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2015 DIGILAW 1008 (ALL)

Virendra Prasad Singh v. State of U. P.

2015-04-28

VIPIN SINHA

body2015
JUDGMENT Vipin Sinha,J. Heard Sri N. I. Jafri, learned counsel for the applicant and learned AGA appearing for the State. 2. The present application U/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing of the chargesheet dated 17.3.2007 as well as entire proceedings of criminal case no. 936 of 2007 arising out of case crime no. 356 of 2003, U/s 342, 467, 468, 471 IPC pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghazipur and for quashing of the summoning order dated 26.3.2007. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant Sri N. I. Jafri has contended that the applicant has been falsely implicated in pursuance of the FIR, which was lodged by opposite party no.2 on 4.7.2003 at P.S. Nunhara, Ghazipur bearing case crime no. 644300356, U/s 342, 467, 468, 471 IPC. He contended that the applicant has been falsely implicated at the behest of senior officer Markandey Singh, Dy.S.P., who in connivance with the officers of the Vigilance Department and who in pursuance of that connivance has facilitated the lodging of the FIR against the applicant with the sole intention of harassing the applicant and teaching him a lesson. He further contended that during the course of the investigation, the Investigating Officer has recorded the statements of Mohan Lal, Amar Singh Yadav, Hari Singh Yadav, Ranjeet Singh Yadav, Kashinath Pandey and Rajendra Singh under sections 161 Cr.P.C. and thereafter has submitted a chargesheet against the applicant in the court of CJM, Ghazipur on 17.3.2007, a cognizance of which was taken by the learned Magistrate and summons were issued against the applicant on 26.3.2007. 4. Basic defence as taken by the learned counsel for the applicant is that the applicant has not committed any offence and that he had only acted and discharged his official duties that too only on the direction of his superior officer. He has been falsely implicated at the behest of his senior officer. 5. The fact remains that at this stage this Court cannot make a roving inquiry about the factual aspect of the case and the question with regard to the factual dispute which can be better gone into by the trial court itself at the stage of trial. The fact also remains that all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant relate to the disputed questions of fact. 6. The fact also remains that all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant relate to the disputed questions of fact. 6. This Court has also been called upon to adjudge the testimonial worth of the prosecution witness and evaluate the same on the basis of various intricacies of factual details. The veracity of the credibility of material furnished on behalf of the prosecution has been questioned and false implication has been pleaded. 7. The law regarding sufficiency of material which may justify the summoning of accused and also the court's decision to proceed against the accused in a given case is well settled. The court has to eschew itself from embarking upon a roving inquiry into the last details of the case. It is also not advisable to adjudge whether the case will ultimately end in conviction by the court or not and at this stage only a prima facie satisfaction of the court about the existence of sufficient ground to proceed with, is required and, thus, while exercising the inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court does not deem it proper to have a pretrial before the actual trial begins. 8. This Court cannot enter into the realm of conjectures and surmises and make a roving inquiry with regard to disputed question of fact. Moreover, the present case is a case where a chargesheet has been filed under Sections 342, 467, 468, 471 IPC and it cannot be quashed at the very threshold as has been prayed by holding a parallel trial and also by looking into the adequacy of the evidence at this stage. At the present/relevant stage, the learned Magistrate has only to see as to whether there exists a prima facie case or not. The sufficiency or adequacy of evidence is not to be seen at this stage. The Magistrate, at this stage, is not supposed to go into the question as to whether the evidence is sufficient for a conviction or not. Moreover, all the contentions as have been raised by Sri N. I. Jafri, learned counsel for the applicant can be well gone into at the various subsequent stages of trial with due reference to the evidence that may be collected or produced during the trial and it would not be appropriate to interfere with the trial at this stage. 9. Moreover, all the contentions as have been raised by Sri N. I. Jafri, learned counsel for the applicant can be well gone into at the various subsequent stages of trial with due reference to the evidence that may be collected or produced during the trial and it would not be appropriate to interfere with the trial at this stage. 9. It is established position of law that a chargesheet ought not to be quashed at the initial stage itself, if there is some evidence on record and also in view of the fact that the accused persons have a number of remedies available to them at various stages of trial itself. It has been the consistent view of the Apex Court that the Court should use the power of quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which are in the nature of inherent power, very sparingly. 10. A reference with regard to the discretion vested in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be made with reference to the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Rajiv Thapar and others v. Madan Lal Kapoor reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 , the relevant extract of which is quoted herein below: "The discretion vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised suo motu to prevent the abuse of court, and/or to secure the ends of justice. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. The converse is however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. Where the prosecution/ complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charges(s) levelled, and have placed material before the court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial mus be held." The Apex Court in the said judgment further holds as under: "... the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal , or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false." 11. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false." 11. However, from the perusal of the record, it is apparent that it cannot be said that there is no evidence on record against the accused-applicant and, thus, in the opinion of the Court, the present case is not a case where the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should be invoked or ought to be invoked because the adequacy of the evidence on record will have to be seen at the trial itself and not at the stage of summoning or taking cognizance by the Magistrate. 12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid and from the perusal of the FIR, the chargesheet and the summoning order itself, a prima facie case against the accused-applicant exists and there is no justification to quash the proceedings has has been prayed for. Sri N. I. Jafri, learned counsel for the applicant has failed to demonstrate any abuse of the process of the Court and, thus, the prayer for quashing the impugned chargesheet, entire proceedings of the aforesaid case and summoning order is refused. 13. Interim order dated 27.7.2007 is hereby vacated. 14. However, as has been informed by Sri N. I. jafri that the bail has not been obtained by the applicant, this Court observes that in case the applicant appears and surrenders before the courts below within 60 days from today and applies for bail, his prayer for bail shall be considered and decided in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgement passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. For a period of 60 days from today or till the applicant surrenders and applies for bail, whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant. However, in case, the applicant does not appear before the courts below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against him. 15. State of U.P. For a period of 60 days from today or till the applicant surrenders and applies for bail, whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant. However, in case, the applicant does not appear before the courts below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against him. 15. It is made clear that no application for extension of time shall be entertained if this order is not availed of in the stipulated period of time. 16. With the aforesaid observations, the instant application U/s 482 Cr.P.C. is disposed off finally.