JUDGMENT : 1. The instant second appeal arises out of the Judgment and Decree dated 29/05/2014 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 3, Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as "the first appellate Court") in civil regular appeal No. 13/12 (23/12), whereby the appellate Court has confirmed the Judgment and Decree dated 24/02/2012 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (J.D.) No. 1, Ajmer (hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court") in civil suit No. 368/93 (36/92) and in suit No. 305/93. 2. The facts in nutshell are that the plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for eviction against the defendants-appellants with regard to the suit premises. In the plaint it is stated that the suit premises were given on rent to the defendants-appellants @ Rs. 250/- per month. The eviction was sought on the ground of personal bonofide necessity of respondent No. 2-plaintiff No. 2 Sh. Gopichand who wanted to start a business pertaining to polish and repairs of wooden furniture and its sale on basis of commission. The eviction was also sought on the other grounds of default in payment of rent for a period of about 15 months, nuisance, alternate accommodation, material alteration. 3. A written statement was filed by the defendants-appellants wherein the defendants-appellants admitted the fact with regard to tenancy. So far as ground with regard to bonafide necessity, was denied and it was stated the the premises in dispute is situated in cloth market and in no manner can be used for the purpose stated in the plaint. The defendants do not have any accommodation other than the suit premises for running a cloth business and plaintiff have an alternate vacant premises in the ground floor where the husband of plaintiff No. 1 used to carry on business of cutting of woods which has ceased to be of use owing to death of husband of plaintiff No. 1. The rest of the grounds and averments in the plaint were denied. 4. Another suit for specific performance of contract was filed by the defendants-appellants (plaintiffs therein) wherein it was stated that two shops were taken on rent from Late Sh. Brijesh Kumar who was husband of Smt. Krishan Devi (defendant therein) @ Rs. 250/- per month. It was after the death of Mr. Brijesh Kumar that Smt. Krishna Devi became the landlord of premises in dispute. Brijesh Kumar who was husband of Smt. Krishan Devi (defendant therein) @ Rs. 250/- per month. It was after the death of Mr. Brijesh Kumar that Smt. Krishna Devi became the landlord of premises in dispute. Late Shri Brijesh Kumar and his wife Smt. Krishna Devi entered in to an agreement with the plaintiffs (defendants-appellants herein) on 6.5.1985 and obtained a sum of Rs. 30,000/- from the plaintiffs (defendants-appellants herein) and promised that the same can be returned by way of making appropriate adjustments in the rent. The said sum was taken on interest @ 18% per annum. From 11.8.1986 to 15.8.1986 late Shri Brijesh Kumar alongwith his wife re-paid a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and with regards to rest of the money i.e. Rs. 20,000/- both the parties again entered into an agreement dated 16.6.1986 that the same can be returned by way of making appropriate adjustments in the rent. Despite the aforesaid agreement Late Shri Brijesh Kumar and his wife requested the plaintiffs not to adjust the rent against the said sum and thus rent was duly paid by the plaintiffs. On 15.12.86 Brijesh Kumar expired owing to which Smt. Krishna Devi requested the plaintiffs to not adjust the rent against the said sum and thus rent till 30.4.1987 was paid by plaintiffs. It was stated that sum of Rs. 20000/- alongwith interest @ 18% per annum has still to be repaid by defendants therein to plaintiffs. It was stated that the plaintiff was entitled to the aforesaid sum alongwith interest i.e. 18% per annum w.e.f. 16.8.1986 which is to the tune of Rs. 3600/-. 5. That a written statement was filed by defendants therein (plaintiffs-respondent herein) whereby the averments made in plaint were denied on the ground that Smt. Krishna Devi had no knowledge of the said agreement. Rest of the averments were denied and stated to prove the same. 6. That on 3.5.2006 both the suits i.e. Suit No. 305/93(160/87) Chiman Das and Anr. v. Smt. Krishna Devi and Suit No. 368/93(36/92), Smt. Krishna Devi and Ors. Chiman Das and Anr. were consolidated. 7. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of either parties framed the following issues: ?1? vk;k izfroknh us fdjk;k vnk;xh esa O;frdze fd;k gS\ -------okfn;k ?2? vk;k okfn;k dks oknxzLr ifjlj dh futh ,oa ln~Hkkoh vko';drk gS\ ------okfn;k ?3? Chiman Das and Anr. were consolidated. 7. The trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of either parties framed the following issues: ?1? vk;k izfroknh us fdjk;k vnk;xh esa O;frdze fd;k gS\ -------okfn;k ?2? vk;k okfn;k dks oknxzLr ifjlj dh futh ,oa ln~Hkkoh vko';drk gS\ ------okfn;k ?3? vk;k oknxzLr ifjlj ds fu"dklu ls fMdzh ikfjr djus ;k u djus ls fdl i{k dks rqyukRed :i ls vf/kd dfBukbZ gksxh\ ------okfn;k@izfroknh ?4 ? vk;k oknxzLr ifjlj dk vkaf'kd fu"dklu laHko ugha gS\ -----okfn;k ?5 ? vk;k izfroknh us oknxzLr ifjlj esa lkjHkwr ifjorZu dj blds ewY; dk gkl fd;k gS\ ------okfn;k ?6 ? vk;k izfooknh dks O;olk; gsrq vU; mi;qDr ifjlj miyC/k gks x;k gS\ -----okfn;k ?7 ? vk;k izfooknh us/kkjk 13 ( 1 )( Mh ) jktLFkku fdjk;k fu;a=.k vf/kfu;e] 1950 ds izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj mirki fd;k gS\ -----okfn;k ?8 ? vk;k oknh us okn la[;k 368@93 esa i;kZIr U;k; 'kqYd vnk ugha fd;k gS\ ------izfroknh ?9? vk;k oknh o izfroknh ds e/; ,d bdjkjukek fnukad 6-5-1985 fu"ikfnr fd;k x;k ftldh vuqikyuk esa cdk;k jkf'k chl gtkj :i;s e; Ctkt oknxzLr ifjlj ds fdjk;s ds fo:) lek;ksftr fd;k tkuk Fkk\ -------izfroknh ?10? vk;k izfroknh bdjkjukek fnukad 6-5-1985 ds lEcU/k esa okn la[;k 305@93 esa pkgs x;s vuqrks"k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ ------izfroknh ?11? vk;k izfroknh ds ikl euh ysf.Max vf/kfu;e ds rgr/ku m/kkj nsus dk dksbZ ykbZlsUl u gksus ds dkj.k okn la[;k 305@93 pyus ;ksX; ugha gS\ -----oknhx.k ?12? vk;k okn la[;k 305@93 le;koknh ls ckf/kr gSA ------oknhx.k ?13? vuqrks"k\^^ 8. To prove the above issues plaintiffs-respondents got examined PW-1 Krishna Devi and PW-2 Gopichand and exhibited three documents while defendant appellants got examined DW-1 Leela Ram, DW-2 Govind Ram and DW-3 Laxhman Dass and exhibited document A-1 to A-111. 9. That vide order dated 24.2.2012 both the suits were decided by the Court below. In Suit No. 368/93 (36/92), Smt. Krishna Devi and Ors. v. Chiman Das and Anr. a decree for eviction was passed against the defendants and issue No. 2 i.e. personal bonafide necessity, issue No. 3 i.e. comparative hardship, issue No. 4 i.e. partial eviction. Issue No. 9 and 10 (agreement dated 6.5.1985 pertaining to Rs. 20,000/-) were decided in favour of plaintiffs-respondents. Rest of the issues were decided in favour of the appellants-defendants. 10. a decree for eviction was passed against the defendants and issue No. 2 i.e. personal bonafide necessity, issue No. 3 i.e. comparative hardship, issue No. 4 i.e. partial eviction. Issue No. 9 and 10 (agreement dated 6.5.1985 pertaining to Rs. 20,000/-) were decided in favour of plaintiffs-respondents. Rest of the issues were decided in favour of the appellants-defendants. 10. That being aggrieved by the Order dated 24.2.2014 defendant appellants preferred an appeal to the extent of challenging the finding given by Court Below on issue No. 2, issue No. 3, issue No. 4, issue No. 9 and 10 before Additional District Judge, No. 3 Ajmer bearing Civil Appeal No. 13/12 (23/12) which was dismissed on 29.5.2014. 11. That being aggrieved to the extent of finding pertaining to the issue No. 2, issue No. 3, issue No. 4, issue No. 9 and 10 the defendant- appellants preferred this appeal. 12. During the pendency of this appeal an application under Section 14 (2) of the Rajasthan premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 read with Section 151 CPC has been filed on behalf of the appellants-defendants and they prayed that while considering the issue regarding partial eviction, the Court may take into consideration that the appellant tenant are ready to vacate the premises measuring 16'x 9' as shown in the map annexed herewith. 13. Reply of this application has been filed by the plaintiffs-respondents. 14. Since the issue regarding partial eviction (issue No. 4) was framed by the trial Court and in evidence the appellants-defendants has specifically denied that the partial eviction of the suit shop is not possible. This Court is not inclined to accept this application and the same is dismissed. 15. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants Sh. Ajeet Bhandari that the learned first appellate Court has erred in holding that it is an admitted position on the record that the plaintiffs are carrying on their business in residential premises whereas there was no admission to this effect by the defendants. In fact the ground floor of the property is used for commercial purposes for the last more than 30 years. The first appellate Court have proceeded on wrong assumptions and as such the whole Judgment is perverse. In this regard, the first appellate Court grossly erred to consider the evidence on record. In fact the ground floor of the property is used for commercial purposes for the last more than 30 years. The first appellate Court have proceeded on wrong assumptions and as such the whole Judgment is perverse. In this regard, the first appellate Court grossly erred to consider the evidence on record. It is further submitted that the plaintiffs have not even pleaded that the portion of the property in their possession in which business is carried out is a residential premises which is not suitable for them, It is for the first time in their affidavit that they have narrated it to be a residential premises. Both the Courts below have not considered this fact in right perspective. In support of his contentions he relied upon (2003) 9 SCC 151 Kishan Chand v. Jagdish Pershad And Others , (2001) 5 SCC 705 Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal and Judgment of Delhi High Court reported in Deepak Gupta v. Shushma Agarwal. 16. I find no substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants. I find that in the written statement the defendants in para No. 7 pleaded as follows:- ^^oknh ds ikl blds edku esa ftlesa og jgrh gS uhps dh eafty esa og ifjlj gS ftlesa mlds ifr ydM+h dh dfVax dk dke djrs gSa tks mudh e'R;q ds i'pkr csdkj o fujFkZd iM+h gSA^^ 17. It reveals from these pleadings that the defendant himself admitted this fact that at the time of filing of the suit the plaintiffs were not carrying out any business. They have specifically mentioned that the premises in which the husband of the plaintiff was carrying on business is laying vacant. This Court is of the view that subsequent to the filing of the suit if the plaintiffs are carrying on the business in the said premises, the need of the plaintiffs does not come to an end. 18. The Apex Court considering various other judgments in respect of subsequent events has made very pertinent observations in case of Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. v. Uttam Chand and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 490 , as under:- "7. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. v. Uttam Chand and Anr. (2004) 8 SCC 490 , as under:- "7. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. 8. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of the petition. In Ramesh Kumar V. Kesho Ram a two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachalia, J., as he then was and (N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief Justice observed therein is that: (SCC pp. 626-27, para 6) "6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 9. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 9. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court which approved and followed the above decision, in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, (1981) 3 SCC 103 has taken care to emphasise that the subsequent events should have "wholly satisfied" the requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. The relevant passage is extracted below: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 14) "Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till the final decree or an Order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events have cropped up which would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events. 10. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the that to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system, it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused." 19. Therefore, the first appellate Court is right in observing that to determine the personal necessity date of the suit is relevant and if the plaintiffs are carrying on business in the name of 'Seema Crafts', this is not adversely affected the necessity of the plaintiffs. The Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellants Kishanchand v. Jagdish Prasad (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellants Kishanchand v. Jagdish Prasad (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In this case both the three Courts held that the landlord has concealed the material fact that the son of the plaintiff owns a flat but in the present case the plaintiff PW-1 has stated in her evidence that the plaintiffs are carrying on business in residential premises which is not suitable for them. In Uday Shankar Upadhyay v. Naveen maheshwari, (2010) 1 SCC 503 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in para No. 7 of the Judgment has observed as under:- "The court cannot dictate to the landlord which floor he should use for his business; that is for the landlord himself to decide. 20. Similarly in Sait Nagjee Purushotham and Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal and Others, (2005) 8 SCC 252 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in para No. 4 of the Judgment has observed as under:- "It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. 21. Also in Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery and Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 , the Hon'ble Apex Court in para No. 10 of the Judgment has observed as under:- "It is a settled position of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan.) In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted". 22. In view of the above observations the appellants-defendants cannot dictate the respondents-plaintiffs to start their business in the premises available with them. 23. (See Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan.) In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted". 22. In view of the above observations the appellants-defendants cannot dictate the respondents-plaintiffs to start their business in the premises available with them. 23. It is needless to say that the existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions contained in Section 100 of the CPC, the scope of exercise of powers by the High Court under Section 100 CPC has been elaborately considered by the Apex Court in case of Gurdev Kaur and Ors. v. Kaki and Ors. reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 in which the Apex Court observed as under:- "51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of Section 100 CPC. The Court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code and Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution." 24. The first appellate court having considered all the factual and legal aspects involved in the appeal and the appellants having failed to point out any illegality or perversity in any of the findings recorded by the appellate court, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the appellate court. The first appellate court having considered all the factual and legal aspects involved in the appeal and the appellants having failed to point out any illegality or perversity in any of the findings recorded by the appellate court, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the appellate court. There is also no question of law muchless substantial question of law involved in the instant appeal. 25. In the result, the present appeal being devoid of merits, and hence, accordingly dismissed.Appeal dismissed.