JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan J. Since common question of law arises for consideration in all these petitions, therefore, they are taken up together for disposal. 2. The petitioners were all granted liquor vends license L-14 for the year 2014-15. As per the policy/instructions regulating the renewal of liquor license, the State Government decided to renew the old licenses to the same vendors in case they were ready to pay 15% hike in the license fee. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners after completion of codal formalities had sought renewal of the licenses. 3. The grievance of the petitioners in CWP Nos.2220, 2221 and 2222 of 2015 is that instead of renewing licenses, the respondents without intimating the petitioners unilaterally decided to issue their units No. 100, 102 and 103 by lottery system. It is further averred that the respondents have illegally clubbed the units with the other units and then put their vends to auction by lottery system. 4. The respondents in their reply have sought to justify their action by claiming that the entire exercise undertaken by them was in the interest of revenue and the process of allotment by clubbing the vends had to be resorted to because no application for unit No. 105 had been received and it had become almost impossible to allot this unit and the revenue loss to the State exchequer appeared to be inevitable. Consequently, alternative modes of allotment became imperative to save the Government revenue. It became essential to resort to special provisions of Conditions No. 1.1 and 1.2 of Chapter-I of Announcements of Excise Allotments for the year 2015-16 and Rule 34 of the Himachal Pradesh Liquor License Rules, 1986, as amended from time to time. It is only after considering the various factors of viability of the pending Unit No. 105 and the possibility of its allotment in combination with other units/vends that it was clubbed with Unit Nos. 91, 100, 102 and 103. Therefore, in short the reply filed on behalf of the respondents is the allotment by regrouping and reforming the units and non-conformation of the renewal applications etc. has been done exclusively in revenue interest and the same is, therefore, valid. 5. The petitioner in CWP No. 2225 of 2015 was running unit No. 63 and he too had applied for the renewal of the same after depositing the requisite fee. has been done exclusively in revenue interest and the same is, therefore, valid. 5. The petitioner in CWP No. 2225 of 2015 was running unit No. 63 and he too had applied for the renewal of the same after depositing the requisite fee. The grievance is that, this unit has not been allotted to him, but the same was clubbed with unit No. 25 and has not been allotted so far. 6. The respondents in their reply have contended that since there was no offer for unit No. 25, having a license fee of Rs.71,74,064/-, consequently the same was clubbed with unit No. 63 in the interest of revenue. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 7. It is more than settled that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants-its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. 8. Once the State Government has framed rules for granting of privilege of sale of liquor and announced policies from time to time, the State cannot act arbitrarily and discriminately and it must comply with the quality clause while granting exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. 9. It also cannot be disputed that in exercise of its powers of judicial review, this Court would ordinarily not interfere with the policy decisions of the executive, unless the policy can be faulted on the ground of malafide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. Indeed, arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and malafide will render the policy unconstitutional. However, if the policy cannot be touched on any of these grounds, the mere fact that it may affect business interests of a party does not justify invalidating the policy. 10. It has repeatedly been pointed out by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to judgment of the executive. 10. It has repeatedly been pointed out by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to judgment of the executive. The Courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted or not. It is best left to the discretion of the State. 11. It is not in dispute that as per condition No. 1.3 of Chapter- I of the Announcements of Excise Allotments for the year 2015-16, the allotment and renewal of licenses of the vends/units have been made subject to the confirmation of the Excise & Taxation Commissioner-cum-Financial Commissioner (Excise), Himachal Pradesh and the said clause reads as follows:- “1.3 All the allotments of the vends/units or renewal of licenses of the vends/units shall be subject to confirmation by the Excise & Taxation Commissioner-cum-Financial Commissioner (Excise), Himachal Pradesh, who reserves the right to reject any allotment/renewal without assigning any reason for doing so.” It is while exercising the powers under this clause the respondents did not confirm the applications for renewal of the liquor licenses, despite payment of 15% hike in the license fee. 12. Therefore, in such circumstances, the further question which arises for consideration is as to whether the grouping of vends in order to save guard the government revenue is legal and valid. 13. In M/s Rishi Pal& Co. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, AIR 1999 SC 541 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the issue of grouping of vends to save guard the government revenue and also considered the powers of the Financial Commissioner to do so and it was held:- “5.….The Rules entitled the Financial Commissioner to grant licenses by the modes of auction, negotiations, private contract, allotment, tenders and any other arrangement or mode which he considers expedient. It also entitles the Financial Commissioner, by order in writing, to change the mode of granting the license prior to its grant for a financial year. We do not find in this Rule, or anywhere else, any restriction in regard to the regrouping of vends. If, for any reason, the bids at an auction cannot be accepted, the Financial Commissioner can decide to resort to negotiations instead. We do not find in this Rule, or anywhere else, any restriction in regard to the regrouping of vends. If, for any reason, the bids at an auction cannot be accepted, the Financial Commissioner can decide to resort to negotiations instead. He can do so provided the bids at the auction have not been confirmed. The Financial Commissioner would then be entitled to negotiate for one vend or two vends combined, the objective being to get the maximum revenue for the State. A clause that relates to auctions and permits the Presiding Officer thereat to regroup vends does not imply that the power to do so does not exist in the Financial Commissioner. “6……All those who had participated in the auction on that date had been given notice of the negotiations that were proposed for 25th March, 1995. It is true that those negotiations were originally proposed for Shimla-1 and II unit but it became clear during the proceedings that the revenue of the State would be greater if the Rampur Bushair unit was combined with the Shimla-I and II unit. Therefore, the participants in the negotiations were told to return in the afternoon. When informed about the decision in this behalf they asked for some time, which was given, and it was thereafter that the highest amount offered by the other party (respondent No. 6) was accepted. There is irrefutable evidence in the form of a Photostat copy of the record of the persons present at the negotiations that the Contractor was represented throughout. The Contractor was the highest bidder at the auction for the Rampur Bushair unit and its bid had not been accepted. It was given notice, in the circumstances, the authorities cannot be faulted at its instance for lack of adequate publicity, considering also the fact that the new financial year when the period of the license would commence was fast approaching.” 14. Similar issue came up for consideration before this Court in CWP No. 473 of 2008 titled as Narender Pal Vs. State of H.P. & others and it was held as under:- “…. The decision of respondent No.2 not to confirm the renewal of licence in favour of the petitioners cannot be faulted with. The power of non-confirming the renewal of licence by respondent No.2 is easily traceable to the conditions of the Announcements Excise Allotment/Renewal 2008-2009. State of H.P. & others and it was held as under:- “…. The decision of respondent No.2 not to confirm the renewal of licence in favour of the petitioners cannot be faulted with. The power of non-confirming the renewal of licence by respondent No.2 is easily traceable to the conditions of the Announcements Excise Allotment/Renewal 2008-2009. It is clearly stipulated in sub-para (ii) of para 1 of the Announcements Excise Allotment/Renewal 2008- 2009 that it is always open to respondent No.2 to sell all or any of the licenses by taking following steps: a. by allotment; b. by auction or by private contract; c. by calling tenders or by negotiations; d. by draw of lots or by renewal; e. by any other arrangement (including combination of the foregoing modes. This para is to be read with the note appended to para 4 which specifically provides for the re-formation of vends to fetch maximum revenue to the State. Respondent No.2 is also authorized to change the mode of grant of the licences whenever necessary before the actual grant of the licence. The petitioners had no vested right to get the licences renewed merely by submitting applications and depositing requisite fee. The ultimate renewal was to be confirmed by respondent No. 2 on the basis of the provisions stated hereinabove in extenso. The petitioners had no legitimate expectations to get the licences renewed. In view of the observations made hereinabove there is neither any irregularity, irrationality or procedural impropriety in the allotment process adopted by respondents No. 1 to 3.” 15. Identical issue came up recently before a coordinate Bench of this Court in Hem Raj Vs. State of H.P. & Others 2015(1) Him.L.R 561, wherein like the present case, the unit of the petitioner therein had been clubbed and not re-allotted to him, despite he having deposited the enhanced license fee. This Court held that the mere factum of deposited license fee would not bestow or invest upon the petitioner right to obtain renewal of the license, unless, until the action of the respondents could be termed as malafide or ultra vires to rules, the Court would not interfere. It is apt to reproduce paras 4 and 5 of the judgment, which reads thus:- “4. Both the submissions aforesaid are bereft of legal tenacity or sinew. It is apt to reproduce paras 4 and 5 of the judgment, which reads thus:- “4. Both the submissions aforesaid are bereft of legal tenacity or sinew. The mere factum of the petitioner having deposited license fee before the authority concerned as divulged by Annexure P-4 does not perse bestow or invest in him a right to obtain renewal of hitherto Unit No. 23 especially when Unit No. 23 has faded into extinction on its alongwith units No. 20, 25, 27 and 44 having come to be realigned, reconstituted and regrouped, unless it was demonstrated that the re-alignment of units aforesaid alongwith Unit No.23 qua which a liquor license was initially issued in favour of the petitioner under Annexure P-1 smacks of malafidies or is ultra vires the rules. Besides it was entailed upon the counsel for the petitioner to substantiate that such regrouping has been constituted or such regrouping/realigning is generated by exercise of extra constitutional power by the respondents or is prodded by whimsicality or caprice arising from no authority or power vesting in the authority concerned to create a new group by amalgamation or regrouping. In the aforesaid scenario the nonrenewal of license qua Unit No. 23 in favour of the petitioner would be ridden with the vice of arbitrariness and concomitant illegality. However, an incisive perusal of the record demonstrates that the authority concerned is vested by empowerment contained in Rule 13 and 34 of the Himachal Pradesh Liquor License Rules, 1986 read with Conditions No. 1.2, 1.3 and 3.18 of the Excise Allotment/Renewal Announcements for the year 2014-15 to carry out regrouping/realignment of liquor Units/Vends and concomitantly to amalgamate Units. In fact an uncircumscribed/ unfettered power is vested in the Financial Commissioner to carry out regrouping of liquor units. The plenitude of powers vested in the Financial Commissioner to carry out realignment of liquor units and on such regrouping reconstitute and assign them a new unit number has been upheld in a decision reported in M/s Rishi Pal and Co. vs. State of H.P. and others, 1998(5) SCC 333 . Besides vires thereof has been upheld in a decision rendered by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 473 of 2008 decided on 25.09.2008. vs. State of H.P. and others, 1998(5) SCC 333 . Besides vires thereof has been upheld in a decision rendered by this Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 473 of 2008 decided on 25.09.2008. In face thereof the act of the respondents to render extinct Unit No. 23 qua which a liquor license was initially issued in favour of the petitioner under Annexure P-1 by its tenable act of on its regrouping/realignment with other Units bearing No. 20, 25, 27 and 44 ascribe to it a new unit No. 45 cannot obviously bestow any right in the petitioner herein to on merger of Unit No. 23 with other Units aforesaid claim a vested or entrenched right merely on the anvil of his having deposited the revenue fees qua one of the Units forming a part of newly constituted Unit No. 45 for the latter renewal in his favour. Moreso, when the license initially issued under Annexure P-1 qua one of the Units forming part of newly constituted unit No. 45 has faded into extinction. In other words, when Unit No. 23 no longer exists or has faded into oblivion, no vested/subsisted rights endure in the petitioner to claim renewal of license qua a part of reconstituted unit number in his favour. He though does have a right to participate in the process for allotment or issuance of license qua newly constituted Unit No. 45 and in case he was interdicted or forbidden to participate in the process for allotment /issuance of license qua newly constituted Unit No. 45 on its coming into being on regrouping/realignment of units aforesaid then he could tenably agitate before this Court that such interdiction imposed upon him by executive fiat acquires the taint of bias and is liable to be interfered with by this Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction for facilitating the cherished constitutional tenet of equality. However, when as apparent on an incisive rummaging of the record that the petitioner was advised by the respondents to file an application before the authority concerned, before 12.00 noon on 26.3.2014 for his being considered for issuance of license or his being allotted on completion of codal formalities newly constituted Unit No. 45, yet his having omitted to participate renders him ill-equipped to agitate that in the process undertaken by the respondents to allot newly constituted Unit No. 45 he has been denied an opportunity compatible with other bidders seeking allotment/issuance of license qua it, besides estops him from contending that the process initiated by the respondents for allotment of the newly constituted Unit No. 45 by omitting elicitation of his participation is ridden with arbitrariness. 5. The discussion aforesaid unfolds the factum that the authority concerned in taking to obliterate Unit No. 23 by resorting to a tenable or legally ordained act of regrouping/realignment had not committed any illegality nor had indulged in any act smacking of arbitrariness. Besides when the rule of promissory estoppel as sought to be invoked by the petitioner on the strength of his having deposited license fee for the since obliterated Unit No. 23 by a tenable act of regrouping by the respondents, hence, stands effacement, obviously it cannot surge forth to the rescue of the petitioner for his claiming renewal of liquor license qua Unit No. 23.” 16. Faced with this situation, the learned counsel for the petitioners would then seek to invoke the plea of estoppel on the ground of having deposited the 15% hike in the license fee. To our mind, even this submission is equally without any force and has been squarely answered in Hem Raj’s case (supra), wherein it was further held as under:- “6. For reiteration, In the face of Unit No. 23 standing obliteration it would be an abuse of the equitable principle of promissory estoppels to stretch it to a scenario as in the instant case when with the unit qua which it is canvassed to be purportedly generated has faded into oblivion by a tenable act of the respondents. For reiteration, In the face of Unit No. 23 standing obliteration it would be an abuse of the equitable principle of promissory estoppels to stretch it to a scenario as in the instant case when with the unit qua which it is canvassed to be purportedly generated has faded into oblivion by a tenable act of the respondents. In other words, it would be a travesty of the rules permitting exercise of un-circumscribed powers embedded in the authority concerned to create/constitute new units by regrouping of hitherto units in case merely on the strength of deposit of license fees by the petitioner herein for renewal of an extinct liquor vend/unit, the equitable principle of promissory estoppel is permitted to sprout. The latter rule is a rule of equity and is unavailable to be drawn, when rules as in the instant case governing the issuance of liquor license to the aspirants exist. Even otherwise, the act of the respondents in rendering extinct Unit No. 23 by resorting to by its tenable act of regrouping create a new unit no. 45 is buoyed or fostered by a profiteering motive of the Government. Annexures P-9 and P-10 portray that since no application for renewal of license in respect of four units namely Kunihar, Darlamore, Bhararighat and Dumehar having a license fee of Rs.4.23 crores were received, as such, for want of receipt of application for renewal of units aforesaid which application if received would have reared a revenue of Rs.4.23 crores to the State exchequer the legally authorized step of the respondent to regroup of the units aforesaid with Unit No. 23 and thereby create/constitute newly ascribed unit No. 45 is to be presumed to be a legally warranted step prodded by statistical data. The petitioner has omitted to display any material portraying that no statistical data loses of revenue to the respondents existed before they proceeded to obliterate units aforesaid and on regrouping/realigning thereof theirs having constituted a new Unit No. 45 in which the participation of the petitioner herein too was elicited. For lack of adduction on record of the aforesaid material an invincible conclusion which ensues is that the respondents in resorting to the act of regrouping/realigning of Units and on such regrouping, ascribing a new unit number had carried out a stretched and thoughtful exercise. For lack of adduction on record of the aforesaid material an invincible conclusion which ensues is that the respondents in resorting to the act of regrouping/realigning of Units and on such regrouping, ascribing a new unit number had carried out a stretched and thoughtful exercise. Preponderantly then, when the said exercise is not imaginative or conjectural rather is obviously to buor revenue or obviate loss to the exchequer in the sum of Rs.4.23 Crores, it cannot be construed to be smacking of any malafides or arbitrariness.” 17. The petitioners would then contend that no notice had been given to them before regrouping the vends. This submission too is without any force, because a public notice dated 26.3.2015 in CWP Nos. 2220, 2221 and 2222 of 2015 was issued by the respondents for inviting applications for allotment of remaining licenses of liquor (L-2) and for manufacturing and retail sale of country fermented liquor (L-20B) for the year 2015-16. Unit No. 105 was clubbed with Unit Nos. 91, 100, 102 and 103. In all, 38 applications were received for allotment of the clubbed units and by a draw of lots it was respondent No. 5, who was declared the successful allottee. Therefore, in view of the above, it can safely be concluded that the entire process has been carried out by the respondents in a just and legal manner and no undue advantage has thereby been conferred upon respondent No. 5 in the aforesaid writ petitions. 18. Similarly, no undue advantage has been conferred upon respondent No. 6 in CWP No. 2225 of 2015, whereby the units No. 25 and 63 were clubbed and put to auction, more particularly in light of the fact that even the petitioner was given an opportunity to file fresh application for this clubbed unit i.e. 25 and 63. 19. There is no provision in either the policy or the Rules which may stipulate automatic or deemed confirmation of any application for renewal and the same have been made subject to confirmation by the Financial Commissioner and this provision as noticed above has already been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rishi Pal’s case supra. Having said so, we find no merit in these petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their costs.