JUDGMENT : Samarendra Pratap Singh, J. The Letters Patent Appeal, which has come to be registered as L.P.A. No.44 of 2014, is directed against the judgment and order, dated 23.12.2013, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court, in C.W.J.C. No. 6490 of 2003, dismissing the writ petition. 2. In the writ petition aforementioned, the petitioner sought for directions to be issued to the respondents not to take any steps, including steps under Section 24 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, for the purpose of recovery of past dues of the petitioner and to restore electric connection to facilitate the proceedings pending before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SICA’). 3. After ten years of filing of the writ petition aforementioned and just before its hearing in the year 2013, the ambit of the relief was sought to be enlarged by filing I.A. No. 5054 of 2013 seeking quashing of the energy bill, dated 18.04.2003 (Annexure-2), whereby the demand was raised from Rs. 8 Crores and odd to more than Rs. 16 crores, which was also subject of challenge in Title Suit No. 65 of 2013. 4. In order to avoid multiplicity of the litigation, the learned single Judge, on an application made by the appellant, in LPA No. 44 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first appellant’), allowed the Interlocutory Application, whereby amendment, in relief portions, had been sought for. That part of the impugned order, dated 23.12.2013, whereby the learned single Judge had allowed I.A. No. 5054 of 2013, has been challenged by the respondent, Power Holding Company, in L.P.A. No. 236 of 2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the second appellant). 5. Because of the commonality of the issues in both, L.P.A. No. 44 of 2014, filed by the writ petitioner, and L.P.A. No. 236 of 2014, filed by the respondent-Power Holding Company, the two appeals, on the request of the learned Counsel for both the parties, have been taken up together for hearing and disposal at the admission stage itself. 6. Before we consider the respective cases of the parties, it would be necessary to notice the facts of the present case, which has a chequered history. 7. 6. Before we consider the respective cases of the parties, it would be necessary to notice the facts of the present case, which has a chequered history. 7. The first appellant is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Patna and its factory, at Deokuli, under Bihta Block, in the district of Patna. The factory was set up in the year 1995. The factory produces end products of Iron and M.S. Ingots by using process of electrical induction furnace, which requires heavy consumption of electrical energy at high voltage. The company, accordingly, took High Tension electric connection, commonly known as HTS, for supply of electricity, at 33 KV, with a contract demand of 25 KVA. Later on, the contract demand was increased to 4850 KVA. 8. A case of theft, bearing Bihta P.S. Case No. 211 of 1999 under Sections 39 and 44 of Electricity Act, 1910, read with Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, was instituted against the first appellant on the basis of inspection, which was conducted, on 26/27.8.1999, because the first appellant was allegedly found using electricity in excess of the contract load and a demand, for a sum of Rs.8,85,77,131.00/-, was raised vide bill, dated 31.08.1999, under Clause 16.9 of the 1993 tariff. The demand was set aside by a learned single Judge of this Court by order, dated 27.09.1999, passed in C.W.J.C. No.8939 of 1999, with a direction to the Electricity Board to prepare a fresh bill after issuing show cause notice and on consideration of the reply thereof. As per the order of learned single Judge and upon considering the reply to the show cause notice of the first appellant, the Chief Engineer (Transmission), Adjudicator, vide order, dated 29.10.1999 (Annexures-1 and 2 to LPA No. 44 of 2014) issued a fresh bill for the same amount of Rs.8,85,77,131.00. 9. The challenge to the bill, dated 29.10.1999, was made by the first appellant, in C.W.J.C. No. 10842 of 1999, which was rejected by order, dated 03.12.1999. The order is reported in 2000 (3) PLJR 60 . Being aggrieved, the first appellant preferred appeal bearing L.P.A. No.1665 of 1999. The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal holding that the Board, in exercise of power under Section 16.9 of the Tariff, cannot levy three times bill on fuel surcharge and electricity duty. The order is reported in 2000 (3) PLJR 60 . Being aggrieved, the first appellant preferred appeal bearing L.P.A. No.1665 of 1999. The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal holding that the Board, in exercise of power under Section 16.9 of the Tariff, cannot levy three times bill on fuel surcharge and electricity duty. The order of the Division Bench is reported in 2002 (1) PLJR 21 . 10. The decision of the Division Bench was carried, in appeal, to the Supreme Court by both, the Bihar State Electricity Board, the predecessor of the second appellant, as well as the first appellant. The appeal, preferred by the Electricity Board, was numbered as Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 12903 of 2000 giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 8395 of 2002, whereas the appeal, preferred by the first appellant, was numbered as Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 8071 of 2000 giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 8394 of 2002. The Supreme Court observed that Clause 16.9 and 16.10.03 of the Tariff are separate and distinct and Clause 16.10.03 does not lay down that additional surcharge would also be levied at thrice the rate per unit of the tariff. The Supreme Court, in its decision, did not, however, interfere with the findings of the Division Bench that there is no provision to charge electricity duty at thrice the rate per unit of the tariff. The decision of the Supreme Court stands reported in AIR 2003 SC 134. 11. In light of the order of the Supreme Court, the erstwhile Electricity Board issued a modified demand by raising its demand to Rs.16,64,88,831.00/- vide its bill, dated 18.04.2003 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). The first appellant assailed the said bill by filing Title Suit No. 65 of 2003, wherein a declaration was sought for that the bill, dated 18.04.2002, was not prepared in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of the High Court and, hence, the same would not be binding and was, therefore, required to be quashed. Initially, the learned trial Court granted interim injunction in favour of the first appellant company. The interim order of injunction was, in course of time, vacated. Initially, the learned trial Court granted interim injunction in favour of the first appellant company. The interim order of injunction was, in course of time, vacated. The first appellant, thereafter, filed, on 04.08.2004, an application seeking to withdraw the said Title Suit and this prayer, on being allowed, the suit was disposed of as withdrawn without any leave to institute a fresh suit. 12. In the meantime, the first appellant also preferred writ application, bearing C.W.J.C. No. 6490 of 2003, which has given rise to this appeal, seeking direction to the Electricity Board to discharge their legal obligation under the provisions of SICA and, consequently, not to take any steps for recovery of the past dues. 13. As noticed in the earlier paragraphs, I.A. No. 5054 of 2013 was filed by the first appellant, in the year 2013, challenging the bill, dated 18.04.2003, though the same was already on record as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The learned single Judge, though conscious of the fact that the initial relief prayed in the writ petition and the subsequent addition of the relief were much at variance, nonetheless, in order to avoid the multiplicity of litigation's, allowed I.A. No. 5054 of 2013 on the ground that both the reliefs more or less arose out of common bundle of facts. 14. Finally, by the judgment and order under appeal, the learned single Judge, upon taking the view that there was no merit in the writ petition, rejected the writ petition observing that the impugned bill, dated 18.04.2003, was raised in consonance with the directions of the Division Bench of this Court and also the Supreme Court. 15. The first appellant has assailed the order of the learned single Judge, dismissing the writ petition, on, broadly speaking, the following grounds: (i) Once the matter is pending before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, an obligation is created by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction under the SICA against the Board not to recover any past dues or take any action, which would jeopardize the existence of industry concerned; (ii) The bill, raised by the Electricity Board, was not in accordance with the Tariff provisions and, as such, no Delayed Payment Surcharge can be levied on such bill; and (iii) The bill, in dispute, was not prepared in terms of the order of the Supreme Court. 16. 16. Refuting the submission of the first appellant, learned Counsel for the Electricity Board submits that the bill, in question, has been raised in terms of the order of the Division Bench passed in L.P.A. No. 1665 of 1999 and upheld by the Supreme Court, in S.L.P. No. 8071 of 2000 (filed by the first appellant), in its order, 6.3.2003. He contends that the learned single Judge ought not to have allowed the amendment in the prayer for additional relief after ten years as the relief was at variance with the reliefs prayed for in writ petition, besides the relief being time-barred. In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on the decision in Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and Sons and others, reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 . 17. We would, first, examine the pleas of the first appellant in support of its case. The first appellant contended that being a sick industry, it filed a case of reference, under Section 15 of the SICA, before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi, on 21.07.2003, which was registered as Case No. 300 of 2003. After due enquiry under Section 16(1) of the SICA, the first appellant was declared sick on 16.08.2005 and the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (D.R.S.) was being prepared under the aegis of Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. Further-more, as the Draft Rehabilitation Scheme (D.R.S.) of the first appellant’s unit was pending for consideration before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction and the Unit had been declared sick, an obligation was created on the part of the Electricity Board restraining the Electricity Board from taking recourse to recovery of alleged past bills or taking any such action, which would jeopardize the survival of the industry itself. The first appellant was hopeful that it would survive with the aid and rehabilitation scheme contemplated by the Board and, hence, any action, for recovery of alleged amount, is legally not sustainable. In support of its submissions, the first appellant relied upon the decisions in E.S.C. Limited and others v. Bowrech Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. and others, reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 451; Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa and others, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 669 , as well as Real Value Appliances Ltd v. Canara Bank and others, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 554 . 18. Ltd. and others, reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 451; Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa and others, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 669 , as well as Real Value Appliances Ltd v. Canara Bank and others, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 554 . 18. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition of law that where the case of an industrial company falls within the four corner of Section 22(1) of the SICA, no proceeding for winding up or for execution, distress or the like, against any of the properties or any suit for recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with. The issue is whether the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases would be applicable to the facts of the present case. 19. According to counsel for the second appellant, neither the aforesaid judgment nor the provisions of the SICA restrict the Electricity Board from charging electricity duty for supply of electrical energy under its statutory contractual obligations covered by the Indian Electricity Supply Act, 1948, and the tariff created under the regulation of the Electricity Board. The issue remains whether prohibition, contemplated by Section 22 (1) of the SICA, upon which the first appellant has relied, covers even recovery of price and dues by the Electricity Board for supply of energy as per its contractual right and obligation. 20. As the protection claimed by the first appellant is based upon Section 22(1) of the SICA, it would be relevant to notice the relevant provisions at the first instance itself, which is quoted herein below: “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. 20. As the protection claimed by the first appellant is based upon Section 22(1) of the SICA, it would be relevant to notice the relevant provisions at the first instance itself, which is quoted herein below: “22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. –(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under Section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under Section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under Section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceedings for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.” 21. The scope and intent of Section 22(1) of the SICA and the issue, in hand, whether the Electricity Board can direct disconnection and enforce recovery of price of electrical energy, have been, in the past, subject of consideration by the Courts. The learned single Judge has rightly observed that the aforesaid issue has been best answered in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, reported in (1997) 9 SCC 462 . We, too, quote paragraph 5 of the above decision, which has been quoted by the learned single Judge in the impugned order as well: “5. A reading of the above section would indicate that when the proceedings are pending before the BIFR in respect of any mater referred to therein for inquiry by the Board, the proceedings or order of execution, distress or the like would be stayed until the proceedings get concluded before the BIFR or would not be proceeded without the leave of the Board or Appellate Authority. It is seen that under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 one of the conditions is that continued payment of the price of electrical energy supplied by the Board is a condition for the continued supply and the default committed in the payment thereof entails disconnection of the supply of electrical energy, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the contract or the regulation issued under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Execution connotes pre-existing decree. It is true that any action for realization etc. pending decision by BIFR or without its permission is prohibited. Enforcement of compliance of the obligation under the contract or regulation for supply of electrical energy by ordering payment of electrical energy is not and cannot be considered to be execution of a decree. Execution of the decree presupposes the existence of a decree of a competent court and the decree-holder should take steps to have it executed pending proceeding before BIFR. There is no decree of court. Since the petitioner had committed default and as a condition for reconnection, agreed to pay the amount in instalments, he is liable to comply with the undertaking given for supply of electrical energy. The petitioner committed default in that behalf. So, it is not entitled to seek any declaration or direction from the Court that since the matter is pending before the BIFR, he would be entitled to the supply of electrical energy without the compliance of the corresponding obligation of payment under regulations or of the contract under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It is, therefore, not correct to say that since the proceedings are pending before the BIFR, the electricity is required to be supplied to the consumer without compliance of the conditions. It is then sought to be contended that the authorities may take coercive steps to recover the arrears. At this stage, we need not go into the question.” 22. The Supreme Court, in paragraph 5 of its decision, in Indian Maize & chemicals Ltd. (supra), has observed that Section 22(1) of SICA indicates the circumstances, where under an industrial company would be entitled to protection provided by Section 22 of the SICA. The issue is as to what is the extent of protection provided under section 22(1) of the SICA and whether it stretches to the extent of prohibiting dues against cost of energy supplied under statutory agreement. 23. The issue is as to what is the extent of protection provided under section 22(1) of the SICA and whether it stretches to the extent of prohibiting dues against cost of energy supplied under statutory agreement. 23. Explaining the relevant provisions, the Supreme Court has observed, in Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. (supra), that where the proceedings are pending before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in respect of any matter referred to therein under Sections 16, 17 or 25 of the SICA, the proceedings or orders of execution, distress or the like, would be stayed until the proceedings get concluded before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction or would not be proceeded without the leave of the Electricity Board or the Appellate Authority. 24. We find that under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, as well as tariff framed under Section 49 thereof, payment of price is an essential condition for supply of electrical energy by the Electricity Board and in default thereof, the electrical connection is liable to be disconnected as per the prescribed procedure. The first appellant has entered into an agreement and it had an obligation to make payment, under the contract, in terms of the tariff for supply of electrical energy. Furthermore, the enforcement of compliance under a contract or regulation for supply of electrical energy cannot be considered to be an execution, which presupposes existing of a decree. The provisions bar realization of dues, which may be a fall out of a winding up operation or execution of decree. 25. As such, in our considered view, the realization of electrical dues, governed under statutory contracts, which are neither a fall-out of winding up operation or of execution of a decree, would not fall within the zone of prohibition under section 22(1) of the SICA. Any other construction would allow an escape route to many of defaulting industrial companies to deliberately avoid payment of price for electricity consumed despite there being an obligation of making payment for the same and continue to demand supply of electrical energy without paying the bill for consumption of electrical energy. Any other construction would allow an escape route to many of defaulting industrial companies to deliberately avoid payment of price for electricity consumed despite there being an obligation of making payment for the same and continue to demand supply of electrical energy without paying the bill for consumption of electrical energy. The Supreme Court, in paragraph 5 of its decision, in Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. (supra), has held that if a person commits default, it cannot seek any declaration or direction from the Court that one would be entitled to supply of electrical energy without the compliance of the corresponding obligation of payment under regulations or of the contract under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. 26. In view of the provisions of the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, as well as the decision in Indian Maize & Chemicals Ltd. (supra), we have no hesitation in concluding that merely because a proceeding is pending before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, the Electricity Board is not precluded from raising a demand for the electrical energy supplied, more so, when it is raised in the light of order of the Supreme Court provided, of course, that the bills are in tune with the decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court. 27. Learned counsel for the first appellant next contended that the bill, raised by the Electricity Board, was neither in accordance with the directions of the Supreme Court nor in accordance with the tariff provisions and, as such, no delayed payment surcharge can be levied on such payment. The first appellant has tried to impress upon the Court that the bill, dated 29.10.1999, for Rs.8,85,77,131/-, was found incorrect by the Division Bench, in L.P.A. No.1665 of 1999, as electricity duty and fuel surcharge were calculated at thrice the unit rate, which was not permissible. Learned Counsel for the first appellant points out that the Division Bench had directed that the electricity duty and fuel surcharge would be chargeable per unit and not three times of the unit rate and that this order remained intact up to the Supreme Court, which, on 06.03.2000, upheld the order of the Division Bench and, hence, the Electricity Board ought to have given a reduced bill in view of directions mentioned aforesaid. 28. 28. Learned counsel for the first appellant has further argued that the Electricity Board, instead of reducing the bill consequent upon deletion of State electricity duty and fuel surcharge, hiked the demand to the tune of Rs. 16,64,8,831/-, vide bill, dated 18.4.2003, from Rs. 8,85,77,131/-, which was the amount raised vide bill, dated 31.08.1999, and order, dated 29.10.1999, of the Chief Engineer (Transmission), Adjudicator. 29. In our view, the submissions of the first appellant do not depict a correct picture of the case, which has been appropriately explained in the counter affidavit filed by the Electricity Board in the writ petition as also in the impugned order, dated 29.10.1999, of the learned single Judge passed in C.W.J.C. No. 10842 of 1999. 30. The Electricity Board, in paragraph 52 of its counter affidavit, at page 20, has stated that the first appellant has not produced the supplementary bill, dated 18.01.2000, issued by the Electricity Board, for a sum of Rs.3,73,63,204/-, which was necessitated on account of order of the Chief Engineer as upheld by the order, dated 13.12.1999, passed by the Court in C.W.J.C. No. 10842 of 1999. In the covering letter of the bill, dated 18.01.2000, it was specifically mentioned that the total amount comes to Rs.12,62,24,828/-. Moreover, the bill, dated 29.10.1999, for a sum of Rs.8,85,77,131/-, was prepared on the basis of load of 6000 KVA instead of 7200 KVA. Hence, the bill, dated 18.01.2000, was prepared for the additional 1200 KVA as per direction of this Court, which was left out earlier. The bill was also produced before the Supreme Court by the first appellant in S.L.P.(Civil) No. 8071 of 2000 as Annexure-P-17 to the memo of appeal. The Electricity Board, in paragraph 52 of the counter affidavit, has elaborately dealt with facts and figures explaining the addition of the additional amount of fuel surcharge and electricity duty. The relevant part of paragraph 52 of the counter affidavit is quoted herein below: “Hence to say that previously the bill was raised only for Rs.8 crores and odd is not correct and in fact the previous bill was for a sum of Rs.12,62,24,828.00. In fact, if D.P.S. of a sum of Rs.7,17,14,749.00 is deducted from the bill amount of Rs.16,64,88,831.00 then the balance comes to only Rs.9,47,74,082.00 which in any case is much less than the previous bill of Rs.12,62,24,828.00. In fact, if D.P.S. of a sum of Rs.7,17,14,749.00 is deducted from the bill amount of Rs.16,64,88,831.00 then the balance comes to only Rs.9,47,74,082.00 which in any case is much less than the previous bill of Rs.12,62,24,828.00. Hence it is incorrect to say that the bill amount has not reduced despite the decisions of this Hon'ble Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. If the bill dated 29.10.99 and 18.4.2003 are compared it would be found that the amount of fuel surcharge has been reduced from Rs.6,03,53,339/- to Rs.2,47,90,912.00, although the final rate of fuel surcharge has increased from Rs.1.3735 to Rs.2.0440, and the amount of Electricity duty has come down from Rs.11,29,227.00 to Rs.3,76,408.00. However, the amount of Energy consumption has remained the same in the previous bill as well as the payment bill i.e. Rs.6,47,42,262.00. Thus it is absolutely clear that after the judgment of this Hon'ble Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the compensatory penal bill has considerably been reduced”. 31. Thus, it is evident from the bill, dated 18.04.2003, (Annexure-2) and perusal of facts and figures mentioned in foregoing paragraphs that the additional fuel surcharge and electricity duty, as directed by the Courts, have been deleted. 32. The first appellant next contended that as per 1993 Tariff, the demand for the month was to be raised either as per the contract demand or 75 per cent of the connected load, whichever was higher. The first appellant asserts that at time of inspection, the contract demand of the first appellant, in terms of the existing agreement, was 4850 KVA, whereas the connected load, at the time of inspection, was found to be 6000 KVA and, as such, 75 per cent of the connected load is to be computed, which would come to 4500 KVA, but as the contract demand of 4850 KVA was higher than 75 per cent of the connected load, the load factor, while calculating the demand, at the best, ought to have been taken at 4850 KVA as load factor in place of 6000 KVA as per the multiplier formula (L x f x h x d) provided under clause 16.9 of 1993 Tariff for raising demand in respect of energy extracted beyond the contract demand. 33. We are not in agreement with the submissions of the first appellant that the connected load at the time of inspection was 6000 KVA. 33. We are not in agreement with the submissions of the first appellant that the connected load at the time of inspection was 6000 KVA. There were two induction furnaces and the capacity of each furnace was 6 MT. As per agreement entered into by the parties concerned, the first appellant had been using induction furnace and minimum of 600 KVA was required for melting 1 MT and, as such, the actual load, used for melting 12 MT, would be 7200 KVA instead of 6000 KVA as asserted by the first appellant. The aforesaid aspect has been noticed by learned single Judge in the order, dated 13.12.1999, passed in C.W.J.C. No.10842 of 1999 as well as in the order of the Supreme Court placed at page 121 and 126 of the memorandum of appeal. 34. Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first appellant, submits that even assuming that the connected load was 7200 KVA, yet only 75 per cent of the connected load could have been taken as load factor for raising the demand as per clause 16.9 of 1993 Tariff, which would come to 5400 KVA, and, as such, the demand could not have been calculated either taking 6000 KVA or 7200 KVA as load factor under the formula and methodology of calculation provided under clause 16.9 of 1993 Tariff. 35. It would not be appropriate for us to go into nitty-gritty of such issues as the Supreme Court has faulted the bill only to the extent that the Electricity Board wrongly charged the electricity duty and fuel surcharge at thrice per unit instead of charging at per unit alone. The direction of the Division Bench, upheld by the Supreme Court, was to delete the additional amount of electricity duty and fuel surcharge to the extent mentioned, which has been done. Hence, we do not find any merit in the submissions of made on behalf of the first appellant. 36. Learned counsel for the first appellant, in the same breath, argued that the Board wrongly considered the average hours consumed per day inasmuch as 21.25 hours was the figure even according to the order of Chief Engineer, dated 29.10.1999, contained in Annexure-2. 36. Learned counsel for the first appellant, in the same breath, argued that the Board wrongly considered the average hours consumed per day inasmuch as 21.25 hours was the figure even according to the order of Chief Engineer, dated 29.10.1999, contained in Annexure-2. The submission of the first appellant is only to be noticed to be rejected as the aforesaid defect, with respect to consideration of average number of hours consumed by the first appellant, was rectified in the bill, dated 18.01.2000, which was also produced before the Supreme Court by the first appellant in S.L.P.(C) No.8071 of 2000 as Annexure-P-17 to the memorandum of appeal. In the aforesaid bill, the average number of hours, consumed by the appellant, was corrected as 22:25 hours as supply at 33 KVA with a contract load of even 4850 KVA guaranteed supply on an average of 22:25 hours per day. As such, we agree with the submission of learned counsel for the second appellant that the second appellant has rightly taken into consideration 22:25 hours of average supply per day, while raising the bill, dated 18.04.2003. 37. The final limb of the argument of the first appellant is that as the bill, dated 31.08.1999, and the subsequent bill, dated 29.10.1999, both for Rs.8,85,77,131/- was found not correct by the Division Bench and affirmed by the Supreme Court for having wrongly added State electricity duty and fuel surcharge three times the unit, no delayed payment surcharge could be legally leviable. He submits that even the fresh bill, dated 18.04.2003, was faulty and, as such, no further delayed payment surcharge would be leviable on it. In support of his submission, Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior counsel, has relied upon decisions in the case of M/s Gaya Roller Flour Mills (P) Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Others, reported in 1995(2) PLJR 715 , (paragraphs 9 and 10) and M/s Electric (Patliputra) Power Equipment (P) Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Others, reported in 1992(2) PLJR 62 , (paragraphs 3 and 4). Reliance has also been placed in the case of M/s Iceberg Industries Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Others, reported in 2010(4) PLJR 574, (paragraphs 19, 22, 25 and 29). 38. Reliance has also been placed in the case of M/s Iceberg Industries Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board and Others, reported in 2010(4) PLJR 574, (paragraphs 19, 22, 25 and 29). 38. We find that the learned single Judge has elaborately considered the cases referred to above, while dealing this issue and before coming to the conclusion that the ratio, laid down therein, would not be applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the Division Bench and the Supreme Court has limited its decision to only two aspects of the bill and accordingly directed deletion of fuel surcharge and State electricity duty, which was charged thrice the rate per unit, and that the Courts did not hold the bill, as a whole, to be invalid. 39. We do not find that the view, taken by the learned single Judge, is either unreasonable or inappropriate. For instance, in the case of M/s Gaya Roller Flour Mills (P) Ltd. (supra), the authorities admitted the fault in computation of bill. In the case of M/s Iceberg Industries Limited (supra), the learned single Judge held that there was no conscious disregard or neglect to pay the electric charges as liability to pay was not denied. However, as the petitioner was not in a position to pay, he sought instalment, which was belatedly approved. The case of the appellant is different as it has disputed the liability to pay demand. 40. Moreover, in the present case, the matter had travelled up to the Supreme Court, which directed for preparation of fresh bill deleting the additional electricity duty and fuel surcharge to the extent as indicated above. There is no reference therein that the first appellant would be exempted from delayed payment surcharge, when the bill, as a whole, was not found invalid. The learned single Judge rightly rejected the contention that one cannot expand the ambit of the order of the Supreme Court and we have no hesitation in affirming the same. 41. For reasons discussed above, we do not find any infirmity in the order of learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. The appeal filed by the writ petitioner-appellant is, accordingly, dismissed. L.P.A. No.236 of 2014 42. 41. For reasons discussed above, we do not find any infirmity in the order of learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition. The appeal filed by the writ petitioner-appellant is, accordingly, dismissed. L.P.A. No.236 of 2014 42. This letters patent appeal, which we have heard analogous with L.P.A. No.44 of 2014, has been preferred by the second appellant against that part of the impugned order, dated 23.12.2013, whereby the learned single Judge allowed I.A. No.5054 of 2013 permitting thereby the first appellant to challenge the bill, dated 18.04.2003, after ten years of filing of the writ application. 43. Learned counsel for the second appellant submits that the writ petition was filed in the year 2003 and the bill, dated 18.04.2003, was already on record of the writ petition as Annexure-2, but the first appellant did not choose to challenge the said bill for ten years and only when the writ petition was about to be heard finally, for disposal, in the year 2013, the said interlocutory application was filed seeking amendments in the prayer portion of the writ petition. 44. The second appellant submits that by not challenging the bill for full ten years, the first appellant acquiesced to the correctness of the bill. Further-more, the challenge to the bill, prepared in the year 2003, is hit by the law of limitation. He also submits that the discretionary power of the Court is to be exercised judiciously. In support of his submission, the second appellant has relied upon the decision in Revajeetu Builders and Developers (supra). He next contends that the first appellant had challenged the bill, dated 18.04.2003, in Title Suit No.65 of 2003, which was withdrawn without taking leave of either this Court or of the trial Court and, hence, the impugned prayer is hit by the principle of res judicata and the learned single Judge ought not to have allowed the amendment to be made in terms of the prayer portion of the memorandum of appeal. 45. As we have already dismissed the L.P.A. No.44 of 2014 and writ application as a whole, we need not go into these issues, which are, now, only of academic interest and the outcome of same would not have any bearing on final decision of the main appeal. 46. The L.P.A. No. 236 of 2014 is disposed of accordingly. 47. 45. As we have already dismissed the L.P.A. No.44 of 2014 and writ application as a whole, we need not go into these issues, which are, now, only of academic interest and the outcome of same would not have any bearing on final decision of the main appeal. 46. The L.P.A. No. 236 of 2014 is disposed of accordingly. 47. Summing up, L.P.A. No.44 of 2014, filed by the first appellant, is dismissed. 48. While agreeing, as a whole, with the conclusions reached and the decisions taken by my esteemed brother, Samarendra Pratap Singh, J., I deem it necessary to add a few lines. Order 39, Rule 1 CPC 49. What needs to be noted is that the first appellant has withdrawn Title Suit No. 65 of 2003 without, admittedly, obtaining leave of the Court. What would, then, be the effect of such a withdrawal of the suit on the first appellant’s rights, if any, to come to this Court with a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 50. What needs to be noted is that Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code envisages that the Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. 51. Negatively speaking, therefore, there is no bar to the institution of a suit unless any law, expressly or impliedly, bars institution of such a suit. When a suit lies, there is no absolute bar on the part of the aggrieved person Md. Jamaluddin Khan/ANAND/Mk to approach a High Court with an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the issuance of a writ is sought against the State or any of its instrumentalities inasmuch as an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the entertainment of a writ petition if a writ petition is, otherwise, maintainable. 52. Jamaluddin Khan/ANAND/Mk to approach a High Court with an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the issuance of a writ is sought against the State or any of its instrumentalities inasmuch as an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the entertainment of a writ petition if a writ petition is, otherwise, maintainable. 52. Necessarily, therefore, when, as a matter of public policy, institution of a suit is impermissible if a suit having been filed is withdrawn without leave of the Court, no writ petition can be entertained for the relief, which could have been sought for in such a suit, if the relief sought for is the same, which the writ petitioner had raised in the suit, but chose to withdraw the suit without leave of the Court to institute a fresh suit inasmuch as the extra-ordinary jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has to be exercised to enforce the law and not to defeat the same. Having, therefore, withdrawn the suit, the first appellant could not have come to this Court with a writ petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.