occupants using the same. We cannot, however, ignore the fact that the question of dispossession of the owner or the transferee was never agitated or determined by the High Court in the writ petition filed by the transferee. We could appreciate the argument if the issue regarding dispossession had been raised and determined by the Courts in the previous litigation. That was, however, not so, apparently, because the question of dispossession was not relevant in the proceedings initiated by the transferees who were challenging the vesting order on the ground of their having purchased the surplus land from the owner. That attempt failed as the Court found the sale in their favour to be void. The question of dispossession relevant to Section 3 of the Repeal Act thus never arose for consideration in those proceedings. It will, therefore, be much too farfetched an inference to provide a sound basis for either the High Court or for us to hold that dismissal of the writ petition filed by the purchasers in the above circumstances should itself support a finding that possession had indeed been taken over. It will, therefore, be much too farfetched an inference to provide a sound basis for either the High Court or for us to hold that dismissal of the writ petition filed by the purchasers in the above circumstances should itself support a finding that possession had indeed been taken over. Having said that we must hasten to add that even the Division Bench has while reversing the view taken by the single bench not recorded any specific finding to the effect that possession had actually continued with the erstwhile owner even after the vesting of the land under Section 10(3) and the proceedings dated 7th December, 1991. 19. In support of the contention that the respondents are even today in actual physical possession of the land in question reliance is placed upon certain electricity bills and bills paid for the telephone connection that stood in the name of one Mr. Sanatan Baishya. It was contended that said Mr. Sanatan Baishya was none other than the caretaker of the property of the respondents. There is, however, nothing on record to substantiate that assertion. The telephone bills and electricity bills also relate to the period from 2001 onwards only. There is nothing on record before us nor was anything placed before the High Court to suggest that between 7th December, 1991 till the date the land in question was allotted to GMDA in December, 2003 the owner or his legal heirs after his demise had continued to be in possession. All that we have is rival claims of the parties based on affidavits in support thereof. We repeatedly asked learned counsel for the parties whether they can, upon remand on the analogy of the decision in the case of Gyanaba Dilavarsinh Jadega (supra), adduce any documentary evidence that would enable the High Court to record a finding in regard to actual possession. They were unable to point out or refer to any such evidence. That being so the question whether actual physical possession was taken over remains a seriously disputed question of fact which is not amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution no matter the High Court may in its discretion in certain situations upon such determination. That being so the question whether actual physical possession was taken over remains a seriously disputed question of fact which is not amenable to a satisfactory determination by the High Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution no matter the High Court may in its discretion in certain situations upon such determination. Remand to the High Court to have a finding on the question of dispossession, therefore, does not appear to us to be a viable solution. 16. The Court finds that in the facts situation obtainable in the case on hand, the decision in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra), could be applied to decide the controversy and not the decision in the case of Hari Ram (supra) and the judgments rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court dated 31.3.2014 in Special Civil Application No.9814 of 1999 and in the case of State of Gujarat Vs. Popat Jadav Patel Decd. Through Legal Heirs and Representatives and Anr. reported in 2015(3) GLH (UJ) 1 as sought to be relied by Mr. Pahwa. 17. With the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No.2, documents showing different actions at different stages from declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act till taking of possession under Section 10(6) of the land in question are placed with copy of panchnama. The Copy of notice dated 8.2.1991 is placed at Annexure-R-8 issued under Section 10(5) of the Act. By this notice, the petitioner was asked to handover the possession of the land in question within 30 days to the authorized officer. It is further stated that if the petitioner failed to deliver the possession of the land in question, the possession shall be taken by necessary action under Section 10(6) of the Act and if found necessary, by using necessary force. The petitioner was thus further put to notice that within 30 days, if she did not handover possession of the land in question, possession of the land in question shall be taken by the Government ex-parte in her absence. In this notice, land in question of which the possession was to be taken is clearly identified by Final Plot No.38 Paiki of Town Planning Scheme No.8 Paiki of Dariapur-Kajipur village. The petitioner did not comply with such notice. It is stated that such notice was ever challenged by the petitioner. In this notice, land in question of which the possession was to be taken is clearly identified by Final Plot No.38 Paiki of Town Planning Scheme No.8 Paiki of Dariapur-Kajipur village. The petitioner did not comply with such notice. It is stated that such notice was ever challenged by the petitioner. The petitioner thus accepted that the possession sought to be taken was of open land declared as excess of 642.45 Sq. Mtrs. of Final Plot No.38 Paiki of Dariapur-Kajipur village. Thus, the issue raised that the land, possession of which was taken under the panchnama, was not open land stood concluded and at this stage, after a period of more than 22 years, such issue cannot be permitted to be opened, that too with the help of the Court Commissioner’s report drawn in the suit filed in the year 2011 before moving this Court for restoration of the main petition which stood dismissed for non-prosecution. In the panchnama dated 30.4.1991 at Annexure-R-9, annexed with the affidavit-in-reply, the land is clearly described and identified by four different boundaries. Such panchnama of taking possession of the land in question drawn on 30.4.1991 appears to have been signed by two different panchas. Therefore, it clearly appears that in presence of panchas, possession of the land in question was taken in a legal manner and taking of possession de-facto by drawing panchnama cannot be said illegally taken. Considering the notice dated 8.2.1991 at Annexure-R-8 issued to the petitioner, stating that if the petitioner failed to deliver possession of the land in question, the possession of the land in question shall be taken by taking necessary action under Section 10(6) in her absence, it could well be said that before taking possession of the land in question by drawing panchnama, the petitioner was put to notice for the action to be taken under Section 10(6) and therefore, the contention that requirement of issuing notice under Section 10(6) was not followed cannot be accepted. As held and observed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra), especially in para 17 of its judgment, the petitioner having not made any grievance based on Section 10(5) of the Act and since there was nothing inherently wrong in taking over the possession of the land in question, so as to affect either identity of the land or the boundaries thereof or any other circumstances of the similar nature going to the root of the matter which would require adjudication, the possession of the land taken in the year 1991 cannot be held to be illegally taken on the ground that requirement of serving notice under Section 10(6) was not followed. 18. In light of the above and for the reasons stated above, no relief could be granted to the petitioner. Hence, the petition is dismissed. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated. Petition dismissed.