JUDGMENT Mr. R.P. Nagrath, J.: - The petitioners have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to challenge the order dated 08.04.2011 passed by the Waqf Tribunal, directing the return of plaint to be presented before the court of competent jurisdiction. 2. The question arising in the instant revision is “whether the suit instituted by plaintiff-petitioners is triable exclusively by Waqf Tribunal, Rup Nagar or by an ordinary civil court?” 3. The suit land comprising of two khasra numbers total measuring 9 kanals 11 marlas is stated to be a Muslim graveyard and, therefore, a ‘Waqf property’. Muslim residents of village Kumbra, where the land is situated, have formed a Muslim Welfare Committee-petitioner no. 1, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The suit has been filed through petitioners no. 2 and 3. 4. It was stated that the land is ‘Muslim graveyard’ and Muslims of village Kumbra and adjoining villages have been using this land as a graveyard for burial of Muslim dead bodies since times immemorial. It was further stated that Muslims of the area are facing great difficulty for the past many years as certain persons, namely; respondents no. 3 to 8 who are having their houses around or near the disputed site, raise protests and object to the bringing of dead bodies, forcing the families to wait for burial for 2 to 3 days. It is only with the intervention of police they are able to bury the dead bodies. The petitioners have undertaken that they would raise fencing around the graveyard at their own expenditure, without claiming any ownership right, because Waqf Board is not maintaining and protecting the property in question. 5. Learned counsel for respondent-defendants no. 1 and 2 also submitted that the land in question is meant for Muslim graveyard but contended that the management, control and administration of the land vests in the Waqf Board. The learned counsel, however, supported the contention of the petitioners that the Tribunal constituted under the Waqf Act, would have the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try the dispute. Respondents no. 4 and 6 to 9 have not disputed that the suit land was a Muslim graveyard. The learned counsel, however, supported the contention of the petitioners that the Tribunal constituted under the Waqf Act, would have the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try the dispute. Respondents no. 4 and 6 to 9 have not disputed that the suit land was a Muslim graveyard. It was pleaded by them in the written statement that the matter was settled with the intervention of Deputy Commissioner in the presence of Senior Superintendent of Police, Mohali and it was decided that in future dead bodies would be buried at some other place and not in the present graveyard because the residential colony has been developed around the graveyard. The residents have also built up three storeyed houses in Phase-IX, Mohali. The children belonging to these families get scared of the scene when the dead bodies are brought and buried in their presence. Greater Mohali Area Development Authority (GMADA) is stated to have already provided five acres of land in village Balongi for burial of dead bodies of Muslims and Christians as an alternative site. GMADA has also been asked to maintain the present graveyard as a park by planting flowers etc. on it. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, carefully perused the impugned order, the paper-book and also the record. 7. The relevant provisions of the waqf Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act’) are Sections 6, 7 and 85 of the Act. These provisions as amended by the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, read as under:- “6. Disputes regarding waqfs.- (1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as waqf property in the list of waqfs is ‘waqf property’ or not or whether a waqf specified in such list is a Shia waqf or Sunni waqf, the Board or the mutawalli of the waqf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final: Provided that no suit shall be instituted before the Tribunal in respect of such properties notified in a second or subsequent survey pursuant to the provisions contained in subsection (6) of Section 4. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), no proceeding under this Act in respect of any waqf shall be stayed by reason only of the pendency of any such suit or of any appeal or other proceeding arising out of such suit. (3) The Survey Commissioner shall not be made a party to any suit under sub-section (1) and no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against him in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder. (4) The list of waqfs shall, unless it is modified in pursuance of a decision of the Tribunal under sub-section (1), be final and conclusive. (5) On and from the commencement of this Act in a State, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted or commenced in a Court in that State in relation to any question referred to in subsection (1). 8. Section 7 of the Act provides for the forum for determination of questions referred to therein and arising after the commencement of this Act. The questions referred to in Section 7(1) are the very same questions that are referred to in Section 6(1) with the only difference that Section 7(1) refers to the said questions arising after the commencement of the Act. 9. Section 85 of the Act brings a Bar to the jurisdiction of civil court, revenue court and any other authority. It says that no suit or other legal proceedings shall lie in any Civil Court in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal. 10. In Ramesh Gobindram (dead) through LRs vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza waqf, [2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3697] : 2010 (8) SCC 726 , the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Waqf Act 1995, which are identical in nature came up for consideration. The question posed for determination was “whether the Waqf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Act, 1995 was competent to entertain and adjudicate upon disputes regarding eviction of the appellants who were occupying different items of what were admittedly waqf properties?” 11. The question posed for determination was “whether the Waqf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Act, 1995 was competent to entertain and adjudicate upon disputes regarding eviction of the appellants who were occupying different items of what were admittedly waqf properties?” 11. In the said case suits for eviction were filed before the waqf Tribunal which had held that it had the jurisdiction to entertain those suits and after adjudication had decreed the suits filed by the respondent – Sugra Humayun Mirza wakf. The tenants/ appellant filed revision petitions against that order before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which dismissed the revision petition, affirming the view of the waqf Tribunal regarding its jurisdiction. Against the order of the High Court, the appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was held as under:- “On a plain reading of sub-section (5) of section 6 of the Act would show that the civil court’s jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings stands specifically excluded in relation to any question referred to in sub-section(1). The exclusion, it is evident from the language employed, is not absolute or all pervasive. It is limited to the adjudication of the questions (a) whether a particular property specified as wakf property in the list of wakfs is or is not a wakf property, and (b) whether a waqf specified in such list is a shia wakf or sunni wakf. From a conjoint reading of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, it is clear that the jurisdiction to determine whether or not a property is a wakf property or whether a wakf is a shia wakf or a sunni wakf rests entirely with the Tribunal and no suit or other proceeding can be instituted or commenced in a civil court in relation to any such question after the commencement of the Act. What is noteworthy is that under Section 6 read with Section 7 of the Act, the institution of a suit in the civil court is barred only in regard to questions that are specifically enumerated therein. The bar is not complete so as to extend to other questions that may arise in relation to the wakf property. Under Section 85 of the Act, the civil court’s jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the matter in dispute is required under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The bar is not complete so as to extend to other questions that may arise in relation to the wakf property. Under Section 85 of the Act, the civil court’s jurisdiction is excluded only in cases where the matter in dispute is required under the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The words “which is required by or under this Act to be determined by a Tribunal” holds the key to the question whether or not all disputes concerning the wakf or wakf property stand excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil court. Therefore, the jurisdiction of civil courts to try eviction cases was not excluded. Rather, the aforesaid provisions of the Act did not include such disputes to fall within the jurisdiction of the wakf Tribunal, and therefore the wakf Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to deal with eviction matters.” 13. It was further held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “It is clear from sub-section (1) of Section 83 above that the State Government is empowered to establish as many Tribunals as it may deem fit for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a wakf or wakf property under the Act and define the local limits of their jurisdiction. Sub – section (2) of Section 83 permits any mutawalli or other person interested in a wakf or any person aggrieved of an order made under the Act or the Rules framed there under to approach the Tibunal for determination of any dispute, question or other mater relating to the wakf. What is important is that the Tribunal can be approached only if the person doing so is a mutawalli or a person interested in a wakf or aggrieved by an order made under the Act or the Rules. The remaining provisions of Section 83 provide for the procedure that the Tribunal shall follow and the manner in which the decision of a Tribunal shall be executed. No appeal is, however, maintainable against any such order although the High Court may call for the records and decide about the correctness, legality or propriety of any determination made by the Tribunal. There is, in our view, nothing in Section 83 to suggest that it pushes the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts extends beyond what has been provided for in Section 6(5), Section 7 and Section 85 of the Act. There is, in our view, nothing in Section 83 to suggest that it pushes the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts extends beyond what has been provided for in Section 6(5), Section 7 and Section 85 of the Act. It simply empowers the Government to constitute a Tribunal or Tribunals for determination of any dispute, question of other matter relating to a wakf or wakf property which does not ipso facto mean that the jurisdiction of the civil courts stands completely excluded by reasons of such establishment. It is noteworthy that the expression “for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a wakf or wakf property “appearing in Section 83(1) also appears in Section 85 of the Act. Section 85 does not, however, exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of any or every question or disputes only because the same relates to a wakf or a wakf property. Section 85 in terms provides that the jurisdiction of the civil court shall stand excluded in relation to only such matters as are required by or under this Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The crucial question that shall have to be answered in every case where a plea regarding exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is raised is whether the Tribunal is under the Act or the Rules required to deal with the matter sought to be brought before a civil court. If it is not, the jurisdiction of the civil court is not excluded. But if the Tribunal is required to decide the matter the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand excluded. In the cases at hand, the Act does not provide for any proceedings before the Tribunal for determination of a dispute concerning the eviction of a tenant in occupation of a wakf property or the rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessees of such property. A suit seeking eviction of the tenants from what is admittedly wakf property could, therefore, be filed only before the civil court and not before the Tribunal. 14. It would be appropriate to refer to Sections 83 and 84 of the Waqf Act, 1995, as amended by the Waqf (Amendment Act), 2013. Section 83 refers to the constitution of Tribunals etc. 14. It would be appropriate to refer to Sections 83 and 84 of the Waqf Act, 1995, as amended by the Waqf (Amendment Act), 2013. Section 83 refers to the constitution of Tribunals etc. and states; (1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute as many Tribunals as it may think fit, for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property, eviction of a tenant or determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessee of such property, under this Act and define the local limits and jurisdiction of such Tribunals. 15. Section 84 of the Act reads as under:- “84. Tribunal to hold proceedings expeditiously and to furnish to the parties copies of its decision - Whenever an application is made to a Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matter relating to a waqf or waqf property it shall hold its proceedings as expeditiously as possible and shall as soon as practicable, on the conclusion of the hearing of such matter give its decision in writing and furnish a copy of such decision to each of the parties to the dispute”. 16. The import of Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra) was considered in the later judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Board of waqf, West Bengal vs. Anis Fatma Begum and another, [2010(6) Law Herald (SC) 4459] : 2010 (14) SCC 588 . The following questions arose in that case:- 1. Whether the demarcation of the wakf property being Premises No. 33, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta - 700 017, made as above in dividing the said property in two distinctive parts, one for wakf-al-al-aulad and the remaining portion for pious and religious purposes, is correct and has been made in consonance with the provisions of the wakf Deed ? 2. Whether the waqf Act, 1995 is applicable for the portion of the said property divided and earmarked for wakf-al-al-aulad ? 17. It was held in Anis Fatma Begum’s case (supra) as under:- “14. Thus, the wakf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters relating to a wakf or wakf property. The words “any dispute, question or other matters relating to a wakf or wakf property” are, in our opinion, words of very wide connotation. 17. It was held in Anis Fatma Begum’s case (supra) as under:- “14. Thus, the wakf Tribunal can decide all disputes, questions or other matters relating to a wakf or wakf property. The words “any dispute, question or other matters relating to a wakf or wakf property” are, in our opinion, words of very wide connotation. Any dispute, question or other matters whatsoever and in whatever manner which arises relating to a wakf or wakf property can be decided by the wakf Tribunal. The word `wakf’ has been defined in Section 3 (r) of the wakf Act, 1995 and hence once the property is found to be a wakf property as defined in Section 3 (r), then any dispute, question or other matter relating to it should be agitated before the wakf Tribunal. 16. We may further clarify that the party can approach the wakf Tribunal, even if no order has been passed under the Act, against which he/she is aggrieved. It may be mentioned that Sections 83 (1) and 84 of the Act do not confine the jurisdiction of the wakf Tribunal to the determination of the correctness or otherwise of an order passed under the Act. No doubt Section 83 (2) refers to the orders passed under the Act, but, in our opinion, Sections 83 (1) and 84 of the Act are independent provisions, and they do not require an order to be passed under the Act before invoking the jurisdiction of the wakf Tribunal. Hence, it cannot be said that a party can approach the wakf Tribunal only against an order passed under the Act. In our opinion, even if no order has been passed under the Act, the party can approach the wakf Tribunal for the determination of any dispute, question or other matters relating to a wakf or wakf property, as the plain language of Sections 83 (1) and 84 indicates. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, relied on the decision of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza waqf, [2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3697] : (2010) 8 SCALE 698. In the aforesaid decision it was held that eviction proceedings can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the wakf Tribunal. 24. The dispute in the present case is not an eviction dispute. Hence, the aforesaid decision in Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra) is distinguishable.” 18. In the aforesaid decision it was held that eviction proceedings can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the wakf Tribunal. 24. The dispute in the present case is not an eviction dispute. Hence, the aforesaid decision in Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra) is distinguishable.” 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana Committee vs. P.V. Ibrahim Haji and others, [2013(5) Law Herald (SC) 3592] : AIR 2013 SC (Civil) 2355. In that case appellantsociety registered under the Societies Registration Act stated to be formed for the management and administration of waqf property including a Mosque situated therein, filed a suit for an injunction before the Court of Munsiff, Manjeri, which was transferred to the Court of waqf Tribunal. The suit was contested by the respondents on merits and the waqf Tribunal decreed the suit on 28.09.2004 granting a decree for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant-respondents and their men from interfering in any manner in the administration, management and peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Mosque, namely; Akkode Jumayath Palli, the madrassa run by it and all the assets attached to the Mosque. The respondents filed civil revision before Kerala High Court which set aside the judgment of the Tribunal holding that suit for injunction is not maintainable before the Waqf Tribunal by relying upon Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra). Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court has committed an error in holding that the reliefs sought for by the appellants in the suit could not be claimed before the waqf Tribunal in view of the Judgment of this Court in Ramesh Gobindram (Dead) Through Lrs. (supra). 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court thus held in Akkode Jumayath Palli Paripalana Committee’s case (supra) that dispute that arises for consideration is with regard to management and peaceful enjoyment of the Mosque and madrassa and the assets which relate to waqf. Nature of the relief clearly shows that the waqf Tribunal has got jurisdiction to decide those disputes. 20. Learned counsel for contesting respondents submitted that in Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra) Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the observations made in Board of Muslim waqfs Rajasthan vs. Radha Kishan and Ors. (1979) 2 SCC 468 that the object underlying the proviso to Section 6 was to confine the power to file a suit to the mutawalli and persons interested in the waqf. (1979) 2 SCC 468 that the object underlying the proviso to Section 6 was to confine the power to file a suit to the mutawalli and persons interested in the waqf. It did not extend to persons who are not persons interested in the waqf. Consequently the right, title and interest of a stranger, (a non-Muslim), to the waqf in a property cannot be put in jeopardy merely because that property is included in the list of waqfs. The following passage of the judgment in Radha Kishan’s case (supra) was referred:- “The question that arises for consideration, therefore, is as to who are the parties that could be taken to be concerned in a proceeding under subsection (1) of Section 6 of the Act, and whether the list published under sub-section (2) of Section 5 declaring certain property to be wakf property, would bind a person who is neither a mutawalli nor a person interested in the wakf. The answer to these questions must turn on the true meaning and construction of the word `therein’ in the expression `any person interested therein’ appearing in sub- section (1) of Section 6. In order to understand the meaning of the word `therein’ in our view, it is necessary to refer to the preceding words `the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf’. The word `therein’ must necessarily refer to the `wakf’ which immediately precedes it. It cannot refer to the `wakf property’. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 enumerates the persons who can file suits and also the questions in respect of which such suits can be filed. In enumerating the persons who are empowered to file suits under this provision, only the Board, the mutawalli of the wakf, and `any person interested therein’, thereby necessarily meaning any person interested in the wakf, are listed. It should be borne in mind that the Act deals with wakfs, its institutions and its properties. It would, therefore, be logical and reasonable to infer that its provisions empower only those who are interested in the wakfs, to institute suits. It follows that where a stranger who is a non-Muslim and is in possession of a certain property his right, title and interest therein cannot be put in jeopardy merely because the property is included in the list. It follows that where a stranger who is a non-Muslim and is in possession of a certain property his right, title and interest therein cannot be put in jeopardy merely because the property is included in the list. Such a person is not required to file a suit for a declaration of his title within a period of one year. The special rule of limitation laid down in proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 is not applicable to him. In other words, the list published by the Board of wakfs under sub-section (2) of Section 5 can be challenged by him by filing a suit for declaration of title even after the expiry of the period of one year, if the necessity of filing such suit arises.” 21. Now by way of amendments incorporated by Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013, in Section 7 of the principal Act - (a) in sub-section (1),- (i) xx xx xx xx xx (ii) for the words “or any person interested”, the words and figure “or any person aggrieved by the publication of the list of auqaf under Section 5” shall be substituted. 22. In Haryana waqf Board vs. Mahesh Kumar, [2014(1) Law Herald (SC) 399] : AIR 2014 SC 501 decided on 21.11.2013, the question was whether the property in dispute was or was not a waqf property and, therefore, it was held that it was the Tribunal constituted under the Act which has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was Haryana wakf Board which claimed that the entire land was a Muslim graveyard land and hence, the same is waqf property. The appellant had instituted the suit in the year 2000 seeking possession of the property measuring 21 sq. yards allegedly given on rent by the wakf Board to one Major Ram Parkash vide allotment letter dated 01.09.1969. It was the version of the appellant that respondent-defendant claims long term lease executed in the year 1991 by heirs of Major Ram Parkash. The respondent raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the suit. 23. The suit was decreed by the trial court and in appeal it was held that since respondent-defendant had denied the disputed property to be the waqf property, the matter can be tried exclusively by the Tribunal. The respondent raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the suit. 23. The suit was decreed by the trial court and in appeal it was held that since respondent-defendant had denied the disputed property to be the waqf property, the matter can be tried exclusively by the Tribunal. Therefore, the plaint was ordered to be returned to be presented before the court of competent jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the appeal against that order in limine. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in view of the aforesaid facts as under:- “10. Present suit was instituted in the year 2000 i.e. after the wakf Act, 1995 came into force. Therefore, the present case is not covered by exception to Section 7(5) of the wakf Act. Thus, on a plain reading of Section 7 read with Section 85 of the Act, it becomes manifest that wherever there is a dispute regarding the nature of the property, namely whether the suit property is wakf property or not, it is the Tribunal constituted under the wakf Act, which has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the same. We need not delve into this issue any longer, inasmuch as in a recent judgment by this very Bench of this Court in the case of Bhanwar Lal and another vs. Rajasthan Board of Muslim wakf and others, [2014(1) Law Herald (SC) 27] : 2013 (11) SCALE 210 decided on 09.09.2013, this Court took the same view, after taking note of earlier judgments on the subject, namely, Sardar Khan & Ors. vs. Syed Nazmul Hasan (Seth) & Ors., [2007(3) Law Herald (SC) 1992] : 2007 (1) SCC 727, Ramesh Gobindram (D) through LRs. vs. Sugra Humayun Mirza wakf, [2010(5) Law Herald (SC) 3697] : 2010 (8) SCC 726 . This view has been re-affirmed in Akkode Jumayuath Palli Paripalana Committee vs. P.V. Ibrahim Haji & Ors, [2013(5) Law Herald (SC) 3592] : 2013 (9) SCALE 622. 24. In Chhedi Lal Misra (dead) through LRs vs. Civil Judge, Lucknow and others, [2007(1) Law Herald (SC) 740] : 2007 (4) SCC 632 Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once a waqf is created, the waqf stands divested of his title to the properties which after creation of the waqf vests in the Almighty. 24. In Chhedi Lal Misra (dead) through LRs vs. Civil Judge, Lucknow and others, [2007(1) Law Herald (SC) 740] : 2007 (4) SCC 632 Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once a waqf is created, the waqf stands divested of his title to the properties which after creation of the waqf vests in the Almighty. It was held as well settled that once a waqf is created, it continues to retain such character which cannot be extinguished by any act of the Mutwalli or anyone claiming through him. 25. Even in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (dead) by LRs and others vs. Mohd. Hanifa (dead) by LRs and others, AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1569, it was held that once a kabristan has been held to be public graveyard then it vests in public and constitutes a waqf and it cannot be divested by non-user but will always continue to be so whether it is used or not. That in my view would otherwise a question which has to be adjudicated upon on merits of the case. 26. From the facts of the instant case it is quite clear that there is a dispute of the fact whether the local administration is competent to extinguish the nature of Muslim graveyard existing in the disputed land which is admittedly ‘waqf property’ and shift the same to another place at a some distance to be termed as place of graveyard. 27. Such a dispute in my view would be covered within meaning of the words “any dispute, question or other matters relating to a waqf or waqf property” which are the words of wide connotation as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anis Fatma Begum’s case (supra). The dispute would be whether the suit can be contested on the ground that the Muslim graveyard in question has been agreed to be shifted to some other place? 28. The present is not a case for seeking eviction of the tenant for which the appellant can take support of the judgment of Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra). It may, however, be separate issue on merits that the plaintiffs will not be able to establish their claim on the contest with regard to locus standi to institute a suit etc. apart from the other issues involved in the matter. 29. It may, however, be separate issue on merits that the plaintiffs will not be able to establish their claim on the contest with regard to locus standi to institute a suit etc. apart from the other issues involved in the matter. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find the impugned order passed by the trial Court is manifestly wrong and patently illegal. The instant revision is allowed and the impugned order dated 08.04.2011 is set aside and the Tribunal would proceed further to dispose of the suit in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 10.02.2015. 30. Before parting with this judgment, it may be noted that one Baljit Kaur has filed CM No. 29774-CII of 2011 for becoming party to the instant petition on the strength of a lease deed dated 20.05.1980 executed by the Waqf Board in her favour and one Mohinder Singh. It is stated that as per terms and conditions of aforesaid lease deed, the applicant had deposited a sum of Rs.1500/- by way of cheque towards lease money for the first 25 years and remaining lease money of Rs.75/- per year in cash. That application is moved under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC. There is, however, no such plea set up in the written statement of the defendants already on record. The applicant may thus file appropriate application for being impleaded before the Tribunal and on moving such application, the Tribunal would proceed further to decide the same in accordance with law. The applicant might have to make out a case that the waqf Board was competent to lease out of the land of Muslim graveyard or that she is in possession of the land as a lessee. The observations made herein would, however, have no bearing on the merits of the said application. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————