Research › Search › Judgment

Manipur High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 102 (MAN)

Sinam Sekharjit Singh v. Union of India and Ors.

2015-07-31

LAXMI KANTA MOHAPATRA

body2015
JUDGMENT Laxmi Kanta Mohapatra, CJ. 1. Petitioner was appointed to the post of Director, Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), Imphal in the pay scale of Rs. 67,000 to 79,000/- w.e.f. the day on which he assumes charge of the post for a period of 5 years or till his superannuation or until further orders whichever is earlier. In pursuance of the said order, the petitioner joined as Director of the RIMS and while working as such the impugned order dated 25.8.2014 was passed relieving him from his duty as Director, RIMS with immediate effect and further directing one Dr. Ch. Arun Kumar Singh, Head of Department & Prof(Orthopaedics), RIMS until further orders. Challenging the above order dt. 25.8.2014, this writ petition has been filed. 2. The case of the petitioner is that RIMS is a society which was registered initially under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, now under Manipur Societies Registration Act, 1989 vide Registration No. 1777 of 1975. It is an autonomous Institute under the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Govt. of India and is also financed and controlled by the said Ministry. It being a society, it has its Rules & Regulations and bye-laws. So far as the post of Director, RIMS is concerned, the appointing authority, disciplinary authority and the authority competent to impose penalty is vested with the President of the Board of Governors as per the Memorandum of Association. The petitioner was appointed as Director of the said Institute, RIMS by order dated 14.9.2010 for a period of 5 years or till his superannuation or until further orders whichever is earlier. As per the said appointment order, the petitioner was to serve as Director of RIMS for a period of 5 years, i.e. upto 14.9.2015. According to the petitioner, he could only be terminated from service and without passing any such order of termination and without giving him opportunity of hearing, the impugned order was passed on 25.8.2014 relieving him of his duties as Director, RIMS with immediate effect. According to the petitioner, he could only be terminated from service and without passing any such order of termination and without giving him opportunity of hearing, the impugned order was passed on 25.8.2014 relieving him of his duties as Director, RIMS with immediate effect. The said impugned order dated 25.8.2014 is challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds: "A -before issuing the impugned order, notice not less than 3 months in writing had not been served on him as required; B - there is no provision anywhere under which the petitioner could be relieved of the post of Director, RIMS, except by way of termination; C - there is no indication in the impugned order that he was relieved of the post in public interest; and D - the impugned order is arbitrary and whimsical and in contravention of Articles14 and 16 of the Constitution of India." 3. The respondents 1 to 4 have filed a joint counter affidavit wherein it is stated that ever since joining of the petitioner as Director, RIMS, the Ministry started receiving complaints from various quarters including teachers and Medical Officers' Association of RIMS, voluntary organizations, employees' Union of RIMS. Some of the issues raised in the complaints relate to appointment of various staff in RIMS such as Staff Nurse, Asst. Professor and Grade-IV employees on acceptance of bribe, irregularities committed in procurement of medicines and non-medicines etc., award of contract to his own people and non availability of basic requirements of the hospital such as dressing materials, cotton, rectified spirit, antiseptic, i.e. fluids, life saving drugs etc. etc. Such complaints received by the Ministry were sent to the petitioner for comments but in spite of several reminders, no comments were received from the petitioner except saying that the complaints are baseless and false. 4. A newspaper clipping dt. 18.7.2014 published in Imphal local Newspaper was received by the Ministry and the clipping was under the heading, "DESAM accuses RIMS Director of nepotism, corruption." In the above published column, DESAM levelled various allegations of corruption and nepotism against the petitioner and urged to constitute a panel to probe into the charges of misconduct on the part of the petitioner in collusion with his wife, Dr. N. Damayanti, Professor of Anatomy of the Institute. N. Damayanti, Professor of Anatomy of the Institute. It is further stated in the counter of the respondents- 1 to 4 that the petitioner did not co-operate with any kind of investigation for which a decision was taken to relieve him from the post of Director, RIMS and replace him with the senior-most Professor and consequently the impugned order dated 25.8.2014 was passed. It is further alleged that instead of complying with the said order dt. 25.8.2014, the petitioner did not allow the senior-most Professor to take charge of the office of the Director and locked the office. The wife of the petitioner was also laid a protest march against the said order dated 25.8.2014. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that considering the serious allegations made against the petitioner, the Ministry thought it proper to conduct an enquiry and also thought it proper to relieve him from the post pending enquiry. 5. The present Director of RIMS has also filed a counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent No. 5. It is also stated in the counter affidavit of respondent No. 5 that while the petitioner was serving as a Director, number of complaints were received by the Ministry from various agents and the petitioner was not cooperating with the Ministry on various issues such as appointment of regular Medical Superintendent in RIMS who selected by a Selection Committee headed by the Director General of Health Services. 6. An FIR was also lodged with the CBI in relation to some of the allegations and the matter is now under investigation by the CBI. With reference to several documents indicated in the said counter affidavit in support of the stand that the allegations made in the complaints have some substance; it is further stated in the counter affidavit of respondent No. 5 that on consideration of such allegation, the competent authority, in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 12 of the Rules and Regulation of the RIMS, issued the impugned order relieving the petitioner from the duties of the post of Director, RIMS. It is further stated that the impugned order was passed to ensure free and fair enquiry into the allegations levelled against the petitioner and it is not punitive in nature. 7. Shri Harin P. Raval, learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Shri Shariq Ahmad, Mr. It is further stated that the impugned order was passed to ensure free and fair enquiry into the allegations levelled against the petitioner and it is not punitive in nature. 7. Shri Harin P. Raval, learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. HS Paonam, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Shri Shariq Ahmad, Mr. Aniruth Sharma, learned counsel and Mr. N. Bipin, learned counsel has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds: "(i) the appointment of the petitioner in the post of Director, RIMS is a tenure appointment and therefore no order can be passed by the competent authority relieving him from the post; (ii) the impugned order was passed without approval of the ACC; (iii) no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed; (iv) the impugned order is in contravention of Rule 12(1) v of the Rules and Regulations of RIMS; and (v) the impugned order is not supported by any provision of law." 8. The order of appointment in Annexure-A/1 is quoted below: "F. No. U 12025/18/2009-NE Government of India Ministry of Health & Family Welfare (North East Division) ------- Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi Dated 14th Sept. 2010. ORDER In pursuance of Department of Personnel and Training's reference No. 5/12/2010-EO(SM.II) dated 9th September, 2010, conveying the approval of the competent authority, Prof. S. Sekharjit Singh is appointed to the post of Director, Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), Imphal in the pay scale of Rs. 67000-79000 (maximum ceiling and NPA to be restricted to Rs. 85000/-) w.e.f. the date of assumption of charge of the post for a period of five years or till his superannuation or until further order whichever is the earliest. Sd/(Jaya Bhagat) Director (North East)" It is clear from the appointment order that the petitioner has been appointed as Director of RIMS for a period of 5 years or till his superannuation or until further order whichever is the earliest. Referring to the above order of appointment, it was contended by Shri HP Raval, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the appointment being a tenure appointment, the petitioner could not be relieved from the post by the impugned order. Reliance was placed on two decisions of the Apex Court. The first cited case is the case of Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1992) 3 SCC 526 . Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the appointment being a tenure appointment, the petitioner could not be relieved from the post by the impugned order. Reliance was placed on two decisions of the Apex Court. The first cited case is the case of Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (1992) 3 SCC 526 . The petitioner in the said reported case was appointed as Director of AIIMS w.e.f. Feb/1979. His appointment was for a period of five years or till he attains the age of 62 whichever is earlier. However, by an order dt. 24.11.1980 he was made to retire from service in public interest with immediate effect by giving him 3 months' pay and allowances in lieu of notice. Challenging the said order of premature retirement, the petitioner therein approached the Delhi High Court and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court rejected all the points raised by him and dismissed the petition. Thereafter, matter came before the Supreme Court. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, it was held by the Supreme Court that under the recruitment rules, the post of Director of AIIMS is a tenure post. The service conditions made the post of Director a tenure post and as such question of superannuating and prematurely retiring the incumbent of the said post does not arise. The age of 62 years provided in the Regulations only shows that no employee of the AIIMS can be given extension beyond that age. This obviously was done for maintaining the Institute's services. Therefore, only because in the appointment order it is mentioned that he was appointed for a period of 5 years or till he attains the age of 62 years, such appointment ceases to be a tenure post. Even an outsider in a existing employee of AIIMS can be selected and appointed to the post of Director. Therefore, any such a person be retired prematurely and the answer was obviously -"No." 9. The second decision relied upon by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is the case of P. Venugopal v. Union of India reported in (2008) 5 SCC 1 . This case also relates to premature retirement of another Director in AIIMS and the Court took note of the decision rendered earlier in the case of Dr. The second decision relied upon by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is the case of P. Venugopal v. Union of India reported in (2008) 5 SCC 1 . This case also relates to premature retirement of another Director in AIIMS and the Court took note of the decision rendered earlier in the case of Dr. L.P. Agarwal's case (supra) and again concluded that the appointment being on tenure basis, the question of superannuating or prematurely retiring the incumbent of the said post does not arise. 10. Shri A. Bimol, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5 and Shri S. Rupachandra, learned ASG appearing for the Union of India submitted that the above two decisions have no application to the facts of the present case as the petitioner has not been retired prematurely and has only been relieved from post of Director, RIMS. 11. It was contended by Shri HP Raval, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the Director of the Institute is appointed by the President of the Board of Governors with the concurrence of the Central Govt. from a panel of names recommended by a search-selection committee as approved by the Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare in his capacity as the President of the Board of Governors RIMS and DOPT. The term of office of Director has to be for a period of 5 years or till the incumbent attains the age of 65 years whichever is earlier. The appointment of such Director has to be with the approval of the ACC and necessarily any order passed by the competent authority which has the effect of termination has to be also with approval of ACC. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the services of the petitioner having not been terminated, approval of ACC is not required. 12. In relation to the 3rd ground, it was contended by Shri HS Paonam, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner that under Rule 12(1) v. Of the Regulations, the Board of Governors shall, if it is of the opinion that it has been in public interest to do so had allowed to retire the term of Director at any time before expiry of his term by giving him a notice of not less than 3 months in writing or 3 months' salary and allowances in lieu thereof. According to the learned Sr. According to the learned Sr. Counsel the impugned order has the effect of termination and therefore the above provision was required to be complied with. The learned counsel for the respondents reacted to the above submission solely on the ground that the impugned order is not an order of termination and therefore the above provision has no applicability. 13. So far as the 3rd ground of challenge is concerned, the learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner it was contended that before passing the impugned order, no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. To substantiate the above contention, 4(four) decisions of the Apex Court were relied upon. The first case relied upon by the learned Sr. Counsel is the case of Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India reported in AIR 1958 SC 36 . The relevant paragraph relied upon by the learned Sr. Counsel is quoted below: "Para 25 : It follows from the above discussion that both at the date of the commencement of the 1935 Act and of our Constitution the words "dismissed", "removed" and "reduced in rank", as used in the service rules, were well understood as signifying or denoting the three major punishments which could be inflicted on Government servants. The protection given by the rules to the Government servants against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, which could not be enforced by action, was incorporated in sub-ss (1) and (2) of S. 240 to give them a statutory protection by indicating a procedure which had to be followed before the punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank could be imposed on them and which could be enforced in law. These protections have now been incorporated in Art. 311 of our Constitution. The effect of S. 240 of the 1935 Act reproduced in Arts. 310 and 311, as explained by this Court in S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, 1954 SCR 1150 : ( AIR 1954 SC 375 )(Y), has been to impose a fetter on the right of the government to inflict the several punishments therein mentioned. The effect of S. 240 of the 1935 Act reproduced in Arts. 310 and 311, as explained by this Court in S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, 1954 SCR 1150 : ( AIR 1954 SC 375 )(Y), has been to impose a fetter on the right of the government to inflict the several punishments therein mentioned. Thus under Art. 311(1) the punishments of dismissal, or removal cannot be inflicted by an authority subordinate to that by which the servant was appointed and under Art. 311(2) the punishments of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank cannot be meted out to the Government servant without giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The Principle embodied in Art. 310(1) that the Government servants hold office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is qualified by the provisions of Art. 311 which give protection to the Government servants. The net result is that it is only in those cases where the Government intends to inflict those three forms of punishments that the Government servant must be given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. It follows, therefore, that if the termination of service is sought to be brought about otherwise than by way of punishment, then the Government servant whose service is so terminated cannot claim the protection of Art. 311(2)and the decisions cited before us and referred to above, in so far as they lay down that principle, must be held to be rightly decided." The second decision relied upon is the case of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 625 . Relevant paragraph relied upon by the learned Sr. Counsel are quoted below: "21. In view of the factual position recorded by the High Court that at the point of time the appellants' units were set up and the commercial production started there was no assurance or promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application to the facts of the case at that stage. We find no substance in the plea that before a policy decision is taken to amend or alter the promise indicated in any particular notification, the beneficiary was to be granted an opportunity of hearing. Such a plea is clearly unsustainable. The doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application to the facts of the case at that stage. We find no substance in the plea that before a policy decision is taken to amend or alter the promise indicated in any particular notification, the beneficiary was to be granted an opportunity of hearing. Such a plea is clearly unsustainable. While taking policy decision, the government is not required to hear the persons who have been granted the benefit which is sought to be withdrawn. 22. The question of legitimate expectation arises according to the appellants after the benefits were granted by the concerned G.O. Ms. At this juncture we would like to take note of certain factual positions highlighted by the appellants which are practically undisputed by the respondents. Contrary to what the High Court has stated, it appears from record that counter affidavits were filed. The reasons which have weighed with the High Court to uphold the action of the State were not pleaded before the High Court specifically, and the High Court cull out those from the files which were produced before it. Though the appellants were not entitled to any opportunity of hearing before alteration of the benefits flowing from the notifications or withdrawal of any benefit, yet when the State has not taken any specific stand justifying the withdrawal and the High Court referred to the files to put its seal of proof, notwithstanding non-requirement for granting any opportunity before the withdrawal, principles of natural justice certainly were applicable, since the High Court with reference to the files recorded findings on the basis thereof. As noted above no specific grounds or reasons were indicated to justify the withdrawal in the affidavits filed before the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be. As the correctness of factual basis justifying withdrawal is in issue, fair play certainly warranted grant of opportunity to the appellants to present its side of the picture." The third decision relied upon by the learned Sr. Counsel is the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan & Ors. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 379 . In the said reported case, the Municipal Committee was superseded under 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The Court held that such supersession entails civil consequences and hence the least minimal requirements of natural justice must be observed even in a crisis under Section 238 of the Act. reported in (1980) 4 SCC 379 . In the said reported case, the Municipal Committee was superseded under 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The Court held that such supersession entails civil consequences and hence the least minimal requirements of natural justice must be observed even in a crisis under Section 238 of the Act. The last decision, in this regard, is the case of Sahara India (Firm) Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax Central-I & Anr. reported in (2008) 14 SCC 151 . Though this case related income tax Act, it was held that where an order entails civil consequences, the rule of audi alteram partem must be observed and pre-decisional hearing has to be given. In reply to the above submission, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the impugned order under no circumstances can be said to be punitive in nature and therefore does not have any civil consequences. Accordingly, it is the case of the respondents that the above four decisions relied upon the learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner have no application. 14. The last ground of challenge is that the impugned order is not supported by any provision either under the Rules and Regulations of the RIMS or of CCS & CCA. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that CCS & CCA Rules have application to the employees of RIMS and on the basis of the alleged allegations, the recourse could be taken to the said Rules but instead of taking recourse to the said Rules, an order was passed relieving the petitioner from the post of Director which is not supported by any provision either under the Rules and Regulations of the RIMS or under the CCS & CCA Rules. 15. In reply to the above submission, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the date on which the impugned order was passed, only complaints containing serious allegations were available with the Ministry. No enquiry had been conducted by them to find out the truth and otherwise of those allegations. It was therefore decided to conduct an enquiry into the allegations by constituting a committee and also considering the nature of allegations made. It was thought it proper to keep the petitioner away from the post in order to have a free and fair enquiry. It was therefore decided to conduct an enquiry into the allegations by constituting a committee and also considering the nature of allegations made. It was thought it proper to keep the petitioner away from the post in order to have a free and fair enquiry. Under these circumstances it was thought proper to relieve him from the past of Director so that the petitioner suffers from minimum discomfort. 16. In order to appreciate the submission made at the bar in relation to the grounds taken in the writ petition as well as at the time of hearing, it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions contained in the Rules and Regulations and bye-laws of the RIMS as well as CCS & CCA Rules. 17. The Rules and Regulations of the RIMS, Imphal define the "Board of Governors" or "Board" as the highest authority of the Institute and the "Director" means the Director of the Institute who is Chief Executive Officer of the Institute. Regulation 12 provides for appointment and termination of the Director of RIMS. The three provisions relevant for the purpose of this case are quoted below: "12(1)(i) There shall be a Chief Executive Officer designated as the Director of the Head of all academic, scientific and administrative functions of the institute and be overall in-charge of day to day affairs of the Institute. (ii) The Director of the Institute shall be appointed by the President of Board of Governors (BOG), RIMS (Hon'ble Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare, GOI) with concurrence of the Central Government from a panel of names recommended by "a Search cum Selection Committee as approved by the Union Minister of Health & Family Welfare in his capacity as President of the Board of governors, RIMS & DOPT." The terms of office of Director shall be five years or till the incumbent attains the age of sixty five years whichever be earlier. An incumbent Director shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term provided the procedure laid down hereinabove is followed. Authority for approval of extension is tenure of Director will vest with the ACC(*). ..................................................... An incumbent Director shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term provided the procedure laid down hereinabove is followed. Authority for approval of extension is tenure of Director will vest with the ACC(*). ..................................................... (v) The Board of Governors shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the right to terminate the term of office of Director at any time before the expiry of his term by giving him a notice of not less than three months in writing or three months' salary and allowances in lieu thereof. The Director shall also have the right to relinquish his office at any time before the expiry of his term by giving to the institute a notice of not less than three months in writing, failing which he shall have to pay the institute three months salary and allowances." As is evident from the said Regulations, the Director of the Institute shall be appointed by the President of the Board of Governors with concurrence of the Central Government from a panel of names recommended by a search cum selection committee approved by the Union Minister of Health & Family Welfare in his capacity as President of the Board of Governors of RIMS and DOPT. The term of office of the Director shall be for five years or till the incumbent attains the age of 65 years whichever is earlier. It is also provided in the said Rules that the Board of Governors shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the right to terminate the term of office of Director at any time before expiry of his term by giving him a notice of not less than three months in writing or three months salary and allowances in lieu thereof. In terms of Rule 12(1)(ii), the petitioner was appointed as the Director by the President of Board of Governors for a period of 5 years or till his superannuation or until further orders whichever is the earliest. In terms of Rule 12(1)(v) the service of the Director can only be terminated before expiry of the term by giving him a notice of not less than three months in writing or three months salary and allowances in lieu thereof. In terms of Rule 12(1)(v) the service of the Director can only be terminated before expiry of the term by giving him a notice of not less than three months in writing or three months salary and allowances in lieu thereof. Admittedly, in the present case, no order of termination having been passed in terms of Rule 12(1)(v) the requirements of the said Regulation have not yet been complied with. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on Regulation 12(2). The said Regulation is quoted below: "12(2) The President shall have the power to suspend operation of any action taken under sub-clause (1) pending its consideration by the Board of Governors. It will be competent for the Council to revoke or modify such action if it is considered to be inconsistent with the Rules and Regulations governing the Society or are not in conformity with established practices of prudent Financial and Personnel Management." 18. As per the above Regulation, the President shall have the power to suspend operation of any action taken under sub clause (1) pending its consideration by the Board of Governors. Relying on the above provision, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in exercise of powers under the above Regulation, the President could suspend appointment of the petitioner which had been done under Regulation 12(1)(ii). In reply, it was contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the provision contained in the Regulation 12(2) can only relate to the duties of the Director which he fails to discharge under Regulation 12(1)(vi). It was further submitted that once the Director is appointed for a fix tenure the only way to remove him is by way of termination in terms of Regulation 12(1)(v). In this regard, two decisions were relied upon by the petitioner as referred to earlier, i.e. Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India & Ors(supra) and P. Venugopal v. Union of India (supra). Admittedly, in both the cases the petitioners therein had been appointed as Director of All India Institute of Medical Sciences and had been placed under compulsory retirement. Interpreting the term of appointment, the Supreme Court held that such Director could only be terminated from service before expiry of the term, but cannot be placed under compulsory retirement. Admittedly, in both the cases the petitioners therein had been appointed as Director of All India Institute of Medical Sciences and had been placed under compulsory retirement. Interpreting the term of appointment, the Supreme Court held that such Director could only be terminated from service before expiry of the term, but cannot be placed under compulsory retirement. On facts, both the cases are distinguishable as no order of compulsory retirement in public interest has been passed in the present case. Regulation 12(2) empowers the President to suspend operation of any action taken under sub clause (1) pending its consideration by the Board of Governors. Certain allegations were received in relation to discharge of official work by the petitioner as Director of RIMS by the Ministry. By the date on which the impugned order was passed, no formal enquiry had been conducted by the Ministry to find out the truth or otherwise of the allegations. Therefore, there was no matter pending before the Board of Governors for consideration and therefore in absence of any complaint placed before the Board of Governors for consideration, the President could not have exercised the powers vested in him under Regulation 12(2) of the Regulation. I am, therefore, of the view that the impugned order is also not passed in exercise of powers vested with the President under Regulation 12(2) of the Regulation of RIMS in absence of any complaint having been placed before the Board of Governors for consideration. Therefore, the petitioner could only be terminated on compliance of the provisions contained in the Regulation 12(1)(v) either with three months' notice or with three months' salary and allowances in lieu of notice. There is no provision under the Rules and Regulation empowering the President to relieve the petitioner from the post of Director that too without posting him in any other post. This finding answers the first ground taken by the petitioner in the writ petition as well as in the course of argument. 19. The second ground of challenge is that the impugned order had been passed without approval of the ACC. This finding answers the first ground taken by the petitioner in the writ petition as well as in the course of argument. 19. The second ground of challenge is that the impugned order had been passed without approval of the ACC. Regulation 12(1)(ii) provides for appointment of the Director which shall be done by the President of Board of Governors of RIMS with occurrence of the Central Government from a panel of names recommended by a search cum selection committee as approved by the Union Minister, Family Welfare in his capacity as President of the Board of Governors, RIMS and DOPT. For appointment of Director, approval of ACC is required and this is not only provided in Regulation 12(1)(iii) but also it is not in dispute. Therefore, question of approval of the ACC may arise only when action is taken against the Director under Regulation 12(1)(v) terminating his services. Since the impugned order is not an order of termination, question of obtaining approval of the ACC, in my opinion, does not arise at this stage. 20. The 3rd ground of challenge is that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed. The learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon 4(four) decisions the Supreme Court referred to earlier. In the case of Sahara India(FIRM), Lucknow v. Commissioner of Income Tax (supra) it was held that only when an order entails civil consequences, the Rule of audi alteram partem must be observed and pre-decisional hearing has to be given. In this connection, it will be relevant to refer to para 21 of the judgment in which reliance was placed on the decision of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. reported in 1978) 1 SCC 405. It was observed that civil consequences entail infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. In the case of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court was of the view that when State has not taken any specific stand nor indicated reason justifying withdrawal of tax benefits offered by it, High Court was not justified in culling out those reasons from the office files produced before it. In the case of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court was of the view that when State has not taken any specific stand nor indicated reason justifying withdrawal of tax benefits offered by it, High Court was not justified in culling out those reasons from the office files produced before it. In such a situation principles of natural justice would be applicable requiring the affected party to present its stand as to the correctness of factual basis justifying withdrawal of tax benefits which was in issue. So far as the present case is concerned, the petitioner while working as a Director of RIMS was only relieved from the post. It is specifically stated in the counter affidavit of the respondents that considering the seriousness of the allegations levelled against the petitioner, a decision was taken to relieve him from the post temporarily pending enquiry in order to facilitate a free and fair enquiry. Neither the petitioner has been placed under suspension nor any disciplinary action has been taken against him. Therefore, in my view, the impugned order does not entail any civil consequence as the petitioner is neither deprived of his salary, resulting in any pecuniary loss nor has he been removed from the post. As stated in the counter, the intention behind passing the impugned order was to have a free and fair enquiry into the allegations which could not be ensured if the petitioner would have continued in the post of Director. According to the respondents, this was a purely temporary arrangement. Therefore, I am of the view that there was no requirement of opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioner before the impugned order was passed which neither resulted in any civil consequence nor is punitive in nature. So far as the 4th ground of challenge is concerned, it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed in contravention of Regulation 12(1)(v) of the Regulation of RIMS. Since no order of termination has been passed, compliance of requirement of Regulation 12(1)(v) was not necessary. I am of the view that this ground taken by the petitioner does not have any substance. The last and 5th ground taken by the petitioner is that the impugned order is not supported by any provisions of law. Since no order of termination has been passed, compliance of requirement of Regulation 12(1)(v) was not necessary. I am of the view that this ground taken by the petitioner does not have any substance. The last and 5th ground taken by the petitioner is that the impugned order is not supported by any provisions of law. The relevant provisions contained in the Rules and Regulations have already been indicated in the earlier paragraphs of the judgment. Bye-laws of RIMS have several provisions and bye-law No. 9 deals with conduct, discipline and penalties. It is provided in the bye-laws that the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964, Central Civil Services (Classification Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 shall have application to the employees of the Institute. Once the CCS (CCA) Rules are made applicable to the employees of RIMS, on the face of allegations made against any employee, recourse to Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules could be taken by suspending such employee in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. However, the said Rules shall not be applicable to the petitioner since he was selected and appointed as Director of the RIMS and the terms of appointment are specified in the order of appointment. The order of appointment clearly shows that such appointment shall be for a period of 5 years or till the date of superannuation or until further orders whichever is earliest. I am, therefore, of the view that the appointment of the petitioner as Director being a tenure appointment, he could only be terminated from service after compliance of the provisions contained in the Regulation 12(1)(v). There is no provision either under the Rules and Regulation or in the bye-laws under which the Director could be relieved from the post. 21. While answering this question, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents should be taken note of. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that after receipt of several allegations by the Ministry against the petitioner, a decision was taken to conduct an enquiry to find out the truth or otherwise of the allegations contained in the complaints. Earlier, after receipt of complaints the petitioner had been asked to give his reply, but he did not co-operate except saying that the allegations are false. Earlier, after receipt of complaints the petitioner had been asked to give his reply, but he did not co-operate except saying that the allegations are false. Therefore, the President of the Board of Governors, considering the seriousness of the allegations contained in the complaint, decided to keep the petitioner away from the post temporarily for a free and fair enquiry. In normal course, I would have accepted such submission of the learned counsel for the respondents even though there is no provision in the Regulations to relieve the Director from the post temporarily on any ground whatsoever. No doubt, the allegations contained in the complaint are very serious in nature and goes to the root of functioning of the Director in the matter of appointment of different categories of employees of RIMS, awarding contract works, purchase of medicines etc. But as is evident from the admitted facts of the present case the temporary arrangement said to have been made by the President of the Board of Governors is gradually attaining permanency. The impugned order was passed on 25.8.2014 relieving the petitioner from the post of Director without further posting and till the date of hearing of the case, no further order has been passed. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in course of preliminary enquiry, prima facie materials were available to support the allegations and therefore a regular proceeding may be conducted on the basis of these serious allegations made against the petitioner. Though such a submission is made on behalf of the respondents, it is surprising to note that after passing the impugned order, no further order had been passed till hearing of this writ petition. On the other hand, though it is contended in the counter affidavit that the impugned order was passed to minimise discomfort to the petitioner, it appears, the petitioner after being relieved from the post, was directed to vacate the quarter under his occupation, electricity supply to the quarter was disconnected for a day, no salary was paid to the petitioner till Court directed for payment of salary. The conduct of the respondents, as aforesaid, do not indicate that the impugned order had been passed to minimise discomfort of the petitioner. The conduct of the respondents, as aforesaid, do not indicate that the impugned order had been passed to minimise discomfort of the petitioner. However, so far as this ground of challenge is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondents could not cite any provision under which such an order can be passed specifically considering the fact that the post is a tenure post. 22. Before concluding, I feel it necessary to refer to the allegations contained in the complaints which are very serious in nature. The gist of the complaints, as noted in the counter affidavit of the respondent No. 5 dt. 8.6.2015 in para 4, is quoted below: "(i) indulging in corruption; for appointment of various staff in RIMS by pocketing amounts at the rate of Rs. 17,00,000/- for a staff nurse, Rs. 15,00,000/- for an Assistant Professor, Rs. 10,00,000/- for a Grade IV employee; (ii) Procurement and contract works- corruption in development of infrastructure, procurement of medicines, non-medicines, etc. and award of contract works in cahoots and unlawful elements and his coterie; (iii) Non-availability of basic requirements- necessary basic requirements like dressing materials, cotton, rectified spirit, antiseptics, i/v fluids, life saving drugs, etc. are being afforded by the patients." 23. On consideration of the above nature of allegations against the petitioner as well as on consideration of fact that there is no provision either under the Rules or Regulations or in the bye-laws to relieve a Director from the post, I am of the opinion that writ petition can be disposed of directing the respondent No. 2 to pass necessary order in terms of the Rules and Regulations of RIMS within three weeks from the date of communication of this order or allow the petitioner to discharge the duties of Director in terms of his appointment order on expiry of three weeks from the date of communication of this order if no order is passed in terms of the Rules and Regulations.